


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iii

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VOL. 18

BI-MONTHLY

JULY, 1912—MAY, 1913



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24/11/14

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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Published
July, September, November, 1912
January, March, May, 1913

Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

V

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

	PAGE
BAILEY, W. B. The Bird of Passage - - - - -	391
BECKER, CARL. Some Aspects of the Influence of Social Problems and Ideas upon the Study and Writing of History - - - - -	641
BERNARD, L. L. Southern Sociological Congress - - - - -	258
BISHOP, SAMUEL H. The Church and Charity - - - - -	369
BOWMAN, J. N. Patriotism and the Pacific Coast - - - - -	361
CHAPIN, F. STUART. The Variability of the Popular Vote at Presidential Elections - - - - -	222
COMSTOCK, ALZADA P. Chicago Housing Conditions, VI - - - - -	241
COOLEY, CHARLES H. The Institutional Character of Pecuniary Valua- tion - - - - -	543
CROOKER, JOSEPH H. The Psychology of Drink - - - - -	21
DEVINE, EDWARD T. Social Ideals Implied in Present American Pro- grams of Voluntary Philanthropy - - - - -	784
FAIRCHILD, HENRY P. Preventing Cruelty to Children - - - - -	556
GOLDENWEISER, E. A. Walker's Theory of Immigration - - - - -	342
HALL, G. STANLEY. Social Phases of Psychology - - - - -	613
HART, JOSEPH K. The Failure of the Country School in the Modern City - - - - -	92
HAYES, EDWARD C. Social Values - - - - -	470
HENDERSON, C. R. Applied Sociology - - - - -	215
HOWARD, GEORGE E. Social Psychology of the Spectator - - - - -	33
JAMES, ELDON R. Some Implications of Remedial and Preventive Legislation in the United States - - - - -	769
LATHROP, JULIA C. The Children's Bureau - - - - -	318
LEAVITT, FRANK M. Some Sociological Phases of the Movement for Industrial Education - - - - -	352
MACDOUGALL, ROBERT. The Social Basis of Individuality - - - - -	I
MATHEWS, SHAILER. The Social Origin of Theology - - - - -	289
MERRIAM, CHARLES E. Outlook for Social Politics in the United States	676
MONROE, PAUL. Influence of the Growing Perception of Human Inter- relationship on Education - - - - -	622
NORTON, GRACE P. Chicago Housing Conditions, VII - - - - -	509
PEABODY, FRANCIS G. The Socialization of Religion - - - - -	694
PHILIPPOVICH, EUGEN VON. The Infusion of Socio-political Ideas into the Literature of German Economics - - - - -	145
POUND, ROSCOE. Legislation as a Social Function - - - - -	755
Social Problems and the Courts - - - - -	331
ROGERS, ARTHUR K. Burke's Social Philosophy - - - - -	51
SHEFFIELD, MRS. ALFRED D. The So-called Criminal Type - - - - -	381
SMALL, ALBION W. General Sociology - - - - -	200
The Present Outlook of Social Science - - - - -	433
STOOPS, J. DASHIELL. Religion and Social Institutions - - - - -	796
WARD, LESTER F. Eugenics, Euthenics, and Eudemics - - - - -	737

	PAGE
WILLCOX, WALTER F. The Need of Social Statistics as an Aid to the Courts - - - - -	601
YARROS, VICTOR S. American Lawlessness - - - - -	77

REVIEWS

ADDAMS, JANE. A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil.— <i>Florence Kelley</i> - - - - -	271
D'ALVIELLA, COMTE GOBLET. Croyances, rites, institutions.— <i>Hutton Webster</i> - - - - -	824
ANDERSON, B. M., JR. Social Value.— <i>C. A. Ellwood</i> - - - - -	585
ANDREWS, CYRIL BRUYN. An Introduction to the Study of Adolescent Education.— <i>E. F. Riley</i> , 709, and <i>F. N. Freeman</i> - - - - -	710
ARRÉAT, LUCIEN. Génie individuel et contrainte sociale.— <i>L. L. Bernard</i>	831
BAKER, LAREINE HELEN. Race Improvement.— <i>Scott Nearing</i> - -	846
BALCH, WILLIAM M. Christianity and the Labor Movement.— <i>E. B. Gowin</i> - - - - -	840
BARCELÓ, ANTONIO PORTUONDO Y. Apuntes sobre mecánica social.— <i>L. F. Ward</i> - - - - -	814
BEAUFACIT, A. DE CALONNE. Études Bakango.— <i>Hutton Webster</i> - -	408
BEAUFRETON, MAURICE. Assistance publique et charité privée.— <i>F. S. Chapin</i> - - - - -	850
BEBEL, AUGUST. My Life.— <i>A. W. Small</i> - - - - -	707
BOGART, E. L. Financial History of Ohio.— <i>Edwin S. Todd</i> - - -	583
BROCKWAY, Z. R. Fifty Years of Prison Service.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> -	400
CARLTON, FRANK T. History and Problems of Organized Labor.— <i>H. A. Millis</i> - - - - -	409
CARVER, THOMAS N. The Religion Worth Having.— <i>Edward L. Earp</i> -	577
CHABOSEAU, A. La réglementation de travail des femmes et des enfants aux États-Unis.— <i>Marion Talbot</i> - - - - -	579
CLARK, JOHN B., AND JOHN M. The Control of Trusts.— <i>E. A. Riley</i> -	712
CLOPPER, EDWARD N. Child Labor in City Streets.— <i>Allan Hoben</i> -	579
COLLIN, REMY. Les foyers nouveaux.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - -	274
COMAN, KATHERINE. Economic Beginnings of the Far West.— <i>Lucile Eaves</i> - - - - -	819
COOLIDGE, MARY ROBERTS. Why Women Are So.— <i>H. B. Clark Powell</i>	825
CRANE, FRANK. Lame and Lovely.— <i>R. W. Foley</i> - - - - -	414
DAVENPORT, CHARLES B. Heredity in Relation to Eugenics.— <i>R. M. Yerkes</i> - - - - -	115
DAVIS, B. M. Agricultural Education in the Public Schools.— <i>D. J. Crosby</i> - - - - -	405
DEVINE, EDWARD T. The Spirit of Social Work.— <i>C. A. Ellwood</i> - -	125
DEVO, JAMES. The Criminal and the Community.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i>	398
CURRIER, ALBERT B. The Present Day Problem of Crime.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - - - -	275
DUCKWORTH, W. L. H. Prehistoric Man.— <i>A. E. Jenks</i> - - - - -	829
DURKHEIM, ÉMILE. Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse.— <i>Hutton Webster</i> - - - - -	843
ELLWOOD, CHARLES A. Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects.— <i>E. B. Woods</i> - - - - -	706
EUGENICS, INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS. Problems in Eugenics.— <i>W. D. Wallis</i> - - - - -	837

CONTENTS

vii

	PAGE
GIBSON, J. Y. The Story of the Zulus.— <i>Hutton Webster</i> - - -	122
GOLDMARK, JOSEPHINE. Fatigue and Efficiency.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> -	399
GRAVES, FRANK P. Great Educators of Three Centuries.— <i>C. A. Ellwood</i> - - -	712
Peter Ramus and the Educational Reformation of the Sixteenth Century.— <i>C. A. Ellwood</i> - - -	712
GUYOT, YVES. Socialistic Fallacies.— <i>A. W. Small</i> - - -	124
HADDON, A. C. The Wanderings of Peoples.— <i>A. E. Jenks</i> - - -	822
HARET, SP. C. Mécanique sociale.— <i>Lester F. Ward</i> - - -	814
HARPELL, JAMES J. Canadian National Economy. The Cause of High Prices and Their Effect upon the Country - - -	126
HARVARD UNIVERSITY. A Guide to Reading in Social Ethics and Allied Subjects.— <i>A. W. Small</i> - - -	123
HEBERLIN, ÉDOUARD. Doit-elle Mourir?— <i>R. C. Chapin</i> - - -	832
HOBEN, ALLAN. The Minister and the Boy.— <i>T. J. Jones</i> - - -	836
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE Y.M.C.A. The Country Church and Rural Welfare.— <i>J. M. Gillette</i> - - -	827
KELLOGG, PAUL U. The Pittsburgh Survey.— <i>A. W. Small</i> - - -	125
KELLOGG, VERNON L. Beyond War.— <i>D. P. Myers</i> - - -	270
KING, IRVING. Social Aspects of Education.— <i>J. F. Bobbitt</i> - - -	408
LE BON, GUSTAVE. Les opinions et les croyances.— <i>S. N. Reep</i> - -	811
LEGGE, THOMAS M., AND OTHERS. Lead Poisoning and Lead Absorption.— <i>R. F. Clark</i> - - -	821
WHITEHOUSE, J. H. Problems of Boy Life.— <i>G. B. Mangold</i> - - -	406
LITCHWORTH, WILLIAM ROGER. The Life and Work of.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i>	402
LOMBROSO, CESARE. Crime, Its Causes and Remedies.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i>	398
LUGAN, A. La grande loi sociale de l'amour des hommes.— <i>John A. Ryan</i> - - -	410
LUGAN, A. L'Egoïsme humain.— <i>L. L. Bernard</i> - - -	273
MACFARLAND, CHARLES S. Spiritual Culture and Social Service.— <i>E. L. Earp</i> - - -	711
MARETT, R. R. Anthropology.— <i>Jerome Dowd</i> - - -	412
MARSHALL, JOHN S. Mouth Hygiene.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - -	275
MEAD, GEORGE H. (Chairman). Report on Vocational Training in Chicago and Other Cities.— <i>F. M. Leavitt</i> - - -	402
MCCONNELL, JOHN P. The Negroes and Their Treatment in Virginia from 1865 to 1867.— <i>T. J. Riley</i> - - -	405
MCLAUGHLIN, ANDREW C. The Courts, the Constitution, and Parties.— <i>J. A. Woodburn</i> - - -	841
MILLIGAN, ROBERT H. The Fetish Folk of West Africa.— <i>Jerome Dowd</i>	848
MORSE, EDWIN W. Causes and Effects in American History.— <i>L. L. Bernard</i> - - -	851
NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY. List of Works Relating to Criminology.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - -	275
OGG, FREDERIC AUSTIN. Social Progress in Contemporary Europe.— <i>Carl Becker</i> - - -	835
PATTEN, SIMON N. The Reconstruction of Economic Theory.— <i>A. W. Small</i> - - -	580
The Social Basis of Religion.— <i>Frances Fenton Bernard</i> - - -	264
PEARSON, KARL. Social Problems.— <i>C. B. Davenport</i> - - -	833
PUFFER, J. ADAMS. The Boy and His Gang.— <i>R. W. Foley</i> - - -	272
PYCRAFT, W. P. The Infancy of Animals.— <i>Wallace Craig</i> - - -	839
RAUSCHENBUSCH, WALTER. Christianizing the Social Order.— <i>A. W. Small</i> - - -	808

	PAGE
ROBERTS, PETER. The New Immigration.— <i>V. E. Helleburg</i> - - -	709
ROBINSON, JAMES HARVEY. The New History.— <i>C. R. Fish</i> - - -	849
ROHRBACH, PAUL. Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt.— <i>A. W. Small</i>	574
ROUDEL, GEORGES. La protection des faibles.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - -	274
ROSS, EDWARD A. Changing America.— <i>U. G. Weatherly</i> - - -	267
RUSSELL, EARL. Divorce.— <i>C. A. Ellwood</i> - - - - -	713
RUSSELL, GEORGE W. Co-operation and Nationality.— <i>J. L. Gillin</i> -	578
SARFATTI, GUALTIERO. Psicologia sociale.— <i>I. W. Howarth</i> - - -	851
SELLO, ERICH. Die Irrthümer der Strafjustiz und ihre Ursachen.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - - - -	274
SIMPSON, BENJAMIN R. Correlations of Mental Abilities.— <i>F. N. Freeman</i> - - - - -	828
SOKOLOWSKY, PHIL. ALEXANDER. Genossenschaftsleben der Säuge- tiere.— <i>Wallace Craig</i> - - - - -	273
STEWART, W. R. The Philanthropic Work of Josephine Shaw Lowell.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - - - -	402
STOUT, SIR ROBERT. New Zealand.— <i>A. E. Jenks</i> - - - - -	830
TURNER, JOHN K. Barbarous Mexico - - - - -	126
TALBOT, M., AND BRECKINRIDGE, S. P. The Modern Household.— <i>Frances F. Bernard</i> - - - - -	411
VAUGHAN, FATHER BERNARD. Socialism from the Christian Standpoint. — <i>A. W. Small</i> - - - - -	808
VROOMAN, F. B. The New Politics.— <i>L. L. Bernard</i> - - - - -	413
WALLIS, LOUIS. Sociological Study of the Bible.— <i>Hutton Webster</i> -	260
WALTER, HERBERT E. Genetics, An Introduction to the Study of Hered- ity.— <i>Carol Aronovici</i> - - - - -	847
WEBB, SIDNEY, AND OTHERS. Socialism and Individualism.— <i>C. C. North</i> - - - - -	716
WEYL, WALTER E. The New Democracy.— <i>Frances Fenton Bernard</i> -	262
WHETMAN, WILLIAM D., AND CATHERINE D. Heredity and Society.— <i>C. B. Davenport</i> - - - - -	714
WHITIN, E. S. Penal Servitude.— <i>C. R. Henderson</i> - - - - -	120
WILE, IRA S. Sex Education.— <i>E. H. Sutherland</i> - - - - -	576
YOSHIMOTO, TADASU. A Peasant Sage of Japan.— <i>A. E. Jenks</i> - -	265

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

July - - - - -	127
September - - - - -	276
November - - - - -	416
January - - - - -	587
March - - - - -	718
May - - - - -	853

BIBLIOGRAPHY

July - - - - -	133
September - - - - -	279
November - - - - -	419
January - - - - -	589
March - - - - -	726
May - - - - -	863

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XVIII

JULY, 1912

NUMBER I

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF INDIVIDUALITY

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New York University

I

In the discussion of future social evolution there is to be met the recurrent expression of a fear that with the progress toward a universal culture will come a decline in the characteristic content of individuality. Especially in debates concerning alternative programs for social action has the charge been made. Socialistic schemes of reorganization in particular have been distrusted by their opponents on this ground. Under the general regimentation of mankind and of human offices which is assumed in connection with this conception, distinction and originality, it is said, will disappear because the impulse to initiative and inner differentiation will have been withdrawn, and the flavor of unique and stimulating personalities will be merged and lost in a multitudinous commonalty in which a single social type is incessantly repeated.

The hereditary foe of socialism, on the other hand, in picturing ideal society not infrequently assigns to human action a form which implies as its logical basis an untrammelled spontaneity—in other words, a complete conformity to original impulse in independence of extraneous stimulation and control. In his fear of herding men in masses until personalities become confluent and indistinguishable the radical individualist removes the will farther and farther

from the influence of a modifying environment until it is finally insulated from those very forces upon which life draws at every moment for energy as well as direction.

In this philosophy human association is endured rather than welcomed; for though it recognizes the necessity of social organization in some form and of a mutual adjustment of conduct among men, contact is still felt to be contamination and limitation the principle of individual death. It is this wild flavor of humanity which socialism fears, or rather the unregulated growth which it is supposed to betray. Where spontaneity of thought or action is claimed, a repudiation of social community is suspected; and the free motion of the individual spirit is looked upon as an uncoordinated and destructive force. To adopt the conception of spontaneity as a guiding principle of existence implies an arrest of development at a presocial stage or its criminal perversion into an antisocial direction, either of which justifies that forcible discipline which society imposes in its educational and penal institutions.

A wholesome dread of the spiritual effects of that repression and enforced conformity which are inseparable from social control is voiced in the protest of the individualist against renunciation and the procrustean authority of conventions. This energetic reaction appears as a note of almost dominant power in modern life. It is the vital breath of philosophical reflection in all its aspects. Like an endemic social ferment it stimulates the unending struggle for political liberty. In art it has broken the shackles of formalism and enriched human culture by individualizing taste in both appreciative and creative activities. It has become the ground of self-direction in morals and an inspiration to personal religion.

The centrality of self-determination, in individual reflection and action alike, cannot be questioned. It is a fundamental constituent of rational life and ideal striving. It is not, indeed, this logical aspect of the matter with which social criticism and moral reform are immediately concerned. The whole system of factors which any practical situation involves need not be passed in review, since in such cases a specific feature of the social organization necessarily becomes the point of attack. Some form of tyranny is to be uprooted, some concrete liberation to be achieved; upon

these objects attention must be concentrated until, through iterated denunciation or advocacy, public opinion is aroused and the change effected. But though action is thus single-eyed and therefore of limited vision, reflection should be circumspect in its review and consider, not the isolated value of an individual social force, but the plexus of relations in which it exists and the conditions under which it becomes effective.

The general problem which every social propaganda suggests is the relation of individual to society. These are the logical constituents, the polar terms, of human association. All change in social theory is based either upon a revaluation of the unit of society or a fresh interpretation of the place of organization in human life; and every practical movement, whether of reform or revolution, may be described as a specific disturbance of the traditional equilibrium between these two forces.

The problem of the relation of individual to society presents three general phases: philosophical, psychological, and sociological. Philosophically, the general conditions of self-realization are to be found in an objective determinant which limits, defines, and supports the original momentum of self-activity. All objective existence which comes within cognizance is part of this determinant, but its characteristic embodiment is the system of human wills with which the ego sustains relationship. Society is thus a logical ground of self-existence in the individual, the material condition of its actualization in a concrete personal character. Psychologically the form of development in the individual self consists in reaction to a system of social stimuli which are presented as objective types of ideal excellence—of skill, power, learning, culture, etc.—and assimilated by the self through an imitative act which is both receptive and assertive in its nature. The continuous reciprocal activity of self and society, therefore, in alternative accommodation and aggression, affords the psychological mechanism of development in the individual subject. Sociologically, the sum of culture possessed by any individual is a social inheritance derived from the system of specific forms—of organization and use, of stimulation and productivity—marking the human group of which he is a member. As this organized culture varies in character or extent,

so will the content and richness of individual life be limited and determined in its nature. Society is thus the general storehouse of cultural materials and personal attitudes the combinations of which give rise to the individual varieties of self-existence. Each of these three aspects must be considered in any general review of the problem.

II

Philosophically the individualistic reaction of modern thought is sharp and aggressive. The cry for autonomous selfhood has been a shibboleth in many literatures of social prophecy. The ego, it is said, must both be free and consciously realize its freedom. The realization of personal freedom is expressed in the consciousness of liberation from restraint and foreign oppression. In its primary aspect the self is a force, not a resistance—a form to be impressed, not a material to receive the die. To be subject, to imitate or obey, is slavery. Freedom is to be found only in self-expression, that is, in the unhampered exercise of natural activities. The self is incarnate will, which manifests itself in affirmation. Its realization therefore consists of the positive development of all those tendencies which are congenitally possessed by the individual.

Believe in yourself, the prophet cries, and obey only the inner voice. The man of destiny is he who has a positive message to bring to men and gives himself unreservedly to its utterance—who will not be stayed by any consideration for others, but has set his mind singly and steadfastly on the realization of his purpose. It is the weak-minded, the intellectually dependent and defective selves who acknowledge external limitations and submit to them. Dependence upon institutions, like appeal to law, is a mark of insufficiency in the self, which, because of its own weakness, hungers for the expression of an authoritative will. The virile ego is a law unto itself. It affords the only conditions under which there can truly exist a personal life presenting a consistent whole. The dependent will is a thing of shreds and patches without any essential belief in which to ground its actions; it looks for direction and support to something beyond itself and is consequently swept hither and thither as the currents of suggestion and of custom veer.

The world is given to each one as a theater for the working out of his will. Its materials are plastic physical substances and modifiable human attitudes. The measure of reality in any self is its effective force in the realization of an ideal purpose through the control of this system of materials. The objective datum is presented, not for acceptance and submission, but to be wrought into conformity with the inner system of purposes which the individual will represents. To deny oneself, therefore, to suppress an impulse which is clamoring for expression, is self-mutilation and stultifies the very meaning of existence. Away, then, with law and control, away with convention and restraint, away with custom and habit themselves! For this liberty of the self is to be essential spontaneity. It must no more be hampered by a subjective incubus than by a fear of external domination. The former, indeed, is the more terrible slavery of the two. In abject minds the dead past rises up against the self to accuse it, and when conditions call for a repudiation of principles, a flinging aside of habitual modes of behavior, the dread of inconsistency, like a disembodied terror, presses upon the self and inhibits all freedom of action.

The necessity of this principle is forcibly urged by egoism. The mind that does not change is dead, for life is growth and variation. Each moment of experience should be treated as a unique situation, to be responded to solely as the present conditions demand. Every problem renews its pristine novelty before the mind at each successive phase of its evolution, and must be solved afresh at whatever stage has been reached. To stand by what has been said when it no longer represents our personal attitude is not merely slavery, it is falsehood. The self of the past should have no more authority for the ego that now exists than the expectation or opinion of other men. Break with your past, says the advocate of this philosophy, spiritual freedom necessitates the renewal of the will in every moment of experience. Growth is the bursting of all the bonds imposed by habit as the ego rouses and stretches itself. Free self-realization must triumph over repression and repudiate fealty, for the incessant sloughing of the past is fundamental to the process of spiritual evolution.

Even when action is irrational and destructive, let it have way!

It is part of the ego's will that such anarchical and iconoclastic impulses should exist and have freedom to work themselves out. Better a lack of harmony among the many aspects of the will's activity than any suppression of its powers and emotions. Out of the former comes accomplishment, though irregular, and the sense of reality; out of the latter can arise only stagnation and nihilism of the spirit.

Now it may at once be granted that in these positive movements of the will lie certain materials necessary to all forms of synthesis, whether they concern our understanding of the world or the rational development of our own activities. The turbulent will needs to be known in order to be interpreted and controlled. The rebellious mood, the antisocial tendency, must exist in the individual's own subjective world or it can neither be sympathized with nor modified as it appears in other wills. The very impulse to be irrational, to defy or deny the self's ideals, has its place in the ultimate attainment of wisdom and personal power. A rich, full stream of experience, fervid with conviction and imperious in its action, is the necessary basis of all high self-development.

Upon a content of positive self-assertion synthesis and control—subjection itself if it find place in the world of the ego—must proceed. The old command should be reversed, for in psychological truth we may say: *He who would obey must first learn to command.* Self-expression precedes self-repression. Energetic reaction upon the world in an aggressive way must, in the cycle of individual history, fore-run the subjection of the self to external authority, or the very basis of a strong and consistent personality will be imperiled. The will of the individual must never, in the absolute sense, be given up; it may only be subordinated, in its lower phases, to a higher and ideal form of self-realization which is incarnated in an external, but not foreign, authority or type of organization. In this process of ideal development through a system of social institutions to which he submits as the condition of action the individual must pass from lower to higher stage, from individual aggression to social submission, in a series of logical steps. Anger and personal resentment—aggressive wrongdoing itself—precede toleration and just dealing. The ego must assert itself roughly

and positively before it can afford to give up its claims. One must have thought and doubted before the view of another can be accepted with spiritual profit. One must have struggled for power, directly and blindly, before the beauty of obedience to a common law can be apprehended.

Teach the young child from the outset to forego his own desires, to yield and never to fight, and you endanger those very characteristics upon which all subsequent mental vigor and self-reliance ultimately depend. Let him at first claim his own and fight for it. While he will inevitably be opposed and limited by other wills, while his place in the fabric of a social world will be impressed upon him in an unforgettable way, he will also find developing in himself those elements of stability—a resolute and unfaltering will, a capacity to take punishment serenely, quickness of observation and resourcefulness in response—upon which so much of his later success depends. The ego must lay the world under tribute before it can itself contribute; it must receive before it can give. Be bold, assert yourself! nature cries aloud. Act as you think and as you feel! See the thing through your own eyes, not through the preconceptions of any other! Let what you do be the embodiment of your own will, and what you seek the object of your own desire! In the perception of these truths lies the beginning of wisdom in all free life as well as rational appreciation.

But the formulation of a positive egoism in terms of the blank immediate assertion of the will is inevitably confronted, at the very outset, by the counter-thesis that the actual world in which the ego exists will not permit the carrying out of any such unconditioned program. Its materials are plastic in part only. They yield to our pressure, yet preserve their own laws, which we are forced to accept and recognize in our treatment. It is only in dreamland that things conform to our thought, and what we will is actualized by very virtue of imagining it. In the world of reality things are otherwise arranged. Facts are stubborn and must not be ignored. We bow to them even when we make use of them. Each class of material must be dealt with in ways determined by its own specific constitution. With wood we build in one way, with stone in another, with iron in a third; and what can

be made with steel beams simply cannot be constructed of wood or stone.

Whether it be sensible things or human attitudes one must accept the conditions which the character of the material imposes, if any rational use is to be made of it. For the reaction of the will in its social manifestation is likewise determined by the nature of the materials which it seeks to mold. Minds must be acted upon systematically if they are to be effectively modified. The world cannot be reformed by an edict, nor can any human attitude be called into existence by an act of will. The spontaneous, untrammelled development of the self in a series of acts which represent its own proper nature and take no account of external forces and conditions is a vain dream. Mutual limitation, or adaptation, is the general condition of association. In itself the will is impotent; it takes on positive form only through a reaction in which the material, or external, condition is as indispensable as the formal condition or constitution of the mind itself.

Each form of excellence must be won from a hostile world, that is, a world which does not freely supply what the self needs but only permits its attainment by directed and persistent activity. All self-realization is thus grounded upon recognition of external conditions and conformity to their requirements. It is only the madman who persistently ignores them, and in a burlesque of reality imagines himself the dictator of a world which faithfully reflects the shifts in his own subjective attitude. The action of the will, in transcending the realm of subjective organization, instantly meets opposition. It finds itself in a world where standing must be won by fighting for it. Yet the obstacles which the world opposes to free activity are at the same time means by which the self attains to its own ideal development. In subjective and objective realms alike obedience to law is the condition of rational freedom. The soul is born in slavery—slavery to weakness, to ignorance, to a chaotic mind—and must work out its liberation through long and patient service. The system of ideals of which the formal character of any individual ego consists is not originally given but developed as the self comes into possession of a knowledge of the external world and its own relations to it. Mastery is

attained, not by wild dreams of dominion, whether physical or mental, but through disciplinary exercise of the power which exists at each moment. Vain desire for knowledge on the part of a supine will must give way to strenuous and persistent study, for the vision of wisdom grows only with the mind's own endeavors.

The individual self must thus submit to the whole system of conditions logically imposed upon it if its realization, in any intelligible sense of the term, is to take place. Learning and discipline, repression and inhibition, subordination and obedience are all implied in the process. The world must be apprehended by the self not only as a means to the realization of its own purposes but also as the general source of its knowledge and ideals. Submission and faith may be exacted even when the rationality of the command is obscure, not merely because the ego finds itself face to face, in the person of human society, with a will stronger than its own and must submit as the first act of self-preservation, but also because it comes to perceive that this greater social self is wiser than it can ever hope to be as the result of its own experimentation with life, and that the laws imposed upon it are, on the whole, such as tend to the furtherance of its own purposes. Obedience, in other words, results in a course of conduct which the self would both approve and spontaneously adopt were it in possession of all the facts.

The logical relation of self to society has its analogue in the determination of purely individual problems, for within the circle of its own inner life as well as in its adaptations to other human wills the self finds it necessary to subdue the impulse of the moment in view of that larger system of ends which its purpose comprehends; it must exercise self-control and prudence. Throughout its life self-limitation is as necessary as self-aggrandizement to the evolution of a rational ego.

III

The psychological study of the empirical self has traditionally suffered from a misconception which vitiates many historical theories in the field of economics and politics as well as morals and education. The ego has been conceived as if it were an isolated

and self-dependent system. Its internal character as an organized whole has been considered, to the practical exclusion of its external relations and development. The fundamental concepts of the historical method have been slow in making their way into the field of mental science in its general theoretical form of psychology as well as in its various special and practical applications in the social relations of men. That archaic point of view in psychology has now been definitively superseded, along with the conceptions of immutability in ethics and the "economic man."

The self of psychology is historically and socially conditioned. From the outset its *milieu* is a spiritual community. It can neither exist nor be developed apart from the vital protoplasm of human association. Considered in such abstraction it has a merely logical existence, like that of the social mind in isolation from the individual wills which participate in a common action. The result of this perception has been a great and permanent enrichment of psychological science. It has not only added social psychology to the study of the individual mind and developed a class of special problems concerning the forms of modification which occur in the mutual adaptation of wills—the study of suggestion and imitation, of inventiveness and initiative, of docility and leadership, etc.—it has also radically affected our general conception of the nature and genesis of the empirical self.

This modification may be described as the substitution of a socialistic for the prevailing individualistic point of view. It is the conception that the self, in its psychological no less than in its metaphysical relations, must be treated as an element in a spiritual complex. To regard it as did earlier psychology is to abstract one of two logical components which existence implies, and to regard it in isolation from its correlative.

The ego and the *alter* come into existence together, the product of a common birth. Progressive enrichment in the content of personality affects equally the concept of the self and that of the *socius*. These two processes of development are reciprocally related; deepening of the self's experience is the basis of enlargement in one's conception of the character and scope of other selves. The maxim of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things,

holds true of this whole system of conceptions; for the general interpretation which human character receives in the individual mind reflects the latter's own criteria and habitual attitudes. It may be practical illusion but it is psychological fact. The mean soul lives in a shabby world, seeing in the actions of men at large the embodiment of ignoble motives and a shameful purpose; the great soul lifts up the world in which it lives to its own measure, because it construes the activities of other men in terms of its own high nature.

Conversely, the very substance of the self, as it grows, takes on a social form. Its attitudes are expressed in a system of reactions toward other human wills. Two general phases mark its activity: first, the representation of its own states to these other wills—in confession, intercourse, and self-expression; and second, adaptation, which appears either in an aggressive modification of their attitudes or in the acceptance and incorporation of conceptions which these attitudes reveal.

In giving and receiving confidences and in learning from or impressing others is the engrossing occupation of man. This sensitive and active response to other human wills has many forms, and draws upon the whole complex of materials which the world affords. It not only appears in the struggle to maintain and extend our social prestige but is intertwined with our most ideal striving. It is the ultimate ground of our endeavor to enrich the general sum of human possessions and the immediate provocative in our utilization of this store to make a more brilliant and effective impression. It is an enduring stimulus to literary and artistic expression, while in every propaganda of self-aggrandizement or renunciation it enters as an appeal—often inarticulate or wholly unconscious—to the verdict of posterity, to abstract justice or the approval of God.

In this activity of persuasion and argument, of acquiescence and domination—in short, of giving and receiving social stimulation—the self is so absorbed that the habit is carried over into solitude and becomes the characteristic of self-consciousness. In critical reflection upon previous action it affords the most general type of mental exercise in those functions which are fundamental to successful adaptation at large; and in sentimentality it provides

an enervating solace for incapacity or defeat, through the fictitious vision of triumph which it creates.

Thus the very form in which the ego represents its own nature is social. The self is perhaps never conceived as a pure principle of existence or identity. It is thought in terms of certain possessions and ideal aims, of characteristic attitudes and reactions, of relations with the objective world and their modification. In chief part these are inter-personal relations, and the form which the sense of self-existence takes is either the representation of what the *socius* thinks, or that vague and poignant stirring which is aroused by the thought of a treasured possession or of any desired but hitherto unattained object. These active programs and permanent sources of stimulation are not properly things which the self possesses, they are the very tissue of its living body. I cannot think of you but in terms of myself, neither can I think of myself except in terms of you, the polar element of my being. What I am is the measure of your existence before my consciousness. If I feel, possess, aspire, so also do you; if any extension of compass or modification of quality takes place in my experience, you too are immediately conceived as the potential subject of a like change. The sign of such a conceptual reconstruction may of course be either positive or negative. I represent you in terms of myself quite as much when I deny as when I assert. To think of your discomfort when I am at ease, of your lack of accomplishments which I boast, of your ignorance, your ineptitude, your narrowness of mind or absence of prestige, to think, in short, of your defect in contrast with my own fulness is to conceive you in terms of a selfhood the conditions of which are given in the form of my own existence no less than when I project into your nature all the ideal virtues I may possess.

Similarly, my thought of myself involves a like polar reference to you. In my social *alter* I find both the stimulus to my own self-development and the material upon which, in its growth, it feeds. The objects of my ideal striving I find embodied—and if I but search widely enough, embodied in a transcendent degree—in other human characters. The very nature itself of such desiderata is, in general, suggested to me by my fellows. Such qualities, becom-

ing both an incentive to development and models to be imitated, are successively incorporated in the self, which like a mosaic is constructed from a multitude of fragmentary patterns and owes whatever harmony of plan it may possess, not to unity in the sources from which its constituents are drawn, but to permanence in the selective principle which it manifests in its successive choices.

The form of activity through which new materials are assimilated by the self is no less social than are the sources to which it owes the qualitative types at which it aims. Each new attitude is made its own by a re-enacting of the original drama with the attitude of the self reversed. It learns the meaning of authority by assuming the rôle of master, of discipleship by entering into pupillage. To know, it must teach; to understand, it must use; to enter reflectively into any relation it must actively participate in its practical embodiment. The law applies, in its strictness, to the appreciative as well as to the reflective and active sides of life. The measure of aesthetic criticism in any self is to be found in the degree to which it has penetrated the processes of creation. The appreciation of human speech, for example, as a technical medium of expression, attains adequacy only in the literary artist whose sense of excellence has been sharpened at every point by his unremitting struggle for mastery in its use. Imitation, in other words, is never a passive receptivity but an aggressive assumption of the function imitated, involving anew the establishment of a circle of human wills through which it is mediated.

For these plastic materials the individual turns to selves of a lower order than his own, in relation to which he may successfully assume a masterful attitude as regards the function in question. He finds them in the more ignorant and unskilled persons, in the weaker and lesser wills, or, on occasion, merely in the more tolerant and accommodative individuals of his circle. The knowledge that has been displayed to him he in turn displays to them; the submission required of him he exacts from them. He plays at the office when he is not called upon to exercise it seriously, with a like result; for the significance of this reaction lies in the activity itself rather than in the motive.

In the family circle the child finds this group of receptive wills

in the members younger than himself, in the cat and dog, in the dolls and toy soldiers. These are made to run the whole gamut of human functions with which the child is acquainted; and each novel accomplishment or relation with which he comes in contact is tried out on them. They are clothed and washed, fed and tended, schooled and corrected, in a miniature reproduction of the family and its characteristic occupations. The meaning of school life is completed in the child's mind only when he has officiated as teacher in addition to sitting as pupil. He defines the significance of kinship and household relations by playing father and mother, by marketing and cooking, by visits and elaborate family confidences with pets and toys.

When a lack of physical materials, or of the system of *socii*, prevents the concrete enactment of the relation, it is vicariously represented in the imagination. In this ideal reconstruction the child plays a thousand parts in the drama of human affairs, drawing to himself every function that offers a field for the further extension of his dominating personality. In all this he follows an unerring instinct. The world of human attitudes and social offices, like that of things and their properties, can be possessed only by exploiting it. The positive content of selfhood is but the continuously elaborated product of reaction to the specific stimuli which the social environment affords.

IV

Sociologically, the conditions of that concrete system of ideal consciousness, in which the life of the self consists, may be expressed in simple terms. The individual as well as society has been brought into existence through the development of human civilization. The results of that process are at once socialization and individualization. On the one hand appear progressive differentiation of function, complication of relations and integration in a system of continuously increasing mutual dependence. On the other hand appears an individual life which grows endlessly more manifold and significant through the progressive enrichment of its own inner content.

This change affects equally the life of reflection, the life of

appreciation, and the life of action. In each realm individual activity is filled with inner distinctions and affiliations, the discernment and exploitation of which constitute the functions of the empirical self. In the assumption of specific attitudes—of understanding, enjoyment, and use—and in the characterization and discovery of their objects the very reality of the self is to be found.

As this system of inner meanings develops, and immediate experience grows more complex, the awareness of his own existence as an individual increasingly pervades the consciousness of each human self. The sense of community with other men advances correlatively with discernment of his own peculiar attitudes and the differences which mark them off from the reactions of his fellows. His own appreciations and preferences, his own points of view and beliefs, his own reflection and interpretation of experience dissociate themselves from all that is communal in the society of which he is a member, and become organized as the system of elements which constitute his own individual world—a world of which he becomes conscious only through its contrast with the features of that common world to which he and all members of his own group equally belong.

In the thought of each man the world of individual life takes on a form which is independent of communal experience. It is a world within a world, which in its very nature must be differentiated from that larger social existence within which it appears. Every increase in complexity within the system of social relations serves but to add to the qualitative manifoldness of this world of individual experience, and to bring it into sharper opposition to that of public life.

The result of social evolution can thus be expressed, from this point of view, as a process of individualization. Instead of causing the sense of individual existence to be submerged in a sense of kind, it has everywhere resulted in throwing that existence into greater prominence. It has isolated and defined the system of the self, and forced a philosophical formulation of the opposition between the ego and the *alter*. It has multiplied a myriad-fold the points of conflict between man and man, and created the vast system of rivalries in which every civilized person is involved. Opposi-

tion, hostility, and strife grow out of this evolutionary process, as well as distinction and contrast in the relation of self and society.

In practical life this opposition has a thousand ways of defining and realizing itself—through the wager and gage of battle, through persuasion and argument, through repartee and ironic laughter, through criticism and social reform. In the life of thought this attitude is represented generically, since reflection itself arises as an individualizing reaction upon communal beliefs and modes of social activity. Further, within the general field in question the emphasis of this particular form of opposition has given rise to a group of particular philosophical conceptions, such as idealism, subjectivism, individualism, and egoism, in which the system of the self, as contrasted with the system of society, is made the basis of metaphysical interpretation.

We cannot, therefore, describe the course of social evolution as a process in which the distinction between self and society has tended to disappear, or the opposition between the two to be narrowed in its field. On the contrary, the points of opposition have steadily increased in number and the distinction in question has grown ever sharper and clearer. The savage can, indeed, scarcely be said to have a private life—a life of his own as individual, of which he is conscious in its discrimination from the communal life of the tribe in which he shares. If its existence be granted its content is so meager, the points at which it is developed so few, and its form so lacking in systematic unity, that it is practicable in almost every essential relation to neglect its contribution.

The significant psychical life of the savage is exhausted in his communal existence. He neither thinks for himself, nor acts in independence of custom, nor individualizes his appreciation of experience. The system of fetishism which in savage culture at once represents the religious interpretation of experience and provides a basis for social morality is accepted uncritically by each member of the tribe and is unreflectively realized in action. Conformity to the system of laws is not the result of a logical reflection upon the necessity of authority and a deliberate subjection of the

life to that form of control which exists; on the contrary, it is due to the absence of all such rational reflection and a lack of the very conception of a possible criticism.

In practical affairs the savage moves inertly within the circle of taboos which his religion has formulated for him, prescribing the whole routine of his daily life. He neither seeks to improve nor varies from the order which it imposes; for any infraction involves him and the group in potential disaster. Crime and its expiation are tribal affairs, for the conception of the individual as a moral subject has not yet been formed. Philosophy, of course, is lacking if individual reflection be non-existent, the sole metaphysical conceptions which the savage possesses being found in the myths which successive generations repeat. That whole system of attitudes upon which the consciousness of individual existence rests is thus practically lacking in the lowest forms of human culture. In that status, if anywhere, life may be described in terms of communal existence, and the idea of an isolable individual experience be neglected.

Thus at the one end of the scale is a form of human life in which the communal element is at its maximum and the individual element negligible, and at the other a form in which individual consciousness and its system of ideals is never lost to sight, even when action is directed to communal ends as such. The continuity of ideal consciousness in the individual is the most distinctive trait in the highest forms of human society.

Must we therefore say that social evolution has tended to loosen the bonds which unite the individual to his fellows, either by the disintegration of those alliances which social existence involves, or by destroying the conception of society as the logical basis upon which such individual life rests? Clearly not; neither theoretically nor practically has the progress of civilization tended to disintegration. Every differentiation in the internal structure of society has brought its members into close functional relations with one another, and every advance in critical reflection has made more clear the essentially social basis of individual activity. These two elements, instead of being opposed and contrastable, are correlative and mutually supplementary. The internal manifoldness of indi-

vidual experience reflects the complexity of reality as it exists for the society to which the individual belongs.

The system of objects with which anyone concerns himself is not created by him; it is a social product which is enriched generation by generation and constitutes the spiritual inheritance of each individual born to the culture in question. To each such individual it affords a system of specific stimulations, which both provokes and directs his psychical activity at every moment. The richness or inner complexity of individual experience can thus never be logically separated from the objective form of human society in which the life is cast.

In practical relations the same integrity between individual and society is found, and the successive stages of a social evolution present an increasing range in the points of contact and a growing interdependence among its members. Such development has had this single result, that in differentiating individuals and classes it has rendered each man the more helpless and dependent the more it has refined and improved his contribution to the sum of human activities. Specialization means imperfection socially as well as biologically, if by perfection we mean the capacity to perform all those elementary functions necessary to the continuance of the life of the individual. In a specialized society each person lives by virtue of the whole system of contributions made in common by the members of that society, each element of which is necessary to the maintenance of the individual life in question.

In this process of evolution every advance serves to render clearer the essential relations of individual and society, as well as to define the instrumental significance of organization. Final worth is to be found only in the values of personal experience. The reality to be considered is always the lives of individual men. Forms of association and social order at large are but means of making these lives more worth living. Since ultimate value is to be found in the individual consciousness alone each phase of social differentiation and control is to be judged by its effect upon the persons subjected to its influence. Whether the institution be economic or political, whether it primarily affect individual or communal life, whether it have or lack an obvious physical basis,

its justification must be sought in the service rendered to those who live under it.

It is the mark of a barbaric culture to attribute an absolute worth to the forms of social organization or their products. The separation of human institutions from the life of a people is the beginning of decadence and slavery when it appears among those who have already transcended the stage of barbarism. That this holds of economic life and the system of materials connected with it will perhaps not be questioned. It is not so readily recognized that truth and morality, loyalty and obedience have no meaning apart from the service they render to human life; and that it is their high functional value alone which has given them the authoritative position they hold in human estimation.

The relation between individual and society may therefore be stated by saying that social organization and social service form the logical basis of individual welfare. The prosperity of each citizen rests upon a well-organized communal life; and in order that each may thus prosper it is essential that everyone fulfil the requirements which mutual assistance and a common existence impose, whether such requirement touch the productive specialty for which the individual has been technically prepared, or the system of regulations which is made necessary by a life in common contact. That common life, therefore, must be made complex and intense as well as unitary and dominant if the ideal conditions of personal development are to be secured. If there is to be a rich and stimulating individual existence it must be sustained by a manifold social culture. The maintenance of continuity in human institutions is simply our means of conserving individual contributions to this culture and thus enriching the system of ideal stimulations for each succeeding generation. Society therefore realizes its logical end, not by the suppression of individuality, but by the fullest possible fostering of its development.

When the equilibrium of these two components is disturbed, collision results; and while it is merely a question of circumstances whether, in any given case, individuality shall be sacrificed or the state destroyed, the issue, in either event, is immediate disaster. In periods of stress human societies have again and again

been so obsessed by the need to preserve their corporate existence at all hazards that individual variations have been suppressed and the very roots of progress torn up. Public discussion, the foundation of every free state, has been prohibited, heretics have been persecuted, classes denied their political rights, and acts of conformity or of exclusion passed, lest individual criticism or initiative should subvert public order and undermine the foundations of social existence.

But those very institutions in defense of which such reactionary measures were taken owed not only their specific forms but their existence itself to the ideal striving of men like those later proscribed. The saints whom we canonize were rebels when they lived. All such measures looking to uniformity are counsels of despair. Inner differentiation is the measure of a society's evolution. That human group or institution, therefore, is highest in the scale which combines the greatest range of free individualities in an essential community, which avails itself of the contribution of every social class and interest, of all faiths and philosophies, and of each sex and age and individual gift in the solution of its theoretical problems or the realization of its practical undertakings. Society and the individual are poles of a common field, and we attempt intellectual suicide as well as invite disaster in the sphere of conduct when we sunder them.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DRINK

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The attentive reader of Homer is keenly impressed with the deep religiousness of the author and the people whom he describes. He represents gods and men as intimately associated in a common life. The divine beings watch the earth inhabitants with great solicitude, keeping near them to bless or to punish. What we call natural phenomena, plastic to the touch of celestial wills, were constantly shaped to foster or injure the life of man. The gods had favorites whom they protected, while there were others whom they chastised.

On the other hand, all human beings felt the immediate presence of the gods. They could say with a conviction seldom found today: In them we live, move, and have our being. The consciousness of divine protection and guidance, with impending punishment of disobedience, was clear and constant. In it were found the sanctions of morality, the sources of heroism, the springs of daily conduct.

This ancient belief in the close association of gods and men in a common life found, however, expression in many actions which seem to us both irrational and irreligious. Of these, the most foreign to modern ideas was the elaborate system of sacrifice. Slaughtered animals were burned with painstaking ceremonials upon innumerable altars, which were regarded as the most sacred meeting places between man and his god. Then the divine presence was most immediate and awful. Oaths there uttered and contracts there made were supremely binding, having the invisible but powerful deity as witness, who would act as avenger in case of neglect.

These offerings were far more than mere presents to win the favor of a heavenly being, as the subject by gifts seeks to secure the friendship of an earthly despot. Nor were they prompted

solely by the sense of sin, in penitent endeavor to secure pardon for wrongdoing. Both these elements were often present; but the chief aim in early times was, in this way, actually to nourish and sustain the very life of God, and so, by reflex action, to enlarge and exalt man's life also, for both gods and men participated in a common existence. The heavenly being really needed the earthly food so presented by his children at the altar, which was in truth a common table where the life of both was enriched. The idea of sustenance was prominent in sacrificial worship.

However foolish or even revolting all this may seem to us, it was a vital conviction to those distant peoples. They were doing their best, for this was their conception of the universe put into action. Here we must note a most important fact, that prominent among their sacrificial offerings was the "libation": the outpouring of various forms of alcoholic liquors. The gods had more ethereal beverages in their heavenly abode, but earthly wines were most acceptable and helpful to them. If the gods needed the flesh and blood of the animals which men ate as food, surely they also needed the wine which makes glad the heart of man. As both heaven and earth were bound up in a common life, and as it was man's duty to sustain the life of his god, what he himself found so helpful, banishing weariness, increasing strength, and giving joy—this man must offer to the deity whom he worshiped.

It is not difficult to see why wine seemed an appropriate gift to God. Judging by appearances—and this was the only way the early man could judge—wine is the supreme life-giver. Its immediate effects are apparently most helpful and delightful: a sense of warmth pervades the body; a feeling of exhilaration takes possession of the whole being, fatigue and weariness being banished; the tongue is loosened and speech becomes rapid; new energies seem to flow through every limb and every sense is apparently quickened; while those who drink feel that they have entered a new world, whose spacious realms they traverse as though walking on air and whose innumerable treasures are their particular property. A feeling of great dignity and exaltation, of new capacity, of increased importance springs up within them. The old world, with its cares, tears, and vexations, vanishes, while all

things become new. Deeds are done without effort, as in dreams. All this is only "apparent," as we fully know today, but it was real to them, and so they called liquor a *stimulant*. We, however, know that it is not a stimulant, but a depressant and paralyzer.

But what to them apparently so blesses human life must be a most precious gift to every celestial being. As it produces experiences which apparently lift men up to the gods, it must be the most god-given of gifts, which man, in turn, with deepest gratitude, must present to his Maker.

About this belief in liquor as a life-giver, operative in the sacrificial system, grew up many other customs.

1. Its use became the medium for the expression of hospitality among men. The primitive mind very naturally argued: If it produces friendship between man and his god, certainly it is the most appropriate means for expressing and cultivating good-will among men. The guest must obviously be given what is best. The greatest distinction that could be bestowed upon him was to present him what was offered to nourish the life of God; what would most increase his own life. Therefore whenever the stranger came, whenever men met and wished to display friendly feelings, the cup was passed. This was a very natural application of their thought about wine: extending to their fellows what also was given to God in worship. The modern habit of "treating" may in this way be easily and clearly traced to its true psychological root.

2. For similar reasons, liquor came to be used in many ceremonial ways. Great undertakings, solemn occasions, and sacred events needed the witnessing presence and approval of some deity. This association of sanctity, insuring divine sanction and human obligation, must be secured by sacrifice. A covenant between men must be sealed by bringing God near through an offering of wine: that which sustains life, human and divine. Hence, liquor was used to solemnize compacts between individuals and tribes, the passing of the cup from lip to lip symbolizing the common obligation. At marriage, birth, and death, the drinking of liquor seemed the proper thing to do, as it was pre-eminently the supreme life-giver. Here is the psychological explanation of the habit of

drinking one's health at banquets; also of the custom of baptizing the bow of the new ship with wine.

3. It was probably later that the specifically hygienic uses of liquor came into prominence. As a "life-giver," it has been universally, and is still commonly, used for medicinal purposes, resort being made to it to cure all diseases, real and imaginary. Whatever the ailment, the patient must be given some "toddy." At the animistic stage of human culture, when every form of sickness was attributed to the invasion of the body or mind by evil spirits, very naturally resort was made to the master spirit residing in liquors, in order to drive out these disease demons. Even the name "spirits" by which alcohol is known carries us back to this ancient state of mind.

Resort was also made to liquor to prepare one to resist cold or heat. Before beginning any great exertion or undertaking any serious enterprise, men felt that they must reinforce themselves by using some kind of drink. All this was, indeed, wise, if liquor is really a life-giver. And undoubtedly, the early sacrificial uses of wine, and its long association with sacred rites as the medium of worship and the food of the gods (consider for a moment in passing how the poets even in recent times have sung its praises—a great misfortune, making it necessary for parents to disinfect such literature before placing it in the hands of their children), did much to inaugurate and sustain these hygienic practices in the use of liquor, which continues long after the psychological conditions out of which they sprang have passed away.

With these considerations in mind, a keen observer will find new interest in sitting in a hotel lobby and watching the stream of men who pass by him into the barroom. Leaving out of account a few inebriates in a diseased condition, *alcoholism*, who ought to be under treatment and restraint, probably a large majority do not care very much for the mere physical taste of liquor, so that mere appetite plays a subordinate part in a majority of cases.

By watching the people as they pass, two main classes may very easily be distinguished.

First, those who drink chiefly for hospitality and fellowship. The use of liquor with them is mainly a means of sociability.

Very frequently this scene is enacted: Two old friends meet and cordially shake hands and begin to talk of old times. Soon a third person is introduced and at once there is sufficient social momentum to cause one of the party to suggest: "Let's take something." So off they go to the bar. And here the social instinct, finding vent in a long-established custom of drinking, conversation flows freely with the liquor and all soon separate with a sense of satisfaction. Mere appetite has here played no important part, while no sinful or vicious intent has been present—simply a common form of sociability, sanctioned by long usage and rooted in ancient beliefs associated with sacrificial worship, though this connection was long since forgotten. The custom survives, chiefly, because of the social warmth which finds expression in it, in which also operates the desire to give a friend something that will nourish his life, in the belief that liquor is a great life-giver—a "superstition," but still active among us.

Second, besides these small social groups which adjourn to the barroom for liquor, there is a succession of less sociable drinkers, most numerous about the middle of the forenoon and the afternoon. These are the men who use liquor because they feel that they need a "bracer"—something, as they say, to steady their nerves, to remove the sense of *goneness* in the stomach, and to put *vim* into their tired muscles. They generally drink alone and quickly, going at once back to their work. If not able to reach a bar, they carry a bottle. Here, too, the motive is generally innocent and the mere pleasure of the palate plays a minor part. They will tell you "that they do not care for the taste of the stuff," but they feel that they cannot get along without it.

Whatever morbid craving may operate here, it is not a normal demand of the body, but the mere tyranny of habit. Like any established routine of life, whether necessary or merely perfunctory, when the periodic moment arrives the demand is felt. For years, at that hour, these men have been in the habit of drinking; and the "habit" (*habeo*—"I hold") asserts itself. The urgency does not so much represent a real need as a superficial routine of life. The body has been accustomed to this "prod" and it looks for it when the hour arrives. Moreover, alcohol belongs to the "habit-

forming" group of drugs, like opium, which tend to weaken the will and produce certain abnormal and vicious demands, which enslave both body and mind.

These drinkers feel sure that they need the "bracer" and that it does them good. But they are under bonds to that old superstition which represents liquor as a life-giver—a belief which descends to us from the ages of sacrificial worship, and which like the bloody animal sacrifice ought to be banished from the face of the earth. What we know is that instead of making the nerves strong and steady, liquor weakens or paralyzes them. Instead of feeding the body like a true food, it merely deadens the sense of hunger, as ether destroys the consciousness of pain without removing its cause. Instead of adding strength to the wearied muscles, it merely makes them forget that they are weary, as a noise in the street diverts attention from the prattle of the child at the knee.

Thus, those who drink because they feel that they need a "bracer" are continually self-deceived. They prod their bodies as the driver whips his horse, but the whip adds no strength to the horse and it is no adequate substitute for oats. Their belief and practice represent a superstition as baseless as the superstition of the African barbarian, who thinks that his sacrifice of a pig really secured his good crop. The line of laborers, who crowd the saloon bar at the close of day, imagine that the drinks rest them and make it possible for them to work easier on the morrow. But their belief is as erroneous and their performance as foolish as the sacrificial offerings described by Homer.

In fact, these modern sacrifices to Bacchus in the saloon are in many ways far worse than the ancient animal sacrifices, because they do an immense amount of injury to the drinker, to his family and friends, to the state, and to his descendants, whereas the sacrificial altars represented little more than a foolish waste of effort and treasure.

Now, the growing intelligence and conscience of the race have long since put a stop to animal sacrifice as a method of influencing providence or nourishing the life of mankind. And surely, it is high time that this associated superstition respecting liquor, that

it is a life-giver, should cease to afflict our race. The foaming cup does more harm than the bloody altar. The drinking of one's health at a banquet is just as much of a superstition (except the fellowship expressed by it) as the offering of a lamb to solemnize a tribal compact. The line of laborers in the saloon at sunset drinking beer represents much more harm than all the Grecian sacrifices on the altars about ancient Troy. The man who drains a whiskey bottle acts more foolishly than the far-off savage who sprinkled the blood of a bullock before his door to keep off the demons of disease.

This view of the drink habit, as closely associated with a foolish and harmful superstition, must be vigorously pressed upon the attention of all classes, but especially upon the rising generation. Men must be made to see that there is no real need of liquor: all these customs belong to barbaric times. There are far better methods of expressing fellowship and sustaining life. The theory of the universe upon which the uses of liquor rest is viciously false. The practices themselves, besides being superstitious, are positively and seriously harmful.

It took many centuries and gigantic efforts to destroy the system of animal sacrifice. The vested rights of priesthoods, the impressive ceremonials enshrined in sacred associations, and the hopes and fears which surrounded altar and temple: all these influences the prophets of spirituality had to fight. Only by the efforts of innumerable martyrs and numberless heroes was the victory for the moral ideal won. But at last the waste of life and treasure, the revolting streams of blood, the low and false views of God, associated with these customs—all these have come to an end.

The hour has struck for a great battle against the twin superstition of drink, which more foolishly misreads the law of God and the need of man; which wastes in treasure every day more than all temple sacrifices cost in a generation; and which presses from the eyes of women and children a stream of tears wider than the rivers of blood flowing from the world's altars, and from human life a wail of anguish louder than the songs of all the temple priesthoods of the earth. And in this present-day battle against

the liquor-superstition, born of the same ignorance that produced animal sacrifice, we have to fight vested interests of mammoth proportions, the venerable associations of ancient customs, and a hundred mistaken notions respecting personal rights and human good.

It is encouraging, however, to note the number of influences irresistibly fighting the liquor-superstition.

1. Medical science is decisive in teaching that even the so-called moderate use of liquor is conducive to disease, producing many specific disorders, aggravating every form of sickness, predisposing to distempers, weakening the body's natural defenses against its enemies, lessening the curative efficacy of medicines, and decreasing the prospects of recovery. These facts are now so well known that alcoholic beverages are less and less used as therapeutic agents. Great hospitals have, in many cases, in the last ten years, cut down their liquor bills to one-fifth, some to one-tenth, of the former amount. Medical science commands: If you want to keep well let drink alone, and if you want the largest chance of recovery when sick, touch it not when well.

2. Insurance experience demonstrates, most clearly and emphatically, that even mild liquor used in so-called moderation is a life-destroyer. Insurance companies have no sentimental interest in human life. To them, a man's life is solely a matter of business investment. Their change of attitude on this subject in the last seventy years has been radical and significant. Two generations ago, the total abstainer was considered a poor risk or refused a policy by many companies. Today he is considered by far the best risk, other things being equal, and many companies take him at a lower rate and give him an annual bonus. All this has come about because experience has shown that the total abstainer has a stronger hold on life, from 15 to 30 per cent greater. Everywhere in the insurance world, the bars are being put up higher and higher, not only against the drunkard, but against the common drinker. Many insurance companies, by their admirable and decisive bulletins, widely circulated, have become very influential in the work of temperance education.

3. The appeal to life along the line of endurance and efficiency

shows that alcohol in any and all amounts is a life-destroyer. This is what the explorers in polar regions tell us from Nansen to Amundsen. All the experiences in every field of athletic contest demonstrate the same impressive fact. Great military and naval commanders give similar testimony: generals like Lord Roberts and admirals like Lord Beresford. The campaigns in India, the Soudan, South Africa tell the same story. So decisive is the evidence that the German Emperor makes urgent pleas for less drinking in his army and navy. Those who employ men where risks are great—notably railway companies—lay down increasingly strict rules respecting temperance. Investigations of the work accomplished by operatives, in mill and factory, have made it clear that the line of efficiency begins low on Monday, as a result of the Saturday night and Sunday drinking (aside from this it ought to be higher), while it rises as the week advances, during the days when there is the least indulgence in liquor.

4. Numerous and decisive physiological and psychological experiments and investigations, carried on especially in the past twenty years, have proved that alcohol is not a life-giver, but a life-destroyer. The researches of the world's greatest scientists all point in one direction. The facts which they present are numerous and conclusive. The most important are now too well known to need repetition here.

Experiments like those on dogs, by Professor Hodge of Clark University, and investigations like those by Dr. Loitinen of the University of Helsingfors respecting infant mortality reveal the terrible degeneracy in offspring due to parental indulgence in drink. The recent commendation of opposite views by Professor Karl Pearson has been shown to be radically defective in logic as well as destitute of truth.

The careful investigations by Professor Kraepelin and many others have made clear two supremely important facts: (1) That alcohol, even in small quantities, permanently slows thought, dulls and deranges perception, weakens the will-power, and perverts the judgment. (2) That the user is woefully deceived, being made to feel that he thinks and acts faster, while in truth just the opposite is the case. The worst thing about the use of liquor is this very

fact that the sense of relief from fatigue and the feeling of increased vigor of mind and body are *false reports*. The discoveries of Overton and Meyer respecting the destructive action of alcohol upon the *lipoids* (the fatty substances sheathing the tissues of the body) help us to understand why liquor deranges the whole intelligence system of the human body, giving rise to the deceptions just noted. If the insulating covering of the power cable be stripped off down the line, so as to cause a leak of electric energy, the indicator in the power-house would show that much power was being used, and the inference would be natural that cars were running rapidly whereas they were actually stalled. In similar fashion the drinker is deceived.

Another crude illustration of what happens is found in the remark of the old sailor who told the young man to stop drinking before the *two* balls hanging across the room looked like *three*. Whereat the young man replied that he himself better stop at once, for he was now seeing *two* where there was only *one*. Just this deception produced by drink accounts for the practice of Australian wool-growers who induced buyers to drink heavily before making their purchases, knowing that in the condition so produced their wools would seem finer. This very deception is at the bottom of the ancient superstition, which still persists, that liquor is a life-giver. An eminent English physician, Dr. Chapple, has strikingly stated the whole case in a few words: The curse of drink continues because it deceives the user and enriches the maker.

In his Norman Kerr Memorial Lecture, given November 11, 1911, Dr. G. Sims Woodhead, professor in the University of Cambridge, gave the results of some original and very delicate experiments upon himself respecting the "Action of Alcohol on Bodily Temperature," which strikingly confirm the statements just made. He equipped himself with apparatus that would give a continuous record of surface and internal temperature (the latter taken through the rectum). He writes: "The alcohol [a very small quantity] was sipped slowly. Almost immediately I experienced a sense of warmth and glow both in the stomach and in the skin, which later became more moist. The face felt a little

flushed. From my general sensation I was satisfied that both external and internal temperatures had risen considerably."

However, after the night's sleep, when he examined the record, what he found was this: While the surface temperature rose for a time, there was later a permanent fall and the internal temperature fell from the start. To quote his own words: "On developing the record given by the internal thermometer I found, however, *that my sensations had misled me completely, and that, instead of a rise, there had been a distinct initial fall.*" The apparent warmth was, on the whole, a deception. The effect of the alcohol was to force blood to the surface where it was cooled, so that while the surplus of blood in the external tissues gave a temporary feeling of warmth, the body as a whole was robbed of heat—a fact which was not reported owing to the deranged condition of the system due to the alcohol.

In these experiments, Professor Woodhead was simply confirming a well-known conclusion of science, that alcohol, instead of permanently warming, really cools the body, and yet, in such a way as to make it harmful even in warm weather. But the point of chief significance, needing special emphasis, is this: the fact that he, a trained scientist, was deceived respecting his own condition. He felt that he was warmer, when in truth his body was losing its heat. Nothing could better illustrate and demonstrate the real effect of alcohol upon the human system: *It deceives the user.* It so deranges the system that the reports given are false. The drinker thinks that he is stronger, warmer, wiser, whereas the exact opposite is the fact. Liquor always lies to the user, making him think that it is a life-giver when it is a life-destroyer. Just here is the root of the ancient superstition which we are considering.

There is another phase of this subject which must be mentioned. It is of very great importance, but it can be given here only slight attention. A serious part of the general effect of alcohol upon brain and mind is that it inhibits or paralyzes the higher faculties, which are the later products of evolution, and therefore more easily influenced. The brain centers associated with our more animal life are older and more hardy, with greater power of resistance. Those associated with our more human qualities, such as

modesty, discretion, and moral feelings, are newer, less resolute, and more susceptible to derangement. As a result, when alcohol is taken into the system, its destructive power is first felt by these higher nerve centers. The restraining influences of good manners and good morals are swept aside or inhibited. And left without these checks and balances, the merely animal impulses come to mastery, so that a man in his cups becomes boastful, obscene, beastly. He does things for which he has to apologize the next day. Intoxication is not increase of life, but putting the reins into the hands of the animal within us. Liquor changes the character by paralyzing the best and highest in us. It puts the real man to sleep. He is not there. This inhibition produced by alcohol is what makes its use so harmful and so dangerous. It tends to strike down all the finer products of culture and civilization. It is more than merely a life-destroyer, for it destroys the higher life and puts the spirit in subjection to the brutish. Therefore, we deal here, not only with a superstition that is false, but with a superstition that is deadly.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SPECTATOR¹

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The task set me tonight is born of the scientific faith which even the newest of the disciplines has inspired. Social psychology, at first in danger of rejection by the builders of "orthodox psychology," seems destined to become the "head of the corner" in the new temple of social education. Great and beneficent has been the rôle in pedagogy of so-called "individual" psychology as an experimental science. Through the study of child-psychology, in particular—from Comenius to Rousseau and Froebel, from Pestalozzi and Herbart to G. Stanley Hall and his disciples—educational method has been vitalized, humanized, and inspired. Yet, how very much of the most fruitful of this long process of "psychologizing education"—as Pestalozzi called it—is in reality but an application of "social psychology," even before the name was born.

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

Moreover, there is good reason to believe that through the conscious and organized use of the laws of the "social mind" as opposed to the "individual mind"—though possibly each of these useful terms when rigorously analyzed may prove to be but a vivid metaphor—education is about to win its crowning victory, to exploit its widest and richest domain—a domain until very recently unbroken save perchance almost unawares by the adventurous pathfinder. Just as sociology, in the few years since it gained the method and the organization of a science, has immensely widened our horizon and increased our power for conscious mastery of the environment, notably the human environment; so the rise of social psychology as a specialized division of sociology has much broadened the vision, sharpened the insight, and intensified the power of the sociologist.

¹ A paper read at the Conference on Physical Education and Hygiene, Chicago, April 26, 1912.

the epidemic of degrading or of uplifting suggestions. If for me another social person consists in my idea of his characteristics, tested by certain personal symbols stored in my mind as standards of spiritual values, ready to obey the call of associative memory, how very practical it is that through education these symbols be wisely selected. "To think of love, gratitude, pity, grief, honor, courage, justice, and the like," says Cooley in illustration of his theory, "it is necessary to think of people by whom or toward whom these sentiments may be entertained. Thus justice may be recalled by thinking of Washington, kindness by Lincoln, honor by Sir Philip Sidney."

ASSOCIATION OF RIGHT IDEAS BUILDS RIGHT CHARACTER

The present application is obvious. What if the symbols by which the youth learns to test personal merits be the traits or actions of his heroes or heroines of the stage, the classroom, the athletic field, or some other spectacle? Especially at puberty the boy or the girl lays in a rich store of ideals and heroes. It really seems as if the factors of such thought-processes are social products: images arising in emotional states under stimulus of new associations.

THE KIND OF IDEAS ASSOCIATED IN CONSCIOUSNESS DETERMINES THE KIND OF CHARACTER

Here is a "law" of social psychology which it will richly repay the teacher to exploit. How vivid, how enduring must be the motion-picture stamped on the film of associative memory, of consciousness, under stress of the surging emotions that sway the joyous recreation-crowd.

A SPECTATOR IS A MINIATURE SOCIETY

Accordingly, as a net result of the foregoing analysis, the spectator appears, not as the wholly imaginary isolated being of conventional phrase, but as a composite social-psychic personality. In a vital sense, he is a miniature society; a veritable microcosm or epitome of the macrocosm—of the larger society which itself is a psychic fact.

THE SPECTATOR IS SWAYED BY EMOTION

Now, the spectator-personality is dominated by his feelings, by his emotions; and the emotions are the most powerful springs of

social action. Consider the vast number and variety of the instincts, appetites, cravings, impulses, sentiments, tendencies, beliefs, and ideals which surge, contend, or blend in the theater of the spectator's emotional life.

A sound psychology of the emotions, therefore, is the basis upon which must be built the social psychology, and therefore the education, of the spectator.

THE SPECTATOR'S EMOTIONS ARE HIGHLY SUGGESTIBLE

To understand the nature of the emotions is the first requisite. The second requisite is to perceive how the emotions of the spectator are peculiarly exposed to the sway of suggestion—imitation. Decidedly the psychology of suggestion is a *sine qua non* for the solution of our problem. So great is its rôle in social life that a brilliant sociologist, Dr. Ross, accepting the fundamental teaching of Tarde, has virtually restricted the field of social psychology to the various aspects of suggestion—imitation. According to Tarde "society is imitation, and imitation is a species of somnambulism." Logically, therefore, he reduces all sociology to a study of the laws of imitation. Without going so far as that, Dr. Ross has devoted the whole of his fascinating book to the different phases of crowd- and mob-mind. Possibly he has not thus covered the entire proper field of social psychology—all the social-psychic phenomena of group-life. Nevertheless, by the very stress which he has laid on suggestion-imitation, crowd-psychology, he has rendered to education a unique service. Beyond reasonable question, this is the most fruitful field which the newer forms of education—perhaps also the older—have yet to exploit. It is a rich mine for almost every sort of social servant; the most practical study which the college student can take up. Already it has borne good fruit. The psychology of the mob, the criminal, the newspaper, race-prejudice, the gaming instinct, the religious revival, advertising, suggestion in education, is fairly well in hand. Shall the spectator next take his turn?

KINDS OF SPECTATOR

Who is the spectator? What are his varieties? "All the world's a spectacle and all the men and women merely spectators"

might truthfully paraphrase Shakespeare's epigram. Without making so wide an excursion, it is desirable swiftly to scan the wider range of our problem. When some competent pen shall write the systematic textbook for the social psychology of the spectator—a book for which the newer social education is calling loudly—it will deal with many examples or applications of the subject which may not here be mentioned, much less discussed. Sometimes it would analyze the emotions of the single spectator; sometimes those of the spectator-crowd; sometimes it would exploit spectator-crowd characteristics “without presence.”

For instance, it might emphasize the morals-debauching, ideals-debasing, thought-enfeebling, wholly degrading antisocial suggestions presented to the little children of a city by that commerce-begot monstrosity, the comic supplement.

It might reflect on the psychic meaning of that nerve-crazing, soul-sickening motion-picture of lying bill-boards which in merciless repetition pelt the traveler's tortured eye through the car-window as he speeds across the disfigured landscape. Is it too bold to suggest that the bodily and mental health, as often the moral integrity, of the traveling public is seriously impaired by this modern sacrifice of beauty and truth in the service of Mammon?

Take a more pleasing picture: the spectator-crowd of disciples, the school or college class of pupils, day after day gathered before the living teacher—the teacher in action. Is it not likely that the display of lofty emotion, of refined and exalted feelings, of the whole visible personality, of the worthy teacher possesses a rare contagious quality of social suggestion? The flashing eye, the eloquent voice, the forceful gesture, the scorn of falsehood and wrong or the reverence for truth and justice revealed on the mobile countenance: surely all this tends to plant in consciousness those higher ideals—those sentiments attached to personal symbols—which so essentially condition right social thought. I verily believe that the highest function of the teacher—even the university teacher—is to teach, and to teach with spiritual zeal.

Again, consider that “greatest fact in modern civilization,” the city. Here is a mass of closely communicating individuals, social psychic personalities, capable of crowd characteristics

“without presence.” They may display exaggerated suggestibility through mental contagion unaided by the bodily touch of the actual crowd. Now, a city is the mightiest of all spectacles, and as such it both reflects and molds the psychology of its people—its spectators. It makes a vast difference, for instance, whether the city be a thing of beauty or a thing of ugliness. The constant repetition of disagreeable feelings—literally poisonous feelings experts tell us—caused by foul streets, ragged skylines, unsightly poles, garish posters, straggling sidewalks, abominable garbage heaps, gaudy ginshops, nauseous smells, reeking dives of sin and shame—all the familiar emblems of the unregenerate city—must inevitably lower the vital and spiritual quality of an urban population. According to a well-known orthodox law of the emotions, I dare affirm that the transformation of the city ugly into the city beautiful would raise the level of the city’s health, morality, thought, and government.

II. THE SPECTATOR-CROWD AND THE DRAMATIC SPECTACLE

Turning now to the spectator-crowd in its relation to the dramatic spectacle, selecting its chief varieties, it is important first of all, as a general law, to accent the reciprocal relation of the spectator and the spectacle. It is right, of course, to lay the chief stress on the influence of the spectator in creating the spectacle. Normally it is largely a case of demand and supply. The desires of the spectator determine the character of the spectacle. But this is not the whole story. The spectacle which the spectator molds, in its turn molds the spectator. The spectator is a being which feeds on its own offspring. Here is an endless circuit of give-and-take which as applied to the spectator-personality might be called the “dialectic of emotional growth.” Moreover, the reciprocal influence of the spectator and the spectacle in our days is not usually normal. The spectacle is commercialized. It is chiefly the asset of the business man—the entrepreneur. The exploiter of the human need of recreation provides what under all the conditions he thinks will pay. A large part of the theater-crowd is fortuitous. It comes from out of town. It takes what it can get, not always what it prefers. Perhaps here

is a hint which the social provider of recreation-spectacles may profit by.

Again, it must be held firmly in mind that we have to do with a species of crowd. As such it is amenable to the laws of crowd-psychology. Now, the result of bodily contagion in the spectator-crowd is greatly to increase the effects of "multiplied suggestion." Every emotion, every psychic manifestation, called out by the stimulating spectacle, is intensified. The emotional conductivity of the mass is very great. Nor must it be forgotten that pleasurable sensations or emotions, even if morbid, take the most enduring hold of the conscious or the subconscious self. They well up readily in associative memory. How vast, then, for good or ill, must be the emotional discharge in the theater-crowd. For almost every social situation, almost every moral crisis or mental conflict, almost every desire, passion, or ideal is presented to consciousness, accompanied by all the allurements of light, color, rhythm, or sound.

Furthermore, the wise exploiter of dramatic recreation must know the composition of the particular spectator-crowd to which he appeals. What may be safe, or moral, or effective in one crowd may be just the reverse in another; for suggestibility varies according to age, sex, race, bodily or mental state. Children, for example, are more easily excited than adults; women more conductible than men; what would excite tumultuous feeling in a crowd of Italians, Slavs, or Irish might "fall flat" in a crowd of Dutch, Germans, or English; what would be entirely safe in a crowd of well-fed burghers might breed a bloody riot in a mass of hungry and therefore hysterical revolutionists or strikers; a presentation which exalts the spirit of the cultured and refined may tend to release the subconscious beast in the ignorant, the degenerate, or the criminal. Sometimes under spell of the opera, the drama, or even the motion-picture, the "gash" in consciousness is so deep, the "mental disaggregation" so complete, the entire obsession of the mind by the momentary suggestion so profound, that the spectator is hypnotized. Even the prolonged contemplation of beautiful pictures or the sound of exquisite music, suggests Souriau, may produce an ecstasy of hallucination analogous to the hypnotic trance.

WHY NOT CAPITALIZE CROWD-SUGGESTION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE?

WHY MODERNS NEED PLAY

Clearly here is a tremendous power which calls loudly for social control. For ages the suggestibility of the spectator-crowd has been exploited for vicious, commercial, or other selfish ends. Why not capitalize it for the advancement of the social welfare? According to Dr. Watts's lyric, suggests Mr. Carrington, the "Devil appears to be the only sociologist who, in modern times, has given his mind to the subject" of recreations. Is it not time to choose a new director? Let the apostle of social righteousness break into Satan's monopoly. Commercialized recreation need not necessarily be bad, if wisely regulated; yet, as a matter of fact in the United States almost every form of dramatic spectacle has been put upon too low a plane, often a disgracefully low plane.

How serious is the danger to society, is partially realized when we count the vast throngs which regularly pack the play-houses. One Sunday evening three years ago, says Miss Addams, it was estimated that one-sixth of the entire population of Chicago went to the theaters. Each week in the borough of Manhattan, according to Dr. Davis, 1,760,088 persons attend the theaters, at a cost of \$567,793.10. If the same ratios obtain throughout the country, how mighty is the multitude whose characters are being molded by the theater. What prodigious sums are being spent, sometimes carelessly, often for antisocial ends.

According to the enlightening monograph of Dr. Michael M. Davis on the *Exploitation of Pleasure*, far too many of the theatrical representations in Manhattan are inferior in quality. Of the vaudevilles, three-fourths grade as "not objectionable," one-fifth as "lowering," and the rest as of "positive value." The vaudeville, he suggests, is in dire need of an application of brains. Of the high-priced performances, 16.5 per cent are "lowering," "demoralizing," or "vicious." Of the burlesques all are bad: five-sixths being graded as "demoralizing" and one-sixth as "lowering." In sharp contrast with these, the motion-picture shows, with their 900,000 weekly spectators, are none of them bad, half of the films being rated as of "positive value" and half as

"not objectionable." May we rightly infer from this fact that among the plain people the spectator-crowd, when given a fair chance, may be trusted to demand healthful recreation? Motion-pictures of the finest scenery, for example, will elicit a storm of spontaneous applause from a crowd of young children.

In fact, we owe to mob-mind in large measure the present low standard of dramatic recreation in our country. It is high time to give up the notion that only the bad is "catching." Even more contagious are the good, the beautiful, and the true.

The intense dramatic instinct of children is a precious faculty; and it may be educated for rare social service. When we learn to educate it rightly, perhaps the dramatic recreations of America may not contrast so unfavorably with the elevating tragedies, comedies, and festivals of ancient Hellas.

III. THE SPECTATOR-CROWD AND THE ATHLETIC SPECTACLE

We may now pass to a consideration of the spectator-crowd in connection with athletics. At the very outset, it seems wise to confess that social education is much more deeply concerned in the extension and organization of play than in athletic contests, either amateur or professional. Play is the sovereign re-creator. Play is necessary for work. It restores the tissues consumed or weakened by toil. This it is able to do through the magical process of nature's emotion-cure. Modern psychology reveals the subtle blending or interdependence of mental states and bodily states. The mind heals the body and the body heals the mind. Pleasurable emotions build up, increase energy; disagreeable emotions tear down, diminish energy. According to Ribot and Feré, the emotion of pleasure is a feeling of power; that of displeasure is a feeling of impotence. Fatigue is a poison that impairs the moral judgment. Play through exciting joyous emotion restores the capacity for straight thinking. Thus play is a safe keeper of a clear conscience; and its beneficent function is best discharged when taken for its own sake—with no other prize in view. "The kind of exercise that hits the mark," says Gulick in his luminous picture of the *Efficient Life* "is the kind a man likes for its own sake."

WHY MODERNS NEED PLAY

How shall the ideal living here suggested be realized? If play be the essential condition of sound physical, mental, and moral health, how may people be led to play? For strangely enough they must be lured even to participation in the rare joys which recreative exercise yields in such full measure. This paradox comes from two crises in human evolution: the first physiological and the second industrial. Man separates himself from the other animals and stands erect. But, to quote Partridge, his "internal organs, the skeleton, and muscles are still 'four-footed.' The veins and other structures often suffer from doing work for which their construction is not suited." In the ceaseless struggle for existence, the active outdoor life of early man was his salvation.

Then came the second crisis. Gradually civilization with its countless labor-saving devices tended to make man sedentary. The industrial revolution of a century ago completed the harmful process. Steam and electricity, with their creature, the great city, have nearly banished the old popular, largely communal play-activities and provided new allurements for indoor pleasures.

Clearly the social welfare calls loudly for a remedy: a reorganization of play-activities to meet the new conditions of work and leisure.

It is equally clear that the athletic spectacle is not the remedy. Gymnastic exercise for all, as a part of sane physical culture, is quite another thing. The spectator-crowd at an athletic contest—a football game, a game of baseball, a wrestling or a boxing match, a Marathon race—is essentially a theater-crowd, except that often it sits in the open air. The members of the spectacle are the only persons who exercise; and their exercise is not play but work, often for hire.

MOB-MIND OF THE ATHLETIC SPECTATOR

In basic principle, the psychology of the athletic spectator-crowd is the same as that already presented. It is crowd-psychology. Suggestibility is higher, contagion swifter, emotion more tumultuous, the range of suggested ideas or actions narrower, than in the dramatic crowd. The subconscious self of the spectator emerges; the elemental gaming or struggle-instinct of the

"not objectionable." May we rightly infer from this fact that among the plain people the spectator-crowd, when given a fair chance, may be trusted to demand healthful recreation? Motion-pictures of the finest scenery, for example, will elicit a storm of spontaneous applause from a crowd of young children.

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We may now pass to a consideration of the spectator-crowd in connection with athletics. At the very outset, it seems wise to confess that social education is much more deeply concerned in the extension and organization of play than in athletic contests, either amateur or professional. Play is the sovereign re-creator. Play is necessary for work. It restores the tissues consumed or weakened by toil. This it is able to do through the magical process of nature's emotion-cure. Modern psychology reveals the subtle blending or interdependence of mental states and bodily states. The mind heals the body and the body heals the mind. Pleasurable emotions build up, increase energy; disagreeable emotions tear down, diminish energy. According to Ribot and Feré, the emotion of pleasure is a feeling of power; that of displeasure is a feeling of impotence. Fatigue is a poison that impairs the moral judgment. Play through exciting joyous emotion restores the capacity for straight thinking. Thus play is a safe keeper of a clear conscience; and its beneficent function is best discharged when taken for its own sake—with no other prize in view. "The kind of exercise that hits the mark," says Gulick in his luminous picture of the *Efficient Life* "is the kind a man likes for its own sake."

WHY MODERNS NEED PLAY

How shall the ideal living here suggested be realized? If play be the essential condition of sound physical, mental, and moral health, how may people be led to play? For strangely enough they must be lured even to participation in the rare joys which recreative exercise yields in such full measure. This paradox comes from two crises in human evolution: the first physiological and the second industrial. Man separates himself from the other animals and stands erect. But, to quote Partridge, his "internal organs, the skeleton, and muscles are still 'four-footed.' The veins and other structures often suffer from doing work for which their construction is not suited." In the ceaseless struggle for existence, the active outdoor life of early man was his salvation.

Then came the second crisis. Gradually civilization with its countless labor-saving devices tended to make man sedentary. The industrial revolution of a century ago completed the harmful process. Steam and electricity, with their creature, the great city, have nearly banished the old popular, largely communal play-activities and provided new allurements for indoor pleasures.

Clearly the social welfare calls loudly for a remedy: a reorganization of play-activities to meet the new conditions of work and leisure.

It is equally clear that the athletic spectacle is not the remedy. Gymnastic exercise for all, as a part of sane physical culture, is quite another thing. The spectator-crowd at an athletic contest—a football game, a game of baseball, a wrestling or a boxing match, a Marathon race—is essentially a theater-crowd, except that often it sits in the open air. The members of the spectacle are the only persons who exercise; and their exercise is not play but work, often for hire.

MOB-MIND OF THE ATHLETIC SPECTATOR

In basic principle, the psychology of the athletic spectator-crowd is the same as that already presented. It is crowd-psychology. Suggestibility is higher, contagion swifter, emotion more tumultuous, the range of suggested ideas or actions narrower, than in the dramatic crowd. The subconscious self of the spectator emerges; the elemental gaming or struggle-instinct of the

human animal—so vividly described a decade ago by Dr. Thomas—slips its leash, and the spectator thrills with emotional reaction to the athlete's muscular experiences.

Who of us has not shared in the hypnotic frenzy, the mob-hysteria, of the "bleachers" if not of the "grand-stand"?

It is because actions are more "catching," more readily imitated than words, that public exhibitions or even suggestions of physical contests by newspaper, in the theater, or on the field, may prove dangerous, especially to children and adolescents. Happily the more brutal forms of contests are being proscribed. Bear-baiting, bull-baiting, cock-fighting, and prize-fighting are passing. Is there not need of going farther? Do not humanism and the gospel of peace demand that exhibitions of boxing, wrestling, and other spectacles suggesting hurt, cruelty, brute-force, or war be abandoned? Yet in my own town a few weeks ago was presented a motion-picture of a bull-fight, before a crowd including hundreds of school children.

Do not misunderstand me. I am not opposing athletic spectacles as such. There need be no great harm, possibly there is sometimes much good, even in professional athletics like tennis, rowing, or baseball, although the professional standard always tends to be low. I am merely pleading for the right sort of contests. I am simply warning against the danger that such contests may draw us more and more away from the real play-activities which are far more essential to the public health and morals under modern conditions.

ATHLETIC CONTESTS ARE DEMOCRATIC

There is a social gain from the emotions that sway the athletic spectator-crowd which offsets some of the losses. Psychologically, for instance, the great American game of baseball is a powerful democratic agent. Vast crowds of both sexes and of all ages; persons of every economic, social, religious, or intellectual class touch shoulders. They shout, thrill, and gesture in sympathy. They are just human beings, with the differentials of rank or vocation laid aside. They are "deindividuated," to borrow the expressive term coined by Partridge.

TEAM-CONTESTS ARE VICARIOUS PLAY

The chief menace to the general use of recreational activities comes from the extraordinary vogue of college athletic spectacles. The primary business of the student is or ought to be study. Necessarily he is inactive during a third or more of the day. There is plenty of time left over for restful recreative exercise, if it be made use of. But the student cannot keep his bodily and mental energy up to the mark by exercising vicariously. The vicarious play of the team, however fascinating, does not exercise the spectator's muscles. It is imperative that college authorities recognize the function of recreation. At whatever sacrifice of team-athletics, at whatever cost for facilities, every student should be physically as well as mentally educated; and the most efficient mental, even moral, education depends on physical education. Moreover, play for all is the best form of educational recreation.

INTERCOLLEGIATE CONTESTS A MENACE

Let us get nearer to the heart of the problem. Its crux lies in the distinctive features of intercollegiate sports. As now conducted, such sports are a menace to American higher education; and it seems probable that the only efficient remedy is their entire abandonment.

Because of their enormous prestige, the saner forms of recreational play are crowded out and the intellectual activities and achievements are overshadowed. The football champion is a hero although sometimes his superior qualities can be appraised only by the pound. The contests become battles between opposing institutions; and in popular sentiment the relative rank of such institutions is gauged by victory or defeat.

EVILS OF ATHLETIC PARTISANSHIP

From these conditions arise certain psychic traits of the academic athletic crowd. They center in its extreme partisanship. The moral tone of the emotions is lowered. The finer appreciation of feelings and actions, notably those of the adversary, are suppressed. Violent shouts and epithets give notice that the cave-man is up. Victory must be had. Accordingly semi-

professionalism has arisen; and, in spite of repeated regulation, it is still widely tolerated. Now, semi-professionalism, even when consisting in earning a penny in the local summer baseball league, is a blight on amateur competition. It narrows the range of eligibles to the team; it discourages the mediocre and the timid from seeking a share in such games. There is urgent need that Dr. Hetherington's two laws—the "law of competition" and the "law of amateurism" shall be enforced to the letter. Let not college sports be tainted by commercialism which semi-professionalism implies.

Under existing conditions the spectator-crowd at an intercollegiate football contest fosters ideals much lower than those suggested by a game of professional baseball.

FUTILITY AND IMMORALITY OF THE ATHLETIC CLAUQUE

A singular example of mental perversion, an absurd and immoral custom tenaciously held fast in mob-mind, has its genesis in the partisan zeal of athletic spectator-crowds. I refer to the practice of organized cheering, known in college argot as "rooting." From every aspect it is bad. It robs the athlete of his due meed of honest praise. The spontaneous burst of emotion is discounted by the artificial clamor. At best, it must be rated as a cunning suggestion intended to start contagious and irrational applause in the hypnotized mass of on-lookers. It is a trap for the emotions of the unwary. Morally it stands on the level of the jimmy, the "toe-hold," the card trick, the stuffed ballot box, tainted news, or the campaign canard; and like the canard it is apt to prove a "boomerang." In a word, it is the claue in athletics; and as such it is precisely on a level with the claue in a Paris theater. It reaches the limit of inept perversity, when, as sometimes actually happens, it is used as a jimmy to unlock the emotions of the audience at an intercollegiate debate.

Who can justly doubt that the partisan spirit or "emotional set" fostered during the school and college years is a powerful subconscious support of American partisan politics? It is a seminar in which the athletic claue-leader is in training for the shady tricks of the "ward-heeler" or the "city-boss."

IV. THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The foregoing discussion may perhaps serve as a tentative appreciation of the social value of spectator psychology. Here ends my allotted task. Yet may I venture a concluding word as to the social control of this neglected aspect of crowd-mind?

1. There must be fostered a powerful sentiment in favor of the public support of all proper forms of the newer recreational education. By Nature's law recreative pleasures are essential to sound body, sound mind, sound character, and sound social living. Why longer suffer them to be monopolized for commercial exploitation—often for vicious ends? Why not co-ordinate them into an efficient division of social education? When that goal is reached, we may be ready to demand the creation of a federal bureau, perhaps even a federal department, of popular recreations.

2. Meantime before we can reap the harvest the seed must be sown. Organized and persistent effort is the price of success. The splendid foundation already laid by the Playground Association of America, backed by the college departments of physical culture must be strengthened and broadened until every city in the land shall have ample facilities for the recreation of its people as an important part of public education. To reach this end, an efficient modern scientific training in school and in college must be provided. The elaborate courses of study outlined in 1909-10 by the Committee of the Playground Association should be installed as fast as practicable. In addition, the psychology of the emotions and social psychology are of basic importance. No studies are of more practical value to the social welfare. Especially, for scientific guidance in evaluating crowd-suggestion, a textbook on the psychology of the spectator is required.

3. To unify and harmonize efforts, the problem of "play for all" versus "intercollegiate contests" must be rightly solved. The contest between regulation or entire abandonment must be fought to a finish. The consciences of educational authorities must be enlightened and quickened. Sometimes—I trust rarely—the advertising motive tips the scale in the administrative policy. What a crop of future evil deeds this sinister suggestion may bear. The academic ethics that sacrifices the common student

welfare in the expectation of bigger attendance may beget the civic ethics which calls back the saloon in the expectation of bigger trade.

4. The socialization of dramatic recreations is a hard task; but there is good reason to believe that it may be accomplished. The firm basis of the social control of the theater must be laid in the intelligent education of the dramatic instinct of the child. Here is a precious faculty sadly neglected by the teacher. Happily we are coming to appreciate its meaning in the expansion of personality. The true nature and the real value of the dramatic instinct are being revealed to us by such excellent studies as those of A. T. Craig, E. W. Curtis, and Alice M. Hertz. That this instinct may readily be educated and thus become a potent factor in mental growth is made clear by recent experiments. By "doing," suggests Miss Barney—referring to her successful experience in the dramatic training of sixth grade pupils—the child learns "to understand" as well as "to do"; for the "essentials of every process and action which the child sees in the heavens above and the earth beneath are made familiar to him in his dramatic imitations."

Especially convincing is Miss Hertz's seven years' work in the Children's Educational Theater of the Educational Alliance in New York. The intense interest shown by young boys and girls in producing such plays as Burnett's *The Little Princess* and *Little Lord Fauntleroy*, Clemens' *The Prince and the Pauper*, even Shakespeare's *Tempest* and *As You Like It*, demonstrates how very much youthful taste and mental capacity are commonly underrated. Miss Hertz has proved, urges President Eliot, "that a strong educational force, for the most part unutilized in American schools, can be exercised through the wise training of the strong dramatic instinct in children."

Decidedly, even as a form of spectator-recreation, the juvenile drama has great possibilities. It is amazing that as yet it has hardly at all been commercially exploited. Yet who can doubt that it would pay better than the penny arcade or the brain-enfeebling vaudeville?

When the dramatic taste of the mass of school children shall have been properly trained, the elevation of the theater will already

be far advanced. Furthermore, it is quite possible to educate the taste, the choice of the existing spectator-crowd. There is no contrast between the pleasing and the good. The plain people, even of the so-called "slums," enjoy real art when they can get it. The enthusiastic reception of Olcott's *Little Women*, Jerome's *Passing of the Third Floor Back*, Zangwill's noble moral drama, *The War God*, the success of Dr. Löwenfeld's "People's Theater" in Berlin, and of New York's "municipal" music, all bear witness to this truth. On the piers and in the parks of New York, testifies Arthur Farwell, high-class symphonies are preferred to "rag-time."

Even more convincing is the five years' experience of the supervisor of music in the schools of St. Louis, beginning with the seventh grade. Among the eighty thousand school children of that city says the supervisor, "there are few advanced pupils who would not much rather sing fine music than rag-time." No doubt, in like case, children would prefer something better than the hideous colored supplement of the Sunday newspaper. For example, in its Easter number the *New York Times* reproduced Abbey's great series of Holy Grail paintings. As a result, the *Times* had a call for fifty thousand copies after the edition was exhausted.

Then why not start an organized plan to increase the supply of elevating dramatic recreations? Indeed, there are distinct signs of healthful insurgency. Such is the meaning of the "drama leagues," organized in the four great cities of the country, boasting an aggregate membership of more than thirty thousand; while the Toy Theater in Boston and the Little Theater in New York are not without significance as revealing a novel craving for a worthier drama. Since the hour seems auspicious, why should not private endowment join with the municipality in providing the new education? Let the children's educational theater and the juvenile recreative drama be generously fostered. The motion-picture show, in particular, seems to have a great future. Under present conditions, it is the people's favorite theater; and morally, at least in the great cities, it is the best low-priced dramatic spectacle. Why not municipalize it as an integral part of the public-school system? Its relatively high grade in the large cities is in part due to the censorship of the films. There is need of much more

intelligent censorship and of extending such censorship to the small towns. May we not go one step farther? Why not create a national committee for the voluntary censorship of *all* classes of dramatic recreations? It might publish lists of accredited plays and spectacles.

Dare we hope that sometime the educational theater, the refined motion-picture spectacle, and the new moral drama shall replace the burlesque, the vaudeville, and the penny arcade; and that the new historical pageant shall reveal to the American people nobler emblems of patriotism, finer symbols of national glory, than the din and carnage of the existing Fourth of July celebration?

We have more wealth, more knowledge, and more leisure than had the Greeks: would that we might add the noble ideal of sane living which made possible the age of Pericles.

BURKE'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

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Burke's chief claim to a permanent place among thinkers lies in his critical rejection of eighteenth-century rationalism in political philosophy, and the general character of this I may assume to be sufficiently familiar not to need exposition. The true virtue in politics, according to Burke, is not metaphysical reasoning, but practical tact and prudence. Go slow, build on the past, avoid sweeping changes, take the "precautions which distinguish benevolence from imbecility"—this is the substance of his teaching. As my purpose is largely polemical, I should make it clear at the start that I have no quarrel with such a position in a general way. As a controversialist, Burke must be allowed to have had considerably the better of the argument. Indeed, were it not that overconfidence in reasoned theories of society running far ahead of practice continues to be much in evidence, one might consider it hardly necessary to raise again the question of the validity, within certain limits, of his justification of expediency versus theory. But the limits would still remain to be determined. For however valid in itself, Burke's doctrine may become the starting-point of very opposite social attitudes according as it is held.

The difference of emphasis may be suggested by the two words *experience* and *experiment*. The one of these looks chiefly to the past, the other chiefly to the future; but it is not unnatural to take them at times as interchangeable. Now the major part at least of what is most valuable in Burke's philosophy is covered by the word "experiment." To say that politics should be experimental is to imply that it should never "entirely and at once depart from antiquity." But a philosophy of "experience" may also have the sense, not that we should

judge on the basis of experience, new and old, our own and that of others, but that we should *abide by the experience of the past*, should accept its outcome in opposition to our merely personal notions, and make it our main business to retain unsullied the wisdom it has handed down.

Now whatever advantages may be allowed to attach to a regard for antiquity, it is clear at the start that Burke displays a degree of veneration for the past, and a fear of innovation, which inclines distinctly to the latter emphasis. No one will deny the danger that lies in a spirit of reckless innovation. But also one might suppose that over-timidity fails of being altogether safe. The present world happens to be so constituted that it is important at times that one be willing to take risks. Burke seldom or never has a word to say of this counter danger. On the contrary, he finds it hard to express strongly enough his ideal of prudential timidity in all matters that concern the state. He will change nothing till he can see his way with complete certainty. He will admit a justification to the idea of revolution that sets itself against the time-honored constitutional forms, only under circumstances of such extremity as would justify our dispensing with the whole moral law. He will set his face rigidly against any tendency to question the existing order, to make the benefits of the constitution a matter of discussion, because it is unsettling and of uncertain issue, just as his modern disciples proclaim the sin of muck-raking as a menace to prosperity. Although he grants, with some hesitation, that in theory truth may perhaps be a higher aim than peace, yet in practice, unless the truth is very self-evident indeed, he is for holding fast to peace. It is odd that Burke should be so mightily concerned for the consequences of discussion if he really is assured that no genuine grievances are to be disclosed. But in any case it remains true that the impression his attitude leaves is the not very bracing one of a desire above all else to be safe and sane, to risk nothing, to tolerate what is bad oftentimes for fear of worse—an attitude which is the more disappointing in Burke in its contrast to the fine moral

fervor with which he himself can deal with such reforms as do not stray beyond the limits of constitutionality.

The inadequacy of Burke's philosophy of experience is equally suggested by his exaggerated opinion of the wisdom of the past. It is not easy to acquit him even of the vulgar prejudice which sets our ancestors on a pedestal of wisdom and virtue simply because they are sufficiently removed from us to have taken their place in a glorified mythus. He speaks of our canonized forefathers, our wiser and better ancestors. God forbid, he piously exclaims, that we should pass judgment upon people who framed the laws and institutions prior to our insect origin of yesterday. It very likely is human nature, as he himself remarks, rather to defer to the wisdom of times past than to the present, of whose imbecility we have daily experience. But this suggests rather too forcibly that we fail to be in like manner impressed with the imbecility of our ancestors, only because we are no longer in possession of a sufficiently minute knowledge of their motives and reasonings. What in one place Burke adduces as evidence of this superiority—the great goodness of our forefathers in sending over colonists to America to introduce the Christian religion and Christian manners among the natives—is not a little indicative of such a bias toward historical idealization.

What then does constitute the advantage to which the past has a fair claim? The obvious answer is, that by its being past, it has had a chance to put its experiments to the test of experience, and so has got rid of some rubbish which, were the testing still in the future, there could be no certain grounds for condemning. But this is not enough for Burke. For his thesis is, not merely that experience is the test of political truth, but that we have already reached a point where through the process of experience a final constitution of English society has been sifted out. But evidently this will not follow except on one supposition. The past is justified only because its results justify themselves to us, the inheritors of the past, in terms of our satisfaction with them. If people are discontented, then the sole reason for maintaining the superiority of the past fails.

And accordingly the question presents itself to Burke again: Why are you so passionately setting forth the claims of the past, crying down the new spirit of dissatisfaction and revolt? If your estimate of the past is right, it approves itself by the absence of other than minor danger from a discontent which has no real ground. If your apprehensions are well grounded, antiquity cannot support the claims you make for it.

Burke tries on occasion both the ways in which this difficulty might be met. On the one hand he is continually endeavoring to reassure himself in his confidence that things are quite as they should be, and that abuses are only temporary and venial, to recall the unbroken faith of earlier days that in the British constitution, and the Whig party, the powers of good in the universe have put forth their supreme and final effort. Something remains to be said of this self-persuasion in the sequel. But first it may be well to consider the more reasoned grounds on which he attempts to make good his confidence in the inherent justice of the English social structure.

There are two motives in Burke's theory of the grounds of political belief which are not wholly in accord. Nothing is clearer than that his philosophy does not intend to be in the end merely utilitarian and positive. He is fully convinced that, along with utility, there is a second and more ultimate foundation of society—eternal justice; that there is a law of truth and equity in human history which every human law or institution must reflect if it is to have the slightest claim on allegiance. Now one might perhaps suppose that if this is so, it would be useful to apply these fundamental principles of justice to the criticism of human affairs. And this is what the philosophers were endeavoring actually to do. After all, the real inwardness of their meaning is not to be found in a tinkering with constitutions, as Burke uncharitably assumes, but in this effort to apply a rational standard for judging things as they happen to exist. And however crude its application, the "Rights of Man" furnished, and was intended to furnish, such a moral standard. Taken in the proper way, and not as a rule which tells offhand just what politically to do in each particular case,

this is by no means the impertinence that Burke declares it to be. Properly used, even its abstractness is not altogether a deficiency. If such a principle really represents a genuine insight, that can serve as a compass to guide our general direction, while yet we realize that it has to be interpreted by reference to particular circumstances, it is in a way easier oftentimes to make use of in its more general form. It impresses the logical imagination more, the issue is less apt to be obscured by the irrelevancies of the particular case, it carries a certain weight of moral impulse that may easily be lost the more we attempt to make it comprehensive and concrete. Expediency is a valuable word, but it cannot be claimed that it stirs very wildly the moral pulse; whereas Burke himself would have to admit that the "Rights of Man" is even dangerously exciting. At the very least it furnishes a rallying point, a flag or emblem, in the constant warfare against bureaucracy. What is the use, asks Burke, of discussing the abstract right to food? The real question is as to the ways of procuring it. But what if our rulers are not interested in procuring it, but rather in evading so far as possible any responsibility in the matter? Then surely it may be a very practical and useful thing indeed to talk, and to talk very freely and pointedly, about our rights.

Now to such a plea as this Burke makes, it may be said, no demur. As a matter of fact it is the very thing that he himself is constantly doing. But the point I am trying to make is this, that on this account his opposition of abstract principles to expediency is polemically misleading. For in the end it is not expediency at all which is the real motive of his opposition; it is rather a second principle which he substitutes for the revolutionary principle of the "Rights of Man." Erroneous theories stand opposed in his mind to the principle of *mos majorum*, the glorification of the constitution as it stands—the constitution "whose sole authority is that it has existed time out of mind." And to say that the principle of political action is the paramount authority of the past, is quite different from saying that all changes should keep in view expediency and fact. Accordingly the real thing that Burke has to justify is not expediency

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versus theory, but one theory against another. The task laid upon him is to establish the philosophy of the legal type of mind as against that of the moralist and reformer, and to ground the over-ruling claims of precedent.

It is not difficult to understand the state of mind which animates Burke. It is most readily illustrated in a religious attitude which is strictly analogous. The belief in an authoritative Bible is not itself opposed to a confidence in reason. Rather such an authority is conceived to be an embodied standard of reason. But when human thinking has started an attack upon the book, its defender finds himself forced in some measure to make a distinction which he would be better pleased to avoid, and to set himself in opposition to the presumption and inadequacy of the merely human intellect, in order to defend the embodiment of settled and digested truth on which he has been accustomed to rest.

But political conservatism, for a man of Burke's caliber, presented a difficulty which did not meet him in the same acute form in religion. There was a generally accepted basis of authority in religion to be found in the conception of revelation. But something different was needed to establish the divine authority of the present social order. Burke's answer is, in general terms, an appeal to history, backed by an underlying faith in the divine order of the world. Prescription, he says, is the most solid of all titles. "It is the deliberate election of ages and generations, made by circumstances ten thousand times better than choice. The individual is foolish, the multitude for the moment is foolish, the species is wise." The justification of the existing order is this test of a developing race experience, which has actually issued in that most blessed of human products, the British constitution; a faith finally anchored by confidence in an over-ruling Providence, from whose justice and benevolence such an outcome as we actually find might from the start have been expected. "For it is not to be imagined that God would suffer this great gift of government to be the plaything and the sport of the feeble will of man." I do not know of a better parallel than is to be found in Newman's philosophy of the au-

thority of the church. There is the same emotional background as determining an a priori probability, the same rather uncritical acceptance of a present attainment as a final meeting of this demand, the same depreciation of human in favor of institutional reason. As Newman would revive apostolic fervor in order to defend the church against its enemies, so with Burke the final justification of reform in the state is always that by so doing we may preserve the time-honored frame of the constitution. It is unnecessary to do more than indicate here the obvious defect of such a view. The test of developing experience is indeed a perfectly sound one so long as we do not endeavor to arrest this testing process at an arbitrary point which we happen to have reached. Development and the test of experience are a sound basis for experimentation, but they cannot safely be appealed to, to ground a perfect and finished product.

But while prescription exalts the embodied wisdom of institutions, it is a principle which cannot safely give any great scope to actual human reason. Accordingly Burke is at times very close to agnosticism in his estimate of man's rational powers. Burke always tests thinking by its rather immediate practical utility. What is the use of them? is the question which he brings to such writings as profess simply to be asking for truth. He has very little sense for the value of intellectual understanding as such: superstition, for example, is not such a bad thing if it can be put by the statesman to practical benefit; and he deprecates the conversion of any man from the sect into which he was born, since correctness of opinion counts little as against religious peace and quietness. Perhaps this accounts too in part for Burke's own rather flexible conception of the ethics of argument, and his readiness to resort to somewhat dubious tricks of rhetoric when there is a good cause to be maintained. This depreciation of reason is the natural outcome of his pragmatic or expediency philosophy, quite apart from the exigencies of the polemical situation. What indeed would become of the world if the practice of all moral duties and the foundations of society rested on having their reasons made clear and demonstrated to every individual? And if the general habit of

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inquiry thus would be intolerable, it is not safe, Burke with his habitual caution argues, for anyone to meddle with such questions, but all should fall back upon the pious trust that a greater intelligence than ours has worked things out for the best, and not attempt to "submit the sovereign reason of the world to the caprices of weak and giddy men." Of course, it is true that there *is* a risk in setting our private judgment against the wisdom of the ages, and it is easy to sneer at the pretensions of the former, to speak scornfully of "going out of our way to discover whether the venerated constitution does or does not accord with a preconceived scheme in the mind of certain gentlemen." This is a sort of arrogance to which he who is backed by authority is always prone. But we must not forget that no one has any mind except his own private one, and if we are only to use this when we admire, and never when we condemn, defects, if they exist, are certain not to be discovered. Accordingly, although historical experience is Burke's court of appeal, it is to the blind workings of history that the appeal is made, and not to any reasoned and critical analysis of it. Any possible knowledge of history in this last sense he expressly calls very superficial and unimportant. And in this way he is enabled to minimize the need of finding causes for such a revolution as was occurring in Europe. Revolutions are largely unpredictable; and so we can ignore the claim that there must be real defects in society to occasion so widespread a discontent, can throw all the blame on the revolutionists, and treat their conduct as a mere explosion of unreason and bad morals. So again if we seem to see flaws in the constitution, Burke replies, in the familiar words of the defender of the Scriptures, that the lack is in us. We ought to "understand it according to our measure, and to venerate when we are not able perfectly to comprehend."

But now in the background there has been one aspect of decisive importance which has not yet been sufficiently emphasized. The most active agent in Burke's conclusions is to be found undoubtedly in his emotional bent. The gist of this side of his philosophy is felicitously put in his own words: "Politics

ought to be adjusted not to human reason, but to human nature, of which reason is only a part, and often a minor part." The germs of this are found as far back as the "Essay on the Sublime." "Whenever," he writes, "the wisdom of the Creator intended we should be affected with anything, he did not confide the execution of his design to the languid and precarious operation of our reason, but he endued it with powers and properties that prevent the understanding and even the will, which, seizing the senses and imagination, captivate the soul before the understanding is ready either to join with them or to oppose them." It is scarcely forcing things to say that in the final analysis the ground of government is for Burke reducible to that aesthetic or semi-aesthetic judgment which he had examined in his early essay.

It scarcely admits of doubt that in Burke's case this emotional bias has throughout an influence so dominant and compelling that it ought to put us on our guard. Whenever our theories contradict our feelings, he declares, our feelings are true and the theory false. "Never, no never, did Nature say one thing and Reason another." And now this does not profess to be merely an academic justification of the rights of feeling. To say that true feeling and true reason coincide might theoretically be true enough, but politically it would be quite unmeaning unless we were able to identify and to locate pretty precisely the feelings for which nature stands sponsor. And if it turns out that we mean by nature simply that more reputable expression of national life and feeling as it is familiar to the modern man—our patriotism, our benevolences, our public and private admirations—it seems scarcely so self-evident that these are bound of necessity to coincide with right reason. But this is what Burke intends. By feeling he means such feelings as in his customary social surroundings seem to the average Englishman spontaneous and proper. That such untutored feelings are "natural" is to Burke sufficient evidence that they are sound. It is such "unerring and powerful instincts" which procure reverence to our civil institutions on the principle on which Nature teaches us to revere individual

men—on account of their age, and on account of those from whom they are descended. "We fear God, we look up with awe to kings, with affection to Parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests and with respect to nobility." Why? because such feelings are natural, and all others are false and spurious. The constitution to this view stands out with all the solidity and unapproachable majesty of a natural object, to be revered and contemplated, but not criticized. What concretely Burke has in mind then is sufficiently plain; it is not merely the primitive instincts, but the familiar objects as well to which these attach in a society with caste distinctions.

In Burke, then, the purely general thesis that man's emotional nature has a claim to be satisfied in any scheme of human society passes over into the easily separable claim that the particular objects toward which his own emotional bent was directed were Nature's eternal answer to the cravings of the human heart. And in this way the vague doctrine that the laws of eternal justice have given birth to the British constitution is rendered more definite, and at the same time withdrawn from the uncertain and possibly dangerous test of a personal and reasoned experience of its workings, by the identification of Nature with those "natural" sentiments which he found actually serving to buoy up his own cherished political ideals, and by virtue of which he can condemn a spirit of innovation on general grounds as the "result of a selfish temper and confined views," while the existing system stands forth as a "great and self-evident correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world—the disposition of a stupendous wisdom." When, therefore, Burke contemplates the ignoring of ranks and distinctions, the exalting of inferiors—"associations of tailors and carpenters"—to a level with their betters, and turns aside from it as a self-evident "warring with nature," we are to recognize that this in part at least is merely an expression of the most common of human weaknesses—the unwillingness to recognize as within the course of Nature whatever is unfamiliar, different from the settled customs of the land.

Before turning to the more reasoned basis for this philosophy

of aristocracy, there are certain further points that may profitably be recognized and discounted, which are connected with his emotional temperament. One can hardly fail, for example, to recognize that Burke is constituted with an instinctive dislike to negation and destruction, which is not wholly amenable to rational considerations. It is very well to talk of the importance of building on the past, but there is a point of wisdom also in knowing when a thing's usefulness is over. Not all the heritage of the past is embodied in the institutions it has created; it may consist in part in a realization that the institution is no longer adequate to its purpose. But Burke has an instinct against throwing anything away, like the housewife who collects the débris of a lifetime in her garret; take as an example his plea for the retention of the monasteries in France.

In a more positive way, also, Burke's emotional prepossessions require an allowance to be made. The pomp of life has a tendency to overawe him after a fashion which in a smaller and less sincere man might easily give occasion to the charge of fulsomeness. Burke must of course have recognized his own political merits; and yet he talks at times in a tone of exaggerated humility, like an underservant who "knows his place." The thought of any abridgment of feudal rights, of any approach to simple man-to-man relationships, seems repugnant to him. The slighting way in which frequently he speaks of lawyers and mechanics, of "plebeian pride and upstart insolence," indicates an inbred respect for birth which only stops short of being servile. Toward his own sovereign his expressions are sometimes needlessly eulogistic, to use no harsher term. His best prayer for George III is that he should "live, reign, and die exactly like his illustrious predecessor." A royal proclamation is the "best of messages, to the best of people, from the best of kings." Still worse is his compliment to the king's style in a state paper—"a style which such a poor crow quill as mine can never hope to equal." At the very least, Burke cannot be acquitted of an over-solemn and over-impressive tone in his admirations; witness the highly wrought romanticism of his Indian writings.

to personal

servile to the class monarchy

Of course in a way this charge of sentimentalism is a matter of taste and perspective, which in the end is scarcely open to strict argument. But there is one aspect of it which is less debatable, and which, after making all allowance, ought assuredly to lower the prestige of his personal authority. This is the palpable unfairness and intolerance into which he is too frequently betrayed by the force of his feelings. Possibly it is an amiable weakness that one should be so strongly possessed by his sense of the worth of certain things that his temper cannot stand the strain of hearing them questioned. But it is a weakness. The fact is, it has to be said that Burke had no real conception of the virtue of tolerance. It is perfectly true that in particular cases he stood up bravely for the tolerant policy. He is an unceasing advocate of liberty for Catholics. But the Catholic faith did not cross his prejudices; indeed its foundation in the past strongly appealed to him. But there is no credit in tolerating what seems to us perfectly tolerable. Now the moment his real emotions are touched, Burke loses suddenly all his sweet reasonableness. He becomes vindictive, and is for bringing in force to avenge his outraged sensibilities. The Catholic is the victim of an "outrageous and antiquated spirit of intolerance." But when it comes to tolerating the atheist, that is quite another matter. These "insect reptiles" are outlaws of the constitution. And as for Jacobinism and the new philosophy, Burke is as convinced of his moral mission to root out the heresy as ever was a Spanish inquisitor. Paine he would have imprisoned. The Unitarian malcontents shall be refused the relief which all his life he had been urging for the Catholics. An honest belief in the principles of the Revolution on the part of the French priests shall be so far from modifying their punishment when the exiles return, that it shall be the express ground for special retribution upon them. Of course the professed basis for intolerance in both cases is the safety of the state. To this end, he would regard it as the interest, duty, and right of government to "attend much to opinions." But Burke seems oblivious to the fact that along that path danger lies—all the danger that has ever attached to persecu-

tion; that a "reasonable, prudent, and moderate coercion" is the plea of all persecutors equally. And he fails conspicuously to guard his doctrine to avoid the danger. The coercive power of the state, he says indeed, is limited to what is necessary for its preservation. But does this mean the preservation of society, or—what he seems to say—the preservation of the existing state, with all its detailed structure of traditional minutiae bound up with tenacious privilege and vested interest. And to make it worse, Burke expressly denies one of the strongest arguments for toleration—its value in opening the way to possible new truth. For it is precisely new ideas that Burke would submit to persecution. The presumption is ever on the side of possession—surely of all human propositions one of the most debatable; and therefore the oldest error and superstition is to be treated more tenderly than what has still to make its way in men's minds. The result is a justification of that whole policy which disgraced England for a number of years to come. "I am not enamoured with this plan of representation," Burke writes, "and as little do I relish any bandings and associations for procuring it." The restriction of such voluntary associations, or "clubs for debating forms of the constitution"—there is something of almost official insolence in Burke's proposal to grant relief to the Unitarians only when they disband as a faction and act as individuals—the limitation of the freedom of the press, the urging upon the Holy Alliance its "duty to know and its right to prevent any capital innovation in Europe"—even outside a monarch's own territory—"which may amount to the erection of a dangerous nuisance"—all this shows clearly that of the real principle of tolerance Burke had scant conception. What effect such principles may have upon his reasonings may be illustrated in his argument about the relief of the Unitarians. They declare against Establishment, he says to the dignitaries of the church; therefore you have the alternative of keeping up their disabilities, or subjecting yourself to their persecution. On such a showing no abuse ever could be attacked with equity, for in assaulting it the reformer would be "persecuting" its beneficiary, and would thereby forfeit his

right to tolerance in turn. Most surprising of all is Burke's deliberate promoting of the blessed Holy War, on the ground of the moral duty of the Allies to an exercise of salutary force to prevent the spread of heretical opinions through Europe. It would have been in vain to ask Burke whether he really thought that muskets and the gibbet were adequate methods for checking a movement which, as he admitted, was one of ideas. He has the satisfaction of meeting reason by force; but he must take the consequence of being writ down a persecutor.

It would be strange if with such feelings Burke had not shown his bias constantly in his reasonings. He says indeed in the essay that the purpose of rhetoric is to display rather the effect of things on the mind of the speaker than to present a clear idea of the things themselves. But to claim allowance for Burke as a rhetorician, and not a mere philosophic reasoner, is simply to admit that he allows his emotional reaction to interfere with his intellectual honesty; and that, however natural it may be, is never an excuse. Indeed his failing cuts at the very root of the philosophic attitude. To be a philosopher one has first to keep his temper. He must be willing to entertain unpalatable opinions without getting angry at them, must weigh them impartially on their evidence, follow premises to their conclusions as if for the moment nothing existed in the world but pure logic. Here is indeed the one essential defect of Burke's genius. His breadth of view was remarkably comprehensive and modern; and because it was so much broader than that of the average man, there is in detail a vast amount in him which is permanently true and fruitful. But Burke could not do what is often possible for men whose range of positive thought is not to be compared to his; he could not put himself beyond the limits of that conception which gripped his imagination and his moral nature. He could not get his own opinions in perspective even for a moment. The consequence is that he remains in the end provincial, though the province over which he rules is a vast one. He cannot get away from the unavoidable overestimate of that scheme of things to which he was used, and which he was accustomed to see only from the inside;

always he swings back to the self-evidence of the existing system which he admires. And this is the ground of that curious phenomenon—an ardent love of liberty and reform, bounded by an absolute fixed limit, outside which he abandons the very principles he has been using on lesser problems. In his judgment on France and the Jacobins this bias becomes an obsession. It is not pleasant to contemplate Burke in his ravings; he feels himself bound to believe the worst and nothing but the worst: his picture of vileness is without relief. On the other side, Burke is equally unable to see any flaws in the roseate picture of monarchical France. The rulers are innocent, and the attack unprovoked. "Never," he writes, "was so beautiful and august a spectacle presented to the moral eye as Europe afforded the day before the Revolution in France." That there is danger of anything but the most chivalrous justice from those trusty servants of God, the allies, and the Bourbon princes whom they are to make masters again in France, Burke will not for a moment admit. At the present day it is hardly necessary to say that this picture, if it is true, leaves the whole Revolution a monstrous and unintelligible anomaly.

Burke's more special theory of society, then, as determined by the existing conditions which he wishes to justify, is an attempt to combine the general principle of social benefit as the underlying law of government, with a system of aristocratic privilege. The special medium for connecting the two, and for disparaging democracy on the contrary side, is the further principle that the great end of government is to "throw the offices into the most virtuously inclined hands." That in the nature of the case it is only an aristocracy that can accomplish this is Burke's justification of the ways of Providence in creating the British constitution.

ns
natural
aristocracy

Burke's postive argument rests chiefly on two considerations. The first is the function of an aristocracy in providing a source from which a safe leadership can reasonably be expected. The representation of the great historic families, free from the constraint that material needs impose, and with the broad outlook that comes from abundant leisure and a liberal

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education, nurtured in the tradition of service to the state, and "grafting public principles on private honor," their interests identified with the institutions of their country, and possessed of all the weight and influence needed to draw lesser men in their train—such to Burke seems the only way to secure the service, at once competent and disinterested, which the government of the country needs.

2 In this there is suggested already the more particular point of political value which Burke finds in an aristocracy. Since stability is the first demand, the greater power should be in the hands of those who have the greatest stake in the country. Here accordingly appears a principle which for Burke is highly important; the deepest basis of the constitution is *property*. It is the very essence of Burke's position that property should have privileges, that it should be "out of all proportion to ability predominant in representation." And the expediency of this is, again, that only so shall we have a body of men both able and anxious to preserve the institutions from which they draw their benefits. In this he sees nothing harmful; "to be honored and even privileged by the laws, opinions, and inveterate prejudices of our country has nothing to provoke horror or indignation in any man."

7 Now this is a position not unintelligible in itself. But on the other hand Burke accepts the sovereignty of the people as the ultimate source of law and government. To what extent are the two consistent? Burke is extremely ingenious in meeting the difficulty, but his solution can hardly evade the charge of special pleading. The theory of sovereignty has its severest test in connection with the Revolution. Here was a nation which had set aside its rulers and adopted a new polity. The action may have been very unwise. But wherein had the nation exceeded its right? Burke has one answer to this to which it is difficult to listen with patience. It is the inalienable quality of the bond between sovereign and people. This mutual dependence is a contract binding forever, if we are not to have the utter subversion not only of all government, but of the principles of morality itself. It is inviolably fixed, of coercive

power on posterity, needing the free consent of the ruler before it can be changed. The feelings which led Burke to such a position it is not hard to understand; but the position itself is an impossible one. The day for talking of inalienable contracts has gone by, and at least no honest reasoning can pretend that the notion is consistent with the sovereignty of the people. But Burke has a more subtle answer than this to make—an answer which shows rather clearly both his strength and his weakness.

The truth in this second contention lies in the recognition of the difference between the will of the people as a capricious, accidental conformity of wishes in a majority, and the really rational will and conscience, governed by genuine insight, and revealing a permanent trend of enlightened endeavor. Burke is altogether right—and the upholder of democracy may follow him with gratitude—when he maintains the need of subjecting occasional will to permanent reason. But when one has declined to see the voice of God in every utterance of the people alike, there is still a choice of alternatives. He may find the genuine will distinguished from the spurious simply by the test of time, of permanent trend, of a wisdom winnowed from folly through the growing comprehension and self-discovery that comes from the education of the race, and the added experience alike of success and failure. Or—and this is what Burke chooses rather—he may find the distinction identical with that between popular demand, and embodied institutional attainment. And the importance of the difference lies in this, that in the first instance it really is the people who determine—the mass, the majority—whereas the latter may be compatible with almost any limitation of the significant political body. Accordingly we find the conception used by Burke to define the “people” after a fashion capable of any abuse in practical application. The people, he argues, are not the mere collection of individuals; and this undoubtedly is true and valuable. But when he goes on to declare that it is a usurpation to consider simply individuals as against organized forms of society, the way is opened to a dangerous misconstruction. How Burke is ready to interpret this is evident in its application to the people

of France, where it turns out to mean that the corporate people of France are not the great body of the nation, since by turning against their natural chieftains the common sort of men have lost their title. Rather, the relatively few refugees are actually the French nation, since they alone continue to represent those constitutional forms whose destruction means the turning of the nation into a mob. So again there is truth in the contention that a legislator may actually be best expressing the people's will not by an abject submission to their temporary wishes, but by a devotion to their higher good which will lead him to oppose them in their own best interests. But this again, being interpreted, comes to mean for Burke that a paternal coercion of the popular will is justified when this last is directed against institutions in which the interests of the rulers are bound up. For the basis of obligation is not consent, but the "*presumed* consent of every rational creature as in unison with the predisposed order of things"; and the people cease to be the people when they cease to support the established order. It is quite evident that this is to confuse the moral order of society with the actual order, in a way to empty of all real meaning the doctrine of the people's sovereignty, and to identify the nation with the respectable and ruling classes. With these premises, liberty also can hardly mean for Burke the common article which goes by that name. In reading Burke's glowing tributes to liberty, we need to remember that back of the word there lies a larger and more dominant conception, the conception of the established order; and that even his finest sayings are to be interpreted in the light of this. So when he declares that "liberty and justice are one," he means more than the words might at first imply—the identification of justice, namely, with the British law. Translate the saying into its full implication—liberty is to be a British subject, enjoying to the full Magna Charta, the House of Lords, Church Establishment, and a property franchise with due place for rotten boroughs—and the fine moral flavor tends in part to evaporate.

Now it does not need saying that Burke has no sympathy with oppression and cruelty to the poor. Quite the contrary,

the whole power of society is to be exerted to secure them those rights which they are granted by the laws. But the fact remains that Burke's notion of society is feudal—a romantic idealization of a caste system wherein a splendid and generous upper class benevolently protects its inferiors, and gives to them the blessings which in its wisdom it sees they need. As applied to this society we are to discourage any critical and impartial scrutiny of the scientific understanding. Because the wants of the populace are childish and unstable, we must soften the realism of the bare facts, throw over them the glamor of poetry and imagination, cover life with "pleasing illusions and decent draperies." We must guard carefully against any spread of the notion that the constitution has defects, is not as perfect as it ought to be, at least until we have it definitely in our power to mend things. People should be led to acquiesce in a belief in the superior wisdom of their law-makers, to repose in them an "unsuspicious confidence" even though they do not see the reason for their acts, as children are on unsafe ground when they begin to question the omniscience of their parents. Without the most weighty reasons, it is "highly dangerous to suppose that the House speaks anything contrary to the sense of the people." The people are not to assume to question, for example, such high matters as the right or wrong of wars in which governmental policy engages; it is to be taught in general piously to believe in the "mysterious virtues of wax and parchment." And for Burke this idea of dependence on benevolent superiority is no temporary and deplorable necessity; it is a picture which expands his bosom and appeals to his sense of eternal fitness. Take his quite similar attitude toward women. One great objection he has to a piece of Irish legislation is that it deprives the husband of coercive power over his wife; the declaration that women have been too long under the tyranny of parents and husbands strikes him as "infamous," and he appeals to the horrible consequences of "taking one half the species wholly out of the guardianship and protection of the other."

In the end, accordingly, Burke's philosophy of experience comes back to the dangerous, in any case the unheroic maxim,

Let well enough alone. True reform consists only in administering the constitution unselfishly and wisely, and never in experimenting with it, or trying to change it for the better. Burke's great powers and ardent temperament were employed to strengthen the already too powerful hands of prescription, and to give added weight to the very thing that has always been the chief weapon in the hands of the enemies of reform. Systematically Burke endeavors to contract the amount of change to be admitted rather than to make it as large as is safe. The whole outcome of his exhortations is to strengthen the habit of unreasoning attachment to shibboleths, and so to increase the natural weakness of those good souls—the words are his own—"whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty politicians." And the danger of such an emphasis will always be a real one because particularly of certain limitations of human character which no political theory can afford to overlook. Discount as much as we please the gross and intentional sacrifice of public to private interests on the part of the ruling class, it is still impossible to get away from the essential and necessary limitations of humankind when intrusted with power. We habitually and vastly over-rate the wisdom of the wise. We talk glibly of the incapacity of the people to govern; but there are far narrower differences between men than our optimistic generalizations admit. How many persons can we call to mind whom we would willingly for a single day intrust with the ordering of our own lives? And the combining of superior men is in some ways not only no relief, but it is an aggravation of the risk. The only palliative to the unfortunate necessity that some men should have to govern others is a proper feeling of humility, a realizing sense of the fallibility of the human judgment at its best. But a ruling class is always headed the other way. It is under a compulsion to exaggerate its own finality, to become cocksure and autocratic, to widen the gulf between the few who do and the many who must have things done for them, and to prefer to the independent, self-assertive man him who is willing for benefits received to take his superiors at their face value, to mind his own business, and keep hands off of

high and esoteric matters. It is inevitable therefore not only that a division of interests should arise, but that the ruler should in an increasing degree become honestly incapable of seeing things from the standpoint of the subject class. The "Washington point of view" is notoriously provincial and behind the occasion, even with all the facilities in a democracy for bringing opinion to bear.

Now Burke and his philosophy are the victims of this astigmatism. Burke is distinctly a man of the prosperous classes. He looks at things through the eyes of that limited portion of society who by reason of their social and financial superiority find things on the whole to be good, and who can afford to wait even where an occasional reform does seem to be demanded. And yet he was not blind to the sort of indictment which it is possible to bring against accepted conditions. In one of his earliest works there are passages which might have a place in a manifesto of modern socialism. These do not, however, represent Burke's own convictions. The book is the *Vindication of Natural Society*. It purports to be written by a rationalist as an attack upon conventional society; but Burke intends it as a *reductio ad absurdum*. The freethinkers were continually attacking Christianity by pointing to the evils and superstitions connected with it; these were held to justify our condemning it in favor of natural religion, a religion of pure reason. Burke thinks that the same sort of argument would condemn government also, and so in the book he applies it to social organization, intending, of course, to lead his readers to the recognition that so ridiculous a result condemns the whole method of argument. But such a procedure is always a bit risky. It is possible that the reader who has followed his indictment of society may not at the end be in the mood to rest satisfied with his conclusions. No doubt his words were intended to be an exaggeration; and they do give an impression too unrelieved. And yet they are substantially true. And if true, ought they not to interfere a little with our contented acquiescence in things as they are, our feeling of the high wisdom of our ancestors who have handed down to us a heritage with

such fundamental imperfections; and make us a trifle more tolerant toward the discontent, though it be often unwise and extreme, which demands something like decent conditions of life for all, even though it may involve drastic treatment of venerable institutions? Burke dismisses too easily the vision he had conjured up. One need not deny that the civilization which Burke admires has been needful in its day and place. It generated virtues—self-restraint, personal honor and loyalty, a sense of dignity and worth—which are involved in any effective social organization. But Burke was for leaving these eternally the virtues of a class, whereas they are stultified save as they show themselves capable of extending beyond their source and becoming a universal property. And the liberalizing of the masses is an impossibility so long as they are looked down upon, and look upon themselves, as inferiors. Here again the defect of Burke's mind shows in his inability to realize that what to him in the retrospect seems admirable may cease to be really admirable by the very movement to arrest it. Benevolent feudalism has had its part to play, but the part is already coming to a close when it ceases to be accepted unquestioningly. A doubt of its finality constitutes its death blow. The rôle of gracious overlord or Lady Bountiful becomes ungracious, narrow-minded, priggish, even hateful, when it is forced to consciousness by coming into conflict with a demand for human equality on the part of its beneficiaries. Burke's intellectual condemnation lies in his entire inability to see that the real basis of the new movement was not the more or less superficial philosophizing of the theorists, but the awakening of the multitudes to wrongs none the less real because not recognized by the powerful classes, or recognized as inevitable, and determined by a kind Providence to provide the means of living comfortably for its favorites. Take even such a thing as the glaring inaptitudes of the British representative system. Burke insists that all is as it should be, that "our representation has been found perfectly adequate to all the purposes to which a representation of the people can be desired," that no other reason can be supposed for the "suggestion that we are not happy

enough to enjoy a sufficient number of voters in England save the demagogical wish to create discontent."

But now there is one side of Burke's theory which, although it has been referred to already, deserves in closing a word further. The more one examines his reasoning, the more it becomes evident that, stripped of its special emotional aspects, his principle is the sacredness, not of monarchy, nor of the nobility, but of *property*. Burke always conceived that wealth would naturally be absorbed into and strengthen the hereditary nobility, and he did not foresee the rise of a business plutocracy. But had he done so, though he doubtless would have regretted the change, his essential philosophy would still apply. It is this which motivates his attack on the loosening of authority and the growth of a "frantic democracy"; if prescription be once shaken, no species of property is secure. The great danger of the times is the setting up of numbers against property; the principal object of all reform is the conservation of property as well as the monarchy. After all his glowing pictures of the sacred organism of society, it turns out to be the one end of government to police property rights. The constitution "expressly regards property rather than persons."

And it is frankly the great properties for which Burke is chiefly concerned; he even seems to imply that it is these that should be securest, that they have a superior claim over the small and emotionally unimportant holdings. In great fortunes Burke can see no elements of danger or injustice. "I like," he writes of the nobility, "to see your estates as great as they are. I wish they were greater; but I wish above all they should be perpetual." "I have done all I could," he declares again, "to discountenance these inquiries into the fortunes of those who hold large portions of wealth without any apparent merit of their own"; for the state to take back into its hands grants made to classes of men, "let them be held by what names or be supposed susceptible to what abuses soever," is to undermine the very props of society. It is indeed a "sort of profaneness" even to talk of use as effecting the title to property. All the danger and wickedness is on the other side, in the malignant disposition

which "leaves the comparatively indigent to judge of the wealth and prescribe to the opulent what use they are to make of their fortune."

But now does not such a constitution of society based on eternal inequality seem to be slipping away from that roseate-hued perfection of divine wisdom whose praises Burke has been celebrating? If, as Burke allows, the rich are the pensioners of the poor who live upon the surplus of the workers, is there not after all some apparent justification for those pestilential fellows, the Jacobins, who are forever telling about the injustices to which property gives rise? As a final answer, Burke falls back upon the new political economy and the praises of enlightened self-interest. But here again his standing is not quite secure. He would prefer of course to see only good in economic conditions; and to this end he enlarges upon the value to society in letting economic laws have free course, and the necessary connection between the prosperity of the capitalist and the benefit of the laborer; if the former is excessively avaricious, so much the better, says Burke, in his naïve confidence in the presence of God in business. It is really a blessing, however carefully disguised, to the workingman thus to give up his surplus to support the landed capitalist, for though the latter does not labor, "his idleness is the spring of labor, his repose the spur to industry," his "luxury and fashion are necessary to distribute the surplus product of the soil." But to this glorification there is a limit. Try as we may, the dead weight of ignorance, poverty, vice, and suffering that hangs over the head of society cannot by any jugglery permanently be ignored. And so Burke, without apparently seeing that it is fatal to his idealization of the *status quo*, falls back upon the only really honest reply—the confession that a universal good is out of the question, and that meanwhile the relative misery of the masses is required to uphold civilization and make life easy for the upper layers of society. Poverty can never be overcome; it is due to the simple fact of numbers. "By the laws of property, which are the laws of Nature, which are the laws of God, it is impossible to supply to the poor those necessities which it

has pleased the Divine Providence for a while to withhold from them." We must simply accept the innumerable "servile, degrading, unseemly, unmanly, and often most unwholesome and pestiferous occupations to which by the social economy so many wretches are inevitably doomed"—else what would become of kings, members of Parliament, and the professional and mercantile classes? But when justice fails, we can still substitute charity. "When it happens that a man can claim nothing according to the rules of commerce and the principles of justice, he passes out of that department, and comes within the jurisdiction of mercy. Charity to the poor is a direct and obligatory duty on all Christians, next in order after the payment of debts, full as strong, and by nature made infinitely more delightful to us." So that after all compensation exists. If poverty is a decree of the laws of commerce, which are the laws of Nature, which are the laws of God, at least it adds its mite to the felicity of the wealthy and benevolent patron of the poor.

I am not here concerned with Burke's economic reasoning. But one thing can be said without qualification. One may find himself driven to accept the fact that for the mass of mankind there is no hope for a full and satisfying human life. But to accept this with nonchalance as at most a minor blemish on the fairness of the world, worse still to make out of it an occasion of moral unction, to cry out against any protest as the result only of "wicked pretences and the levity of the people," to intimate that pity for the poor is morally wrong because the laws of Nature make poverty necessary, and that the very use of the word even is a maudlin sentiment when applied to the laboring poor, and not, as it ought alone to be, to the sick and incapacitated, to assert the entire identity of interest between rich and poor, employer and laborer, as so self-evident that "nothing but the malignity, perversity, and ill-grounded passions of mankind can prevent our acknowledging with thankfulness to the benign and wise disposer of all things"—this is to forfeit in so far any claim to be a lover of liberty and the race, unless the excuse be admitted that the speaker is too much occupied with abstract moral and patriotic conventions to have any genu-

ine realization of what his words involve. Both judgments may, I think, be pronounced, with qualification, on Burke. In a way Burke's enthusiasm for freedom and his hatred of oppression may be over-rated. He inclines toward the spectacular always; some rather gross and obvious violation of liberty is needed to call forth his energies; and even here—take his championship of the people of India—indignation at the overthrow of ancient institutions, and at violations of the rights of begums and rajahs, mingles in equal proportions with a detestation of the sufferings of the poor. And when he is stirred by the latter, normally it is the sufferings of individuals that have to catch his eye and inflame his imagination. And he would meet them by—charity. Such an outcome reveals a certain lack of intellectual grasp. It makes of liberty a vague, diffusive, sentiment-arousing term which can ignore the vast mass of actual human wrongs; and then when it does turn the eye to the facts, it would fall back on methods that not only ignore, but actively circumvent, the true end of liberty. For what Burke himself so admirably says of imperialism holds good of his own outcome; no real liberty is possible to any, in a society which is based on what—though it be disguised by constitutional catchwords—is an actual lack of genuine freedom on the part of the majority. The harmony of interests for which Burke calls is not a real identity of interest between the rich and the poor. It is a truce by which the poor give up hope of any save a relative good that the order of society may not be disturbed. And since the order of society is confessedly the interest of the superior classes first of all, to deprecate all doctrines that “tend to make separate parties of the higher and lower orders,” is not to prevent a break, but only to disguise the differences that are already there, to the advantage primarily of one of the interested sides.

“AMERICAN LAWLESSNESS”: AN INQUIRY

VICTOR S. YARROS

A theme much discussed in a superficial way, in newspapers, after-dinner speeches, sermons, is the lack of respect for law which is supposed to be an American characteristic. Even men in public life, who would rather flatter their fellow-citizens than arraign them, make sweeping statements regarding American lawlessness. Men of judicial training and judicious views frequently support the charge in question without material qualification.

The theme is a serious one, and deserves a little deeper and closer study. Are the Americans a lawless or law-neglecting people? Are they peculiar in any real, palpable way with regard to their attitude toward law, regulation, social discipline? If they are, how is the fact to be explained? And is the explanation, or are the explanations, creditable or discreditable to them?

We may set out on our little inquiry with a few representative utterances embodying the apparent indictment of the nation.

In a speech to the Young Republican Club of New York, Senator Borah of Idaho used these words a few months ago: “We are even now, in our youth, the most lawless of any of the great civilized nations. There is no country of first importance where there is so little respect for law because it is law [as here].”

President Taft, who followed the Senator on the occasion in question, subscribed to the statement. “I believe it is true,” he said, “that we do not hold the law as sacred as we should,” and he added that he doubted whether “we held anything as sacred as we should.”

Professor Franklin H. Giddings, the head of the department of sociology at Columbia University, in an address delivered at a School of Philanthropy, stated that in the last fifteen or twenty years “a profound deterioration in private and public conduct” had taken place in this country. On all sides, he continued, “we see a desperate indifference” to morals and manners.

The editor of the *Century*, a few months since, while severely lecturing a citizen who, weary of American lawlessness, expressed his intention to shake our dust off his feet and move to some country where rules and regulations "mean something," made the following observations:

The fundamental difficulty we have is to obtain respect for law as a principle. Nor is this an academic question. In all our cities it is one of great practical importance. Take, for instance, the unrestrained littering of the streets with paper and banana peels. To object to this, while, every day burglaries and murders are being committed, seems to many an undue anxiety about the anise and cummin of good government. They do not see the value of enforcing public cleanliness, not only for itself, but as a discipline in obedience to law.

A Chicago educator, in an indignant letter to the press, declared that he sympathized with the citizen thus lectured, for he had himself felt, many times, the call to some such act of expatriation. He went on to specify:

There is so much playing fast and loose with law in this country, so much corruption and disorder, so much legislative partiality, so much positive anarchy on every hand.

Everybody in authority, from the individual policeman to the Supreme Court, takes it into his own hands to decide whether a law is to be enforced or not, and if so, how much. We are not a nation; we are a rabble.

Such quotations as these might be multiplied indefinitely. Are the facts as alleged? If they are, how does it happen that men and women who, in Europe, as Englishmen, Scotchmen, Irishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Danes, Swedes, etc., are law-abiding citizens, become by their change of allegiance and habitat, wild and anarchical persons? How does it happen that the descendants of such—and most of us are such descendants—throw off the restraints of tradition and social discipline? It is, indeed, said that the American climate—although our continent has several varieties of climate—tends to make us restless, impatient, strenuous; but we have heard of no scientific attempt to demonstrate the proposition that the American climate produces immorality and crime.

Eliminating physical factors we must turn for hints and possible causes to our social, political, industrial, and moral conditions. We cannot assert that free institutions, democratic government, bills of

rights, due process of law, free and universal elementary education are necessarily demoralizing. To maintain this is to despair of civilization and of progress, to imply that tyranny, caste, privilege and artificial inequality are conducive or essential to reasonably moral conduct—"which is absurd." Moreover, none of the factors just mentioned is peculiar to America. Democracy is advancing everywhere; feudalism and privilege are retreating everywhere. Few progressive thinkers believe that England, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia are threatened with moral deterioration and contempt of law and order as the direct result of the steady liberalization of their governmental systems. We welcome political, social, and economic reform in any part of the world, including the Orient, without any apprehension concerning the moral effects of such reforms. On the contrary, we generally contend, or admit, that equal opportunity, justice, and freedom make for responsibility, strength, dignity in the individual.

What, then, is the matter with Americans? What causes and feeds their alleged lawlessness?

Perhaps, after all, the truth is that Americans are *not* peculiar, not really more lawless than any other civilized people, and that their apparent lack of reverence for law is the product of a combination of factors which beget precisely the same results wherever they operate to the extent or degree in which they operate. Should this be the case, the phenomena deplored might indeed give us pause, but no indictment of Americans as Americans would be warranted. There would still be great need of propaganda, effort, work; but there would be no cause for national self-castigation, for sackcloth and ashes, for gloomy fears and painful reflections.

To bring home the peculiar nature of certain American conditions—conditions under which laws are made and enforced, or enforced with great difficulty and against discouraging odds—it may be well to dwell on the character and meaning of "law." It is axiomatic to say that unenforceable laws cannot be successfully enforced. It is a truism that an act or ordinance which offends the general sense of fairness or outrages the general intelligence of a community is foredoomed to failure. This was substantially true even in the ages of despotic rule; it is emphatically true under

popular representative government. Law is not a command issued by a superior to an inferior. Sociologically speaking, law is a rule of action, a code of rules of action, which the community, with virtual unanimity, recognizes as essential to its peace, order, comfort, prosperity. In other words, law is public sentiment and public reason embodied in statutes. Custom, instinct, tradition, reason, common-sense—these underlie law and give it vitality and sanction.

Machinery and technique may obscure these truths, but truths they are. Laws may be made by means of the initiative and referendum, the simple town meeting, the representative or semi-representative parliament. Laws may be passed in response—ready or reluctant—to public clamor, or they may be enacted by statesmen (or politicians) who, with regard to certain subjects, are a little ahead of the electorate. An act may be placed on the statute books in opposition to the wishes of a strong and agitated minority. Usually, however, there is no real chasm between the minority which frantically protests and the majority which apparently rides rough-shod over opposition and “enslaves” the minority. To watch the game of practical politics is to receive almost daily demonstrations of this fact. The bottom truth is as stated—that law must reflect public sentiment and grow out of realized need.

Now laws which stand this test are enforceable and are generally enforced. Not even the habitual criminal will venture to assert that society is wrong, and that murder, manslaughter, robbery, forgery, fraud, embezzlement are safe, respectable, and harmless practices. The scoundrel has no love for the law, but he is perfectly aware that he *is* a scoundrel and that it would be impossible for society to grant him freedom of action.

On the other hand, ordinances and laws which majorities or strong minorities do not ask or desire, of which they do not perceive the necessity or reason, to which they are hostile or profoundly indifferent, are laws and ordinances that are not enforceable. For even those who do perceive necessity and reason in them cannot, in the course of time, fail to be affected by the attitude of legions of their fellow-men. We are social animals; things for which many entertain contempt and which they habitually ignore cannot inspire in the rest of us the emotions that are inspired by things which are

universally respected and admired. Suggestion, unconscious imitation, the subtle influence of example have much to do with the conduct of the most superior of men.

This is why in the making and enforcement of law "like-mindedness" is so important and valuable an asset to any community.

In the address of Professor Giddings referred to above, stress is laid on the "absolute necessity of like-mindedness" in the United States, but the bearing of this theme on the problem of law-enforcement requires considerable elucidation. To quote from the same address:

We have in the United States one of the largest populations ever gathered together, a population of many races, of very many nationalities, having different histories, different experience of life, different languages, and profound difference of knowledge. Our people range from the most ignorant to the most learned. There are profound moral differences, from vice and crime to altruism, and profound economic differences, from direct poverty to enormous luxury. Add to this, intricate differences of ideals, temperaments, and ambitions.

Remembering the proper definition of "law," it is obvious enough that homogeneity of a population, common traditions, common standards, mutual understanding and sympathy are potent aids to law-enforcement. Where these aids are lacking, where laws demanded and secured by one element of an extremely heterogeneous population are misunderstood, questioned, opposed, ridiculed, or scorned by other elements, extraordinary burdens are thrown on officials, policemen, inspectors, and naturally, the result is meager and unsatisfactory. The community which leans on policemen and inspectors leans on a broken reed. These functionaries can do a little; nowhere can they do everything or even much.

We come, then, to our first proposition—that laws are not enforced in the United States as successfully, as easily, as thoroughly as in any advanced European country because "like-mindedness" is largely absent.

Two or three illustrations drawn from current and burning questions will suffice.

Take our Sunday laws. A state legislature composed almost entirely of Americans of, say, British descent, passes a statute

providing for observance of Sunday after the Puritan manner. The community approves and supports the statute; it is enforced without disheartening difficulties. Decades elapse; cosmopolitan cities grow up; heavy immigration from Teutonic, Latin, and Slavic countries changes the character of the citizenship; tens of thousands of "naturalized" Americans, and their sons and daughters, have a totally different conception of Sunday observance. They are respectable and virtuous citizens, but they systematically ignore or break a law which "does not appeal to them." What happens? Local officials, in spite of an oath to enforce all laws, suspend the Sunday law; the press is silent or even sympathetic; when prosecutions are attempted, juries disagree or acquit the offenders, for juries reflect the average character and intelligence of a community; elections, votes, platforms sanction the disregard of the law. A theory develops that in the cities so circumstanced custom and practice have altered the law. The theory, legally speaking, is unsound, but not even decisions of the highest court of the state affect the practical situation. The proper thing for the legislature to do is to take cognizance of the actual conditions and in the interest of law itself grant "local option" to cities in the matter of Sunday observance. But this is not done, for in the legislature are many representatives from small towns and rural sections in which the conditions are different. The Sunday law remains on the statute-book, but in the large cities it is a dead letter. Respect for law is weakened in consequence.

Turning to another type or kind of regulation, take municipal ordinances prohibiting the littering of streets or expectoration on sidewalks. Such ordinances are clearly desirable; educated and refined men and women favor them and respect them; indeed, it is at the instance and demand of such elements that city councils enact such "health" ordinances. Newspapers and clubs commend them, and what more can we wish?

A good deal more. We forget that there are tens of thousands of citizens or residents in every large city who, in the striking words of a Slavic immigrant leader, live underneath America, not in America. What are health ordinances to the foreign "colonies," to the recent arrivals, to the tenement-house population? These,

and many others, do not belong to civic clubs, do not read magazine and newspaper editorials, do not know, even, that the ordinances exist. If they learn of the existence of the ordinances, they stare, wonder, and quickly dismiss them from their minds. Nothing in their lives, habits, associations, experiences has prepared them to realize the significance of such measures. They move in different worlds.

What is the result? In whole sections and districts the ordinances are habitually violated, consciously and unconsciously. A few sporadic arrests and spasmodic "crusades" remind us of the existence of the ordinances—on paper. Such occasional "enforcement" merely emphasizes the farcical nature of the proceedings. Yet how irrelevant and superficial it is to exclaim, *à propos* of such farcical proceedings, "How lawless Americans are as a nation!" The blunder is in enacting laws and ordinances which "have no chance," which are foredoomed by the nature of the medium and the conditions in which they must vainly struggle for slight and partial recognition. If, however, we deliberately elect to enact laws demanded, understood, and appreciated by a small part of the community, knowing full well that they cannot and will not be generally enforced, then we should not affect astonishment or disgust when the foreseen and expected comes to pass.

A far more serious breakdown of law and justice in the United States has taken place with reference to the Negro population. We lynch and burn black men suspected of crime; we have witnessed race riots in which innocent Negroes were attacked and brutally hunted because of actual or fancied wrongdoing on the part of a few black miscreants; we have witnessed grave miscarriages of justice in the courts owing to the antipathy of juries toward the Negro; we acquiesce in wholesale disfranchisement of black citizens under unfair and discriminatory state laws. These phenomena are deplorable, and it is the duty of every right-thinking American to protest against them and come to the defense of the Negro. At the same time, it is not illegitimate to ask whether, in the same circumstances, any other people would give a better account of itself and show more self-restraint, less prejudice, more humanity. Only half a century ago the Negroes were slaves. They had no legal rights

which white men were bound to respect. They were bought and sold as merchandise. Their emancipation came, not as the product of moral and economic evolution, but as the by-product of a bitter and terrible war over the issue of secession. Enfranchisement was logical and natural as a sequel to emancipation. But the white population of the South, while it acknowledged defeat, was not reconciled to complete emancipation. Reconstruction carried abuses with it and coercion of the South could not be continued indefinitely. The reaction which followed the restoration of autonomy in the South was the work of factors which legislation and judicial decisions could not and did not prevent. The Negro problem is one of extreme complexity and difficulty, and only time and education can solve it. Would any other nation have solved it in fifty years? No one will answer the question in the affirmative in the light of the relations between the British and the natives of India and of Egypt.

But is it necessary to go to India for a parallel? A more striking and convincing illustration is afforded by the Anglo-Irish question. There is more like-mindedness in the United Kingdom than there is in the United States. Still, Ireland is not merely "John Bull's other Island"; it is not a group of British counties. The laws of the Parliament of the United Kingdom have not been welcomed in Ireland. Fenianism, dynamite, boycotting, rent-strikes, cattle-driving, obstruction—these have been the means of Irish resistance to British rule. Coercion, severe repression, extraordinary measures of legislation and administration were tried, abandoned, tried again, and abandoned again. What has brought peace and a régime of law to Ireland? Radical legislation suited to her needs. Reduction of rents, government interference, land purchase, state aid have pacified Ireland, and Home Rule will sooner or later complete the process. The laws which were not and could not be enforced have been modified, repealed, superseded. The laws which are being enforced in Ireland are enforceable in their nature, for the needs and sentiments of the people are back of them and under them.

So much for the cause of apparent lawlessness found in a heterogeneous population, in a Babel of tongues, beliefs, traditions, stand-

ards, intellectual and emotional characteristics. To come now to another potent cause of "lawlessness"—the structure and form of our government.

Federalism is distinctly an experiment—at least on the colossal American scale. A union of "sovereign" states has great and splendid advantages. Our states are wonderful social and political laboratories. We are free to "try out" reforms and measures. We have ultra-conservative, moderate, progressive, and ultra-radical states. Oregon proudly claims to have adopted a completely democratic form of government. Wisconsin boasts of model corporation laws. Commission government, the referendum, the initiative, the recall, income taxation, direct nomination—these and a hundred other modern schemes and devices are being tested before our eyes. The most stubborn conservative cannot fail to profit by these experiments. In so far as machinery, method, form of government are concerned our dual system is calculated to promote progress.

But there is a less attractive side of the picture. In the field of morals state rights and state freedom yield evils as well as benefits. So true is this, and so widely is it realized, that the demand for uniform legislation (either imposed by the federal government or else secured by agreement among the states) is now almost an imperative command of the national conscience. What does "law" mean to the divorce colony of Reno? What does it mean to men and women who marry in one state, obtain a divorce in another, and form new alliances in a third? What does it mean to thousands of superficial observers of such "legal" mockeries?

Nay, the case as regards marriage and divorce legislation is even worse than it is commonly pictured by advocates of a uniform divorce law. Even the loose, crude, incongruous laws of the most "liberal" states, the states which practically advertise for patronage of divorce colonies, are cynically disregarded. As many judges and lawyers have repeatedly stated, perjury, collusion, fraud, and hollow pretense are alarmingly prevalent in the sphere of divorce litigation. The courts are not blind, but they can do little to discourage lying and false swearing. For instance, there is the "residence" provision. In the "free and easy" states even the law

demands of petitioners for divorce a certain minimum period of residence. It does not, in terms, discriminate between those who have actually made the state their home, and those who have not the slightest intention of remaining in the state one day longer than is necessary under the letter of the law. To grant divorces to persons who acquire a legal domicile for the sole purpose of qualifying for divorce is, of course, to outrage common-sense. Yet, without uniformity in legislation having vital relation to morals, such absurdities are hardly avoidable. What is bad and vicious in the situation is the advantage taken of weak state laws by citizens of other states; and the temptations, the opportunities, the incitements to such conduct are the result of misapplied federalism. Flesh is weak at the best, and crime or immorality is largely prevented by removal of temptation and opportunity. Where laws *can* be lightly and cavalierly treated, depend upon it, many will so treat them.

The weakness and danger of federalism from a moral point of view are illustrated constantly in another sphere—that of corporate industry and corporate finance. We have heard and read a good deal about the sturdy honesty and integrity of British merchants. The standards of American men of business are not naturally lower than those of their English brethren. But our chaotic corporation laws put a premium on deception and fraud. What one state will not do for corporations another will; there is apparently nothing some states will not authorize corporations to do for the sake of fees and annual taxes. Men incorporate in Maine or New Jersey to do business in Wisconsin or Minnesota. They seek states where “no questions” are asked regarding their capital, assets, purposes, and methods. They want charters which license them to make money by hook or crook. Now, “guilt is personal,” but the primary offenders in cases of corporate chicane and plunder are the lawmakers who enact corporation laws which beget and breed dishonesty. What a country like Great Britain or France can do for business morality in a month, by enacting one national reform measure dictated by experience, would require years or decades in the United States, owing to our “sovereign states” and their place in the American governmental system.

What is true of corporation law is true of railroad legislation, of

anti-monopoly legislation, of pure-food legislation, etc. The conflict and confused multiplicity of laws bewilder and demoralize men, making obedience difficult and violation or evasion of law both simple and profitable. Need we wonder that "respect for law" is weaker with us than with nations that have no conflicts of jurisdiction, no divided allegiance, no fantastic legal fictions?

Federalism was a necessary compromise when the marvelous American constitution was proposed. But conditions have changed and the states have lost much of their function and occupation. More "nationalism" is essential to morality as well as the efficiency, although in certain directions home rule, local autonomy, and the greatest scope for experimentation are most beneficial. In point of fact, the whole American system is undergoing profound modification, and there is as yet little correspondence between reality and legal theory. This lack of congruity produces practical anomalies of various kinds.

There is a third great cause of "American lawlessness," and that cause is also inherent in the American political system. The reference is to the unique prerogative of the courts in regard to legislation. The independence of the judiciary is a bulwark of civil rights and liberties, while the doctrine of separation of governmental powers, if not carried too far, is fundamentally sound. We are carrying it too far, and are now limiting it in the municipal sphere. Powerful writers are advocating further limitation of it in the sphere of state government. We are not likely to establish commission government for states, but we are likely to increase the advisory power of state executives, and to enable them to introduce "administration bills" and "administration budgets," as well as to defend such measures on the floor of the law-making body. But, whatever we may do to simplify administration and add to its efficiency, we shall not shackle the judiciary or make it subservient either to the execution or to the legislative department. Courts cannot be fearless and impartial unless they are wholly independent.

At the same time there is plenty of room for doubt and discussion with reference to the power of the judiciary to pass upon and annul legislation on constitutional grounds. This power, as thoughtful men are aware, is not expressly conferred in any constitution.

Chief Justice Marshall found it in implications of the federal Constitution, and his argument on the subject has been admired by great lawyers. The people have acquiesced in and sanctioned the remarkable innovation. Still, in practice grave difficulties have arisen. Granted that a written constitution needs and presupposes authoritative interpreters; granted that the courts are the best and safest interpreters of the organic law, it yet must be admitted that there is something anomalous in a scheme which permits a single judge of inferior jurisdiction to "kill" an act of Congress or of a state legislature, or to suspend it indefinitely. The anomaly becomes flagrant when this extraordinary power is used rashly or arbitrarily. It is hardly to be wondered at that restrictions and safeguards are now being urged. Thus it has been suggested that unanimous decisions of the highest courts should be required where laws duly passed and signed are to be declared null and void. Others have suggested three-fourths majorities of the highest courts for the exercise of the power in question.

Whatever we may think of these and other suggestions, the fact that there is, as Senator Root of New York has admitted, much discontent and impatient criticism of the courts is one that induces sober reflection. The feeling is widespread that there is too much "judicial legislation" in the guise of mere interpretation; that "the dead hand" controls the courts and checks political and social progress; that not law, but economic and political conceptions outgrown by the people too often prompt decisions that undo the work of years. Judges have been charged by popular leaders and progressive legislators with "usurpation" and class bias. Such charges, such suspicions and agitation are not conducive to respect for law and government.

It is not mere lawlessness, dislike of restraint, and irreverence that yield criticism of the courts. The situation is in truth unsatisfactory and abnormal. It challenges attention and readjustment. The line must be more clearly drawn between reasonable interpretation and legislation by construction. The question must be definitely settled whether we are to adhere to the present practice, and accept five-to-four or four-to-three decisions on constitutional questions, as well as suspension of statutes

by single judges of first-instance courts, or whether we are to change the existing arrangement by well-considered legislation embodying the mature thought of our own day. To settle this question would be to promote respect for law and its interpreters.

One more major cause remains to be named—one which grows out of the manners of liberty and democracy. How can there be respect for law as law when there is so little respect for most of the men who are sent to the legislatures and city councils to enact our laws? When a legislature adjourns the cry on every side is, "Good riddance!" Commendation for a legislature is the exception, not the rule, even in the most dignified and responsible of our organs of opinion. The average legislature is generally under fire. It is accused of inefficiency, of treachery, of corruption, of servility to special and predatory interests. Bad statutes, crude statutes, omissions, failures are almost always found in its record. Many of our lawmakers are condemned as cheap policemen, tools of selfish bosses, representatives of privilege. We attack their rules, their methods and their motives. We applaud "insurgency." We complain bitterly of the moral and intellectual level of our politicians and our legislatures.

There is, alas! but too much ground for all this, but the point is that one cannot expect to find high respect for law in such an atmosphere. We cannot, except in the spirit of irony, speak of the "wisdom of our legislature" after assailing it as a hotbed of intrigue, dishonesty, and parasitism. We cannot proclaim "the breakdowns of representative government," investigate scandals and bribery conspiracies and at the same time demand respect for the handiwork of suspected, branded, or indicted men.

It is now generally admitted that "too much politics" is one of our serious political troubles. We have too many elections, too many candidates, too many offices. Our ballots are too long, our voting is too blind and too ignorant. This condition does not make for democracy and democratization. It discourages the citizens who have no direct "bread-and-butter" interest in politics and renders them apathetic. The men who live by politics, hold or seek office, work for friends or patrons who expect franchises or favors without a fair consideration, thrive on politics. They are eternally vigilant,

and success is their reward. The disinterested citizen cannot compete with them. Fewer elections, simpler machinery, shorter ballots, longer terms of office, greater authority in elective officials (under proper checks and restrictions)—such reforms as these are necessary under existing conditions if we wish to raise legislative and political standards, to make law-making and law-administration truly respectable. If we could, even for a relatively short period, conscientiously praise our lawmakers, credit them with sincerity, ability, and public spirit, and speak well of their achievements, the general public attitude toward law and legislation would undoubtedly undergo a healthy change.

Among the minor and less general causes of "American lawlessness" the first in the opinion of many observers, is our antiquated and unreformed legal procedure. The law's delays and the law's technicalities and red-tape are too notorious to require much discussion. The forms and practices the United States borrowed from England that country has long since modified or abolished; in most of our states lawyers and legislators are too apathetic or too short-sighted and routine-ridden to reform and modernize procedure. Litigation is therefore costly, and criminal justice slow, uncertain, and inefficient. It is not necessary to assume that speedy justice is always sure justice in order to sympathize with the demand of progressive jurists like President Taft, Mr. Moorfield Storey, and others for simplicity and common-sense in pleadings, for dignity and decorum in the examination of talesmen and the conduct of cases, and for a reasonable limitation of appeals. The absurdities and vulgarities of American procedure benefit no one except the habitual criminals and the shysters.

Public sentiment and the sentiment of the practical and efficient business community have tolerated abominations in legal procedure, first, because a young and prosperous nation is naturally easy-going, and, in the second place, because delays, technical appeals, and decisions on technical grounds have been erroneously associated with democracy and equal opportunity. Where everybody has "a chance," indicted or even convicted men have amiably been given every possible chance. Old conceptions of law and government have been applied to new situations. The perversion of the writ of

habeas corpus, for example, has in certain states threatened to make justice impossible in particular classes of criminal cases. Judges of inferior courts claimed the right to retry cases decided by the highest appellate courts, and had to be sharply rebuked.

It scarcely needs urging that inefficiency, waste, farcical technicalities in the administration of law and justice undermine men's respect for constituted authority.

Finally, as an enlightened foreign thinker has observed, the "magnificent distances which separate American cities hamper the advance of the higher civilization." The United States, as another foreign writer has said, is a continent rather than a country. There is a profound diversity of interests and feelings. Each section has its peculiar conditions and problems, and each section insists on being allowed to work out its problems in its own way. The future may bring about a splendid synthesis, but the period of storm and stress, of transition, of readjustment is inevitably characterized by restlessness, impatience, conflict between tradition and fact, reality and form.

In any court of reason and philosophical insight a demurrer to the indictment of the American nation on the score of "lawlessness" and lack of discipline and reverence must be fully sustained. The true, philosophical statement is that in the United States, owing to its historical, geographical, social, industrial, and other conditions; owing to the Indian problem, the slavery and Negro problem in its various phases, the heavy and unprecedented immigration, the "melting-pot" processes and the nature of the diverse elements which are thrown into the pot, the question of law-enactment and law-enforcement is one of extraordinary and unparalleled difficulty and complexity. Thus to state the case is to emphasize the magnitude of the task before the country as well as the supreme duty and necessity of promoting solidarity, like-mindedness, and unity among us while cherishing freedom of local experimentation and useful differences within wide limits.

THE FAILURE OF THE COUNTRY SCHOOL IN THE MODERN CITY

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The old-time country school has been lauded as the great American educational institution—a very successful institution in its own work, and the forerunner of all subsequent developments in our education. For generations we have been thrilled by the stories of great men who came up to their greatness through that school life; and one of the characteristic notes of the past decade has been the lament that swells as we near what seems to be the close of a chapter in our educational history: for that old country school seems to be passing away.

But not all that was said about the old country school was true. We need to look more deeply into the matter than do most of those who shower indiscriminate praise. It is true that here and there, in country districts, there did exist educational situations that could be called almost ideal. Note the term “educational situations,” not schools. For as a matter of fact the country school was but one element in the educational development of the community. Aside from the school there were great worlds of nature at first hand, which through changing seasons presented infinite points of contact and varieties of stimulation. There was the social life of the whole community, aside from the school—the church gatherings, neighborhood social meetings, picnics and parties attended by old and young. Above all, there was the endless and varied round of work of the household and the farm. The school as an educating influence was but one element in the life of the growing child.

We may put the situation concretely in this way: There were some six years of preliminary play, together with the beginnings of farm and household activities, before the child went to school at all. This, to be sure, was not always healthy activity, it was not

always wise, or wisely directed, activity; but it was largely free, untroubled activity, in the pure air, with endless change of stimulation, both natural and social, and with most of the grown-up people too busy to interfere with natural processes of development except as a last resort. This had its bad sides as well as its good, but it *had* its good sides. There was not much learning of lessons, but there was much real and fundamental growth and development.

After six, there was a maximum, seldom reached, of seven months of school per year: one hundred and forty days, of six hours each—a total for a year of eight hundred and forty hours. But a year of three hundred and sixty days, of fifteen waking hours each, holds more than five thousand hours. Therefore that old country school at its best occupied not more than one-sixth of the total of the child's waking hours. Of course, there was some school work assigned to be done out of school; but that was fully offset by the time in school that was spent in doing "other things" behind the friendly shelter of the big geography.

Now, if one-sixth of the total was all the time actually spent in the school, no one will seriously contend that the remaining five-sixths had no productive educational value. As a matter of fact these other five parts of the time were spent in work and play, doing things, making things, planting things and watching them grow, learning how to care for them and to gather them, how to store them or sell them; making tools and using them; learning the animal and plant life of the farm, the barnyard, field, and woods, in winter and summer; in gatherings and frolics, parties and bees; the church and the literary society; in short, all the thousand interests of the home, the farm, and the neighborhood. And there were the occasional visits to the village or city; the long-to-be-remembered times when cousins and uncles and aunts came from far away and told of distant cities or regions in which they lived, or through which they had traveled; and there were the few books, well used and known by heart, and all the legendary lore of country districts that fed the imagination, even though unhealthily. There were five parts of these sorts of things to one part of school, the year round; and as the years passed, and the child grew older and spent less and less time each year in school, the proportion of these

outside affairs to the life in school increased: not many country boys after the age of twelve spent more than four months in school—a period representing not more than one-tenth of the total time of each year. Who will contend that the other nine-tenths, spent in growing work, was time wasted, educationally? As compared with these far-reaching experiences, the work of the school seems to have been of very minor importance.

No contention is here set up that all this out-of-school time was wisely used, or that it yielded the largest educational returns. But the whole matter needs to be very closely examined. We need to ask ourselves very seriously: What was the actual value of the country *school* in the life of the child? We have had enough of indiscriminate lauding; let us ask ourselves the serious question of values, in order that we may the more truly value the conditions of today.

Answering the question, we may say that the actual value of the country school in the life of most boys and girls was exceedingly small. Few country boys or girls learned much geography or history in the school. Most of them learned the rudiments of reading, writing, spelling, and figuring. This was the actual work of the school for *them*. The real education of most of the boys and girls came in the work of the farm and the household, and in the reading of such books and papers as came their way and in which they found a real interest. The school gave them a start, and little else. Most of what the school had to offer had no meaning to the child beyond some of these simpler processes. They actually got their mastery of themselves, their increase in experience, and their experience-controls outside of the school. It is true that the farm was not always an ideal educational instrument. It was often too severe in its exactions, wearing out the joy and the patience of the boy. It was sometimes too close to the more brutal aspects of nature, and failed to provide substance for the finer fancies of the child. It not infrequently defeated its own ends by killing off all interest in farm life, and forcing the boy out of its toils in sheer self-defense.

But the real weakness in the country-school situation was to be found in the *utter lack of relationship* between what was done in

school hours and the out-of-school life. There was little, if any, vital or obvious connection between the two phases of the child's experience. Very few boys or girls ever found any relationship between the two. The school work was practically unrelated to the farm and home work and life save in the most abstract fashion. The teacher rarely saw or felt the need of any such relatedness; most children never found any connection. If the farm and home life had been a little less exacting; and if the school life and work had been a little more real, a little more concrete, so that both the teacher and the child could have seen some connection between the two; if they could have seen that the farm and the home were giving the child just that constructive activity and practice that he most needed, together with the building-up of habits, and the exercise of his senses and his imagination, and the calling forth of all his physical prowess; and that the school was trying to give him the constructive meanings of all these things: the geography that should make his home and farm and neighborhood a part of the great world in which men live; the history that should make him and his family and his friends and his hopes and ideals a part of the great story of man; the reading and the writing and the figuring that should put him into possession of the tools by which he could open for himself the treasures of man's spiritual past and the resources of the present, so that he too might become a man, "with power on his own life and on the world"—if—if someone had seen these things the country school might have so related itself to the farm, and the farm might have so related itself to the spiritual meanings implicit in the ideal of the school, as to have made every country community a completely ideal educational situation. And this is just the thing that is going to happen in the country school of the future.

Now, this very thing did happen in some degree, here and there. Here and there, there was a rare teacher who did see just this need of a real connection, and who was able to supply it in some measure. Such a teacher made himself, along with the husking-bees and the camp-meeting, an integral part of the community life, unobtrusively interpreting to the community the meanings of the farm and household work, and bringing into relation

to this work the great knowledge of the world, so that he came to be thought of, not so much as a teacher to be shunned, as an oracle to be revered: and he opened the two worlds of work and of books to each other, so that each knew and supplemented the other in the growing world of the child, and a real education was a result. Or, here and there, was to be found a boy, or girl, of exceptional power to grasp relationships who could, instinctively and unaided, make these connections in a more or less adequate fashion; who could catch a glimpse of the concrete meanings of school work in terms of the life of the home and the farm, and who could enrich and ennoble the work of the farm and the home with the splendid visions that came from contact with the books in the school; and wherever such events happened real educational processes were going on; such children became star pupils, devoured the books, amazed the teacher, went on to other, better schools, and to college, perhaps; they became leaders: their names are probably written among those who for a century have served the republic in notable ways.

But it needs to be made clear that wherever such a genuine education did appear it was brought about by a combination of the out-of-school life with the work of the school, so that to some degree, at least, the two became one in the child's experience, mutually interpreting and upbuilding each other. And, it is not too much to say that in this educational partnership the farm and home life and work furnished the great constructive values, while the school interpreted and enriched those values out of the experience of the race. No rightful praise should be taken from the school. All that it has done should be acknowledged, all that it has earned should be paid. But—we shall never get the sort of school we need for today until we are brave enough to face the facts as to what the school actually does in any situation. As long as we indiscriminately ascribe to the *school* all the credit for doing the educational work of the community, just that long we work to prevent that work from being done in the best way by keeping that work from being rightly understood. The old country school should not have all the credit for that work which, occasionally, was done so well, for the school did not do all the work. It did an essential

part of it, but only a part of it; and often it did that part unwittingly and unintentionally, and often even unwillingly. Not infrequently the best service that the school rendered, or could render, a capable country boy was to force him out, with a little power to read, perhaps, throwing him upon his own native, uncramped resources, where he was educated by his work and his hope, his despair and his meditations, his observations, his thinking and his dreaming, and such chance reading as came his way, until, like Lincoln, he could rise through patient waiting to some audacious purpose, to some undying resolution, and to some immortal service. We shall never be able, probably, to measure quantitatively the part which the country school played in such an education—the education of that country boy who has been the boast of the nation for a century; it did not play nearly as large a part as has been thought. But we *must* find out how that boy was educated before we can hope to reproduce in any adequate way such an education.

So much space has been given to setting forth the actual educational institution of the old country district. It was not the school in itself: it was the whole community operating upon the child, and the school was but an incident in that community situation—more or less important accordingly as it connected up its work with the life of the community, or gave it with oracular finality without regard to whether it was concrete and appreciable or not.

Now, in the processes of historic change, that country school was carried up through the village into the modern city. It was unrelated to its community situation in most cases in the country districts out of which it came. It was too intellectualistic even there where there was plenty of physical activity for the normal boy and girl. But, with the course of study remaining the same, with the same methods and the same underlying psychology and theory of educational processes, that country school was torn loose from such connections as it had in the country and brought into the city. The only obvious changes were on the administrative side. Because the population is more dense, more rooms are needed close together. For financial, administrative, and theoretical reasons these rooms are placed side by side or piled one upon

the other, and the children are separated according to the grade of their attainments, and isolated both from those who are more advanced and those who are less advanced. This grading of the children is in itself a striking commentary upon the curious psychology and theory of education which underlay the work of the old district school almost universally, and which, coming into the city from the country with the country school, still persist as the implicit psychology and theory of education. The ideal grade seems to be a group of boys and girls with as great a degree of likeness in their levels of experience as is possible. The less they differ, the more suited they are to the making of a grade. That is to say, the less they can learn from one another the more satisfactory is the grading. That is the theory. But in actual practice, children learn most from each other. In the old country school of mixed grades, the children learned from each other probably more than they learned from the teacher. There was the boy who learned his fractions from watching the work of an older class. He was not drilled until his interest was killed; but he naturally worked away until he knew fractions, occasionally asking an older boy to help him. Such a school is an educational community, for the moment.

But not only are the children, in these country schools imported into the city, cut off thus from the vital social stimulations of those above and below them; added to this is the fact that in bringing the country school into the city, that school, abstract as it was from the actual life of the community even in the country, was cut off from what little concreteness of relationship it had in the country, and in a purely intellectual isolation from the social life of the child and the world of natural motivations, it was set down in the city. Rather, should we not say that, its foundations having been left behind, it was left suspended in intellectualistic and lonely grandeur, for the admiration of those who had escaped from it, and for the consternation of all those, including most of the teachers, who daily must lay aside the world of vital interests and human joys in living, and climb up through thin ether to those intellectual fastnesses where, cut off from home and natural doing, and from the stimulus of working with those who are older but not too much

older, they *learn lessons and recite them*. Is it any wonder that a sober journal said, recently, "The boy who likes to go to school ought to be investigated"? In fact, in order to get them to go, we used to threaten to punish, or promise to reward; we used to plead with them to try to become presidents; we told them they could live more easily than their parents had been able to do; we asked them to do it for the love they bore their teacher; we pointed out how teachers and others were sacrificing much for them: we never dared to look the actual facts of the matter squarely in the face.

It may be well to point out here that the fundamental fallacy of the whole educational situation, from the first grade to the beginnings of actual graduate work in the university, is found in the assumption that a desire for knowledge is an ever-present attribute of the human being. Now, there are no foundations for this assumption in our actual experiences, or in our observations. Few of our acquaintances who have safely escaped from the school care anything for knowledge in general; we ourselves care for it only as it furthers our purposes in life. That is to say, adults demand that knowledge shall have some meaning for their personal experiences before they can find any particular interest in spending time in its acquisition. All this natural motivation in the pursuit of knowledge which adults claim for themselves, we seek to deny to children in the schools. There are some very curious tendencies along these lines, today, especially in our colleges, which would well repay a complete investigation, but this is not the place for it.

Students call those who are given over-much to books "grinds"; and in spite of ourselves we all agree that they are right, since education is not fundamentally a matter of books, even in college. How much more is it a matter of activities other than bookish in the lower schools! The late Professor James insisted that books should not be the central factor in the education of boys and girls until after the fifteenth year. And we all know that the search for knowledge as an end in itself is unknown. Men may delude themselves into the belief that they are working for the ends of "pure science," but the fact remains that their ultimate motivation lies deep in some personal or social need. We know that we are

not fundamentally *knowing* beings: we know that we want to know only that we may do; save, it may be, in connection with some pathological condition of mind. Yet in the old country school the course of study was laid out without reference to the actual personal or social needs of the child as a growing person, but with reference to a hypothetical future career into which he might some day be plunged: a culture-survival from the mediaeval ideal of preparation for a future world, despising the present and its natural interests. And, in spite of the fact that psychology and philosophy have shown the fallacies implicit in that old point of view, our schools in the modern city have up to the present maintained their old scholastic courses of study, brought down from the Middle Ages, worked out in rural and agricultural districts, and naïvely considered sufficient for the present age and social conditions. There have been, it is true, a few who have dared to dream that something else might come to be; but in the main they have been laughed to scorn.

As a result of our blindness to these facts the schools are getting away from us; that is to say, the actual school is no longer in the schoolhouse, in the most actual sense, for boys and girls are not going to the schoolhouse any longer than they are compelled to go. They are leaving as soon as possible and getting out where they can get hold of the experiences that will enable them to live and do some sort of work in the world.

But in another sense the schools are getting away from us. We have tried to keep them just as they were in the past, "wells of English," etc., pure and undefiled. We have tried to keep the manual arts out of the grades; we have fought against social affairs and industrial lines of education in the high school. We have insisted that vocational subjects should have no place in the curricula of the schools: such utilitarian concerns were for the phases of life that have to do with the merely physical; the schools, however, have to do with the immortal soul. And we have tried to save our schools from anything that was merely useful. Yet—and in this sense the schools are getting away from us—those things are all coming into the schools, in spite of all we can do to prevent it: for boys and girls, and the older students, are going to

go where they can get the things that have meaning for them. In fact, over against those subjects which belong in the school according to the traditions there is a whole range of other subjects and materials which have been creeping into our schools in the last twenty-five years—creeping in, in spite of opposition and in the face of the reproach which has called them “fads.”

The failure of the country school in the city is obvious from this point of view; and these so-called “fads” are just a substitute, inadequate, no doubt, but for the present the only possible one, for those industrial and social phases of education which were furnished by the farm and the home in the old district school, and which the school rather necessarily, but thoughtlessly, left behind when it came from the country into the city. The purely intellectualistic school which devotes itself wholly to lessons and recitations from books had some excuse for existence in the country districts where all of the outdoor life of boys and girls was spent in work and play—in doing things that had meanings for them, and that gave them adequate organic development. There was education there even when the school did little or nothing. But in the city conditions are almost exactly the reverse of those in the country two or three generations ago. Under those conditions boys and girls had quite enough, often too much, of constructive activity and practice, in the farm and household work. They longed for other things, for something that would interpret their work to them, and open up the world of mature concerns for them. Under such conditions they could endure for a time, and some could even enjoy and make meaning out of, the almost barren intellectualism of the school. There were few books outside the school, few periodicals of any sort, no daily papers, no libraries, and the school offered about the only intellectual chance—which accounts for its historic overexaltation.

How different are the conditions in the city today! Homes are full of books and papers and magazines of all sorts. There is a branch of the public library only a few blocks away. Daily papers cost but a penny. Boys and girls are free to read as much as they want, and they do read an immense amount, not always wisely or well, however: but all that they read forms a part of their educa-

tion. The schools scoff at a good deal of this reading, and refuse to count it as a part of their work; but every time they refuse to recognize the educational meaning of that which children do because they like to do it, they but re-emphasize the fact that their allegiance is still to that old intellectualistic ideal of the country school, and they lose credit in the minds of the boys and girls, and in the estimation of the public.

The failure of the schools comes from their holding to this older intellectualistic conception of education and their refusal to take up the work of offering a completer world to the growing children. We all live in a too intellectual world, today, a world of mere knowledge. We all know and *know* and KNOW. We *know* so much more than we can *do*. We are over-intellectualized in our city life, today. But we are not *educated*. We are flabby in our wills, and our knowledge makes us, not wise, but cynical. This is the reason why there has risen such an overwhelming call for "moral education" in the past decade. We have succeeded in devitalizing the child's world, in the city, by taking away from him his chance for actual work and play and by giving him a school that could have meaning only in a world of work and play; and we have been hoping to make up for that devitalization by concocting some sort of a "moral education" that would fill in artificially what we have taken away from him by natural processes.

But—and though one may well walk with bated breath here—it seems to be perfectly demonstrable that life cannot be moralized by the injection into it of such extraneous materials as are usually set up when "moral education" is discussed. The flabbiness of our wills comes not from lack of knowledge; nor from lack of feelings; nor from lack of "motives"; certainly no age ever had more "motives" than has this one. No. The foundations of our difficulties are to be found much deeper than this popular psychology has ever penetrated. City boys and girls are suffering today from a lack of those fundamental contacts of life which give chances for the development of the habits that avail in the actual doing of things. We have taken them away from their chances for meaningful work and constructive play; we thought they could be educated by reading and "learning their lessons": the results we have all

about us. The school of the city, even today, is an extreme form of the old district school, with some of its intellectualistic evils much exaggerated. But it rests not back, as that school did, upon actual work-experiences of farm and household. It rests back upon more of the same sort of thing it is doing in itself. The result is that boys and girls are getting an oversupply of the intellectual element. Not being intellectual beings, primarily, the normal boys and girls soon become satiated, and they begin to think of getting away from it all as soon as possible. They do not understand what they are given to learn; they do not know what they are reading; teachers talk to children in a language that belongs to what the philosophers call a different "universe of discourse." This is true all through the grades and in the high school, although the "great migration" has taken place before the high school is reached. In no less than 60 per cent of the cases of all children in the common schools the actual service of the public schools beyond the merest rudiments of the old "three R's," which are drilled in by merciless repetition, is practically nil. They get nothing to carry away with them—nothing of those great treasures of culture which our educational leaders talk so wisely about; their lives are intellectually barren to the end. Sixty per cent of our boys and girls never finish the eighth grade.

Now the reason for all this lies, for the most part, in the actual lack of meaning in what they are required to do. Meaning is lacking. And yet, the only real and lasting and vital reason why the school should exist at all is to be found in the social need of helping the children of this generation to build for themselves worlds that shall be full of meaning for themselves, in which they can live and do their work in the world. It is at this point that we once more come upon a subtle psychological problem which has been touched upon several times, and which must be discussed somewhat, sooner or later, if the contention of this discussion is to be made clear.

According to the theory of the old district school, and the city school also, education consists of learning lessons made up of "facts." This varies somewhat, of course, and there have been teachers who have dreamed of something else, and have even tried

to realize something else. But sooner or later, almost universally the school work has come back to a drill upon *facts*; in practically all the classrooms of the grades and the high school, and on into the college, there goes on the endless round of memorizing facts. But facts are not interesting. And so we have been forced to hunt for "motives" to get the child "moving" in the direction of those facts. The child—the fact or facts, and an adequate motive between them—that was the school. The great problem then, of course, is that of motive. It is the great problem of the so-called "moral education" of our times.

But children do not want *facts*. Hence most "motives" have to be thoroughly extrinsic and formal. In actual practice they all reduce to some form of the maxim of the old Hoosier schoolmaster: "Lickin' and larnin' go together." They are either physically or mentally external compulsions.

On the other hand, however, all children do want *meanings*. Meaning is, for the child, simply the realizing of its own implicit and larger self. It is, accordingly, not a "motive" in the invidious motor sense of the word. It is not a sort of engine outside the child which can be set going and then hitched onto the child. Meanings need no "motives." The child is already "moving" in the direction of the meaning, and it takes up with that meaning as it takes its breath or its food. This, of course, may sound like a wild theory, but our educational psychology is moving in this direction with certainty.

But what is a meaning? We must give this term more specific definition. But before doing this, it will be well to look at the general subject from another point of view.

It may seem that injustice has been done the city school in this discussion, since the city school has been feeling for some two or three decades that there was something lacking in its work. The city school has long been uneasy; but for the most part it has taken no pains to investigate the cause of this uneasiness; and not being able, or willing, to examine its fundamental assumptions, it has missed a convincing view of the facts. It has assumed that all children are intellectual creatures, with minds that are capable of knowing; these minds are made to be trained and filled, and the

proper material for this training and filling is knowledge. Hence has gone on the endless round of assigning lessons, hearing recitations, giving examinations on facts, and passing or flunking children. It has been, at its best, a failure with the majority of the children, and at its worst it has been a merciless torture to thousands of children, not altogether unlike that underground life of the mines, so eloquently described in Mrs. Browning's "Cry of the Children." Children have not always wanted to learn their lessons; and when they have been "motivated" to learn them so that they can recite them glibly, they still do not seem to practice the deeds of love and mercy commanded by the memory gems thus lodged in their expanding "minds." Under other conditions men would have said that a failure of results must be due to some defect in the causal conditions. But the schools have never learned this first and easiest lesson in logic. Instead of facing the facts of actual failure of results, and accounting for that failure by examining the whole situation, the schools have contented themselves with two traditional solutions, one of which is pseudo-psychological, the other being theological. The latter explanation tells us that the child does not follow out what he has "learned" because he is "naturally depraved" and "the imitation of all that is wrong is most easy—of all that is right is most onerous." The pseudo-psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation that is put forward by all those who have come to doubt the adequacy of the theological, is somewhat as follows: the connecting link between knowledge, i.e., facts of the lessons learned, and will, i.e., the act of doing the thing learned, is found in the feelings; if the feelings can be sufficiently aroused in the right direction, if a love for the thing can be set up, we get the "motive"; under such conditions the child will be found willing to sit for hours drinking at the fountains of wisdom, and then spending other hours practicing all the virtues that wisdom dictates. And thus we have the failure of knowledge to result in action just to the extent that we have children learning facts without setting up proper or adequate motives. Hence, to repeat, the great problem in education is that of finding proper motives. Moral education is looking for proper motives; civic education is looking for motives; we are all looking for

motives; and we more than half believe that if we could just find the secret of motives we should be able to turn on, in the child, some sort of a forty horse-power "motive," set him on the beaten track that leads to knowledge, and turn our valuable attentions to something else.

Is it not time that we should see the folly of all this and get down to some appreciation of the facts? The real lack in our educational procedure has not lain in the feelings, *per se*. City children, as a rule, have a great plenty of the mere froth of feeling and emotion. They do not have *depth* of feeling, or emotion, about things, just as they do not have depth of knowledge about things, and for exactly the same reason. Their whole experience lacks some essential elements. They lack, especially, what was left behind when the district school was brought to the city. They lack real chances to *make* and to *handle*, to *observe* and *manipulate*, to *care for* and *feel responsibility for*; they lack opportunity to come into intimate contact with nature in all its infinite variety; they are cut off from their natural rootage in the world of natural experience and activity, in the work of the household and the farm; they lack the life of the larger but more intimate community of the country neighborhood with its interest in them, its criticisms, and its supports. These are the fundamental things in education, not the things learned in the schoolroom. The city child misses all these things, save as he picks them up at random in such ways as our inadequate provision in city life makes still possible for him. It is because of this fundamental lack of opportunity to deepen life at its fountain-head that the city child lacks depth of feeling and of knowledge and of will.

The school has been uneasy for twenty-five years: this is the reason. All that which has been creeping into the schools in this period—those things which we have called "fads"—has been an instinctive, for it has certainly not been intelligent, effort to bring back into the educational situation of the child that which was so valuable in the country, and which was so unthoughtedly left behind. The whole movement for industrial and vocational education is but the rising tide of recognition of this fact. This movement is still, however, more instinctive than intelligent. It

has no arguments, as yet, with which to meet the old traditions and prejudices and conquer them on their own ground. It is the modern democratic and insurgent movement in education, and like all insurgency it is first a feeling rather than an argument, and must wait until it can build up convincing reasons for its existence.

Such reasons are formulating at the present. There is no realm of human endeavor where prejudice and unintelligent conservatism is more deeply entrenched than in the field of educational theory and practice. But—and this is the great hope of our times—there is gathering in the fields of psychology, logic, ethics, philosophy, sociology, general educational theory, biology, and the practical demands of modern industrial conditions such a massive array of arguments, only dimly perceived at present, as almost to startle us by their intense insistence upon this more modern and radical point of view. The so-called pragmatic philosophy of our times is slowly portending a revolution in the point of view of all our educational processes. And the pragmatic philosophy is but the generalized statement of the scientific method applied to as complete a view of life and the world as is possible to be reached. Its educational implications may be summed up briefly as follows: Education is, fundamentally, *a whole-activity process in which the intellectual element functions as a tool of useful progress*, and only incidentally a purely intellectual or knowledge process. The whole intention of modern science, using the word in an inclusive sense, is to destroy the usurpation of authority by the intellect over the ends and values of life, and to put that same intellect back where it belongs in the general stream of experience as the minister of life and not the master. Life itself is bigger than facts. This means that we shall, eventually, get back to the vital foundations of education, no longer in facts, but in the living, developing experience of the child; and we shall care for facts, at all, just in so far as they help that experience to grow into more comprehensive and self-contained experience. Even in the city schools we shall give up our worship of facts and “lessons,” and we shall build our schools on activity foundations, supplying to the children that element which their social world does not supply them at present, just as the old district school tried to supply the

element that was lacking; only—and this is the whole thing—those two elements have just changed places in the change of conditions. The city school will have to prepare itself to do what the farm and the home did in the country district, since no other social provision is made for that phase of education; and much of what was attempted by that older school will be done by other agencies.

Now, if we ask for the reasons for this transfer of duties in the work of the school, we must go, first of all, to psychology for our answer; and this brings us at once to an earlier question, put over for a time—the question of meanings. What is here said with reference to this subject of meanings in education will be drawn largely from psychological considerations; but it can be supported from any one of a dozen other fields of modern inquiry. The psychological arguments take us to the heart of the matter, and we shall deal with those only.

It was said above that what is wanted in our education today was neither theological explanations for our failures, nor the pseudo-psychological explanations by which people delude themselves and bolster up old practices. We do want, and must have, a genuinely scientific psychology of education, and we are by way of getting that today. In place of “motives” we shall talk, henceforth, of meanings. Just as in industrial pursuits old tools are outgrown and new ones are demanded more suited to the work to be done, so in educational psychology new tools are developed to take the place of those worn out and useless. Such a tool for the new uses of our times is the word “meanings.” Just as in the realistic education of the time of Comenius the great word was “facts”; just as in the disciplinary education of Locke’s advocacy the great word was “mental forming”; so, under the influence of the growing psychology of our times the great word is coming to be “meanings.” The child can no longer be educated by means of facts, or in terms of a purely hypothetical mental training: he must find meaning in what he is called upon to do from day to day; meaning is life for him in the present and it portends a constantly growing life.

All this seems very simple, and there are those who will say

that there is nothing new here. Of course, the word "meaning" is an old word; but its adequate definition is a radically new thing. What is a meaning? A correct psychological answer to this question should give us the proper point of view for the school of today. Psychology is saying today that a *meaning* is, fundamentally, a program of action, a way to accomplish something or to do something. It, of course, involves knowledge, but it is not, as the older psychology and education held, merely knowledge, a mental thing. It is something that shoots clear through our world of feeling and opinion, our emotions and our uncertainties, and brings direction to our halting activities. It is true knowledge: knowledge not as a possession, merely, but knowledge as a program of action found at a place where a program is demanded.

New meanings are what we are all after, from the child in the cradle to the old man until he comes to lay down all desires and to resign his interest in the world. But these new meanings are not things to be learned. We know this. We have all experienced the vacant gaze of the person who has been apparently listening to our explanations of some subject, but who at the end responds with a perfect lack of comprehension of what we have been saying. A meaning is not something that can be given to another, unless that other has a place for it in his actual plans for activity. A new meaning is a new experience, rising by reason of new organization out of hitherto unrelated activities and bringing into one comprehensive focus the active powers of expression and of understanding. It may be called forth by a word from another, but that word is much more than a mental thing. The subject is much too complex to be fully discussed here; but enough has been said to make it apparent that when the schools shall have found their way to the work of teaching in terms of meanings they will have given over the method of addressing the merely mental side of the child and will have come to consider the educative process as one involving a thorough round of organic activity.

One thing more, of a somewhat technical nature, must be said. We attend to new things that are presented to us with our powers of responding, and if we have no powers of responding to the new thing we find no interest in it, we do not comprehend it, we get no

meaning out of it. How common is the experience of the schools along this line! Comprehension of meaning is a function of doing something with the thing presented, of acting in some way with reference to it, of directing a course of action in terms of the thing. The acquiring of meanings therefore demands a constantly increasing development of the habit and practice sides of our natures, the organization of new co-ordinations and powers of response that can be put at the service of new meanings, that can, in fact, give meaning to experiences. The implicit theory that underlay the old district-school education was that comprehension of a subject was a function of the mind, and that an intellectual presentation of any material was sufficient. That same theory is implicit in almost all our school work, even in the cities, today. But it is a fallacy, and it accounts, as does nothing else, for the failure of the country school in the modern city.

Take an example: the learning of a word. The learning of the meaning of a word by a child is a wonderfully complicated and fascinating process. It involves bodily attitudes long before it becomes a conscious mental possession. That is the reason why school children never succeed in learning words out of the dictionary.

Following the lead of the country school, where, owing to the organization of the life of the community, a certain over-emphasis of the intellectual element was natural, and, in a way, permissible, the city school has with amazing unintelligence gone on doing the same thing, with almost no reference of the school problem to the problems of the rest of the community life and activity. In this way we have over emphasized the intellectual until we have practically come to a standstill. Our schools have become hives of useless activity from which the children escape as quickly as possible, taking with them a little that is good, but for the most part no permanent intellectual interests. What is to be done?

We must get back closer to the actual nature of the child. The child is pre-eminently an active creature, not intellectual, and our educational processes must be built upon his activities, just as was done in a crude fashion in the country school. The child is active in the intimate sense of that word all the time; and all that

any teaching or influence of any kind can accomplish is to direct or control, or change the course of that activity. The child is acting, doing, constructing, making, building, creating, reconstructing something every waking moment; and it may be that certain of these same activities go on in his unconscious hours. What is needed, therefore, in the schools is a course of study that can find its way into this stream of the child's activity, giving that activity greater richness of content, and surer control over itself and its world. At every step there must be close relationship between the stream of activity and the materials that seek to be entered into that activity. Closeness of relationships shows itself in the child's interest in the material, in his ability to attend to it, that is, to use it—in the fact that it has meaning for him. Activity that is forced upon the child under the plea that it is educative but which in reality has no meaning for him is in fact destructive of his interests, of his spontaneous activities, of his powers of organizing his world, and in the end tends to disintegrate his growing personality. The old word "motive" stood, and still stands, for an artificial connection between educational "materials" and the child's experience. It implies a child abstracted from the natural world of social and physical activities, and "materials" abstracted from their natural relationships in the world of the child's growing need. These two abstract worlds must be brought together in some way: the child becomes a "mind" to be filled; the "materials" are the filling, and the teacher is there to "convey" this material into the child's mind. And in such an abstract situation, the abstract generator of motion, the "motive" must be found. But this is all made necessary by the utter abstractness of the situation. In the child's normal activities, he needs no "motives," and here the most real educational processes are going on. There is no need of a motive, because any genuine educational process is its own reward.

In closing it may be permitted to point out that in our cities there are two phases of education that are not being adequately cared for by any of the social agencies; they rightly belong to the school, not, indeed, to the present school of "facts," but the school of the future that is going to try to do that supplementary work not being done by other agencies. These two things are the most

important elements in the educational problem of our times, and the city schools will have to learn to adjust their activities so as to include these utterly essential phases of the child's development within their programs.

The first of these is that very essential phase of education which was provided in the old country education, not by the school but by the work of the farm and the household. The parts have exactly shifted here as between the country school and the modern city school. The country school devoted itself to the intellectual elements in experience; the city school must devote itself more and more to laying that fundamental basis of life and character which the country school so implicitly and unconsciously assumed. Such things are being attempted in ever-increasing fashion, by our manual-training and household-economics departments, and by the modern movements in the direction of industrial and vocational education. But to date, no one has said, in sufficiently clear way, that this is one of the fundamental tasks of the city school in relation to education. And few seem to recognize the real part that physical activity, play, industry, and the growing sense of actual control have in true education. We are just beginning to become aware of the meaning of this for a genuine democracy in education. Of course, the school cannot do it all; indeed, the school cannot do all of anything. Our parks and playgrounds are doing some of these necessary things; and many forces are at work. But the school should see to it that it is being done; the school must wake up to the fact that if this underlying work is not done, then no real education can result; and the school must come to see that it can, not only not do constructive educational work by forcing materials upon the child in advance of the child's power to react to those materials in some constructively active way; but in attempting to do this it destroys the very fundamentals of the child's personality: his own growing integrity, his wholeness, that only too slowly comes to him.

In the second place, the school of the city must learn how to help the child to organize himself and his world. The life of the city is becoming too much for the child. There is too wide a variety of stimulation forced upon him by his modern artificial

environment. The result is that he gets *experiences*, but fails to get the right sort of an organized and controlled *world*. He is too much the creature of sensations and feelings, too little the master of his world. Our schools help this disintegrating tendency by their willingness to devote themselves to facts, more or less isolated experiences, and by their failing to see that they have a responsibility in the direction of the *organization* of the child's world, as well as in the direction of giving that world to the child in the form of facts. The "grind" of the schools is based on this lack of comprehension of the need of *constructive organization* within the child's growing world. This "grind" continues all through the school years, until, perhaps, the college student comes to a time of revolt, and a demand for activities that have meaning. Incidentally, it is a very curious fact that this condition causes a very marked separation between what an eastern college president calls "student activities" and "studious activities." Here is a dualism of activity and interest that we wonder at, and are stupefied by, but do not know how to meet. Between "student activities" and "studious activities" there runs a very tenuous thread of diplomatic negotiation; but where is the vitalizing and constructive interpretation that can put a unified meaning into the student's whole career?

Education is, in the long run, made up of the ever-increasing development of meanings; and meanings are the most natural things in the world; but they are not abstractions; they are social values; they are organizing foci within the heterogeneous elements of experience; they are centers of light within the phantasmagoria of half-lights, shadows, dim colors, and darknesses that make up the growing world of the child. There can be no real education without these organizing forces within experience, just as there can be no education without the chances for fundamental physical activities and demands for neuro-muscular development.

There is today no institution that stands for these organic meanings, expressly. The school *thinks* that it does. But it is mistaken. The school occasionally floods the life of the exceptional child with the illumination of a new meaning; but for the most part, this is no more intentionally done, or scientifically foreseen,

than when a like event happened in the old district school. It never will be done intentionally and scientifically until the school gets back into the life of the world; until instruction gets back into the life of the child; until the world's activities flow through the school as the curriculum of the school, and the school feels itself an integral part of the whole social process of education, not an institution apart from the lives of men, in "cloistered leisure," teaching abstracted and intellectualized materials to children who are not real children but mere intellects which must be attached to some "motive" before they will work.

The school of the city must think its way through the maze of traditions that have come with it out of the country: it has a work of its own to do, a work which it never can do until it awakes to the actual conditions of our own times, and the actual problems of education as these appear in the modern city. Reconstruction is going on in all other lines: it has begun in the schools. It must go on, even though that should involve great labor and thorough-going criticism. As Professor Sumner said: "The folkways need constant rejuvenation and refreshment if they are to be well fitted to present cases and it is far better that they be revolutionized than that they be subjected to traditional changelessness." "Our education is good just so far as it produces well-developed critical faculty. . . . Education in the critical faculty is the only education of which it can be truly said that it makes good citizens." An education that crams the mind can never produce this critical faculty. Our city schools are face to face with the problem; the country school with its traditional cramming of the intellect is still with us, in large measure: can our educational leaders develop a new school fitted to modern city conditions—a school in which the development of "critical faculty" is the aim and the actual production of that critical power the test of success? How else shall our public schools continue to be what we have so long thought them to be, "the hope of our country," the guarantors of the genuine democracy that is to be?

REVIEWS

Heredity in Relation to Eugenics. By CHARLES BENEDICT DAVENPORT. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911. Pp. xi+298. \$2.00.

Since it was clearly the author's purpose to write a book which should be socially serviceable, if not wholly satisfactory to the scientist, it is fitting that the reviewer deal with it as a contribution to the literature of race improvement, not as a monograph on heredity.

The heart of the volume is a chapter on "The Inheritance of Family Traits" in which almost one hundred characteristics of men are considered as inheritances. Both physical and mental, and both normal and abnormal, traits are represented. Eye color, hair color, skin color, musical ability, memory, temperament, general mental ability, epilepsy, insanity, criminality, night-blindness, color-blindness, deaf-mutism, cretinism, gout, polydactylism appear in the list.

The materials of the chapter have been obtained chiefly from the records of family traits which are on file at the Eugenics Record Office, Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island. In most instances, reports concerning the appearance or degree of development of a trait in several hundred individuals and from a score to a hundred or more families have been used as a basis for the discussion of the heritability of characteristics, for conclusions, and for recommendations concerning marriage.

The author's intent in presenting this mass of material, much of which strikes the reviewer as of uncertain value, is clearly indicated by the opening paragraph of the chapter:

Before any advice can be given to young persons about the marriage that would secure them the healthiest, strongest children, it will be necessary to know not only the peculiarities of their germ plasms but also the way in which various characters are inherited. The work of the student of eugenics is, consequently, to discover the methods of inheritance of each characteristic or trait. After we get precise knowledge of the methods of inheritance of the commoner important traits we shall be in a position to advise, at least, in respect to these traits. It would seem a self-evident proposition, but it is one too little regarded, that knowledge should precede teaching. In this chapter an attempt will be made to consider many of the traits that are known

to run in families and to set forth, so far as known, the laws of their inheritance. We shall begin with some of the general characteristics of man that have been best studied and then pass to a consideration of some human diseases [p. 26].

The accounts of the various human traits are of extremely different value, because of the number and nature of the records which were available. Whereas, in the case of eye color, the facts are convincing, the statements concerning memory are of relatively little value. It is, further, evident that many of the characteristics discussed are extremely complex. Among these might be mentioned artistic composition, literary composition, calculating ability, memory, temperament, general mental ability.

The discussion of each of the scores of traits leads up to a "eugenic conclusion" or recommendation concerning fit marriages. In certain instances, these recommendations are very definite; in others, the author states that our knowledge is insufficient to justify any recommendation. Concerning Huntington's chorea (St. Vitus' dance) we are told that "the eugenic lesson is that persons with this dire disease *should not have children*. But the members of normal branches derived from the affected strain are immune from the disease" (p. 102). Of rheumatism, it is stated that "the exact laws of inheritance in these cases are not clear and eugenic instruction cannot be drawn from them" (p. 105). Turning to defects of the eye, we find under pigmentary degeneration of the retina (*retinitis pigmentosa*) the following unequivocal statements: "The eugenic instruction is clear. An affected man or woman should not marry even into stock without taint of retinitis. Above all, in retinitis stock, cousins, especially if affected, should by no means marry" (p. 118). And the eugenic conclusion concerning color-blindness is "that while color-blind males will have no color-blind sons, and, typically, no color-blind offspring of either sex, yet their daughters, married to men of normal stock, will have color-blind sons" (p. 120).

To consider the data of Dr. Davenport's chapter on "The Inheritance of Family Traits" apart from his purpose in presenting the materials at this particular time and in the setting which this book gives them, would be extremely unfair to the author as well as to the eugenic movement. For, although it is evident that the family records which are available at Cold Spring Harbor contain invaluable information concerning certain human traits, it is equally clear that they offer meager and inconclusive evidence concerning many of the characters which are discussed in this volume. A specialist in the study of heredity

is sure to be unfavorably impressed by the book unless he keeps constantly in mind the author's purpose.

Introductory to the chapter on "The Inheritance of Family Traits" are two chapters. In the first, eugenics is defined, its nature indicated, and its general procedure suggested. This chapter is brief but not very effective. The second chapter, under the title "The Method of Eugenics," presents still less satisfactorily, in the opinion of the reviewer, an account of the mechanism of heredity, of its laws, and of the application of these laws to eugenics.

At the beginning of this chapter, the author partially reveals his motive.

To get at the facts [of human heredity] it is necessary to study the progeny of human marriages. Now marriage can be and is looked at from many points of view: in novels, as the climax of human courtship; in law, largely as a union of two lines of property-descent; in society, as fixing a certain status; but in eugenics, which considers its biological aspect, marriage is an experiment in breeding; and the children, in their varied combinations of characters, give the result of the experiment. That marriage should still be only an *experiment* in breeding, while the breeding of many animals and plants has been reduced to a science, is ground for reproach. Surely the human product is superior to that of poultry; and as we may now predict with precision the characters of the offspring of a particular pair of pedigreed poultry so may it sometime be with man. As we now know how to make almost any desired combination of characters of guinea-pigs, chickens, wheats, and cottons so may we hope to do with man [p. 7].

It is unfortunate that the introductory discussion of the nature, aims, and methods of eugenics should not be more readable. Possibly it is because the author's mental pattern is extremely different from the reviewer's that the latter finds chap. ii both uninteresting and difficult to follow. Certainly an account of the mechanism of heredity is important for this book and should be adapted to the unbiological reader.

Turning to the latter portion of the book, we find six chapters which together contain less pages (90) than the single chapter on "The Inheritance of Family Traits." These several chapters bear the titles "The Geographic Distribution of Inheritable Traits," "Migrations and Their Eugenic Significance," "The Influence of the Individual on the Race," "The Study of American Families," "Eugenics and Euthenics," and "The Organization of Applied Eugenics."

In considering the relation of geographic distribution to heredity, the author discusses the effects of consanguinity in marriage and of physiographic and social barriers. Important among the former are

water and topography; among the latter, social status, language, race, and religion.

The chapter which deals with migration in its relations to eugenics briefly characterizes the primitive, early, and recent migrations and immigrations. An attempt is then made to characterize the races which are today contributing to the stream of immigrants to America. In the list are included Irish, Germans, Scandinavians, Austro-Hungarians, Hebrews, Italians, Poles, and Portuguese.

Summarizing his review of recent conditions of immigration, Dr. Davenport writes:

It appears that, unless conditions change of themselves or are radically changed, the population of the United States will, on account of the great influx of blood from southeastern Europe, rapidly become darker in pigmentation, smaller in stature, more mercurial, more attached to music and art, more given to crimes of larceny, kidnaping, assault, murder, rape, and sex-immorality and less given to burglary, drunkenness, and vagrancy than were the original English settlers. Since of the insane in hospitals there are relatively more foreign-born than native it seems probable that, under present conditions, the ratio of insanity in the population will rapidly increase [p. 921].

Under the topic "Control of Immigration," a plan for the gathering of eugenic facts is proposed. It provides that fieldworkers, distributed over the world, shall investigate the family history of every applicant for naturalization in the United States. The estimated annual cost of this work is \$510,000, but, as the author remarks, "compared with the annual expenditure of over \$100,000,000 in this country to take care of our defectives this amount seems small and would be well invested, for, within a decade, the annual saving to our institutions would pay for the work" (p. 223).

The influence of the individual on the race is interestingly exhibited by an account of Elizabeth Tuttle, the first families of Virginia, the Kentucky aristocracy, the Jukes, the Ishmaelites, and the Baker family.

In the chapter on "The Study of American Families," the author lays special stress upon the integrity of family traits. He thus characterizes the idea that our traits are inherited in constantly diminishing degree from parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc.

This way of looking at heredity is a relic of a former view that a trait when mated to its absence produced a half-trait in the progeny as skin color was considered to do, and which gave rise to the conception of quadroons, octaroons, etc., with successive lightening of the skin to one fourth, one eighth, and so on. Now that we know that even skin color may segregate out in the

ancestral full grades we are ready to accept as practically universal the rule that unit characters do not blend; that apparent blends in a trait are a consequence of its composition out of many units. Since this is so, a unit character (especially a negative character) which a remote ancestor possessed may reappear, after many generations have passed, in its pristine purity. A germ plasm that produced a mathematical genius only once, a century ago, may produce another not less noteworthy again [p. 249].

Not until the reader comes to the chapter on "Eugenics and Euthenics" does he find a suggestion of the possible influence of environment on man. Possibly the author has done well to keep heredity in the foreground instead of confusing the reader by admitting that we cannot be absolutely certain whether a given trait, or condition of trait, is due to nature, to nurture, or in part to each. However this may be, chap. viii makes it perfectly clear that the author is not blind to environmental influences. Perhaps he underestimates their rôle; possibly he overestimates the applicability of the laws of heredity upon which he bases his eugenic recommendations. At any rate, it is inevitable that a reader who turns from such a book as Thomson's *Heredity* to Davenport's *Heredity in Its Relation to Eugenics* will deem the latter one-sided, possibly even unfair to the facts now well established.

Extremely important to the advocate of eugenic measures is the concluding chapter, in which the author strongly urges the desirability of eugenic surveys. He suggests that state surveys to provide us with adequate information concerning families might be made by the teachers of our public schools and he meets objection that this is impracticable by the statement that, in the state of New Jersey, such a survey is being conducted by state institutions and largely on the basis of individual initiative. So far as the reviewer knows, the teachers of the state have not been employed generally or systematically in the gathering of data.

Finally, attention is called to the existence, at Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, of a eugenics record office in which are being accumulated and filed, for convenient examination and safe keeping, the family histories, and other materials bearing on human heredity, which can be obtained through individuals or institutions. The office supplies blanks for a record of family traits and, also, for special traits as they appear in a number of generations. This office has the additional functions which are indicated by the concluding sentences of *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*:

The Eugenics Record Office wishes to co-operate with institutions and state boards of control in organizing the study of defectives and criminalistic

strains in each state. It will offer suggestions as to the organization of local societies devoted to the study of eugenics. It proffers its services free of charge to persons seeking advice as to the consequences of proposed marriage matings. In a word, it is devoted to the advancement of the science and practice of Eugenics [p. 271].

ROBERT M. YERKES

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Penal Servitude. By E. STAGG WHITIN. New York: National Committee on Prison Labor, 1912.

The title of the book indicates the point of attack on the contract system of prison labor. The preface expresses the hope that the campaign against this system will be continued "until it can be said with truth that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, not even as a punishment for crime, exists within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction." By "servitude" the author seems to mean a condition in which the labor of the prisoner is exploited to his detriment for the advantage of contractors. He surely cannot mean that a convict is to be left in entire freedom, on an equality with law-abiding citizens, or that he is to be permitted to remain idle if he is unwilling to work. He declares that "the status of the convict is that of one in penal servitude—the last surviving vestige of the old slave system." Whether this epithet helps to an understanding of the subject each reader must judge for himself; certain it is that no substitute for enforced labor is proposed by the author; and it is also certain that, so long as a man is deprived of freedom as punishment for crime, or for his own reformation, or for social protection, it will seem to him very much like "involuntary servitude," no matter what novel name is found for the situation. The book does give convincing evidence that penalty should be economically administered, that by probation and parole the time of incarceration should be shortened as much as possible, consistent with justice; but for some, so far as we can now see, involuntary labor will remain necessary.

Dr. Whitin urges (p. 8) that it is the duty of the state to provide labor for all convicts, labor which will not compete with free labor; and that the prisoner should "return to the state the full amount of his cost to it, and support his wife and children." Perhaps he would add indemnity for damages to the parties injured. It is the duty of the state to do what is possible in this direction, but duty does not include the impossible. What should be included in cost to the state? The cost of police, courts, prison buildings, administration, or the indi-

vidual convict's share of this cost? The book is not clear on this point and offers no estimate or method of making an estimate. It might, perhaps, for all we know, cost a hundred years or more of labor for many a criminal to pay back what he has robbed or ruined by his misdeeds. All that we can do is to make the industry of prisoners as productive as possible, and to encourage each convict to good conduct by a gratuity measured somewhat by his industry and other desirable qualities. But to promise him wages is to promise him the moon; for no wages fund, in the strict business sense, is created.

There is, indeed, a glowing and rosy optimism about the financial results to be expected from the "state-use system." That system is one toward which modern thought and practice are moving. It eliminates outside interference with prison discipline; it is the form of organization which is best adapted to educational training of young men for industries to which they are best fitted by nature and habit. Whether it can be made lucrative to the state remains to be discovered. It is worth a fair trial. But the evidence furnished in this volume, while very suggestive and encouraging, is not convincing. Indeed, nothing but experiment, under favorable circumstances, can provide proof in the scientific sense. Under the dominant "spoils system" of politics success will remain impossible.

The state-use system thus far has been, in general, a sorry failure, from a financial standpoint. If our author has presented the European experience in this field we should see that this system is quite general on the other side of the Atlantic, and that many able administrators approve it; but that it is a costly method, as there seen, and that it presents difficulties which are admitted by its best friends. It may reduce somewhat direct and concentrated competition with the market of products of free labor, but how far no one can estimate with accuracy; it does not altogether quiet the criticisms of trade unions and manufacturers, who eagerly desire the business of supplying state institutions, army, and navy with needed commodities.

Therefore, while in full sympathy with the purpose of the author, and while desiring the introduction of the state-use system, one must hope that the bright and earnest secretary of the National Prison Committee will continue his studies, and strengthen his argument. For what he has already done in discovering and uncovering gross and inexcusable evils of administration he deserves abundant praise; and his constructive propositions are based on sound principles.

CHARLES R. HENDERSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Story of the Zulus. By J. Y. GIBSON. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. Pp. vii+338.

Mr. Gibson's volume, the first edition of which appeared in 1903, is well printed, well bound, and embellished with eleven illustrations of Zulu scenes and personalities. There is an unusually full index, a "genealogy" of the Zulu royal house, but curiously enough, no table of contents, not even a bare list of chapter headings. So strange an omission ought not to go unnoticed.

The author has enjoyed excellent opportunities for producing a reliable narrative. His boyhood was passed in Natal, at a time when the Zulus furnished one of the principal topics of conversation among both the black and the white races there. Subsequently, he served as a magistrate in Zululand and learned to know the natives at first hand. His book belongs to the small but useful class of works which deal, not with the customs of primitive peoples, but with their history after contact with European culture. The narrative covers about one hundred years of Zulu national life—from the latter part of the eighteenth century to 1888 when Zululand became a British protectorate.

The Zulus, until about 1780, led the uneventful lives of all primitive folk. Though their country was thickly populated by numerous tribes under independent chiefs, there seems to have been little warfare and few efforts on the part of one community to expand over its neighbors. Suddenly all is changed; a great man makes his appearance in the person of Dingiswayo, "the Troubled One." He goes to Cape Town, witnesses the drilling of European soldiers, and returns to his people fired with the idea of subjecting them to a similar military discipline. The Zulu warriors who formerly fought in unorganized masses he forms into regiments and companies, each with its *induna* or captain, each with its appointed place on the field of battle. The new system immediately proves its worth; Dingiswayo conquers all his neighbors, and from the chieftainship of a petty tribe, rises to the position of paramount ruler over a wide extent of country (between the Tugela and Pongolo rivers). If native tradition is trustworthy, the new sovereign aimed to be as eminent in peace as in war. He began an extensive trade with Delagoa Bay; encouraged, by liberal rewards, the arts and crafts of his people; and even established a manufactory where a hundred workmen were employed. This Peter the Great of Zululand died about the year 1818, too soon for his radical innovations to take deep root. A few years later, however, the example of Dingiswayo was pursued with greater success by the well-known Tshaka (Chaka), the real founder of

the Zulu power during the nineteenth century. The military discipline which Tshaka enforced upon his subjects was worthy of a Lycurgus. Like the Spartans, they had to conquer or die in battle; at the conclusion of each fight the cowards were picked out and promptly dispatched by Tshaka's agents. "The practice," remarks our authority, "was certainly a strong stimulus to valor."

The story of the Zulus should thus provide the sociologist with an instructive instance of "nation-making" under the influence of commanding personalities. What Dingiswayo and Tshaka did to create a conquering state was done on a larger scale by those founders of archaic civilizations, Menes, Sargon of Agade, and Hammurabi of Babylon.

HUTTON WEBSTER

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

A Guide to Reading in Social Ethics and Allied Subjects. Lists of Books and Articles Selected and Described for the Use of General Readers, by Teachers in Harvard University. Published by Harvard University, 1910. Pp. x+263. \$1.25.

Professor Peabody's "prefatory note" explains that the book aims to be something less than a perfect bibliography, "which may justify pride in the compiler, but may provoke despair in the reader." Its aim is rather to guide "not a superficial reader, nor yet a learned scholar, but an intelligent and serious-minded student, who is willing to read substantial literature if it be commended to him as worth his while and is neither too voluminous nor too inaccessible."

The main titles are: I, "Social Philosophy," with nine subdivisions; II, "Social Institutions," including three subtopics; III, "Social Service," treated under eleven groupings; IV, "The Ethics of Modern Industry," considered under fourteen rubrics; V, "Social Aspects of Religion," of which five are distinguished; VI, "Bibliographical References in Social Ethics."

Select bibliographies, and particularly brief characterizations of books, are so largely matters of taste that quarrels over them are barred. One is, of course, tempted, nevertheless, on almost every page. Turning the leaves at random, for example, my eye fell upon the word "mercantilist" on p. 18. Then I read the advice

to consult J. K. Ingram's *History of Political Economy* for information on that subject. As I have elsewhere shown, it would be better not to read anything at all about mercantilism than to suppose that Ingram was an authority about it. I do not find Professor Cooley's name in the index, and his two books are certainly more important than two-thirds of the titles under the head "Social Psychology" (pp. 24-28). Professor Giddings appears to have been mentioned only on p. 29. *The Principles of Sociology* is not his only important book. I do not find Professor Simon N. Patten's name in the index, while scores of less stimulating and instructive writers are scheduled. In spite of such omissions and vagaries of judgment, the lists will be useful, and the book should be at the elbow of everyone who is called upon to advise about reading in the social sciences.

A. W. S.

Socialistic Fallacies. By YVES GUYOT. New York: Macmillan, 1910. Pp. xxiii+343. \$1.50 net.

This translation of an already well-known impeachment of socialism will be a valuable addition to our equipment for studying the subject. Guyot tries to be judicial, but he has the temper of an advocate, and the socialists will hardly admit that his position is unprejudiced. There can be no question about the force of his attack. Starting with Bentham's definition of "fallacy," i.e., "any argument employed, or topic suggested, for the purpose, or with a probability, of producing the effect of deception—of causing some erroneous opinion to be entertained by any person to whose mind such argument may have been presented," the author proposes "to reduce to their true value the socialistic fallacies with which a number of able, but frequently unscrupulous, men amuse the idle and attract the multitude. They do not even possess the merit of having originated either their arguments or their systems. They are plagiarists, with some variations, of all the communist romances inspired by Plato. Their greatest pundits, Marx and Engels, have built up their theories upon a sentence of Saint Simon and three phrases of Ricardo." The argument in support of this proposition is divided into nine books, viz.: I, "Utopias and Communistic Experiments"; II, "Socialistic Theories"; III, "The Postulates of German Socialism"; IV, "The Distribution of Capital"; V, "The Distribution of Industries"; VI, "The Inconsistencies of Scientific

Socialism"; VII, "Collectivist Organization"; VIII, "The Actual Class War"; IX, "Socialism and Democracy."

The animus of the book and the author's estimate of its performance may be gathered from the closing paragraph (p. 343): "There are three words which Socialism must erase from the façades of our public buildings—the three words of the Republican motto:

"*Liberty*, because Socialism is a rule of tyranny and of police.

"*Equality*, because it is a rule of class.

"*Fraternity*, because its policy is that of the class war."

A. W. S.

The Pittsburgh Survey: Findings in Six Volumes. Edited by PAUL UNDERWOOD KELLOGG. *Homestead, the Households of a Mill Town.* By MARGARET F. BYINGTON. *The Steel Workers.* By JOHN A. FITCH. New York: Charities Publication Committee (Russell Sage Foundation Publications), 1910.

This series will be reviewed in this *Journal* after Mr. Kellogg's final volume has appeared. It is enough to say at present that no more important single enterprise in the field of social investigation has been undertaken in the United States. The work was done in a way that has demonstrated the wisdom of the plan.

A. W. S.

The Spirit of Social Work. BY EDWARD T. DEVINE. New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1911. Pp. 231. \$1.00.

Dr. Devine has again set forth in this book in a delightful way the spirit of modern social work. In a series of nine addresses he covers a variety of topics, such as "The Conservation of Human Life," "The Tenement House in Modern Cities," "The Attitude of Society toward the Criminal," "The Religious Treatment of Poverty," and "The Dominant Note of Modern Philanthropy." In all of these addresses there is the sanity, breadth of vision, and wisdom which we are accustomed to expect in all that Dr. Devine says. There is the emphasis upon prevention, upon the study and removal of the causes of misery, and upon the conservation of the higher values of human life which characterizes modern scientific philanthropy. The book deserves reading, not only by those who are interested in social work, but by all who wish to understand the humanitarian movements of our time.

C. A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Barbarous Mexico. By JOHN KENNETH TURNER. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1911. Pp. 340, with 18 illustrations.

The bulk of the material embodied in this volume was gathered during two trips through Mexico in 1908 and 1909. The author says: "My purpose is to give the reader a correct impression of Diaz and his political and economic system, of the character of the Mexican people, and of the Diaz-American partnership which has helped to enslave the Mexican nation, on the one hand, and kept the American public in ignorance of the real facts of Diaz and Mexico, on the other. . . . The term 'barbarous,' which I use in my title, is intended to apply to Mexico's form of government, rather than to its people." The chapter titles are: I, "The Slaves of Yucatan"; II, "The Extermination of the Yaquis"; III, "Over the Exile Road"; IV, "The Contract Slaves of Valle Nacional"; V, "In the Valley of Death"; VI, "The Country Peons and the City Poor"; VII, "The Diaz System"; VIII, "Repressive Elements of the Diaz Machine"; IX, "The Crushing of Opposition Parties"; X, "The Eighth Unanimous Election of Diaz"; XI, "Four Mexican Strikes"; XII, "Critics and Corroboration"; XIII, "The Diaz-American Press Conspiracy"; XIV, "The American Partners of Diaz"; XV, "American Persecution of the Enemies of Diaz"; XVI, "Diaz Himself"; XVII, "The Mexican People." We have no means of checking up the alleged evidence. We can merely announce this brief for the prosecution.

Canadian National Economy. The Cause of High Prices and Their Effect upon the Country. By JAMES J. HARPELL. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 1911. Pp. 182. 50 cents.

The author says of his monograph: "The material presented in the following pages has grown out of notes and observations made particularly during the last eight or nine years, when, in the course of business, I have had an opportunity to study Canadian authorities at first hand, and in a similar manner of comparing them with those obtaining in other countries. My first attempt to put these notes into constructive form resulted in an article entitled 'Canada and Tariff Reform' that appeared in the 1910 January number of *Contemporary Review*. The correspondence and comments occasioned by the appearance of this article impressed me with the need for a more comprehensive treatment, such as I have attempted in this volume." The special topics are: I, "The Manufacturing Industry"; II, "The Preferential Tariff"; III, "The Formation, Workings, and Profits of Combines"; IV, "Canada's Natural Resources and Foreign Trade"; V, "The Farming Industry"; VI, "The Mining Industry"; VII, "The Fishing Industry"; VIII, "The Effect upon the Political and Social Life of the Country"; IX, "The Need for National Economy"; X, "Reciprocity with the United States."

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Les premiers stades du processus de la socialisation.—The first stages in the process of socialization represent the accommodation between individuals and between groups in the primitive types of the conflict situation. The primitive family group is based on the economic and military co-operation necessary for the crude struggle with nature and for the success of the expeditions for plunder against weaker groups. Physical force is the social bond in the form of exploitation known as slavery, but on this basis the solidarity of interests tends to unite masters—and common misery to solidify the slaves. Serfdom—a form of exploitation modified by limited personal freedom—is characterized by the physical and psychical separation of master and serf in which mental constraint and legal sanction constitute the social bond. Co-operation, based on equality, becomes significant in the differentiation of labor according to aptitudes and is characterized by the conjunction of different activities into a harmonious whole. In the further stages of socialization, the two types of co-operation react upon each other; in each group the co-operation is equal, but between groups it depends upon exploitation.—Mieczylow Szerer, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, February, 1912. E. W. B.

Die Abnahme der ehelichen Fruchtbarkeit auf dem Lande in Deutschland.—On the basis of 100 married women of child-bearing age, Prussian statistics indicate a decline in the number of births from 29 in the years 1894-97 to 27 in the years 1904-7, in spite of a considerable increase in early marriages during the decade. The probable explanation for the falling birth-rate is discovered in the marked decrease of child mortality which evidently reacts upon marriage fertility, as indicated by the fact that the ratio of the sum-total of children to the whole number of families has remained practically constant. For further investigation it is desirable to secure a radical modification and perfection of statistics of birth, providing first of all for the classification of births according to the age groups of the mothers.—Dr. Prinzing, *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, December, 1911. E. W. B.

Die agrare Neugestaltung Russlands.—There is now in process in Russia a peaceful revolution characterized by the emergence of an independent peasant class based on a transition from communal to individual ownership of agricultural land. The full release of the peasants in 1907, from further payment on the land allotted to them upon the abolition of serfdom, was a preparatory step to the carrying out of the *ukase* of November 9-22, 1906, which provided upon a two-thirds vote of the members of a *mir*, for the dissolution of community ownership and, if feasible, of the common village upon settlement, and for a consolidation of the distributed small strips into individual homesteads. Two agencies have been employed to promote this policy: first, an agrarian commission under whose supervision 14,000 villages have abolished communal ownership and 400,000 *mir*-men have become small landowners; and second, the peasant agrarian bank with provincial branches and local representatives for the purpose of purchasing large estates and dividing them into farms for sale to the peasant on favorable terms. Parallel to this transition in agrarian organization is the changing mental attitude of the peasant, indicated by his growing interest in scientific agriculture.—F. v. Wrangell, *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich*, Erstes Heft, 1912. E. W. B.

Régionalisme et progrès social.—Regionalism is the movement directed toward the development of natural economic and social districts in France—a reaction from extreme centralization. This movement is in accordance with natural growth;

its purpose is to build up lesser centers of trade and social life. Such decentralization as this involves is fostered rather than hindered by the great development of transportation and communication; future development in industry is likely to be in the direction of decentralization as we gain ability to decentralize motor power; the development of mutual credit associations is a decentralization of the banking system; trade-union organization can be maintained only through strong regional organization; nationalism can best be built up through developing strongly the great co-operating outer regions of France.—Dr. Brun, *Réforme sociale*, March, 1912. A. D.

Essai sur la logique de l'éducation morale.—Education must develop in the individual the knowledge of the good and the capacity to carry it out in action. Since character is plastic, the educator can impress and, so to speak, incorporate in the organism the ideas of the good. But these ideas can have value only as they express themselves in action; it becomes, therefore, the function of education to develop capacity for well-directed action; this involves a well-controlled nervous and muscular organism, clearness of thought, perseverance. This knowledge of the good and the sense of power to act is, also, a spiritual support and motive force.—A. Bauer, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, February, 1912. A. D.

La bio-sociologie.—The primary need of social science is a technology and a definite field. Bio-sociology furnishes these elements necessary to an exact science. Its precise field and object is the discovery of the interdependence between the individual characteristic and the environment. Its technology involves (1) improvement in methods of observation; development of biological studies such as those undertaken by the anthropometrist and the anthropologist; studies in heredity and studies of social environment; (2) refinement and development of statistical method; the work in correlation of Galton, Pearson, and Yule can be carried out in the study of a multitude of social data.—G. Papillaut, *Revue anthropologique*, January, 1912. A. D.

Das Aufsteigen geistig Begabter in England.—It is of the highest importance for national progress to provide ways and means for discovering and promoting mental capacity wherever found. Notwithstanding their tenacity in clinging to ancient social groupings and traditions, the English have devised methods for the selection of the fittest. But the standard of fitness has become a narrow economic one, and democracy exists only for the economically gifted, and for no others. Without membership in the moneyed classes the gentleman is impossible. While the Englishman protests his democratic loyalty, he will under no circumstances permit the social ladder to be abolished. On the contrary, he decries equality of opportunity for others as interfering with the opportunity for success of those who are destined to succeed by virtue of superior power, courage, cunning, etc. Nothing hurts the culture life of a nation more than the certainty in a portion of the population of being excluded, on account of lowly birth, from any higher station in life and from all important amelioration. To the close observer it is clear that in the competition of nations in all the fields of creative civilization those will in the long run prevail which best provide for the completest development and effectuation of all the genius living in obscurity within.—Dr. E. Schultze, *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, May, 1912. P. W.

Das Wesen der historischen Kausalität.—The two theories of historic causality popularly held, viz., that of individual-conscious motivation and that of collective or group desire, are both too simple, because purely psychological. For the appearance of any cultural innovation it is necessary that three conditions be simultaneously present: (1) a need or demand for a change; (2) a degree of maturity in the conditions of culture; (3) the initiative of a dominant individual. Historic causality is therefore sociological and not psychological, as appears from the fact that the form of social institutions varies while their instinctive bases remain constant. Cultural and physical factors, social conditions and numerical relations play a prominent rôle as causes in all historic change. The second general principle advanced is that of the dependence of historic causation upon processes of cumulation. In order that a desire shall gain cultural significance, it must rise above a certain liminal value or intensity, determined not only psychologically but sociologically. Due psychic preparation is

necessary for any essential innovation, and the requisite shifting and reversal of feeling tone leading to its acceptance is accomplished through repetition. It follows from the historic structure of consciousness that chance can play but a small rôle in mental life, and consequently also in historic-social life, contrary to the popular view which sees in history only the effects of accidental, isolated causes.—Alf. Vierkandt, *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, Hefte 4, 5, 1912. P. W.

Der Neo-Malthusianismus in seinen Beziehungen zur Rassenbiologie und Rassenhygiene.—The decline and fall of civilizations has been explained by Galton and others on the principle of degeneration of the upper and abler classes and their displacement from among the lower social strata of inferior heredity. On the strength of statistical investigations, however, we know that the distribution of ability within a nation does not coincide with social grouping, and that the hereditary character of superior capacity is at least questionable. Not physical but social heredity is responsible for the phenomena of degeneration among civilized peoples. Increasing wealth and prosperity, changes in the relation of the sexes and in the position of woman, and the disintegration of religious and philosophical ideas are the agencies undermining the life of nations by jointly making for the decrease of population—the great disease threatening civilized mankind with destruction. The neo-Malthusian propaganda is a conspiracy in behalf of race-suicide. But the fatal course of ancient civilizations, on which modern nations are far advanced, is not necessarily to be followed to its historic termination. Our advantage over the ancients consists in our knowledge of the danger and in our ability to forestal it by means of science and morality.—Dr. Pontus Fahlbeck, *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie*, 1. Heft, 1912. P. W.

Kommunale Arbeitslosenversicherung.—The present system of insurance against unemployment is based on the voluntary initiative of cities or of establishments within cities; this system is unsatisfactory (1) because not more than a third of the persons who are unemployed live in large cities; (2) if the insurance is voluntary, the worst risks will crowd in first; (c) the labor market is affected nationally, and the effects should, therefore, be borne by the Empire, rather than by cities. Moreover, the cities are afraid to establish such system because of the danger of attracting the unemployable persons; the present method has increased the amount of unemployment. An effective system must be compulsory and must cover the entire Empire.—Dr. Rosenstock, *Soziale Praxis*, May 16, 1912. E. H. S.

General Ability, Its Existence and Nature.—The great divergence of opinion in regard to the correlation between different intellectual performances is due to misinterpretation; all the facts indicate unanimously that the correlation arises through all the performances, however different, depending partly on a general ability; this general factor is not any special sort of process, such as intelligent or synthetic operation; the explanation by attention is also inadequate; the general factor is the common fund of energy. Every intellectual act appears to involve both the specific activity of a particular system of cortical neurones, and also the general energy of the whole cortex.—Bernard Hart and C. Spearman, *British Journal of Psychology*, March, 1912. E. H. S.

Social Problems: Their Treatment, Past, Present, and Future.—Social problems have been solved in the past largely by social instincts, which are wholly insufficient guides to social conduct and often lead us widely astray by rendering the fertility of the unfit dominant. Since we have suspended Nature's effective methods of raising our stock, it is necessary to consider every social problem from the biological standpoint; we must study, record, and measure the factors of human development with precisely the same accuracy as we have studied animal or plant life or inorganic nature. Sociology must change its methods, just as psychology has changed its methods; opinions, without a sufficient basis of facts, should have no more weight in sociology than in psychology. University laboratories should be established, adequately equipped biologically, medically, and statistically, with the sole business of sociological research.—Karl Pearson, *Questions of the Day and of the Fray*, No. 5, 1912. E. H. S.

Tuberculosis, Heredity, and Environment.—Biometrical studies of tuberculosis show (1) that a father is twice as infectious to his offspring as the husband to the wife; (2) that the father and mother are equally infectious, though the mother is closer to the children than the father. The conclusion is that the hereditary constitutional factor is immensely more important in tuberculosis than the infection factor. The intensity of parental resemblance in tuberculosis is absolutely similar to that for insanity or deaf-mutism, which certainly cannot be attributed to infection. When we devote all our national energies to isolation and segregation we are wasting a very large proportion of our efforts. The fall in the death-rate from tuberculosis is due to immunity; since the fight against tuberculosis, the rate of fall has been retarded.—Karl Pearson, *Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series*, No. 8, 1912. E. H. S.

Die Erweiterung der Sozialpolitik durch die Berufsvormundschaft.—Professional guardianship has developed in Germany as an aid in training children when the family is wholly lacking or is inadequate to perform the task. Such guardians are usually governmental officials; their number has increased very rapidly in the last few years; in October, 1911, there were 274 professional guardians, with 100,000 wards. Professional guardianship is becoming more necessary because of the complications of social relations and the crowding in cities; the illegitimate children, especially, need careful guardianship because of their social handicap and their high death-rate in the first year of life. In the light of social politics the aim of professional guardianship is to care for the child so that it may become a properly functioning member of society; since the guardian assumes the rôle of the normal family, his position should be central in the system of social politics. There are some indications that it may assume such a place.—Othmar Spann, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, March, 1912. W. S. T.

Professor Boas' New Theory of the Form of the Head—a Critical Contribution to School Anthropology.—Professor Boas' theory, which claims that European immigrants change their type—in shape of head—even in the first generation, does not agree with any of the older theories, which rest upon a great number of measurements by anthropologists. His conclusions must be judged to be incorrect, (1) because a regrouping of his own figures shows insufficient differences from the normal to allow for the transfer of the people measured from the dolichocephalic to the mesocephalic type; (2) the technical requirements for accurate measurements were not met in his work.—Paul R. Radosavljevich, *American Anthropologist*, July-September, 1911. W. S. T.

Morality as Inter-Personal.—Goodness is some form of desirable conscious life; it is a mistake to assume that goodness belongs to an individual, as most ethical writers have; goodness has been incorrectly identified, also, with the perfection of one element of consciousness—feeling, cognition, or volition. Social psychology has shown that the self is developed only in connection with other selves. All moral actions, therefore, have social references and social consequences. What is the highest good for me is the highest good for others. "Love of love" thus becomes the true ethical ideal. Love makes activities broader than the individual and gives to them an ethical quality. The good is not something attained at the end of a series of actions.—E. W. Hirst, *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1912. W. S. T.

Tvangsforsikringen i England.—The insurance law of England, which is to go into effect July 15, 1912, contains an unprecedented nucleus of progress in the unlimited powers of the insurance commissioners; thus the success of this law depends on the personnel of the commission. In contrast with this, the German law of 1911 does not give full scope to the authorities but restricts their responsibilities.—Aage Sørensen, *Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift*, March-April, 1912. J. E. E.

A Bugbear of Reformers.—The attempts to deny the law of diminishing returns are futile; this law is nothing more than the fact that land is a limiting factor in production. The amount of land necessary has not been greatly decreased by the substitution of capital; it has meant only that other land has been used. There are

three possibilities for us: (1) we must become more and more a manufacturing and commercial people, depending on the outside world for agricultural produce; (2) our people will spread over territories of the inferior races; (3) we must restrain our people from emigration until the pressure of population on subsistence becomes strong enough to check the increase and restore equilibrium.—T. N. Carver, *Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1912. J. E. E.

Assortative Mating in Man.—Biometrical studies of stature, complexion, color of hair and eyes, physical defects and other pathological conditions, and some psychical characteristics show that similar individuals tend to marry. The "charm of disparity," and "the selection of opposites" have been so long asserted that those notions will not readily be given up. Accurate biometrical results, however, point decidedly to parity, rather than to disparity, in human mating.—Dr. J. Arthur Harris, *Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1912. J. E. E.

The Increase in Industrial Accidents.—In Germany, Austria, and Great Britain there is a tendency to the decrease of those accidents which cause death or permanent disablement. In Germany and Austria the accidents which cause disablement from which the workman eventually recovers show a tendency to increase; there is no information on this point from Great Britain. In Germany the number of minor accidents has steadily increased during the last decade, in which there has been an elaborate and persistent campaign for the purpose of reducing the accident risk; this increase comes from turning serious accidents into minor accidents.—Henry J. Harris, *American Statistical Association*, March, 1912. J. E. E.

Tenant Farmers and a Land Bank Scheme.—Sir Edward Holden has proposed that a bank should be formed by Parliament, with the object of lending money to the farmer for a series of years so as to enable him, if possible within his lifetime, to purchase his land. This plan purposes that a loan of £500,000 should be obtained from the state by the new "bank," such loan to carry $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent interest. A farmer would be permitted to borrow four-fifths of the purchase price of his land at 4 per cent interest, repayable by annual instalments spread over a period up to 75 years if so desired. There seems to be some hesitancy on the part of the House of Lords to consider such a bill. Their attitude will show whether they think it more desirable that agricultural land should be owned by the actual farmer, by the capitalist landlord, or by the state.—*Bankers' Magazine* (London), April, 1912. L. E.

The Medical Side of Immigration.—Certain diseases among the immigrants are found so frequently and others are so inherently dangerous that there should be rigid medical examination. Nachoma, hookworm, and other intestinal parasites, for example, are quite common among immigrants, especially from oriental and Mediterranean countries. In general the records show that the best class is drawn from northern and western Europe and the poorest from the Mediterranean countries and western Asia. Strict enforcement of the present medical laws will automatically exclude these races to a sufficient extent, admitting the few who are fit.—Dr. Alfred C. Reed, *The Popular Science Monthly*, April, 1912. L. E.

The Relation between Large Families, Poverty, Irregularity of Earnings, and Crowding.—A series of statistical studies in England shows that the poorer classes have larger families than the classes better off and as a result the nation is reproducing itself more largely from the less efficient class. While it may appear that large families are the cause of poverty, statistics show that large families and poverty, irrespective of such poverty as is caused by largeness of family, are closely connected. The larger families are found among those where the earnings of the father are irregular, and the largest families are found where there are fewer rooms per family. Two remedies are proposed: draft the more numerous children of the less skilled into the more skilled trades or branches of trade, and reduce the number of children born in the poorest class.—Stewart Johnson, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, April, 1912. L. E.

The Tramp Problem.—The causes of vagrancy are in general the same as the causes of poverty, plus, often, a strong desire to wander. A reduction of vagrancy may be effected through farm colonies for tramps and vagrants, the reduction of railway trespass, disuse of almshouses for housing tramps, establishing the "tramp house" with work-test, having state officials to arrest and prosecute vagrants, abolition of the short sentence and the idle jail, prosecution of public begging. The states, not localities, must handle the problem, which is one of national scope; there should be, also, a national vagrancy committee working systematically. Some form of free employment bureaus should be established, and temporary lodgings furnished the unemployed who meet the work-test. Systematic education is a fundamental aid in preventing vagrancy.—O. F. Lewis, *Annals of the American Academy*, March, 1912. A. H. W.

Workmen's Compensation in Michigan.—The movement for workmen's compensation is of recent origin in the United States but has rapidly advanced. New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Illinois, New Hampshire, Ohio, Nevada, California, Washington, and Wisconsin have passed acts. They are of several types: the elective, the supplemental, the compulsory, and that involving state insurance. The elective system is often condemned as a makeshift between employers' liability and pure compulsory compensation; but it is a distinct advance upon employers' liability in that it recognizes the principle of payment for accidents that occur without the fault of the injured. The Michigan Commission act is compulsory for the state and its subdivisions, and elective for all other employers except in agricultural and domestic service. It provides a reasonable compensation, certain in amount, of assured payment, and readily collectible. The scheme aims to promote prevention.—Hal H. Smith, *Michigan Law Review*, February, 1912. A. H. W.

Rural Recreation, a Socializing Factor.—The play movement has not yet fully penetrated the rural districts, where there is great need of suitable recreational activities for developing and socializing purposes. Church, school, rural Y.M.C.A., grange, and other organizations must co-operate in securing play facilities. An adequate program includes pleasurable occupations for all these organizations, in all seasons and for both sexes at all ages.—Myron T. Scudder, *Annals of the American Academy*, March, 1912. A. H. W.

Die Frau als Konsumentin.—The entrance of women into production as a means of maintaining the family standard of living has not proved efficient. The present problem of the housewife and the means of maintaining the standard of living is her ability to direct consumption economically and her ability as a purchaser. Her education has not fitted her for this work; schools for training women in these duties are now organized; societies of purchasers and of consumers have been formed, which, in addition to organizing the direct efforts in these lines, are using the economic power of the purchasers to solve ethical and aesthetic questions, such as the conditions under which production is carried on, and the artistic characteristics of articles.—Irma Wolff, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, May, 1912.

E. H. S.

Ueber Kulturaufgaben der Arbeiterschaft in Oesterreich.—The legislation of 1867-68 first made possible the labor movement in Austria. The first effort of these organizations of laborers was to secure education and culture, and efforts in these directions have never been so strong and persistent elsewhere as in Austria. The unions have been foremost in fighting for public education, democracy, woman suffrage, and general health, and against clericalism.—Engelbert Pernerstorfer, *Dokumente des Fortschritts*, May, 1912.

E. H. S.

Profit-sharing and Labor Co-Partnership.—The question of how much wealth shall be produced is of more importance to the community than the question of the shares that shall go to employers and employees. The amount of wealth produced is being greatly reduced by industrial disputes and enmity, for production depends on co-operation of capital and labor. The capitalists by some initial self-sacrifice can

relieve this situation by systems of profit-sharing and labor co-partnership; there are in England many cases of successful working of these means to the benefit of both employers and employees.—T. C. Taylor, *Contemporary Review*, May, 1912.

E. H. S.

The Living Wage in the Australian Arbitration Court.—The compulsory submission of industrial disputes to Courts of Arbitration in Australia has incidentally required those courts to accept some principle of determining a just wage, for the court has been left without guidance from the legislature in this. From the first the court decided to reject the "market value of services" as the determinant of wages, and substituted the normal needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilized country. It was adjudged to be better that industries which could not pay such wages should cease. Injurious, disagreeable, or degrading conditions of work, which were preventable, were not considered as cause for an increase in the minimum wage, but as cause for special legislation.—Harrison Moore, *Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation*, N.S. No. 26, May, 1912.

E. H. S.

German Social Insurance and Poor Relief.—German insurance laws were first advocated because they were expected to reduce the necessity for poor relief; it was regarded as a matter of arithmetic—so many more people insured, so many fewer paupers, so much more insurance benefit, so much less poor relief. But at the present time the poor-law authorities, with the full approval of public opinion, are doing a larger and more important work than ever before. The social insurance awakened a social spirit that led to a greater development of the poor-law system, based on extensive preventive work. Also, the social insurance raised the standard of living of the ordinary worker, and this rise has been reflected in the larger grants to those who need aid. The insurance legislation did not decrease poor relief, but widened and deepened the entire system of public care for the poor.—W. H. Dawson, *Contemporary Review*, May, 1912.

E. H. S.

Individualism and Socialism. Socialism in its more precise sense indicates the various orderly measures that are taken by groups of individuals to provide collectively for the definite needs of the individuals composing the group. Individualism maintains that it is the individual that counts, and that for good or ill the individual brought his fate with him at birth. Both theories are absolutely right, for they are not opposed. There is a division of labor between them; no one needs individualism in his water supply and no one needs socialism in his religion. All human affairs at any given time sort themselves out as coming within the province of socialism or of individualism. Each is indispensable to the other. The key to the situation is found in the counterbalancing tendency of individualism and the eugenic guardianship of the race.—Havelock Ellis, *Contemporary Review*, April, 1912.

E. H. S.

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XVIII

SEPTEMBER, 1912

NUMBER 2

THE INFUSION OF SOCIO-POLITICAL IDEAS INTO THE LITERATURE OF GERMAN ECONOMICS¹

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Vienna

I

"First of all, however, *pauperism* directed the attention and sympathies of all cultivated people to the condition of the laboring classes, and, since the disturbances among the spinners in Silesia and Bohemia, not merely produced in the different parts of Germany unions for removing the difficulties, but also dwelt with increasing insistence upon an answer to the great general question: 'What social reforms does the growing chasm between the poor and the rich demand, and what duties does the right of possession impose?' Most notable is the fact that the men who, in other respects, are regarded as the leaders in the science of national economy: Hermann, Rau, Nebenius were silent over most of these open questions, and the practical men of the people who were

¹ *Das Eindringen der sozialpolitischen Ideen in die Litteratur*: a monograph included in the second of the two volumes published in 1908 in recognition of Professor Schmoller's seventieth birthday. The general title of the volumes is: *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Volkswirtschaftslehre im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*. The survey afforded by the paper has important indirect bearings upon the subject to be discussed at the December, 1912, meeting of the *American Sociological Society*. Professor von Philippovich has kindly authorized publication of this translation. A few passages have been condensed and some of the notes have been omitted or abbreviated.—ED.

immersed in business life, or the newer generation of political literati, almost exclusively occupied the arena."

Thus wrote Bruno Hildebrand in the year 1848 in characterizing the attitude of German national economic science toward the great questions of the time.¹ And yet at that time Germany also already had a labor movement and a socialistic trend which could no longer be disregarded, especially since the new theory of society had in France already led to bloody conflicts and threatened to arouse new ones. "To be sure, there have always been a few political romances and utopias," wrote Robert von Mohl a few years later, but "it is something new that sympathy with such a theory is no longer accounted as a sign of mental disease, but people openly acknowledge themselves to be socialists, as though it were a rightful and honorable standpoint, just as in other connections one was a realist or nominalist, a Kantian, or a Hegelian, a moral philosopher or a member of the historical school. It is finally new that many journals and fugitive publications exist which add to the currency of that way of thinking, and bring it to consciousness not only by direct teaching but especially by interpreting all occurrences in the manner of the socialistic party." It was evidence of no great degree of perspicacity that the new way of thinking did not earlier receive attention. There were symptoms of it which should have been observed before the French civic upheavals of 1848 caused vague ideas quickly to ripen into deeds. The gradual dawning of the new conception of human relations then began tardily to be noticed. From that point on, to maintain an indifferent or repellant attitude could be permitted to neither the practical statesman nor to the theorist. "It would have been crime or complete callousness."²

In fact, at the middle of the nineteenth century all those thought tendencies were already present which constitute the conception of the world and the economic system of socialism. The writings of the French socialists, which combine lively fancy and strong feeling with a wonderful wealth of ideas, had been

¹ *Die Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft*, 1. Bd., Einleitung.

² "Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Staatswissenschaften," *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, 1851, pp. 7-10.

translated into German. L. Stein,¹ K. Grün,² Biedermann³ had bound these in their representations into systems and had made them intelligible; Rodbertus,⁴ Marx,⁵ Engels⁶ had already spoken out their basic ideas. Gall, Weitling, Hess, Grün had taught with energy and with agitating zeal a partly home-grown and partly French socialism. Marlo's system had appeared.⁷ There is no socialistic doctrine of essential significance, no socialistic theory of general industry, of historical development, of the state, of law, which had not already been spoken out at the middle of the nineteenth century, and had not been applied in criticism of the existing societary and industrial order; yet German national economic science did not regard it as necessary to reach an understanding with these doctrines. In Rau's *Archiv der politischen Ökonomie*, which appeared from 1835 to 1853, we find not a single monograph which concerns itself with socialism, with socialistic literature, or with the problems proposed by the same.⁸

Among the works reviewed in all these years were only a few on the condition of factory laborers: (Engels, Villermé, Taylor). The *Tübinger Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, founded

¹ *Der Socialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreichs*. Ein Beitrag zur Zeitgeschichte, 1842 (ein Band); zweite Auflage, 1848 (drei Bände): 1. *Der Begriff der Gesellschaft und die Bewegungen in der Gesellschaft Frankreichs seit der Revolution*; 2. *Der französische Sozialismus und Communismus*; 3. *Anhang: Die sozialistischen und communistischen Bewegungen seit der dritten französischen Revolution*.

² *Die soziale Bewegung in Frankreich und Belgien*, 1845.

³ *Vorlesungen über Sozialismus und Soziale Fragen*, 1847.

⁴ *Zur Erkenntnis unserer staatswirthschaftlichen Zustände*. Erstes (einziges) Heft, 1842. *Soziale Briefe an Kirchmann*, 3 Hefte, 1850-51.

⁵ (Marx and Engels), *Die heilige Familie. Gegen Bruno Bauer und Konsorten*, 1844; *Misère de la Philosophie*, 1847; (Marx and Engels), *Das kommunistische Manifest*, 1848; *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte*, 1852; *Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln*, 1852.

⁶ *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England*, 1845.

⁷ Marlo (K. S. Winkelblech), *Untersuchungen über die Organisation der Arbeit oder System der Weltökonomie*, 1850 ff.

⁸ The essay by R. Mohl on the disadvantages which both the laborers and the civic society itself suffer from the factory form of enterprise, and on the necessity of taking measures with reference to the same, which appeared in 1835 and had no influence, is not in connection with the socialistic literature.

in 1844, also pays little attention to the social questions.¹ It is beyond doubt that German national economy in the first half of the nineteenth century was suffering from a poverty of ideas. Born from a union of the old *Cameralistik* with *Eudämonismus*, and the philosophy of the enlightenment, German national economy alternated between technico-administrative considerations and vague endeavors for welfare. It exerted no influence even upon the development of the doctrine of individual freedom, which strove for control in industrial politics, and which was accepted as a part of the economic theory of the period. The intellectual promoter of the movement against the *Polizeistaat* in Germany is rather Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose *Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen*² exerted an influence beyond the boundaries of Germany; and the leader in the field of industrial politics is the publicist and Germano-Englishman Prince-Smith.³ The merits of the German theorists in national economy of this date reside merely in the formalistic elaboration of the theory of general industry, in the sharper discrimination of the fundamental ideas, in a systematically clearer articulation and elaboration of the doctrines of the English and French classicists. In the practical questions of industrial politics, thanks to their cameralistic antecedents, they exhibited greater readiness to champion intervention on the part of the public administration for the removal of the evils of free trade as opposed to the extreme representatives of individualism. They consequently occupied a sympathetic position with reference to private endeavors to mitigate the evils, to lessen the great inequalities in providing the different classes of the people with material goods,

¹ The volume for 1846 contains an essay on socialism by Stein, that of 1847 another on labor unions by Fallati. The problems of a social policy much discussed among publicists are not noticed. Among national economists only Schüz treats, in the volume 1844-45, certain fundamental theoretical questions of politics and social ethics.

In later volumes only philosophers treat the same (Warnkönig, Vorländer, etc.).

² Published in book form in 1851, after it had already appeared in parts.

³ *Ueber Handelsfeindseligkeit*, 1843; *Ueber die englische Tarifreform und ihre materiellen, sozialen, und politischen Folgen für Europa*, 1846. Compare on Prince-Smith, Becker, *Das deutsche Manchesterthum*, 1907.

and in improving the situation of the factory laborers. They assert, however, that through the apprehension of such failings "the fundamental truths of economic theory are not shaken," that its circle of generalizations from experience is merely subject to extension in particulars. With respect to these details industrial politics may not ignore the challenge "to seek new governmental measures for application to new evils or needs."¹ Of a fundamental determination of industrial policies through the new facts of experience, viz., the turning of society into a mass of factory laborers, and the operations of "free competition," there is not a word. Such a view would go to pieces in collision with the mass of the old doctrine. Accordingly, German national economy passed by the signs of the times without attention. The noise of the street, the strokes of the scourge of the agitating publicists, the historical and philosophical observations of the critics of society affected it as little as they would the astronomers who trace out in the orbits of the stars the eternal laws of nature.

German national economy was not dragged forth from that self-conscious repose until the powerful agitation which was contained in the socialistic literature and the socialistic reform movement penetrated its territory in a circuitous way. This invasion occurred from two sides, namely: from the side (1) of the *philosophy of law* and from the side (2) of *ethics and the historical conception of society*. Economic theory had not manifested an ability to triumph over the new and strange phenomena of a critique which attacked one of its fundamentals—individual property and free competition—or to assimilate the elements of this criticism. It had to be admitted that the older theories had defects and called for extension. There was a demand for an enlargement and deepening of scientific investigations of the industrial relations of human beings, whose peculiarly independent life was now beginning to be recognized, and for an evaluation of the same on the basis of firm philosophical and ethical principles. Such a new treatment of private property and of the relationships in industry on the basis of a philosophy of law emerged in close

¹ Rau, *Volkswirtschaftslehre*, 4th ed., 1841, p. 41. To the same effect in the preface of his discussion of Sismondi.

connection with a new conception of human community. Socialism had brought about recognition of this community with that of "society," and it had promoted the demand for ethical standards with the requisition that the industries of men should be judged in accordance with the whole sum of local, temporal, psychological conditions which are created by historical development. For the interpretation of the change which entered into German national economy in the second half of the nineteenth century, and for an understanding of the tendency founded upon the same which we now call the *social political* tendency, we must analyze more particularly these two scientific factors.

II

One of the most valuable scientific results of the socialistic literature, and of the discussions with reference to it, is the perception that the community of men which exists along with, and outside of, the state, built upon likeness of blood, of race, of economic, intellectual, and religious interests, leads a life which is peculiar, independent, and in a high degree detached from the state. It is this community which we designate as "society" when we consider it as a unity, and when we observe its own organic life. Hegel was the first in German moral philosophy to call attention to this, but in so doing he had in mind rather the conception of the individuals bound together through intercourse as a unity, and not the real actuality of the articulation of the *Volk*.¹ The differentiation between society and state as two circles

¹ The particular passage to be noted in this connection reads as follows: "Civic society is the difference which steps between the family and the state, although the completion of the same occurs later than that of the state; for as difference, this society presupposes the state, which the society must have before itself, as something independent in order to exist. In civic society each is an end unto himself, everything else is nothing to him. But without the relationships to the others he cannot attain the compass of his purposes. The others are for him means to the end of his particularity. Accordingly a system of all-sided dependence is founded, in which the subsistence, the weal of the individual and his legal being is woven into the subsistence, weal and rights of all, is based thereupon, and only in this interdependence is actual and assured."—*Rechtsphilosophie*, 1820, pp. 246-47. Philippovich adds: "The conception of civic society is of course much older. Goethe used it in 1774, in the *Leiden des jungen Werthers*, in the sense of a community ruled through laws and welfare somewhat as the word *bourgeoisie* was applied later."

varying in compass and kind was more completely grasped by Ahrens. He saw in society "the unified totality of all life-spheres operating for the cardinal purposes of human life." He pointed out, further, that each of these spheres had its own organism of functions and organs.¹ Accordingly the societary organism embraces the organism of legal life, of the state, of religious life, the church, the organization of industry and of trade, "with its progressively energetic and extended development," of instruction and of education, of science and of art. Among these life-circles, state and church have attained most independence and have taken the rest under their protection, guardianship, guidance, and control. In modern times, the endeavor of these life-circles after independence and freedom has grown constantly greater. It is, according to Ahrens, the task of the state, as the societary institution which has attained the relatively highest grade of development, to educate the others toward freedom and for this purpose to create the necessary limitations; but complete separation may never occur, *since the state is the legal organism of the whole human society*. Likewise, however, we should guard against making the state responsible for all the aims of life. This is the fundamental error of the socialists, who have properly turned against the previously negative formalistic doctrine of law and of the state. In their very endeavors, however, to bring into being a new societary organization, they have made the mistake of confusing state and society. Socialism directed its attack chiefly against the principle of competition; but this principle is in itself, according to Ahrens, a necessary consequence of freedom, and an indispensable promoter of all industrial progress. This freedom should, however, be joined with a principle of order, and therefrom results the conception of *organization*, which combines the two principles. "This organization can and should be called forth by the state, inasmuch as the state sets up the general legal condition for the regulation of the relationships among all the participants in labor, employers and employees, in their various gradations, but along with these

¹ Ahrens was probably the first who scientifically emphasized this difference: *Cours du droit naturel*, 1839, 2d part (f. Mohl's review, *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, 1840, No. 3); more at length, in the *Organische Staatslehre*, 1850, pp. 48 ff.; *die Rechtsphilosophie*, 4. Aufl., 1852; *Juristische Encyklopädie*, 1855, pp. 107 ff.

general conditions permits also in every relationship a certain play of freedom, and in the exercise of this freedom the conditions which are most agreeable to all are fixed upon through agreements and contracts between the parties." In such an organization, endeavors after association in all circles will be accorded legal rights. The significance which this societary organization, supported, regulated, and promoted by the state, possesses for overcoming the evils of the times, demands that its life-conditions shall be investigated by a special science, the science of society (*Gesellschaftswissenschaft*), which, however, shall not be limited to the economic realm only, but must comprehend all realms of human activity. This investigation of the nature of man and of the principal relations of human life constitutes, then, the point of departure and the basis of philosophy of law, the task of which is to exhibit in these life-relations the concept and the task of the law and of the legal order.¹ Wherein this task consists has already been indicated by what has been said, viz., the preservation of the freedom of the individual within the setting of an order which respects the interests of all. The internal structure of "society" is only casually touched upon by Ahrens in the course of his treatment of the rights of property. Stein, on the other hand, in his presentation of French socialism and communism, makes it a matter of special importance to show that the essence of society is formed by the economic conditions of life.² Men are bound to one another through the division of labor. The labor of the one becomes a condition and presupposition of the labor of another. The ordering of human labor is consequently a necessary presupposition of the prosperity of all. Out of this ordering of labor, which confronts us as a sub- and super-ordination, arises consequently an ordination of the distribution of goods, in which for the individual the degree and position in which he participates in the labor of all determines also the part and the

¹ *Die Rechtsphilosophie*, 4. Aufl., 1852, Einl., chaps. V and VI.

² *Der Sozialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreichs*, 1842, is so advanced as to contain emphasis of "society" as an independent arena upon which the social movement has its standing-ground. Stein does not have an exposition of the nature of society, however, until he makes it an introduction to the history of socialism in the second edition of his work, 1848.

degree of his share in the distribution of goods. In this way is determined the degree in which he can subject goods to himself, can possess them, can have them as property. But the possession again creates the opportunity to arrive at a better position with each distribution of goods. Thus arise societary classes which are separated by the antithesis between possession and non-possession. This stratification has, in the most recent period, through the transformation in the ways of carrying on industry, through the use of machinery and the development of great industries, as well as through the operation of free competition, been intensified and brought into the consciousness of the classes. The result of free competition was: "The whole class of the non-possessors has been defeated in its struggle for possession. It has through this free competition lost the necessary condition of the independence of the individual, and is daily losing it more. In the whole realm of industry there appears the division of the ruling and of the subjugated, of the possessor and of the non-possessor, and instead of the expected equality of the classes, competition has produced the incessantly increasing inequality of the same, the decisive victory of capital over the mere ability to labor."¹ This is not an accidental but a necessary consequence of competition. It has brought things to the pass that the great class of non-producers, sunken into permanent dependence, is filled with the consciousness of its situation and is rising up against it. This class demands its share in possession on the grounds of the principle of equality and of personality, the fulfilment of which depends upon control of goods. Thus the proletariat of the present has come into existence, and the spirit with which it is filled is "perhaps the weightiest fact of the whole modern life of society."² We see that through property the ordering of the community of men comes to be permanent, that it establishes the basis for the life-task and the life-philosophy of the individual in the education that it imparts. This ordering is protected by the law, it receives a fixed form, and this latter assigns a fixed course from the start to the career of each individual. This it is to which we give the name "society"

¹ *Sozialismus und Kommunismus*, 1. Aufl., p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, 2. Aufl., 1. Bd., p. 47.

(*Gesellschaft*).¹ It is dominated by the laws which control the utilization of possessions, of capital in promotion, or, in other words: "the ordering of society rests upon the lordship of capital over available labor without capital."² This fact of the proletariat "compels us to promote the manifold and frequently repeated observations about human society into a science of society; this science of society must teach us what the proletariat is, what it wants, and what it wants to be."³ A consideration of the relationship between society and the state shows us that always the societary position was a condition of sharing in the exercise of the civic power, so that the constitution of the state always reflects the constitution of the society, and the history of society is the basis of the history of constitutions. Until now the possessing classes alone have had a share in the political power. At present the proletariat is also striving to bring its principles into practical application through the possession of this power. The contradiction which must result from this struggle between the possessing and the non-possessing is absolute; it cannot be resolved through the principle of personal freedom. There is only one power which stands above these antitheses of society, that is the monarch; "hence the present and future of the state will rest upon the monarchical principle."⁴ In his system of *Staatswissenschaft*⁵ Stein attempts to find a deeper foundation for the theory of society, and to fix the limits between it and the related sciences such as *Volkswirtschaftslehre* and *Staatslehre*. As he makes the analysis, the first science shows how the individual and the society subject nature, the world of goods, to their purposes. In the state, the totality of the individuals is fused into a willing and working unity as a personality, which receives its peculiar form through the element of its society, and therewith of its system of controlling goods (*Staatsverfassung*), to which, however, at the same time, both realms, as objects on which the activity is exercised, are subordinated (*Staatsverwaltung*). The society on the other hand

¹ *Socialismus und Kommunismus*, 2. Aufl. 1 Bd., p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 57 ff.

⁵ Two vols., 1852-56. Vol. I, *System der Statistik, der Populationistik und der Volkswirtschaftslehre*, 1852; Vol. II, *Gesellschaftslehre*, 1856.

presents a system of the inter-dependencies of the individuals, and at the same time a community order which differs from that of the state. The latter contains a community of the will, the former a community of the life which rests upon the basis of the property system (*Güterwesen*), but at the same time a community of the spiritual life constructed by the community of manners (*Gesittung*). In his theory of society Stein analyzes these two bases of society, the societary ethic and possession as material basis of society. Degree and kind of possession determine the societary order; that is, the kind of possession determines the societary form, the quantity of possession the societary classes. The latter surpass the former in importance, since the structure of classes manifests the process through which, by virtue of distribution of possessions, distribution of all rights, goods, and functions in society takes place. We find in history higher and lower classes as antitheses between large possessions and no possessions, and between these the middle class. The history of society is a struggle between these classes, and the best order of society is that in which transition from the lower into the higher classes, that is, an ascending class movement, is possible.

Stein's theory of society was not further elaborated, although in it many notable relationships were brought to light, and especially the principle of the class struggle, a still controlling conception of societary development, was strongly emphasized. Meanwhile many stimuli started with him, and he has without doubt strongly influenced the development of the science.¹ Stimulated by Ahrens and Stein, Mohl also took up the idea of society as an independent vital unity of men.² In his view society is the unification of the several types of human association naturally formed around the nucleus of some definite interest, the community of

¹ In 1866 Schmoller wrote of *Das System der Staatswissenschaft*: "It contains both genius and abstruse scholarship, and has done most to place Stein in the position of an author whom nobody but specialists reads, whom consequently others may plunder with impunity and without any qualms of conscience about ignoring him or attacking him."—*Zur Literaturgeschichte der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften*, 1888, p. 116 (aus *Preuss. Jahrb.*, Bd. XIX).

² "Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Staatswissenschaften," *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatswissenschaft*, 1851.

the stock and race, the social position (nobility), the occupation, possession, religion, etc. These associations should be the subject-matter of a series of sciences, one of which should be the science of social utility (*Gesellschaftszweckmässigkeitslehre, oder Sozialpolitik*), the theory of the means of attaining the internal purposes of the several associations, in contrast with alien individuals, in relationship with the state. The significance which he ascribes to the facts of society is great and decisive for cultural and civic development.

The new conception did not lack opponents, and it is very notable that, deep as it went in its influence upon the development of the theory of general industry, it did not lead to the founding of a separate science. The general discussion about society grew quiet in the fifties, and only one successor put in an appearance in the person of Karl Dietzel, who in the sixties undertook in his history after the manner of Stein an analysis of the great unities which determine the cultural life of men. In his case the position which he assigns to the state is especially important. He ascribes to it the task of removing the bonds which embarrass the economic energies, through the antitheses which are operative in society. According to him, only when all individuals are brought, as like members of a great whole, into an all-comprehensive interrelation, will the beneficent influences of association and co-operation fully develop.

The idea of a community which is born out of inner necessities of the physical and spiritual life of men, and which possesses an independent unconscious development, had already in a high degree occupied the attention of French and English authors in the eighteenth century,¹ but the overwhelming power of the state was so great that this decisive sort of society was chiefly considered. Political science (*Staatslehre*) is the science of the relation of the individual to the state and of the nature of the civic power. By the side of it, the thought of industrial relationships was made to contemplate the combination of individuals through the economic interest, but in it the *Volk* was considered as in its atoms a homogeneous mass of contiguous individuals, as a totality without

¹ Güntzberg, *Die Gesellschafts- und Staatslehre der Physiokraten*, 1907.

organic articulation. This atomistic conception which recognized only state and individuals was greatly strengthened by German philosophy, by Kant and Fichte, and became so powerful that in the nineteenth century reference to independent life-circles which stand between the individual and the state had the effect of a discovery. "The late discovery of a great new thought and the gradual recognition of the same by contemporary science is a phenomenon of our own time and in a highly notable example, that is, it occurred with respect to the idea and the science of society." Thus wrote von Mohl.¹

From the Greek philosophers and historians down, there was no interruption of the series of those who grasped the idea of the state. The literature is almost unlimited. Now something completely new appeared. Whereas earlier all wishes for improvement referred almost exclusively to the state, and even minor changes in the civic order were followed with intense expectation, now improvements of *society* were demanded, the state now began to be spoken of as merely a consequence of society or of significance only as a means of exerting power. Constitutional questions in this connection had no longer their earlier interest. "The question monarchy vs. democracy is perhaps discussed with indifference where 'the right to labor' is the head of Medusa." Mohl therefore praises Stein as "one of the first to attempt scientifically a concept of society."² Mohl cannot understand why political economy at least did not lead to the complete recognition of society and of a special societary science. The theory of industry treats the industrial question as something outside of the state, but under the presupposition of an ordered human intercourse. "So soon as a peculiar societary life was recognized the significance and the logical position of this science was clear, and more than that, unless such a science was developed, and if, instead of it, there was retention of the traditional conception of the state and civic science, no valid division was possible.³ It is a merit of the socialists and of the socialistic literature to have drawn the attention

¹ "Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Staatswissenschaften," *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, 1851, p. 7.

² *Geschichte und Litteratur der Staatswissenschaften*, 3. Bd., 1858, p. 326.

³ "Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Staatswissenschaften," p. 14.

of science to the societary phenomena. "No longer does anyone, for example, fancy that he understands all the relationships and the actual significance of the manufacturing population when he has informed himself about the labor contract customary in the country, and any of its more particular specifications for the factories, and on the other hand, about the participation of the laborers in voting for members of popular assemblies, about their taxes and their legal rights of citizenship. We all now know that the condition common to these millions has begotten among them, and, indeed, far beyond the boundaries of the particular states, a community of manner of life, of conceptions of life, of interest and of passion, consensus in virtues and vices, a like attitude toward other circles in the *Volk*. We all now know that through this so widely extended peculiarity a quite new element has come into public life, largely unfortunate in all its relationships and consequences for those of other social groups; and that it is quite independent of the civic form, and until now only in a quite external way reachable by the laws of the state."¹

Other writers of repute agreed with von Mohl. Thus W. H. Riehl: "Every period finds one or two great truths, one or two general principles with which it conquers its own world. Such a principle, among others, is found for our epoch in the idea that civic society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) is by no means identical with political society; that the idea of "society" in the narrower sense, often, in fact, as it may lead over into the idea of the state, yet theoretically is to be distinguished from it."² This conception,

¹ Mohl further expresses these views as early as 1840 in his discussion of Ahrens *Cours du droit naturel*, in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, Jahrgang 1840. "We shall gradually understand that the doctrines about the ways and means of organizing the civic power and its organs are only child's play in comparison with the fundamental principles which must have as a consequence a completely new organization of all civic society, an entirely new attitude of men with reference to one another, when these principles come into actual life" (p. 490). "Fifty to sixty years have sufficed to produce the millions of factory laborers and to bring about their corruption. A briefer time may suffice to set them over against the other elements of society in firm battle array." "Every voice which is raised in opposition to these profoundly immoral and materially dangerous consequences of our competitive national economy is to be regarded as a benefaction" (p. 501).

² *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Sozialpolitik*, 2. Bd., *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, 1851, p. 4.

was adopted by many authors.¹ From that time on society was held to be a peculiar organism living its own life. Its manifoldness of form is also recognized, while attention is especially held by the mighty changes in the realm of industry, and there is increasing consciousness of the reactions which are exerted from the industrial relationships upon the formation of human life in law, morality, state. Hence society rouses attention first of all as the product of industrial facts. As early as 1840 Mohl gave expression to this, and since that time the conception constantly appears that the political movement will fall into the background as compared with that which is evoked by industrial contrasts. Stein assumed that the time of purely political movements in France had passed. "As at the end of the last century a class of the *Volk* revolted against the state, so now a class of the same *Volk* aims to revolutionize society, and the next revolution can be only a social one."² Mohl and Riehl took over this idea for Germany.³

"It is consequently easy to understand that the science of society puts in an appearance almost exclusively as social economy. It would be less if it attempted to be more. It is the contrast between poor and rich which now, more than every other, splits contemporary society. . . ." "Therein consists, in spite of all their ill-balance and confusion, the cardinal merit of the real socialists, that they have not merely, in the sense of earlier teachers of industrial theories, fixed their eyes upon the order of procedure in the production and distribution of goods, but they have rather put the emphasis on *the personal side of economic life or man himself*, and hence the reactions of all the relationships of labor and of

¹ For example: Fröbel, *Soziale Politik*, 1847; Hasner, *Das Verhältnis der sozialen zur Staatstheorie*, in Haimert's *Magazin für Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft*, 1850 (Hasner used the idea of society in his *Filosofie des Rechts*, pp. 81 ff., and in his *System der Politischen Ökonomie*, 1. Bd., 1860, p. 22; Heysler, *Die Gesellschaft und ihre Stellung im System des Rechts*, in the same journal; Widmann, *Gesetze der sozialen Bewegung*, 1851; Mundt, *Die Geschichte der Gesellschaft*, 2. Aufl., 1856.

² *Sozialismus und Kummunismus*, 1842, preface.

³ Riehl: "The social revolution waits for its Luther, in connection with whose thesis the celebrated proposals of a German constitution will be forgotten. . . . In our political struggles an armistice is today or tomorrow possible; in the social struggles there will be no armistice, to say nothing of a peace, until long after grass has grown over our own and our grandchildren's graves."—*Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, p. 4.

business upon the economic and moral conditions of the laboring population." With these words, Schulz-Bodmer correctly indicated the point at which national economy must draw for its realm the consequences from the new perceptions.¹ Thus the range of its research was extended, since it was under the necessity of giving more attention than before to the facts of the industrial conditions; and a new viewpoint was thus forced upon the attention of national economy. When once man with his desires, his personality, and his ideally unlimited possibilities of development was put in the foreground, thereupon also the legal order, as the power protecting personality by limiting it, was automatically placed under investigation. Hand in hand with discussions about the essence of society went, consequently, investigation in the philosophy of law.

III

The historical school of jurisprudence had taught scholars to regard the law as a product of the whole life of the *Volk*. Like language and morality, it arises not through volition and reflection merely. It is not a conscious creation of men, but an organ that has come into existence historically, a member of the total life of the *Volk* which can be understood only in close correlation with the whole national life. Valuable as this objective conception of the law was, in antithesis with the individualistic conception of the earlier theory of natural rights, yet it could not completely satisfy, because it did not regard the fact of the conscious elaboration of the law upon the higher planes of civilization, and furnished no criterion for criticism and further development of existing law. But now the very social movement itself showed that in the larger

¹ Article "Kommunismus" in the Rotteck-Welkersche *Staatslexicon*, 3d ed., 1850, p. 678. Stein expressed a similar idea, that national economy must put man in the foreground, when he said: "National economy has hitherto completely disregarded the attitude of the laws of industrial life to the individual and his welfare; it has completely subordinated the individual life to the life of the whole, and has never descended from the contemplation of this whole to that of the individuals who constituted this whole." He reasons that socialism would not fill out this gap in previous national economy, but it would be an occasion for dealing with it, because national economy would found a new science, the object of which would be the individual welfare in the community, the science of *society*.—*Sozialismus und Kommunismus*, 2. Aufl., p. 212.

part of the *Volk* existing right was felt to be wrong,¹ and a change of the law was promoted by the endeavor to develop the personality, to bring human dignity into its own, independent of possession and wealth. That which as a matter of right should be, cannot be determined from historical experience alone. In that experience there works at the same time a permanent element—the longing of man for the just, for the realization of a principle shaped by the essence of human personality, and by the ultimate destiny attributed to the same. The law always asserts itself as a limitation of the life-activity of the individual, which limitation, however, springs from the community of men, from their reciprocal relationships, from the restrictions of the realm of material things, and it places the relationships of men to one another and to material goods under an order which is supposed to assure the realization of the life-purposes of the individual as well as of human society. Man is therefore to be considered by the philosophy of law not merely as a detached person, but as a part of a collective life; and the law must determine his position therein not merely formally but with reference to its content. Starting from such views, Hugo had already expressed the idea that private property was in contradiction with the nature of man, that at last private law must entirely merge into public law.² The social conception of right was made deeper by K. Chr. Fr. Krause,³ and particularly by his pupils Ahrens and Röder. Ahrens in particular struck out the path of today's socio-political conception of society in that he regarded the fundamental facts, civic equality, freedom, property, association, the state and its relation to society and to the individuals from a unitary standpoint dominated by the thought of the weal of all. His philosophy of law may indeed be characterized

¹ The ambiguity of the German word *Recht*, which means both right and law, is a constant aggravation when one is attempting to follow arguments which admit both the juridical and the ethical factors. The transition from the one meaning of the term to the other cannot be paralleled in English. For the Germans this fact is both a convenience and an inconvenience. It has undoubtedly perpetuated obscurities which would have been eliminated from German thought if the passage from the concept "right" to the concept "law" were not so fatally facilitated by the use of the same word for both ideas.—A. W. S.

² *Naturrecht*, 2. Aufl., 1799, p. 236 f.

³ *Abriss der Philosophie des Rechtes*, 1828.

as laying of foundations for social politics. Against the earlier theories of the philosophy of law he enters the objection that with all of them the will—whether as the individual will or as the will of a group emerging in custom or morality, or the assumed will of God, always, however, interpreted by man—is the point of departure in determining law, but that no earlier system had furnished a supreme principle as a norm of the will and a determiner of right. This principle of will, he contended, had its good element, namely, the demand that freedom should be preserved to human personality. This principle can nevermore be suppressed. It can never be the supreme or controlling factor, however, because it contains in itself no rule, no criterion, and thus leaves everything to the caprice of the individual. In the concept of law, on the other hand, there is first of all the idea of an objective reality which must be brought into a relationship to an essential objectivity. The right must consequently be sought in a special mode of the objective realistic order of the life-relations, the investigation of which is a task for thought and cognition, the correct and just shaping and development of which is a requisition on the will.¹

The ideas of right which most powerfully move men, and from the realization of which in the legal order the degree of the development of personality depends, are those of equality and freedom of the person and of property. “*Equality* is an idea and a feeling which dominates all the ideas and feelings of man in his social relations, and which should spread around him that atmosphere of sympathy which is for men in general the condition of necessary aid and support.” All men are joined together by the bonds of solidarity. Wherever equality can be made into a rule without destroying the individual and personal element, it has a right to precedence which is unquestionably recognized by reason. On the other hand, that material equality which is demanded by the socialists signifies an impossibility. It presupposes the complete sacrifice of individual freedom to the mechanical rule of the state or of the society, and must still have as a consequence inequality of enjoyment, since the needs of men are various. From that principle of equality follows the demand that the laws shall set

¹ *Rechtsphilosophie*, 4th ed., Introduction, chap. VI.

up for all men alike the limitations which will make it possible for each to live as a man, and independently to develop his talents; that is, a right to instruction, to education, to the possibility of acquiring by his own activity the material and spiritual means for further development, in the case of children and feeble persons, the right to help and support from the community, the state, or special benevolent societies as representatives of the community. The principle of equality demands the equality of dignity of all vocational activities, no privileges, no arbitrary external differences which would raise one calling above another, but on the other hand the inequalities which arise from the variety of the purposes, of the natural factors, of the application of talents, are to be recognized. This would involve the disappearance of inequalities resting upon ignorance, oppression, injustice. Mankind has passed through three stages of inequalities: the caste system, slavery, the feudal system; and it is now experiencing the fourth—pauperism. This may be regarded “as the last form of the inequality of man, an inheritance which the injustice and the defective organization of the past have bequeathed to modern society.” Reason will not rest until the right of all men to the means of existence and development is recognized.¹ “It is impossible that a condition of society can be permanent in which one part lives in superfluity and does not even know how to enjoy its riches in a worthy manner, while another class of men, bowed down by misery and tortured by anxiety, drags out life in a condition which brings it close to the brute, which cultivates low propensities and wild passions and is a permanent source of vice and crime. It is unjust for men with the best intentions, with the most zealous wish to support themselves by labor, to be the victims of an unfortunate, unwise, and defective organization of society, and consequently the state as administrator of justice has the task of adopting in this connection the immediate and mediate measures for securing to them at least the essential physical and moral conditions for a human existence, and no longer to permit mankind, contrary to all the laws of religion, morality, and justice, to be outraged in an increasing number of its members.”²

¹ *Rechtsphilosophie*, 2d ed., p. 185.

² *Ibid.*, p. 186.

The second quality involved in personality is freedom, that is, the ability in a rational manner to control the various means of development which put us in a situation to attain in the general order of things the purpose of our existence. While upon the first plane of human development the conception of freedom consists in an ability to follow the impulses of the senses, upon a higher plane man is guided by his understanding. He then appraises the advantages or disadvantages of a transaction according to the personal interest. With this concept of freedom, "each looks upon himself alone as purpose, and instead of regarding himself as a particular member in the great economic body, each is tempted to regard himself as the middle point, as the heart toward which free social activity must be directed." He sees in the social order, not an essential condition of the existence of society, but a hindrance to his freedom. Every social unity is for him an evil. Accordingly freedom becomes for him a demand in the interest of the abstract individuality. This condition of abstract and individualistic freedom characterizes present society. It has done much good through the enfranchisement of emulation, but we are now beginning to understand its disadvantages and to feel the need of an organization in which personal freedom may put itself in better accord with the life of all. This plane of reasonable harmonious organic freedom will be reached "when we come to the conviction that society is not an aggregate of individuals which, arbitrarily created, exists under the laws of individual caprice, but that it constitutes an organic whole in which the particular members are articulated by a higher life-principle; and further, when man has come to recognize the totality of purposes which are prescribed to him by his reason and which he wants to gain by virtue of his freedom in the community." Then will freedom be understood as the means which should always be applied to a rational end; then there will be an essential solidarity between all the parts of society. This harmonious freedom must liberate society from the abuses of abstract freedom, "and put in the place of rivalry and competition a genuine organization of all realms of human activity, in which the rights of personality will be in accord with the higher laws which ordain the application of

common conditions and means to the attainment of the destiny of all."¹

The third basic characteristic of man is the capability of combining with his kind for all the rational purposes of human life, the associational ability (*die Associationsfähigkeit*). It rests in part upon natural instinct, in part upon reflection of the understanding, in part upon the reason striving for harmonious organization. The combinations which rest upon intelligent reflection develop especially in the systems of individualistic freedom, they arise from calculation and the perception of the advantages which they afford to the special interests. They rest, consequently, upon selfishness and promote the selfish impulses. They work, consequently, not in the direction of conciliation, but by way of intensifying contrasts and by making inequalities greater. The true need of the present is, consequently, search for ways and means of "emerging from this condition of opposition, of struggle, and of competition, and of organizing all needs and social elements according to the principles of co-ordination and harmony."² Human society should take shape corresponding with each of the chief life-purposes and the different planes of personality, in special organisms, which organisms should be joined to one another and ordered by the state in their just relationships. Always, however, personality and freedom must remain the basis. The societary bond may limit them, to be sure, and may guide them in their activity toward the societary purpose. It must, however, respect them in their peculiarity and each individual must be assured of access to all the other ranges of life.³ Association therefore does not consist in destroying the interests of the individual through the interests and the purpose of society. "The association which excludes individualism is quite as remote from communism."⁴

The weightiest consequence of this societary conception of the position of the individual is to be drawn in the realm of *property rights*. The definitions of property in the law books assign to the proprietor almost always an unlimited and exclusive usufruct

¹ *Rechtsphilosophie*, 4th ed., pp. 389-90.

³ *Ibid.*, 4th ed., p. 407.

² *Ibid.*, 2d ed., p. 209.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2d ed., p. 219.

(*Gebrauchsrecht*) of the things of which he is proprietor. They nevertheless find themselves under the necessity of setting up many sorts of limitations which unconsciously contain recognition of the principle that the property must serve reasonable purposes. In fact, property consists of two elements, a personal and a social. History teaches us how great social ideas, like new thought in morality, religion, and politics, necessarily modified property. Property is, to be sure, a personal, original, natural right of each man, because his physical and spiritual development depends upon control over material goods. The state does not create property.¹ The state must, however, insure, guarantee, and regulate the rightfully existing property and the exercise of the right of property. For this right cannot be unlimited and cannot involve anything that can be harmful to the community. In the manner and the degree of these limitations is reflected the prevailing relationship between the individual, the state, and the society. This relationship varies with the stage of civilization. This right of influence is one of the weightiest means of extricating society from that condition of individualism and of dismemberment in which the individual looks upon himself as the unlimited lord of his actions, and of the things which he has made, and thereby overlooks the organic bonds which unite him to the community and lay duties upon him.²

In his review of the first French edition of Ahrens' *Rechtsphilosophie* Mohl prophesied that the book would make an epoch in France and in all the Romance states. In fact, the work went through several editions and has been translated into six languages. Of Germany, Mohl asserted that here "the most who cultivate, officially, natural law will not allow themselves to be disturbed in their peaceful possession of the teachings of Kant, Hegel, and

¹ This passage is a good illustration of the confusion inevitable until there is rigid reckoning with the different connotations of the term "property," e.g., (a) "property" in the sense of the external object possessed; (b) "property" in the sense of an adjudged *rightfulness* of the relation between possessor and the thing possessed; (c) "property" in the legal sense, i.e., the civic ratification and sanction of the judgment in (b), or more exactly the relationship established by that civic ratification and sanction.—A. W. S.

² *Rechtsphil.*, 2d ed., pp. 266-369, 4. Aufl., bes. Theil, zweiter Abschnitt.

Stahl, which alone can make wise unto salvation." It did not, however, fail to make an impression even in this class. The German version went through five editions and even appeared again in 1870. It unquestionably influenced the contemporary younger national economists, and even in recent times it has been treated with consideration, notably by Adolph Wagner.¹ In the philosophy of law Röder particularly has followed Krause and Ahrens. Particularly in treatment of the question of property, he breaks in the most decisive manner with the individualistic conception,² yet without accepting the socialistic ideas of the distribution of wealth. If the needs and the worth of each individual were precisely ascertained, and likewise the two corresponding items with respect to the aggregate of the population, that which belongs to each might be assigned to him by society. In simple community relationships of an intimate sort which could be readily surveyed, this way has been followed (the Jesuit state in Paraguay, the agrarian community of the Germans, the distribution of goods in ancient Rome). With the development of peoples, however, a societary distribution of material goods, even under the most favorable circumstances, can hardly occur even in theory, since all three decisive factors, namely the need, the means, and the number of people, are constantly changing. This appears to justify the present system, since it is left to each to get the value out of the product of his own labor, and in free commerce by means of contracts to assure the wage that he earns. But we must not forget that "aside from labor, favorable or unfavorable fortune also, in brief, accident, both directly and indirectly, and often in the most decisive way exercises an influence upon the distribution of material goods." This comes properly into the true light when we reflect that the acquisition of material goods through labor and the dependence of the total distribution of goods upon the labor of the individual is still dependent upon two presuppositions: "first, that every man is in a position to labor or not as he will; and second, that his confidence is justified, that under com-

¹ *Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie*, 3. Aufl., 1. Theil, 2. Halbbd., pp. 872 ff.

² *Grundzüge des Naturrechts oder der Rechtsphilosophie*, 1. Aufl., 1843; 2. Aufl., 1860-63, 2. Bd., 5. Hauptstück.

pletely free exercise of all the individual forces, each available activity, each true merit will be able to win its corresponding recognition. If, however, we do not want to come into contradiction with all experience, we must remember that both of these presuppositions are to be regarded as, at most, rules the exceptions to which leave only a small margin. Merely a consequence of this is unquestionably the sharp antithesis in which we so frequently observe the division of external goods—through excessive accumulations or subdivisions—with the needs and the worth, that is, with the equitable grounds of all material property." If free play is not to be given to the blind accidents of fortune, and if the decisions of the same are not to be accepted with Turkish resignation, we may not, in determining the legal order for material goods (possessions, earnings, loss, consumption), proceed from the standpoint of the individual, but we must decide from all-sided consideration of the essential purposes of the whole, as well as of the members of the society. "That selfishness which aims at the ruin of one's neighbor through all possible evil arts, along with utilization of one's own superiority in the so-called free competition, that is virtually the whole insufficient basis and center of today's economic theory, is at all events equally dubious from moral and from genuinely economic and legal considerations." The outcome of today's irregular distribution in society, decided almost wholly by accident, cannot be so important as it would be if we had orderly organic co-operation. Private property in its present exaggerated extent and exclusiveness is not permanently maintainable. Only in a far less degree than we today usually assume can it pass as unrestrictedly necessary. The more we gain in the way of insight into justice, especially with reference to the more general and advanced needs of society, as our culture increases, the more shall we approach to an ordering of property which through legal limitation assures a use which is in accordance with the purposes of the individuals and of the aggregate, which facilitates commerce in material things and promotes the production of goods. The special norms of such a legal order must be adapted to the total conditions given from time to time in a particular state.

The idea that law must be based upon investigation of society relationships, and that its content must be a movement toward social reform, has also been represented by Eisenhart and Warnkönig. The former declares that legal training calls for a basic training in the social sciences.¹ "Our science must broaden itself into social science and it must assimilate the various complementary community spheres," writes the latter with reference to *Rechtsphilosophie*. At the same time, however, he calls attention to the fact that this discipline cannot alone perform all the tasks which follow upon its fundamental principles. "The science, however, has to show the ways and means by which the harmful effects of private property may be prevented or how they may be diminished or abolished. To this end it must leave the juristic realm and turn to ethics, national economy, *Polizei*, and even to the science of finance in order to find the remedies for the social ills necessarily begotten by the severity and immobility of private law."²

IV

The influence which the ideas of legal philosophy just referred to have exerted upon *national economy* are directly traceable only in particular cases. There is no doubt, however, that it has been great, and that on the whole it is to be recognized in that conception of economic science which has called itself the *historico-ethical*. The social movement, the discussion about society, the investigations in legal philosophy have all exhibited an abundance of life-phenomena which are interdependent with the industrial facts, and which were not interpreted by the previous national economy. As a theory, this interpretation was a mere "arithmetic of egoism," an economic logic (Treitschke), the inadequacy of which for the comprehension of the empirical reality of industrial life was proved as soon as we took into the field of vision the complex whole of society. As a civic policy (*Politik*) it was eclectic. It lacked a principle of unity. The incomplete condition of national economy

¹ *Philosophie des Staates oder allgemeine Sozialtheorie*, 1843, Vorrede.

² "Die Gegenwärtige Aufgabe der Rechtsphilosophie," *Zeitschrift f. ges. Staatsw.*, 1851, pp. 257-80.

was felt and confessed by many.¹ Some urged the national economists to broaden their science into the science of society, others insisted that they should change the fundamental conception of the economic man, that they should take account of him in his whole moral personality, and that they should investigate his industrial activity in the reality of historical life in connection with all the other sides of the societal life. The reckoning-in of ethics, of politics, of the historical individual phenomenal form of folk-thrift and its development by the economic sciences was unquestionably the necessary consequence of the total complex of facts and thoughts which consideration of industry from the viewpoint of society brought to the attention of science. An immediate recourse to particular authors would not be a necessary consequence, but we may regard the essential, actual connection between the ethical and the historical tendencies in national economy and the above-characterized intellectual movement as inevitable. This has been recently and rightfully emphasized, especially in the case of history, by Othmar Spann.² He calls attention to the fact that the quarrel of the historical school with the older systematists begins with attacking the previous idea of *Wirtschaft* as an abstraction and in general by attacking the previous relationship of isolation of the industrial from the other civic and social phenomena.

¹ We should compare the opinion of eminent scholars of that period about the incomplete, inconclusive, and even chaotic condition of the science of national economy. For example, Hildebrand, *Gegenwart und Zukunft*, 1848, p. 4; Roscher, to be quoted presently; Mohl, *vid.* original of this monograph, p. 5, and *Geschichte u. Litter. der Staatswissenschaften*, I. Bd., 1855, p. 18, and 3. Bd., p. 299; Treitschke, *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, 1859, p. 35; Schäffle, "Der gegenwärtige Standpunkt der Wissenschaftlichen Politik," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1861, 4. Heft, p. 13; *idem*, *Mensch u. Gut in der Volkswirtschaft*, 1861, 4. Heft, p. 232.

² *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1907, pp. 13, 136. To be sure, it would be a mistake to assume that the historical conception sprung up in national economy from the discussions about the nature of society. The standard sources of this conception, especially the involved "aboriginal reaction of empiricism in general and of historical empiricism in particular against aprioristic speculations in civic matters," were brought to light by Karl Menger.—*Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der politischen Ökonomie insbesondere*, 1883, IV. Bd., 3. Kap. It is in point to show here merely that the newly emerging endeavors in the line of societal science necessarily worked in the same direction.

Roscher writes:¹ "Our aim is the exhibit of that which peoples have thought, purposed, and felt in respect to industry, what they have endeavored and attained by means of it, why they have endeavored, and why they have attained. Such an exhibit is possible only in closest connection with the other sciences of popular life, especially with the history of law, of the state, and of civilization." In his *Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie*, he still more strongly asserted, with reference to the corresponding views of Ahrens, that the life of a people is a whole, the various manifestations of which are essentially interdependent.² He continues: "The task of economic theory is to investigate folk-thrift in its course and its development under the influence of all the forces of folk life. Thereby we shall learn the relative justification of all the institutions from the special conditions of the people and of the stages of culture in which they came into being, and we shall learn to have before our eyes in the case of the minutest particular transactions in the conduct of folk-thrift always the aggregate, not merely of the industry, but of the folk life itself."³ In an immediate interdependence with the seething in the societary life, with the changes in the economic polity of the times, and with the social theories which attach themselves to the same were the researches of Bruno Hildebrand. In his own words, he wanted to find "in the midst of the anarchy of prevailing opinions the correct course for economic theory in the future."⁴ He rebels against the cosmopolitanism, atomism, materialism of the Smithian school which conceives of political economy as a "physics of commerce" in which the individual is assumed to be a purely egoistic force; yet he likewise repudiates the a-priori constructions of the socialists, who, to be sure, correctly emphasize many shady sides of the

¹ *Grundriss zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirtschaft, nach geschichtlicher Methode*, 1843, p. iv; also in the monograph "Der gegenwärtige Zustand der Wissenschaftlichen Nationalökonomie u. d. notwendige Reform desselben," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1849, I.

² *System der Volkswirtschaft*, I. Bd., *Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie*, I. Aufl., 1854, § 16.

³ *Ibid.*, § 29.

⁴ *Die Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft*, 1848.

existing industrial organization, but overlook the gradual improvement of society achieved and attainable in the course of historical development. According to him, therefore, the science of national economy has the task "of investigating the course of development of national thrift, both that of separate peoples and that of all humanity from stage to stage, and in this way to learn the foundations and the structure of contemporary industrial society, as well as the task the discharge of which is reserved for the labor of the living generation."¹ That in this development not the individuals alone but their organized aggregates such as nation and state play the decisive rôle, had long before been emphasized by Adam Mueller,² and was at this time again urged by Friedrich List.³ The comprehensive treatment of the historical method of national economy by Karl Knies⁴ penetrated still deeper into the interconnection of the economic with the other life-manifestations of man. "The total historical existence of a folk furnishes clues to the common basis for the various life-circles, and for the special reason that through them a unitary spirit prevails, and the particular factor, as though encompassed by a common medium, develops in a total movement—i.e., a folk is something more than an arbitrary sum of separate individuals. Moreover, the industrial conditions and developments of a people may be regarded only as a member closely united with the entire vital organism of the same. The popular thrift is in reality not something isolated, something self-sufficient, it is the economic side of the one folk life."⁵ This unity of the actual life of the folk was sufficiently emphasized by Stein, Ahrens, Dietzel, and others.⁶ Only Mohl uses a rough form

¹ "Die gegenwärtige Aufgabe der Wissenschaft der Nationalökonomie," *Jahrbuch für Nat. u. Stat.*, 1863.

² *Elemente der Staatskunst*, 1809.

³ *Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie*, 1841.

⁴ *Die politische Ökonomie vom Standpunkte der geschichtlichen Methode*, 1853, 2. Aufl. (durch Zusätze vermehrt), unter dem Titel: *Die politische Ökonomie vom geschichtlichen Standpunkt*, 1883.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁶ Stein, *System der Staatswissenschaft*, 1. Bd., 1852, p. 23, "die wirkliche Gestaltung des Lebens und die Wissenschaft"; Ahrens, *Organische Staatslehre*, 1850, p. 73; Dietzel, *Die Volkswirtschaft und ihr Verhältnis zu Gesellschaft und Staat*, 1864, p. 52.

of expression and declares that the state is a life-circle completely detached from society.¹ In the methodological questions, in the structure of systems, and in the formation of concepts covering the various sides of folk life, differences emerge, to be sure; but so long as a methodology of the mental sciences, especially of the civic sciences was lacking, these differences necessarily favored the historical method, because through it the unity of the object was obviously most completely preserved. This consciousness was a co-operating factor especially in the case of all the questions of economic policy for the solution of which the facts of historical experience and the laws of development seemed to afford a secure foundation.²

Almost always those national economists who oppose to the one-sided view of the Smithian school the completely empirical reality of human volition and action in the realm of industry, urge that the inadequacy of the traditional theory and its failure in the presence of the turbulent demands of the times for social reform rest upon the narrowness with which it confines itself to the selfish endeavors of men in industry, so that it becomes a science of greed, while in reality men, even in their economic actions, are subject to the moral law, and are stimulated by moral motives or should at least be guided by them. The German group of the Smithian school had, to be sure, never, with the one-sidedness of the English and the French, stood for the principle that the individual, in pursuit of his own interests, served also the common weal. The Germans had therefore, through the designation *Volkswirtschaftspflege*, indicated a realm upon which the state and the public spirit (*Gemeinsinn*) of the people emerging in it subordinate industrial to moral principles. But "selfishness and public spirit cannot operate as two separate powers in two distinct

¹ *Geschichte und Litteratur der Staatswissenschaften*, I. Bd., p. 104.

² This was emphasized particularly by Roscher in various connections. See also Treitschke, *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, p. 45: "From the laws of the economic development of the folk life, from the position which the economic circumstances occupy in a given time in the total life of the people, arise with historical necessity the fundamental rules for the influence of the state upon folk industry"; Knies, *Politische Ökonomie*, III, 9. Kap: "Der Absolutismus der Lösungen und das Prinzip der Relativität"; Hildebrand, etc.

worlds. They must in reality in various and changing degrees, according to the morality and culture of the folk, operate with and through each other."¹ The object of national economy, therefore, cannot be merely the individual pursuing his special interests. It must rather be the whole man as personality, that is, as a person subject to the moral law. Among the older national economists, Schüz particularly represented this idea in a consistent way. He assigned to national economy the task of observing and representing the industrial development of a people in its reciprocity with its whole moral, civic, and political life, as it would shape itself in the future in a natural and reasonable way.² That human nature acts not merely upon egoistic impulses but also follows moral motives is emphasized by these national economists in the same way as by the juristic philosophers. When Röder said: "The assertion that the prospect of gaining private property is the sole spur of human activity contains a slander upon human nature which experience contradicts,"³ he could reckon upon the approval of national economists. Knies in particular undertook a thoroughgoing critique of the dogma of the invariable selfishness of man,⁴ and he cited the contradictions in which Rau, Hermann, and other leading German national economists were involved when, on the one side, they explained the attitude of

¹ Hildebrand, *Die Nationale Ökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft*, p. 33. Later he represented more at length the idea that economic transactions are subject to ethical ideas and moral principles, in a monograph on the present task of the science in the *Jahrb. f. Nat. u. Stat.*, 1863.

² "Über das sittliche Moment in der Volkswirtschaft," *Zeitschr. f. ges. Staatsw.*, 1844, 1. Bd., p. 132; "Über das politische Moment in der Volkswirtschaft," *ibid.*, p. 329; "Über das Prinzip der Ordnung in der Volkswirtschaft," *ibid.*, 1845, p. 234; "Über die sittlichen Ursachen der Armut und ihre Heilmittel," *ibid.*, 1851. Notable are also the monographs which the philosopher Vorländer later published in the *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatsw.*: "Über die ethische und soziale Bedeutung des Wohlstandes und Eigenthums," 1855; "Das Gesetz der Gerechtigkeit als Grundlage für die Bestimmung der Rechte der Individuen," 1856; "Über das sittliche Prinzip der Volkswirtschaft in Rücksicht auf das soziale Problem," 1857; "Über das ethische Princip der volkswirtschaftlichen Konsumtion," 1858. Vorländer in these essays expresses himself quite generally but in a very intelligible way with reference to many ideas and demands of the socialists.

³ *Rechtsphilosophie*, 1. Aufl., 1846, p. 251.

⁴ *Politische Ökonomie*, II, 3. Kap.

man toward material good as invariable, because it was based upon the egoistic nature of man, but on the other side they credited the *Gemeinsinn* and the altruistic attitude with an influence upon economic action. In contrast with this, it was urged, observation of historical life and psychological study of mankind teach us that the individual's impulse of self-preservation is not in contradiction with vital sense for the weal of others and of the whole. Quite in harmony with the views of Ahrens and Röder on legal philosophy Knies writes, "the operation of indiscriminate selfishness in economic activity rests not upon freedom but upon the right of might, it is caprice in place of political and social freedom," and "the impulse of private industrial activity which is based upon the endeavor for personal weal in our sense is not only not in contradiction with the moral imperatives, it fulfils in itself a moral imperative, and the consideration and promotion of the weal of one's neighbor and the force of public spirit do not need to be added as something contradictory to that individual action. They are bound up with the same in the normal man as such."¹ Along with public spirit, the same author says, the sense of the right and the just emerges, it has its source "in the moral sense of justice." "Here again we are concerned with no fiction, but with attention to a fact which proceeds from the moral nature and development of man and can only strengthen the bonds between the individual members of the community."² The progress of moral culture, the strengthening of the national and patriotic impulses in peoples, have diffused in them the conviction of the abnormality of a condition in which the individual members in their industrial conduct would regard themselves only, and would be released from all regard for one another. Even in the field of economics proper, science could assume the exclusive good effects of private egoism only so long as it regarded the largest possible total production as the paramount task of economic activity. On the contrary, a different view had to be taken by that national economy which devoted its most earnest inquiries to the realm of the distribution of goods and of income, and which in fact tested the actual distribution with reference to the question whether or

¹ *Politische Ökonomie*, p. 239.

² *Ibid.*, p. 241.

not it is a "good," a "just," an "appropriate" distribution. Here, then, an ethico-political concept becomes the test of the theory. This deeper conception of the nature and life of a people, the same author urges, has prepared the way for recognition of the intimate connection between all sides and manifestations of folk life, and has made possible the insight "into the ubiquity of the inter-relation between the activities of the civic power and the economic private activities and spheres of life." Not merely the moral value of the individual personality, but the moral foundations of the political order of human society are thus in question.

These ideas were energetically supported by Schäffle, by whom as by no other national economist the juridico-philosophical ideas of the time were employed for the examination of economic phenomena and the relation between them and the state. He called attention to the fact that those who in the most recent times had earned the greatest reputation for developing national economy had been in part eminent or, at least, respected exponents of moral and juridical philosophy, in part historians.¹ From other essentially ethical disciplines new viewpoints have come over into national economy, while the proposals for reform which the moral and legal philosophers and theologians addressed to the national economists rest upon grounds of justice. "Not the good that has been gained and is to be gained, the *Chrema*, but in the gaining and applying of goods *man* must be placed at the center of national economy, and must be regarded as the point of departure and of arrival for all economic actions. Such action, moreover, must be regarded not as a natural process in the sense that it goes on automatically, like the process of breathing and the circulation of the blood, but as a realm of *ethical* activity in which man appears as a being who with conscious will proposes new purposes and endeavors to gain them; as a realm of cultural activity, not as a process of unconscious nature. In this sense such thinkers demanded an ethico-anthropology in place of a chrematistic national economy."² The essential limitations of wealth, of the

¹ "Mensch und Gut in der Volkswirtschaft," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1861, 4. Heft, p. 232.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 236. Schäffle later expressed a similar idea in the following words: "The question whether national economy has a right to claim the dignity of an ethical

extent of private and societary business operations, the moral justification of property, its distribution, the justification of the capitalistic class, the taxation of the latter—these questions all belong in national economy, but it has neglected them. It consequently could not overcome communism, for the latter proceeded from man. To be sure, the so-called social, societary tendency is now at work in national economy, but with great confusion. "Yet it has, at all events, the one meaning that man must be understood in his social reality." We must not, however, regard it as sufficient to set up against egoism as a corrective the moral nature of the community feeling. In order to be a corrective, secure social institutions are necessary: marriage, family, community, national banding together, legal organization, the church, etc. Especially must the central organization of the state combine all the autonomous organizations of the society with one another and with the peculiar central unity.

In another place Schäffle discusses this task when he deals with the movements for economic freedom and for abolition of the "police state."¹ In England, Belgium, France, Germany, organized schools and unions are struggling against the preponderance of repressive state supervision, for a compensation in the shape of free association. "In the presence of the practical needs of life, however, such nihilism shows itself to be thoroughly untenable." The most prominent German publicists had also not allowed themselves to be carried to these extremes. Bluntschli, von Mohl, Rau present with clear consciousness or with indirect recognition the essential justification of state intervention. Yet they lack fundamental unity of conceptions. This unity is given not when we regard *Polizei* and *Recht* as antitheses, but when we combine them; that is, no judicial activity in the state which does not serve a reasonable welfare-purpose, and no promotion of discipline is not at all a question of method. The decisive point is in the question whether it regards the economic life of the folk as a realm of free volition, in which all the moral and sensual forces of human personality are engaged and directed consciously to an all-sided satisfaction of the morally rational purposes of life. National economy lays claim to this conception."—*Die ethische Seite der nationalökonomischen Lehre vom Werthe*, 1862, p. 7.

¹ "Der gegenwärtige Standpunkt der wissenschaftlichen Polizei und Politik," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1861, 2. Heft.

welfare which is not in essence and form a judicial transaction. The problem, then, is to detach ourselves from the subjectivistic conception of the law which regards it as a mere marking of the boundaries of individual license, and to conceive it as the substance of the ultimate direction of the subjective will toward the manifold moral purposes. We must regard the state as the society organized for the law so understood. The task of providing the speculative basis for this idea of the law and the state, and of adapting it to the particular parts of the positive legal system and the special conceptions of the same has been performed brilliantly by Ahrens and Röder.¹ More recently greater significance has been credited to the state, and only between the individual and the central state has a special "society" and a societary law been introduced, but this, however, as a purely formal matter; the law must rather vitally pervade the whole society. *Politik* is everywhere necessary where there is *Recht*. *Recht* comes into being and disappears politically; *Politik* however rests upon two supports; it shapes *das Recht* historically in correspondence with temporal and local conditions, but it is also idealistic, rational, and hence dependent upon the moral principles.

Like Schüz, Hildebrand, Roscher, Knies, Schäffle, finally Kautz also makes his profession as adherent of the historico-ethical tendency.² The principle and guiding star of folk-thrift is to him the *Gemeinsinn*, the common weal as ethical postulate, and the science of folk-thrift has the task of depicting a societary order that is an ethico-historic basis and promoter of private and community weal.³ He held that national economy must also co-operate in realizing the social and political purposes of life.

¹ In the preface to the second edition of his *Rechtsphilosophie*, 1863, Röder could write with complacency of Schäffle that at last "a German has been found who openly and definitely professes this conception of law as worked out by Ahrens and myself; who has no hesitation in adopting it in all its consequences and in estimating it as a cardinal means of approaching solution of many of the burning questions in science and in life, and of preparing the way for changing the 'police state' into the 'legal state' for which life has long been struggling."

² *Theorie und Geschichte der Nationalökonomik*, 1. Bd., *Die Nationalökonomik als Wissenschaft*, 1858, especially Erstes Buch, iii. u. iv. Kap.; 2. Bd., *Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Nationalökonomik und ihrer Litteratur*, 1860, especially pp. 465 u. 765.

³ Vol. I, p. 176.

It is a socio-political science and consequently has to prepare the way for the discharge of those tasks which concern the perfecting of the social order and are both economic and politico-administrative in their nature.¹ It is a carrying-out of this line of thought when Roesler attacks the Smithian system because it overlooked the fact that in a theory which has for its subject-matter man and his development on the basis of the will only, moral concepts have a claim to scientific character. For him therefore economic theory is intelligible only as a component of *Rechtsphilosophie*, because all industrial relationships, by virtue of their societary character, are necessarily sovereignty relations and consequently must be subject to the legal order. He developed this idea later and showed that the law of property and the so-called law of persons is not left to private caprice, but is definitely influenced by the cultural situation, the expression of which at a given time is to be found in the social conceptions of right. In the present culture period, he held, society is determined by the moral principles: development of all consistently with equal rights, and community in all cultural relationships.²

V

"The abundant works of socialistic literature constitute an independent whole by the side of the old national economy. They are not yet incorporated into the latter, but it will not be possible permanently to deny them their place by the side of the other theorems." Thus wrote Lorenz Stein in the year 1846.³ In fact the theories of society as an independent actuality along with the state, of the close connection between legal ordination and economic action of the reciprocally limited societary conditions as products of historic development under the influence of the moral volition of men, are nothing but attempts to comprehend scientifically the interconnections which socialism had brought to light. When a place was assigned in the theory of industry

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

² *Soziales Verwaltungsrecht*, 2 Bde., 1872, 1873.

³ "Der Begriff der Arbeit und die Prinzipien des Arbeitslohnes in ihrem Verhältnis zu Sozialismus und Kommunismus," *Zeitschr. f. ges. Staatswissenschaft*, 1846, p. 242.

to this way of thinking, it was quite intelligible in view of the fact that this science had never contented itself with being a theory of economy, but had always exceeded this limited task, and had endeavored to develop the fundamental principles for a satisfactory ordering of society, of law, of politics in their relationships to economics. National economy, without being conscious of it, as a matter of fact posed as a science of society, and after the manifold presuppositions and relationships of such a science had been better understood, the demand grew that national economy should make itself correspondingly profound. Therewith that significant advance was accomplished which distinguishes the German science of economics, namely, that special attention was given to presentation of the industrial conditions, their historical development, the uncovering of the industrial substrata in all the societary relationships. It was an error, to be sure, to suppose that a new system had thus been founded, since all this amounted merely to a further development of those beginnings of a societary science which were already present in the theory of economic action from the time of the mercantilists. But this error had the less significance in proportion as the new conception of economics was used, not for theoretical doctrines about the essence of the interdependencies of industrial facts, but as a basis for demands through which it was hoped to secure a reform of society, especially of the industrial section of society. The socialistic criticism, particularly the industrial depression at the end of the forties, the revolutionary agitations by the labor element of England and France, directed attention to the evils of an individualistic industrial order, such as the free-trade school desired, and roused the conviction of its impracticability in wide areas. Even before the science had arrived at a formulation of new bases of industrial polity, symptoms of a new conception of the relationship of men to one another appeared in practical life. In connection with the first German industrial exposition in Berlin in 1844, the *Zentralverein für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen in Preussen* was founded, and presently it was imitated in other German states. Its purpose was the improvement of the moral and economic conditions of the laboring classes. Questions of the

conditions of labor, rates of wages, regulations of labor, coalitions, and the insurance of income through mutual funds, sickness and old-age insurance, etc., were publicly discussed. In church circles attention was given to the great social questions of the time, and the religiously inclined were warned to bring economic relationships under the influence of religio-moral ideas, and to promote the reform of society by means of spiritual conversion. There was no hesitation about adopting positions in sharp contrast with the ruling conceptions. The bishop of Mainz, Freiherr von Ketteler, said in a sermon "the aphorism, 'property is robbery' is not a mere lie; it contains along with a great falsity a fruitful truth." He declared that the false doctrine of the inflexible right of property was a sin against nature.¹ In Protestant circles J. H. Wichern in 1849 proposed as the task of the *Innere Mission* a great program of social amelioration. The material distress, he held, depended closely upon the moral distress. Toward the removal of the latter the state alone could do nothing with statutory measures. The state must, in this connection, be reinforced by higher powers exercised by subjectively free persons. To animate the family and the domestic condition, and the therewith immediately to be connected relationships of education, of property, of labor, and the vocational classes determined by these, with Christian purposes, is the chief task of the *Innere Mission*. It is within its power not only to contribute to the mitigation of the miseries of the poor, but also to the sanctifying of property and the adjustment of the disarrangement between the classes that are separated by differences in possessions. The chief realms of activity which he assigned to the mission are: care for the sick, work for the education of children and youth, rescue of the neglected, securing of work for the poor, associations of the needy even in combination with the well to do, associations of the various labor and occupational classes, and domestic colonization. Since that period, in both Catholic and Protestant circles, church work as well as church influence has been a strong factor in the extension of a sentiment hostile to economic individualism and

¹ *Die grossen sozialen Fragen der Gegenwart, sechs Predigten gehalten in Mainz im Jahre 1848*, Ausgabe 1878, p. 15.

favorable to positive organizing activity. A further symptomatic fact was the trade-union movement. It also did not start with the representatives of national economy, but from practical men like Schulze-Delitzsch and from political authors of other occupations, like Victor Aimé Huber. The latter, a statesman of the evangelical conservative school, by visits to England, France, and Belgium had become acquainted with the trade-union movement in those countries, and had absorbed their basic idea of supplanting the individualistic industrial order by the association of individuals. After 1846 he was active as a publicist for the organization of trades, and no other German author has so profoundly grasped the union idea on both its material and its moral side.¹ The point of departure of his demands is the consideration that the unwholesome disintegration of the laboring classes which was everywhere observable goes along with the weakening and the dissolution of the older obligatory organization of labor, and with an absence of reorganization of the masses, disorganized by the changed system of labor and by transformation of all the social and economic conditions. The ameliorative measures must be carried on in the spirit of Christianity. They must correspond with the modern development of production and consumption. They must not suddenly threaten in its whole circumference the existing conditions. They must have the "tendency toward the organic reproduction of the atoms," they must make the moral and intellectual influences work together with the material and economic, and finally they must not weaken the lawful ambition for self-help, independence, and self-respect; but they must strengthen it. He finds all these conditions satisfied in the unions both for producers and consumers. The former increase the common earnings and the common production of the individuals combined for industry on a large scale. The latter remove the disadvantages of the small consumer in the use of the necessities of life, housing, etc.

¹ Huber's numerous works extend from 1846 to 1869. The most important which concern the trade-union idea are: "Die Selbsthilfe der arbeitenden Klassen durch Wirthschaftsvereine und Kolonisation" (im *Janus*, 1848); "Über Assoziation in England" (*ibid.*, 1851-52); *Reisebriefe aus Belgien, Frankreich und England*, 1855; *Soziale Fragen*, 1862-69.

While Huber attained no practical successes, Schulze-Delitzsch in 1848 established his first raw-material association (*Rohstoff-genossenschaft*) and in 1850 his first credit society; and he therewith opened the way in Germany for the new form of societary organization. In principle he was working along the same line as Huber, although their world-philosophies were different. Huber had adhered to the fundamental principle of liberalism, namely, the self-reliance and responsibility of the individual. Hence he demanded fundamentally self-reliance, and differed from the old liberals only in that he demanded this, not of the isolated individuals, but of combinations of them on the basis of free initiative. He represented *social liberalism* and recognized also the necessity of the co-operation of public administrative bodies, the state, the community, the churches, with private bodies; but the foremost matter with him was the establishing of voluntary organizations.¹

That organization was a pressing need, that the atomization which had corresponded with the consistently applied principle of industrial liberalism had caused great evils, that positive tasks must again be assigned to the state, is a widely spread view. When Maximilian II of Bavaria in 1848 proposed the question for his prize conference, "Through what means can the material needs of the lower classes of the population of Germany be relieved?" the prize was given to von Holzschuher.² He declared that the social classes of the feudal state had disappeared and that the state must put in their place a new and organic structure. "The money power alone cannot build up an organism in the state. Money as a mere means of enjoyment has developed no organically cohesive force in society. It operates rather as a dissolving agency. The dominance of money as capital over the laborer is a far more dangerous matter than the former feudal lordship." The state must consequently promote associations and corporations which grow from within, it must support their industrial initiative

¹ Most of the Schulze-Delitzsch writings are devoted to practical labor or to agitation. The first, especially devoted to the fundamental principle of the union, were: *Mitteilungen über gewerbliche und Arbeiter Assoziationen*, 1850, and the *Assoziationsbuch für deutsche Handwerker und Arbeiter*, 1853.

² *Die materielle Not der unteren Volksklassen und ihre Ursachen*, 1849.

through various measures without going into detail. Only in the case of factory laborers should such arrangements be necessary for the maintenance of adequate wages, the shortening of the labor day, and the removal of the truck system. Further it is necessary to take measures under the guaranty and supervision of the state for the founding of endowment funds in the case of accidents and old age, and for extraordinary needs, and also to organize institutions which will be concerned with the most important needs of the laborers, such as housing, distributing centers for grain and flour, educational institutions for children, etc. In order, however, to afford to the laborers in their relations with the manufacturers a permanent and effective organ, a kind of representation, the laborers must organize themselves into unions and choose committees under the supervision of the state, which committees will have, on the one hand, the duty of making note of all the evils and of listening to all proper complaints, and on the other hand, of supporting the *Sitten Polizei* within the whole organization. This repudiation of anarchical conditions, of unrestricted competition and freedom, appears very frequently in other ways in the publicistic literature of the times, especially in articles in the *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*.¹ These ideas are, to be sure, represented systematically only by Ahrens and Röder, who wanted to lay the foundations for a new school of societary politics between liberalism and socialism.

With all the precision with which he opposed the atomization of society through free competition, Ahrens still rejected the other scheme of state omnipotence, "the monster of state socialism" which the Hegelian theory of the state tended to produce.² He argued that it would amount to an essential misinterpretation of one condition of human realization (*Vervollkommenung*) if we should assign to the state a too narrow purpose, but on the other hand it would mean the establishment of a despotism which would destroy all moral freedom and would everywhere restrict progress

¹ As early as 1838, Bülow published a paper on pauperism in this journal and also in his *Handbuch der Staatswirtschaftslehre*, 1838, at the same time he referred to other works aiming at the same sort of associated efforts.

² *Juristische Enzyklopädie*, 1855, p. 107.

if all the particular social purposes should be put in charge of the state.¹ These particular purposes should be undertaken by the several social circles and the organizations existing within them. But the state must prepare the ways and means for the attainment of the societary purposes. The state is the distributor of these means and incessantly supervises their application. It stands by the side of the societary organizations as a protector. It is an ally in the development of everything that is good, beautiful, true, and genuinely human.² It is the business of the state to take care that the several societary circles do not interfere with one another. It has consequently the right of intervention within the realm of industry among others, in order that it may be able to prevent the suppression of the interests of the majority by a new commercial aristocracy, "in order that from calculation of material gains the higher human interests which concern the intellectual, moral, and legal development of the laborers of every age may not be lost from view." Ahrens refers particularly to the necessity of setting in order the conditions of labor in factories. He cites with approval Stahl, who demands two things: first, protective laws against oppression by the manufacturers with reference to wages, labor time, and the use of children; secondly, attention to the socialization of the available means of laborers (provision for widows, the sick, the unemployed, the weak). For these purposes funds should be established, with compulsory annual contributions of the laborers and *voluntary* contributions by the manufacturers. He argued for only a limited material contribution by the state, and he is also very cautious in his conclusions about the social program of taxation.

In contrast with this Röder regards the tax system as "by far the most important step which modern times can take toward the goal of a thoroughgoing ordering and regulation of material goods in accordance with the tendencies of life. The taxes contain, in so far as they are justly and properly assessed, collected, and applied, a means of general constant adjustment and relief according to the needs and merits of men, and no other means

¹ *Rechtsphilosophie*, 2. Aufl., p. 124.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 123-44.

can be substituted for them."¹ He consequently regards the taxes as a giving-up of a part of private property, and regards them as like other limitations of the right of property indispensable, unless the poverty of the masses, the checking of the middle class, and monstrous inequalities of possession are constantly to be reproduced by the régime of free competition.²

He also places great emphasis upon the measures of the state which aim at reimbursement for the effects of accident upon the distribution of goods. He contends that the state should take measures for assurance against accident of every sort. The state will accordingly properly prescribe that there shall be taxation for death and accident benefits on the part of the community, the employers, the members of given occupations, etc. It is a mistake, he claims, on the part of many, to regard the state as incompetent to exercise the insuring function in any way. The mistake is the greater with each clearness of our perceptions that only with unlimited reciprocity and with co-operation of the largest possible groups can the purpose of the most effective indemnification for every accident be attained, for the benefit of those immediately concerned, and for the whole, and that with the exclusion of selfishness as far as possible.³ Through gradual extension of the competence of the communities, essential progress can be made toward an equality of general reciprocal aid. The communities might lay upon the members, especially the laborers, the duty of sharing in the support of the various sorts of saving, loan, and insurance organizations, especially with respect to the means of external life: housing, food, organization of community work, aid to immigrants, etc. The reduction of the accidental factor is to be sought for through prohibition of pure games of chance, regulation of the stock-exchange business, and particularly through the regulation of business freedom in which, if left to itself, the accident of the possession of money, that is the right of the stronger, decides. The fundamental principles of such regulation should be: (1) Everyone must have an opportunity in society and by means of it properly to qualify himself for labor. (2) The

¹ *Grundzüge des Naturrechts*, 2. Aufl., p. 317.

² *Ibid.*, p. 308.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

possibility of labor and of earning by means of it must be given to everyone capable of labor. "At all events the state must see that each is in a condition to live on a human plane in return for his labor. Conditions must be created so that in the case of no one it will depend upon mere accident whether he can through his labor provide the necessities of life for himself and his family, and can improve his condition." The means for this, he held, are labor exchanges (*Arbeitsnachweisanstalten*). Fundamental security is, to be sure, possible only through the conduct of industrial order in a genuinely societary way. "In fact, every day it appears more indispensable that there should be a unified conduct of every occupation through the totality of those who belong to the same occupational class, in contrast to the old guild institution, in accordance with which the right of a voice in occupational matters was limited." These occupations should start with the several circles, but they should be legally regulated by the state. (3) Obligation of the capable poor to labor. (4) A proportional wage should be paid for every kind of work. "Most important is the legal ordination and supervision of the relations of laborers toward the employers in the case of great enterprises, especially the determination of the labor time and the corresponding wage; the proper scale of shares of all concerned in gains and losses, as well as the contributions to the insurance fund of the business in order that sickness, death, etc., should not become a burden exclusively upon the community. We are only now beginning to understand this demand of justice." "In itself it is clear how little we have a right to speak of the legal protection of property so long as those whose whole means consist almost entirely in the ability to labor are consigned without protection to the accidents of competition and to the caprices of hard-hearted money bags." (5) Those who are incapable of labor should also receive the material goods necessary for their support.¹

VI

In these literary discussions which were carried on outside the circle of economic science the whole territory of social polity was marked off in broad outlines. The socialistic criticism of the

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 350-51.

liberal industrial order was in these discussions recognized as justified in essential points. "Our legislation, our administration, our community system, our private and associational activities are already filled with socialistic ideas," writes Biedermann in the year 1847, referring to the education of youth in the public schools, the laws of expropriation, the income taxes, the intervention of the state in business. He also emphasizes the fact, however, that we differ from the socialists in not regarding it as necessary, as they do, to demand the complete merging of the individual in society, but rather in believing that progress in culture can be gained by mitigation of the individualistic principle through mere removal of the harmful elements of competition. A modified organization of the relations of labor, business, and society in general should bring in greater equality and justice and righteousness in the reciprocal relationships between the propertied and the non-possessing classes.¹ The general character of this school opposing the liberal industrial system is plainly discernible: organization in place of atomization; limitation of competition and the strengthening of the weak elements through association; public regulation of business by law wherever association could not be effective; direct civic or communal intervention and initiative where the individual means are not sufficient; and all this from the viewpoint of justice, of protection of personality, of preventing the treatment of men as objects of exploitation. The point of departure for all these endeavors lies in the ideas which the legal and societary philosophy of the time had represented. First of all they spring from the consciousness that the societary relationships are not those of unconscious nature, but that they are controlled by the will of men and therefore by moral conceptions. The view of "society" as a community of life which was independent although under the influence of the state led to these conceptions. "Upon the fundamental idea that a distinction must be made between *bürgerliche* and *politische* society, *soziale Politik* has been built." In this way Riehl in 1851 expressed the signifi-

¹ *Vorlesungen über Sozialismus und soziale Fragen*, Leipzig, 1847, p. 256. Roscher also recognized that the socialistic demands had points of attachment in the existing societary arrangement: "Über Sozialismus und Kommunismus," *Zeitschrift f. Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1845, 4. Bd., p. 42.

cance of that distinction for practical politics.¹ The tasks which were to be performed were not political in the sense of activities within the scope of the civil law, they were also not economicopolitical, because the purpose was not the increase of goods, that is, general wealth; the purpose consisted in the ordering of those relationships of men which are voluntarily arranged in society, and hence the endeavors after the reform of society received its name. They are accordingly not limited to the organization of the industry of men, since society comprehends more relationships than those of industry, but the need of the reform was most intensely felt in connection with industry, because under the system of freedom industry had been the chief creator of dependence of some men upon others and of the possibility of the exploitation of one by another. To abolish this situation became a moral duty. Hence the labor question occupies the middle point of all social reforms, because here the great antithesis between possession and non-possession with its damaging consequences for our thought and action sets the task, "to find a form of societary life in which personal possession will be maintained and still no absolute hindrances will be presented by it to the complete development of personality."²

All the discussions of social reforms were consequently connected with the situation of laborers, were accompanied by labor agitations, and were supported by them. Hence the socio-political views in Germany gained definitely in precision and extension when Lassalle in 1862-64 set in motion the first great German labor movement. He had coined the socialistic ideas for circulation and had given them the stamp which had made them capable of currency. His seductive eloquence and brilliant rhetoric won over even political opponents, and especially the social politicians of the Catholic school followed in his train. Freiherr von Ketteler, bishop of Mainz, appropriated his representations and criticisms of the condition of the laborers,³ and the publicist Edmond Joerg published a history of socio-political parties in which the teachings

¹ *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, p. 5.

² Stein, *Sozialismus und Kommunismus in Frankreich*, 1. Aufl., p. 26.

³ *Die Arbeiterfrage und das Christenthum*, 1864.

of Lassalle so far as they are of an economic nature furnished the standard of criticism.¹ Joerg's characterization of the socio-political currents observable in the various parties gives evidence of the great extent to which the soil of the liberal economic conception in the folk was already undermined at a time in which it was moving toward its highest influence upon economic policy. He could with justification write: "The modern theory of economics can no longer ignore the frightful opposition which has arisen against it, and within the labor world the new spirit has taken a powerful hold."² In fact, at the beginning of the sixties the emergence of new conceptions among the representatives of national economy is evident. The unequivocal attitude of Hildebrand, Schäffle, Kautz, and Dietzel has already been referred to. In 1864, Schmoller for the first time expressed himself on the labor question.³ His conceptions of industrial evolution still bear an optimistic stamp and show great appreciation of economic liberalism, but already the break with the "older, fatuous scientific conception" is perceptible, which conception scattered the opinion that "man cannot exercise a free molding force in economic life, as though little or nothing depended upon him and his moral culture." Schmoller urges, on the contrary, that, in fact, all men's actions, the economic included, depend upon their ethical presuppositions. The natural articulation of society through the division of labor must always be furthermore a basis of duties, moral habits, and laws. "Progress in human freedom is never

¹ The essays appeared in the *Historisch-politische Blätter*, 1864-66, and were published separately in 1867 under the title *Geschichte der Sozialpolitischen Parteien in Deutschland*. They are not really a history but rather a characterization of the socio-political tendencies. Joerg distinguishes (1) the liberal, the bourgeois party, the real representative of the controlling industrial interests and industrial policy in which only a lean social liberalism which hopes for salvation from voluntary association makes itself felt (Schulze-Delitsch); (2) the conservative-guild party, which wants to revive the irrevocably outworn constitutional forms of manual labor; (3) the conservative-organizing tendency, which would create a new organization on the basis of right to labor which would be a defense against the preponderance of capitalistic control and would gradually accomplish a reconstruction of society; and (4) the radical social democratic party which looks to the state for a great saving act of the societary organization of production.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 228.

³ "Die Arbeiterfrage," *Preuss. Jahrbücher*, 14. und 15. Bd.

a progress in capriciousness, but a system of restrictions between compulsory law and free morality." Along with this a fundamental view emerges that the whole economic life always moves upon the basis of the general moral philosophy and of the legal structure, and in closest connection with this view there is a second, namely, that the individual or the special class must be considered and judged never in and of itself but always in connection with all the rest of society and its purposes; so that the progress of each part always depends upon that of the whole. Therefore state initiative and individual initiative are not mutually exclusive but they are in the most intimate interconnection. The labor question especially calls for this co-operation in many directions: improvement of the standard of life of the laborers as the basis for the raising of the wage, prohibition of child-labor, limitation of the labor time, care for good housing, profit-sharing, associations, recognition of the unions are matters with reference to which initiative action must be taken, by public opinion and the church through exhortation, by the state and the community through compulsion, by the immediately interested persons themselves through their own initiative.

About this time the philosopher F. A. Lange took his place in the ranks of the social politicians with his treatment of the labor question and his presentation of views upon social questions which were remarkably similar to those of Mill.¹ Not of immediate significance for social polity, but of great influence upon the development of economic theory as a social theory, as well as for the founding of the theoretical social polity, was the second edition of Schäffle's national economy which appeared in 1867, under the significant title, *Das gesellschaftliche System der menschlichen Wirtschaft*. In this book for the first time the economic forces which mold human society are grasped in their totality and the peculiarity of the two systems of organization, the private and the public, as well as their reciprocal relationships, limitations, and reactions, are displayed. The necessity of the employment of various driving forces, of a variety of societary organs, and of

¹ *Die Arbeiterfrage in ihrer Bedeutung für Gegenwart und Zukunft beleuchtet*, 1865; John Stuart Mill, *Views of the Social Problem*, 1866.

a multiplicity of public duties begotten of societary development comes clearly into view in this presentation. A few years later Schäffle showed what tasks followed for politics.¹ He said: "Not merely the state—I go farther and say all the civilizing powers of society must work upon social reform: science, literature, the press, art, pedagogics, the school, the church, and voluntary religious activity." The state, to be sure, remains the chief factor, for the societary need of law and order advances with civilization and with the extension of the community. But although the public power is essential for the law, yet the whole societary arrangement must not be accomplished through compulsion. On the contrary, with advancing culture the voluntary principle finds increasing application. State initiative and self-reliance then co-operate, and no longer constitute an absolute antithesis. Conscientious investigation of social conditions places at the head of all measures the organization of laborers and managers, the installation of organs of economic inspection and control (*Polizei*). These latter should not abolish free competition, but they should afford protection for manufacturing and agricultural wage labor, and by means of a great system of special measures should raise the productivity of national industry and should insure the enterprises of particular productive groups.

Contemporary with the appearance of Schäffle's *Socialismus und Kapitalismus*, other national economists published monographs which plainly showed that a transformation had occurred in the science. In the preface to his history of the small industries in Germany in the nineteenth century, Schmoller confesses that he had formerly taken a too optimistic view, and that following the traditional notion of the liberal national economy he had regarded freedom of occupation as the exclusive means of salvation against all bad conditions. "The deeper my studies went . . . the more did my earlier abstractions change into concrete discriminations, my highly colored optimism into the perception that of necessity there resulted from the great changes of our

¹ Incidental to extensive discussion of socialism in the book *Socialismus und Kapitalismus, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Geschäfts- und Vermögensformen. Vorträge zur Versöhnung der Gegensätze von Lohnarbeit und Kapital*, 1870.

time, along with splendid and unique progress, profound social and industrial evils; the nihilism of *laissez faire, laissez passer* was transformed into the demand for positive reform, and in this connection the reforms appeared to me always the chief matter, not the question whether state or society had to take them in hand." In summing up the results of his investigations he demands positive activity by individuals and organizations, by school and church, by state and community, to prevent further progress of inequality in possession and to insure the moral public control of competition which must still of necessity remain in a degree free. Sentences like the following show that Schmoller had gone over the grounds of the above-mentioned juridical philosophers and social politicians. "The popular consciousness will regard every existing inequality of property and income as tolerable which at least approximately corresponds with the personal qualities, with the moral and intellectual merits of the parties concerned and of the social class."¹ "Property is not absolute. The value of property is always more a consequence of society than a merit of the individual: every individual is so thousand fold under obligation to society and the state that his property is thinkable only with far-reaching obligations and burdens due to the whole."²

At the same time appeared Brentano's studies of the English trade unions.³ They exhibited the limitations, the methods, the workings of labor organizations, which, resting on the basis of the given societary order, still accomplished a reform of the conditions of labor and an improvement of the conditions of the laboring classes. In all this a firm concrete foundation was given to the demand for the organization of labor that had sprung from theoretical philosophical considerations, and had been formulated in a generalized shape. In the year 1871, von Scheel published his theory of the social question,⁴ a work which elaborated the contradictions to which formal legal freedom and equality lead, as the development of society actually goes on, the industrial unfreedom and inequality which result, and it shows that only a

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 672.

² *Ibid.*, p. 686.

³ *Die Arbeitergilden*, 1. Bd., 1870, 2. Bd., 1871.

⁴ *Die Theorie der sozialen Frage*, 1871.

strengthening of the civic power as the supreme civilizing force, to the advantage of freedom and equality and the use of the means which legislation, supervision, and administration put at the disposal of the state, can lead to a sound societary organization. In the same year, Schönberg proposed the establishment of labor bureaus.¹ These should have as their official scope the duty of precisely determining the material and social conditions of the wage laborers within their territory, and the tracing of all changes going forward in this direction, and as organs of reform they should everywhere promote and stimulate self-help and societary help, and after the enactment of laws for the protection of laborers should supervise their enforcement. Thus with the utmost clearness the conditions of laborers were lifted out of the circle of purely private matters and were advertised as the affairs of the public administration. In the autumn of the same year (1871) Adolph Wagner delivered his famous speech on the social problem.² In it he forcibly asserted that national economy must again take on more the character and the significance of an ethical science in order correctly to treat the social problem. He argued that the idea of the moral responsibility of the individual, the society, the state for the molding of industrial relations was again gaining in significance, as contrasted with the mere investigation of natural order and sequence. The consequence is a demand for the abolition of luxury, for a better understanding between laborers and employers, for limitations of private holdings of land, in general for increase of state help and for a better distribution of the burdens of taxation. Labor commissions (*Arbeiterkammern*) on a legal basis should bring together laborers and managers for the orderly discussion of the questions at issue. Sometimes they should even settle the scale of wages. Decrease of the labor time, prohibition of Sunday labor, insurance of laborers in cases of sickness, disability, old age, care for widows and orphans are public duties. Likewise the improvement of consumption through housing reforms, intellectual, moral, religious improvement of the lower classes, reform of taxation. "In this connection it is

¹ *Arbeitsämter, eine Aufgabe des Deutschen Reichs*, 1871.

² *Rede über die soziale Frage*, 1872.

certainly true that freedom is better than compulsion." But the former presupposes much education, the latter is today not dispensable. "Nothing but extensive state intervention, nothing but the statutes and the compulsion of the state have in these respects brought the simplest duties of humanity and of Christianity into effect. Hence self-help *and* state help.

This speech was the focus of a campaign of argument within the liberal school in which the theoretical representatives of social politics were nicknamed socialists of the chair (*Kathedersocialisten*).¹ This was the express recognition of the new tendency as a socio-political school. An external union was presently accomplished. In the summer of 1872 a number of professors of national economy in connection with a few representatives of other callings agreed to hold regular meetings for the discussion of the social question in order to create a counterbalance against the harmful influence of the Manchester doctrine. The first congress met at Eisenach in October.² In his opening address Schmoller referred to the leading ideas which had moved the signers of the call to promote the assembly in the hope of founding here a basis for the reform of social conditions. Survey of the psychological interrelation between the forms of the organization of industry and the whole moral condition of the nation was spoken of as a clue to the evils of the times. We have had in view too much the increase of production and too little the reciprocal effects of the new forms of organization upon men; we have not sufficiently regarded the increase of inequalities in property and income, the inadequacy of the life-conditions of the laboring classes and the emerging of their class consciousness. Reform is necessary not as a revision of the older measures nor as an overturning of all existing conditions, but as the development of an already existing beginning in social order which will adjust conflicting needs, especially through the energizing of the civic power in all divisions of industrial action. But a constantly increasing portion of the folk should be called to share in all the higher goods of civilization, of culture,

¹ Oppenheim, in *Nationalzeitung*, December, 1871: "Manchesterschule und Kathedersozialismus," published later as a pamphlet under the title: *Der Kathedersozialismus*.

² Cf. Dr. Else Conrad, *Der Verein für Sozialpolitik*, 1906, I. u. 2. Kap.

and of well-being, as the ideal toward which in all this we must strive. Among current questions, the congress should discuss that of lockouts, of trade unions, factory legislation, and the housing question.

Among the older representatives of national economy who took part in the discussions and the summoning of the congress were Roscher, Hildebrand, Knies, Ad. Wagner, Conrad, Knapp, Brentano, Schmoller, Mithoff, and Nasse. Besides these Cohn, Held, Neumann, von Scheel, and Schönberg took part in the congress. Among those not present the most eminent were Stein and Schäffle, who were connected throughout their whole literary past with the new movement. It was clear that German national economic science stood completely upon the ground of social economy. One year after the congress at Eisenach, it created for itself a rallying-point in the Verein für Sozialpolitik, which since that time has performed important services in the investigation of social conditions and in the discussion of reforms to be attempted.¹ In correspondence with the program proposed for the session at Eisenach the work of the Verein was always planned to include preparation for the discussion of special concrete questions in an objective way through a previous determination of facts, and the expression of opinion on the part of the various interested parties and observers; and it was the program to carry out the discussion in a scientific way. The Verein represented and still represents consequently not a fixed doctrine of social reform, and as little have the representatives of national economic science met upon a definite program. The socio-political ideas are not, like the economico-political ideas of liberalism, demands upon the basis of a simple and unitary principle. They rest upon recognition of the necessity of positive activity, not only on the part of individuals, but on the part of all the societary organs and powers. But many qualities and directions of these activities are appraised in different proportions. Even when there is considerable agreement upon fundamental questions, there is nevertheless variety of judgments about special problems of practical politics. The most fundamental differences of opinion about

¹ Cf. Else Conrad, *Der Verein für Sozialpolitik und seine Wirksamkeit auf dem Gebiete der gewerblichen Arbeiterfrage*, 1906.

principle, aim, and limit of social polity when questions arise about the attitude of the individual toward the state, about the consequences which follow from the fundamental principles of freedom and equality, about the ways and means of distributing income, about the value of the different occupational strata, productive organizations, classes, etc. Foundation-laying discussions of this sort are not numerous, yet Schäffle, Ad. Wagner, and Schmoller have worked upon them. With one accord, in spite of the various divergences upon details, they have endeavored to show that civilization and progress in society depend upon perception by the individual that he is not an end unto himself, but merely a member of the community. The supreme purpose moreover of the economic processes is the highest moralization of the community which in its complex articulation strives after the perfecting of the life of all. The process of the creation of income and property in the service of this purpose, through production and business, does not acknowledge the highest individual enjoyment, nor the enjoyment of any particular class, as its supreme principle, but it posits as the end the highest possible proportional and permanent aggregate satisfaction of the historically given society. This purpose, however, cannot be attained without the limitation of individual freedom, without civic constraint, without a complicated legal order, a complexity of societary organs with positive functions. Schäffle and Wagner had represented these ideas in their systems during the seventies, and especially Wagner had devoted a thorough discussion to the bases of economic theory so understood.¹ Schmoller had an opportunity to declare himself on this matter when he defended himself against the attacks

¹ Schäffle, *Das gesellschaftliche System der menschlichen Wirtschaft*, 3. Aufl., 1873; Ad. Wagner, *Allgemeine oder theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre*, Erster Theil, Grundlegung, 2. Aufl., 1879 (3. Aufl., 1892-94). The philosophical foundation for social policy proposed by Ahrens and Röder is today still standard with the Catholic writers. Cf. Freiherr von Hertling, *Kleine Schriften zur Zeitgeschichte und Politik*, 1897 (especially pp. 248 f., on *Naturrecht und Sozialpolitik*); Franz Walter, *Sozialpolitik und Moral*, 1899; Pesch, *Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie*, 1. Bd., Grundlegung, 1905. These writers are particularly inclined to emphasize the organic articulation of society through which social politics derives an enlarged content. Hertling designates as its task the guiding, assistance, and conciliation of the various social circles by means of the state and in the interest of the civic community. *Op. cit.*, p. 254.

of Treitschke upon the socialists of the chair.¹ In this defense Schmoller gave an account of the change which had taken place in the conception of the task of the science with respect to industrial phenomena, and at the same time he drew the base-line of the most general task of social reform. He indicates the progress and deepening of the science as compared with the older historical school which was the first to oppose the idea of a constant and normal form of industrial organization superior to the limitations of time and space. This was only a partial insight. The whole nature of industry is comprehended only when we perceive that the external natural technical facts of economic development are highly important, to be sure, but not the only decisive conditions for the form of industrial organization. Custom and law always co-operate, so that industry is always a product of the co-operation of natural and societary causes. Societary order, moral ideas, the legal institutions are not, however, constant factors, but they are dependent always upon the total civilization, upon culture and education, hence no individual and no class can raise a claim to the permanence of a given legal order. Rather does social progress consist in the fact that the principle of justice transforms existing law and so orders societary conditions that merit and power, performance, possession, and income, the societary value and the social position of men tend more and more to correspond. Our time has been responsible for much industrial wrong through industrial changes. It is our problem to remove this wrong by that kind of social reform the aim of which consists in restoration of harmonious relations between social classes, in elimination or mitigation of the wrong, in closer approximation to civic justice, in creation of a social legislation which shall guarantee a progress that shall include the moral and material uplifting of the lower and middle classes.

With this conception national economy is lifted far above the scope of the task which was assigned to it as the theory of the

¹ Treitschke's monograph was entitled, "Der Sozialismus u. seine Gönner," *Preuss. Jahrbücher*, 1874. Schmoller's reply was published in the *Jahrbuch f. Nationalök. u. Statistik*, Bd. XXIII, 1874, and separately as a monograph in 1785. Schmoller's fundamental views were expressed also in a later essay on justice in national industry in the *Jahrbuch f. Gesetzgebung u. Volkswirtschaft*, 1880 (cf. *Zur Sozial- u. Gewerbepolitik*, 1890, p. 204); further in his *Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*.

economic relationships of men by the founders of the science. It has become that which in the forties, in the presence of the new and strange phenomena in the life of people, was demanded; namely, a science of society (*Gesellschaftswissenschaft*). Whoever undertakes to comprehend the whole complex reality in industry must, in fact, investigate the life-conditions and life-manifestations of "society," and this is the significance of the infusion of the socio-political ideas into the literature of national economy; that is, the result has been this expansion of view. Moreover historical experience and the basing of industrial institutions upon a juridical philosophy have significance only from the standpoint of societary science. For the economic factor considered in itself is in fact something constant in time and space, it shows the dependence of men upon quantities of goods. The limited expanse of the world of goods that are controllable or attainable in proportion to the unlimited scope of desire calls forth an industrial attitude among men which leads to a regular kind of conduct on the basis of exhibits of values which are determined by the psychological nature of man, and in their essence are always alike. It was this fact which came to the fore in the classical national economy and its theory. It must have consideration as a recognition of permanent value, for it shows us the bounds which are set to all the societary influences and to all moral volition. But it shows us nevertheless only the operation of a single condition of societary life. How the relationships of men shape themselves within these bounds is no longer dependent upon economic appraisal, it is rather a consequence of the moral ordering of life. To have shown this and to have made it a basis of the actions of men in society and in the state is the merit of that change which has been brought about through the infusion of the socio-political ideas into national economy. New tasks are therewith assigned to the science which the older science did not recognize. From a mere theory of industry it becomes a social theory. Its task is no longer merely to describe the simple correlation between goods and active self-interest. Its business is now to recognize this interdependence as also both cause and effect of other occurrences; and consequently its duty is to understand the course of industry under the influence of nature and of moralization in order that we may learn to control it.

GENERAL SOCIOLOGY¹

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Like all sciences which embrace fundamental principles and concrete elaborations of the same, sociology falls naturally into two parts. *General sociology* is study of the conditions (physical and psychical), elements, forms, forces, processes, results (at given stages), and implications of human association. *Special sociology* ("applied sociology," "social technology," "Sozialpolitik") is procedure on the basis of a presupposed general sociology, particularly upon the presumption of certain ascertained social values and corresponding purposes, to work out feasible programs for social co-operation which will assure progress toward attainment of the purposes.

It will be convenient to amplify these descriptions by means, first, of a brief historical survey, and second, of further analysis.

One of the least contested conventionalities of sociology is that Auguste Comte was its founder (*Philosophie Positive*, 6 vols., 1830-42). It does not detract from Comte's merit, while it partially explains the sparse growth of sociology for a half-century after his first planting, to point out that a tedious work of clearing the ground was necessary before the kind of seed sown by Comte could be fruitful. It is instructive to recall certain almost forgotten steps in the experience of bringing soil fit for the growth of modern social science under cultivation.

The apogee of the speculative method of interpreting social phenomena was marked by Hegel's lectures on the "Philosophy of History" (1823-27). The finial of Hegel's social philosophy is the "synthesis," "The state is reason at its highest power." An unfinished century of practical politics has meanwhile proved,

¹ This paper and the one that follows by Dr. Henderson, were written for the *Cyclopaedia of American Government*, announced to appear in the near future. The papers together present a conspectus which should not be without value even to professional sociologists. Messrs. D. Appleton & Co. have courteously granted permission for the present publication.

not by dialectics, but by its diplomacies, its international law, its Hague tribunal, its arbitration treaties, its voluntary associations, that the state is not reason at its highest power. Some of Hegel's own contemporaries began to be skeptical of the Hegelian formulation of the congenital German presumption. Evidence was already visible that both power and reason existed in the world above and beyond the state. Accordingly, men began to reconsider the question, What is the state? Almost a generation after Hegel had pressed his method to its self-contradiction in drawing the deadline of human development at the boundaries of the state, challenge of this arbitrariness first took its modern form. Whether with or without the Hegelian logic, the question, What is the state? would inevitably have elicited answers, sooner or later, in terms of what the state is not. In fact, at the middle of the century, a number of men in unison, but with little if any knowledge of one another except in one or two instances, uttered virtually the same answer: "*The state is not society. What then is society?*" This question in effect opened up from a new direction the whole field of inquiry since occupied by the sociologists. There could be no development of the researches which Comte demanded till the minds of many men were fertilized by desire for objective knowledge of the social reality.

At the same time it would be provincial and preposterous for the sociologists to claim that they alone have made the discoveries with which sociology is immediately concerned. All human experience, and all social sciences as interpretations of that experience have co-operated in reaching perceptions which it is now the sociologists' division of labor to formulate, to systematize, and to evaluate as means of more penetrating interpretation of experience. In other words, the relation between general sociology and the social sciences as a whole bears close resemblances to the relation between historical methodology, as represented by Bernheim for instance, and the technique of particular historical investigations.

Although the term "society" (for reasons which will be evident presently we are particularly concerned with the German equivalent *Gesellschaft*) is not a modern invention, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that serious attempts were made

to fashion that term into a tool of scientific precision. The names of Ahrens (*Cours du droit naturel*, 1839; *Organische Staatslehre*, 1850; *Rechtsphilosophie*, 4th ed., 1852), von Mohl (*Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften*, 3 vols., 1855), and Lorenz von Stein (*Der Socialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreichs*, 2d ed., 1848) may be selected to represent the mid-century effort to this end. Under the general title "Civic Sciences and Societary Sciences" von Mohl sketched the fortunes of the concept "society" previous to his time, and attempted to show the need of a system of societary sciences (*op. cit.*, I, 67 f.). When the insurgency which was latent in the societary conception had reached expression in the group referred to, the principal variant from the prevalent orthodoxy was distinct affirmation of a *somewhat*, over and above the state, corresponding to the term "society." The problem then was to analyze the concepts "state" and "society" so as to determine their relation to each other. The success of this mid-century out-reaching for a definition of "society" which would be a means of more precisely determining the state was dubious. One of the reasons is to be found in an association carried over from immemorial tradition of the state, and transferred in kind as a preconception of "society." In brief, as the state was thought of in a mystical fashion as a power independent of persons, superior to persons, and transcendent over persons, so the initial attempts to comprehend "society" did not untrammel themselves from a parallel mysticism. Certain obvious facts were observed and noted about spheres of human interests which were not coterminous with the realm of the state. Thus, von Mohl said (*op. cit.*, p. 70):

Only recently have we come to the clear conception that the community life of men is by no means exhausted by life in the state, but that between the sphere of the individual personality and of the organized unity of popular life there is a collection of intermediate life phenomena which also have community objects as their purpose, which do not have their origin from the state or through it, although they are in existence in it, and that these are of the highest significance for weal and woe. These two areas of thoughts and theories, which for more than two thousand years have seemed to be similar, or at most have been regarded as part and whole, have at length proved themselves to be essentially different, and must also be treated separately, so that in the future they will exist side by side as distinguished but not coequal divisions of human knowledge.

If we may venture to force these vaguenesses into the more literal terms of today, we find that at this stage of interpretation a certain type of spatial conception was the peculiar factor of unreality. "Sphere," "area," "intermediate life phenomena," and the like are phrases which, as the context conclusively shows, connoted location as one of the chief stigmata of "society" in the same sense in which it was attributed to the state. "Society," like the state, was somewhere, the two somewheres not coinciding in position; and the problem was primarily to mark their stations.¹

It must be admitted that these propositions do not account for everything contained in theorizing about "state" and "society" of which they are affirmed. On the contrary, the main difficulty in discovering the clue to differences between earlier and later conceptions of "state" and "society" is that in so large a part of their concrete contents they look identical. It is only when we probe down to these antecedent notions that we find radical variation. Thus, von Mohl posits three cardinal human "conditions" (*Zustände*), which appear to figure in his mind as intersecting planes of human life (and yet, by definition, not human life at all), or perhaps more nearly as interpenetrating nebulae of different composition (*op. cit.*, pp. 88 f.). In the first place, there is the "area of the *individual personality*," or "the great number of the particular personalities existing side by side in time and space, and their relationships to like personalities." In the second place, there is the area of *the state*, or "an organism of arrangements which in each case unites a number of persons living together in a limited space into a unity with a total will, a total energy and pursuing common purposes." In the third place, there is "*society*," i.e., a totality of associations" which can be located neither in the life-circle of the separate individuals nor in that of the state" (*ibid.*, p. 98). Referring to this third category von Mohl further specifies:

These conditions are differentiated from the life of the individuals essentially in this respect, that in the former the central point always is the egotistic

¹ Mr. Louis Wallis has suggested as a parallel to the above-described presumptions about the spatial location of "state" and "society" the condition of Job's thoughts about Jehovah: *Oh that I knew where I might find him! . . . Behold, I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him: on the left hand where he doth work, but I cannot behold him; he hideth himself on the right hand that I cannot see him*" (Job 23:3, 8, 9).

purpose (*Selbstzweck*) of a single person, and everything may be considered merely in connection with the same. In the latter, on the contrary, a considerable collection of persons is at the same time under corresponding influences of a common cause, and thus moved to community action. The essence of the individual life is selfish reference to itself. The essence of these spontaneous associations is extension and community.

In a note von Mohl exposes the futility of his analysis more effectively than it could be done by a critic. He refers to the possible question: May there not, besides these three relationships of men to men, be others, and if that is the case, is it not necessary in order to discover the full truth, to investigate all of these at the same time? He replies:

Undoubtedly there are, along with these three, other relationships of men to men, and among these many that are important: for instance, the family, the tribe, the associations of states; yet for the present purpose it is enough to investigate the three, *because the others do not contribute to the understanding of the nature of society and of the state in themselves, and of their relationships to one another. It follows that taking them into account would merely confuse our survey and insight.* (!!)

Although political philosophy had arrived at a strong sense of the necessity of a social philosophy, its exclusions as thus indicated show that it was still a long way from a clue to an objective method of social interpretation. Nevertheless, von Mohl proceeds to develop an intricate scheme of "societary sciences," to be worked out in close parallelism with the civic sciences as at that time defined. This whole mid-century movement, under the influence of a partially completed discovery that in addition to the state there are outlying human relationships not yet interpreted, marked an important advance toward positive social philosophy. It emphasized a need, although it did not accomplish much toward satisfying the demand.

The immediate effects of these groping social interpretations upon the methodology of the social sciences are not easy to trace. For nearly a generation after the Ahrens-von Mohl group there was little to indicate vitality in the suggestion of "societary science." In 1874, for example, Roscher declared that he was not impressed with the methodological importance of von Mohl's proposals (*National Oekonomik in Deutschland*, p. 944). His reason was as fictitious as his foresight was fallible. He says:

A civic science without regard to these societary areas would be quite superficial. All the great statesmen have known that, since Plato and Aristotle. On the other hand, a theory of these societary areas without regard to the state [*sic!*] would be quite incomplete and impractical.

He adds:

Yet the whole proposal may be regarded as in several respects an important sign of the times. Thus a reaction against the empty formalism into which the greater part of our theories of natural rights and of constitutionalism had degenerated; a protest against the excessive state-omnipotence to which the democracy of our times is inclined; a cry of warning to rouse the ruling and propertied classes from their complaisant contentment toward the fourth estate; a warning against that so customary ignoring, or even despising of the smaller groups in the folk, although they alone are capable of supporting a genuinely vital and free folk-life; perhaps also a symptom of the degree in which, notably in Germany, folk-life and civic life had grown apart!

Roscher undoubtedly voiced the impression of the majority of his generation that, so far as serious science was concerned, the societary suggestion was a closed incident. But a new generation was already on the stage, and even the older generation had not yet uttered its last word on the subject of "society." The *Verein für Sozialpolitik* was born before Roscher's book appeared. That organization proved to be, in spirit and in practice, if not as profoundly as might be in confession, a vindication of the social idea (*vid.* below, p. 213). Almost at the same moment with the publication of Roscher's book, Schäffle was writing the preface of *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers* (1875), and Spencer was delivering the first instalment of *Principles of Sociology* (1874-77). "Society" had been rediscovered by a publicist whom Roscher himself had called "certainly one of the foremost economists of our time" (*op. cit.*, p. 1042), and by a cosmic philosopher who was doing more than any contemporary to advise the world of the significance of Charles Darwin's generalizations. Both of these writers were ridiculed and abused, but the opposition attacked non-essentials and was blind to that part of their work which marked an achievement in objective apprehension of human reality. Both overworked biological analogies as vehicles for exposition of the interconnections between human facts; but all their crudities of method were outweighed by their service in visualizing literal relations between different human activities. Schäffle and Spencer had outgrown

the obsessions which credited "state" and "society" with "spheres" set off in mystical ways from persons. They had advanced to the perception that human experience, from earliest to latest, is a function of innumerable group relationships. Their problem then was to make out the different orders of groups which are visible in human experience, and to define the typical forms of reciprocal influence which these groups exhibit. We may characterize the Schäffle-Spencer stage of societary interpretation as assured of the continuity of human relationships, of interconnections of personal actions and reactions, from the minutest or most casual human group out to the most comprehensive and permanent, as having made a creditable beginning of analyzing the social groups and their interactions, from family to humanity, and (perhaps most significant of all) as having in principle suspended all favoritism toward particular types of groups. The clue which their analyses followed was that society is a plexus of personal reactions mediated through institutions or groups. One among these reaction-exchanges was the state; but the state was no longer presumed to be in the last analysis of a radically different origin, office or essence from any other group in the system. It simply had to pass muster with the other groups, on the merits or the demerits of its performance.

It would be imprudent to allege that the sociologists since the Schäffle-Spencer period have discovered anything which was not implicitly in the two works named. Purposely waiving that issue, we need assert only that subsequent observations of human phenomena have resulted in reconstructions which contrast sharply, in form, in details of content, and in effect upon mental and moral attitude, with the sociological interpretations of that earlier date. This proposition is true in different particulars, in the variations of sociological theory peculiar to different countries. The limits of this article permit illustration of the divergence in a single case only.

Until quite recently, sociology has languished in England, while it has flourished in the United States. One of the decisive reasons for the English side of this contrast was a diversion created by an antecedent question which arrested the development of purely sociological theory. It seems paradoxical that the chief popularizer

of the evolutionary idea should have proved a hindrance to the growth of constructive sociology. In England, at least, that was the case in a high degree in this way: evolutionism, and particularly Spencer's version of evolution, was understood to make for the conclusion, that modification of the workings of physical laws by human volition is impossible. It is an open question whether Spencer was more sinned against or sinning in the creation of this impression. At all events, sociology for a time almost disappeared in England, while the mental attitude which obstructed sociological progress found its support in a conception of evolution supposed to have been sponsored by Spencer. If the last word of science was that evolutionary human improvement is a delusion, that men must wait for physical laws automatically to work out all the human salvation that is possible, no sufficient motive was left for attempting to lay a scientific foundation for ameliorative effort. Anything in excess of mere historical review of past evolution would be futile. It came about, therefore, that sociological initiative in England during the past thirty years has tended predominantly either into superficial empirics, or into the field of "eugenics." This latter development is quite in character, because in the phenomena of breeding, if anywhere, facts may be ascertained and inferences drawn with a minimum of shock to the preconception that the conditions concerned are exclusively physical. The most convincing picture of this situation, because it is unintended, may be found in the little book *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (1911), by Hobhouse, one of the few men in England whose sociology has not remained insular.

The case in the United States is very different. In 1883, Lester F. Ward, a botanist, qualified as Spencer never was by first-hand study of organic phenomena to speak as an evolutionist, published in two volumes the work *Dynamic Sociology*. It performed the service of convincing a generation of budding American sociologists that the suspected conflict between evolution and human effort was a false issue. The fictitious dilemma between evolution and enterprise has consequently never visibly embarrassed sociological thinking in this country. In Ward's preface was this declaration of independence:

Just as Comte could complain that the philosophy of Hobbes, Locke, and Voltaire was negative, so it may now be maintained that the school of Mill, Spencer, and Fiske is also negative. From the purely statical stage of the former the latter has only advanced to the passively dynamic stage, which recognizes only the changes wrought by Nature unassisted by Art; but before the science of society can be truly founded another advance must be made and the actively dynamic stage reached, in which social phenomena shall be contemplated as capable of intelligent control by society itself in its own interest.

Contempt for sociology has often been expressed in Europe in the phrase, "the American science." The slur is an ungraciously masked tribute. While work of the first rank in the field of general sociology has been done in Europe during the past quarter-century, the most effective work has been done in the United States. This has been due less to the exceptional originality of detached individual achievements than to actual, though not formal, division of labor carried on with progressive consciousness of common purpose. An increasing number of scholars prompted by fundamentally identical interests have devoted themselves to different phases of pending problems within the range indicated by our description of general sociology. They have subjected one another's work to searching and stimulating criticism. There have been few instances in the history of science in which the circumstances were more favorable to positive results. No vested orthodoxy existed which could prejudice conclusions. By tacit consent, the work to be done was undertaken as search into relationships which had never been fairly explored. The very fact that many men entered upon this search from almost as many different approaches insured multiple checks upon the returns. The outcome up to date would doubtless be variously appraised by different participants in this virtual co-operation, and it would be impossible to obtain a consensus about the relative importance of different pieces of work which have been positive or negative factors in reaching the present status of the inquiry. Without attempting to pass upon details of this sort, we venture to describe that which is today common to American workers in the field of general sociology as follows:

We have arrived at ability to state fundamental problems of sociology in substantially this form, viz.: *Under what categories*

is it necessary to think human experience, if it is to be presented objectively, and what are the typical relationships between activities assembled under the several categories? Without comment on the magnitude of this achievement in itself, as a means of controlling and co-ordinating investigation, it must be added that the first formal answer which we now give to the question is also of inestimable methodological importance, viz.: We now say that human experience is chiefly an affair of *associatings* between persons, in their copings with the physical and psychical conditions to which they are subject. That is, presupposing the physical factors, and also the consciousness factors into which personality may be resolved (both of which groups of factors are in the first instance problems not of general sociology at all but of other disciplines), "experience," which presents the problems of sociology, is the phenomena of the lives of persons in the course of developing and using their endowment as sentient beings. Experience then is never strictly solipsistic. It is always social. Accordingly, to speak after the manner of the Schoolmen, the categories "experience" and "association" are to each other as substance and attribute. That is, they are interchangeable for certain alternative purposes. The fundamental problem of sociology thereupon falls into the specific problems of discovering the categories under which the different orders of associatings observed in experience must be subsumed.

There is little difference of opinion among American sociologists today over the further proposition that sociological categories will be adequate in the degree in which they connote prevalence of movement over status. That is, experience reveals to us more meaning under the aspect of activity than of fixity. This is of course merely a detail implied in the evolutionary conception. Accordingly, the category *social process* has become a cardinal means of sociological interpretation (Ratzenhofer, *Sociologische Erkenntnis*, 1898, chap. iv. Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, Index title, "Process, social"). "The process conception of life," or "the social process," is a phrase that has only recently come into standard usage among social scientists, and it marks a development of social self-consciousness which cost the labors of many

thinkers during a half-century. Analysis of experience is carried on by sociologists today with reference less to what is existing than to what is doing and becoming in a given passage of experience. Described with respect to form rather than content, the social process is a tide of separating and blending social processes, consisting of incessant decomposition and recomposition of relations within persons and between persons in a continuous evolution of types of persons and associations. (Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 91-99, 150.)

All this apparently sterile labor, therefore, of determining the categories in accordance with which experience unfolds, is in fact the most basic work thus far performed for sophistication of the social sciences. It marks the latest gains of social self-consciousness in out-growing the condition of "seeing men as trees walking." In other words, the social reality is a "going affair." The entities which men used to think they found when they inspected life turn out to be cross-sections of a continuity of personal becomings. The myth "individual" has given place to the *socius* (Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 24; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 10, 34, 161, ff.). Each grouping of *socii*, from the simplest sexual mating up to the collidings of civilizations, tells its full story, not in terms of what it is, at a given time. That is merely a moment in the process. The completer report combines what the relationship was, but is no longer, what it is tending to be, and what our present insight indicates that it should be. Incidentally, therefore, "the state" in the traditional sense, the sense which vitiated most of Spencer's political reasonings, the sense which still frequently confuses the minds of legislators and jurists and executives, falls into the rank of a discredited hypothesis. The concept "state" of the older political philosophies was used as a term in a type of reasoning which authorized transfer of general propositions illustrated by the Pharaohs' "state," the Sultan's "state," or the Czar's "state" to the "state" of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, or Americans. This is as far from objectivity as it would be if the concept "matter" were held to justify specific affirmations about radium or sodium or oxygen, merely because the same had been illustrated in the behavior of ice or iron

or hydrogen. In the last analysis, the "state" is merely a convenient term of inclusion for all the compulsory ways in which the persons of a more or less accidentally determined territory are co-operating at a given time in adjustment both of their common and their particular interests. This co-operating may not be stated as though it were yesterday, today, and forever the same. It is always a function of the associatings of past, present, and future persons. It is therefore, like the rest of human experience, a congeries of relationships in the course of evolution.

The like is true of the category "society." It is still a term of convenience, but with less prospect than ever of becoming a tool of precision. What we actually find where the term "society" was once supposed to fix bounds, is merely an indefinite range of partially or wholly articulated associatings, among which are those co-operatings provisionally denoted by the term "state." Several years ago an American sociologist crystallized this perception into the aphorism, "Society is virtually a verbal noun" (Hayes, *American Journal of Sociology*, XI, 36). We may generalize the proposition. If we should invent a vocabulary along the lines cautiously followed in this article, that is, a terminology to correspond with all we can now see in the light of the process concept, we should probably seem even to some of our own number to be compounding pedantry. As we now interpret experience, however, each noun which stands primarily for a social situation or condition would have to appear in a verbal form if it suggested our whole thought. Thus, when we say "individuals," or "groups," or "associations," or "functions," or "institutions," and so on, we really mean "individualizings," or "groupings," or "associatings," or "functionings," or "institutionalizings," etc. That is, experience makes itself known to us in the form of incessant repersonalizings of persons and rearrangings of arrangements; and this element of becoming is the most decisive factor in our understanding of any portion of experience.

It should go without saying that at least embryonic sense of proportion is assumed as a precondition of using sociological categories. The ratio in which the aspects of status and of movement are to be reckoned as meaning factors in a given case must

always be a matter of judgment. A desperate criminal at large, a starving family, an epidemic, is first and foremost a very present fact, to be dealt with as such. On the other hand, the factors which predetermine crime, poverty, disease, or the elements which should find their reckoning in a national tariff, conservation, or arbitration policy reach far back and far forward, and they consequently call for consideration and action very different from that appropriate to a specific case.

Thus far we have spoken almost exclusively of the formal side of experience. In the mere matter of terms, sociologists are nearer uniformity in their symbols for the modes of experience than in categories for the content of experience. In spirit, however, they have steadily been approaching unanimity in the conviction that the social process must be understood as of, by, and for persons, and that appraisals of given stages of the process must turn upon their visible output in personalizings and associatings of enlarged scope and improved quality.

"The supreme result of efficient social organization and the supreme test of efficiency is the development of the *socius*, or the personality of the social man. If the man himself becomes less social, less rational, less manly; if he falls from the highest type, which seeks self-realization, to one of those lower types that manifest only the primitive virtues of power; if he becomes non-social or anti-social—the social organization, whatever its apparent merits, is failing to achieve its supreme object. If, on the contrary, the man is becoming ever better as a human being, more rational, more sympathetic, with an ever-broadening consciousness of kind—then, whatever its apparent defects, the social organization is sound and efficient" (Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, p. 320). "Men's experience is the evolution of human values" (Small, *The Meaning of Social Science*, p. 137). Considered on the side of content, some shaping of the concept *human realization*, as a consummation not to be defined *a priori* but to be built up by accumulatings and expandings and adjustings of concepts of personal qualities, both within persons and between persons, is becoming the normative category of experience.

It is not practicable within the limits of this article to speak

of the more particular sociological categories. They seem to be more heterogeneous than they are, because they have been worked out from the standpoint of different planes of relationship within the social process. Some of the best-known groups of categories may be found in the following works: from the standpoint of social *genesis*: Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*; *Inductive Sociology*; Sumner, *Folkways*; Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*; Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*; social *forms*: Simmel, *Soziologie*; social *forces*: Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, *Pure Sociology*, *Applied Sociology*; social *psychology*: Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, and *Social Organization*, the two last named books at the same time the fullest exposition of the category "social organization"; social *control*: Ross, *Social Control*.

In thus describing the distinctive work of general sociology, we have indirectly expanded our description of special sociology.¹ There either is, or there is developing, a peculiar technique and technology for each division and subdivision of deliberate effort for social improvement. The respective technologies are systematic programs for promoting the health, wealth, and culture interests of the groups with which each is primarily concerned: the family, the industrial group, the urban group, the rural group, the criminal group, etc. In so far as these technologies are scientifically founded, they presuppose the categories to which we have referred, and they make use of these categories not only in analyzing the group situations and tendencies, but also in determining the rational group purposes. This was memorably illustrated in the platform adopted at its organization by the Verein für Sozialpolitik, perhaps the most influential voluntary organization in the world for promoting social technology. That creed was a particular rendering of the human realization category. It may be summarized in the proposition reiterated by Schmoller in many variations: "*Every member of the community should be put in a way to share in all the developing goods of civilization.*"

The most instructive résumé that has been written of the influence of the social idea is the contribution of Professor von

¹ Cf. Dr. Henderson's paper following this.

Philippovich, entitled "The Infusion of Socio-political Ideas into the Literature of German Economics," in the second of the two volumes dedicated on his seventieth birthday to Professor Schmoller. The estimate is especially valuable because it is the judgment not of a sociologist but of an economist. The closing sentences of the monograph are these:

How the relationships of men take place . . . is no longer dependent upon economic appraisal, it is rather a consequence of the moral ordering of life. To have shown this, and to have made it a basis of the actions of men in society and in the state, is the merit of that change which has been brought about through the infusion of the socio-political ideas into national economy. New tasks are therewith assigned to the science which the older science did not recognize. From a mere theory of industry it becomes a social theory. Its task is no longer merely to describe the simple correlation between goods and active self-interest. Its business is now to recognize this interdependence as also both cause and effect of other occurrences; and consequently its duty is to understand the course of industry under the influence of nature and of moralization in order that we may learn to control it.¹

¹ For the whole paragraph, *vid.* above, p. 199.

APPLIED SOCIOLOGY (OR SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY)

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German economists find it convenient to distinguish between general (theoretical) and special (practical) economics. There is an important and significant difference between the divisions of social technology here proposed and the divisions commonly used in practical economics and economic politics. In the latter the divisions are based on the specialization of labor and branches of industry or commerce; as the economics of banking, insurance, railroads, agriculture. In practical sociology, because it deals directly with humanity, the divisions should be based on natural groups of persons, as families, communities, classes. It is convenient in sociology to follow the hint of economists and cultivate general and practical sociology. Social technology starts from the analysis of social groupings and interests furnished by general sociology, and it is modified at every step by advance in knowledge in all the fields of science. At a given moment, however, all available knowledge must be utilized for achievement; there is no final "solution" of social problems. The physician must each day do the best he can in his science and art of healing, well aware that tomorrow a laboratory bulletin may place him under moral obligation to adopt entirely different means. Herbert Spencer showed that science is just common knowledge carried to the highest possible degree of completeness and accuracy. Whenever an intelligent citizen adopts a principle of personal conduct he takes into account all the interests and consequences he can remember or discover.

He may abstract any one of them for thorough examination, but if he consciously omits any one in his life plan, he is that far immoral, and knows it. We can illustrate the scope of social technology by what constantly happens in a chance group of farmers or in the deliberate discussions of a village improvement

society when the "general welfare" is under consideration. The range of topics is as wide as the urban newspaper. The farmer suggests one set of phenomena, the storekeeper another, the doctor another, the county editor many things, and the visiting commercial traveler touches all. They may call in a lawyer to formulate local regulations or a bill for a law, but their plans look more to future achievements than to salted precedents. They know that they must agree on a policy because they must live together, and must find a practicable method of realizing the covenanted end. Thus they are social technologists. Certainly with wider and clearer vision and fuller knowledge their policy would be more adequate; and it is here that applied social science can help them.

Each "socius" has in his nature all the needs of all men, without exception, but feels them as wants in varying degrees. Each "socius" must use all the institutions of society and all the forms of knowledge. He goes to specialists, as lawyers, teachers, physicians, for expert professional service; but he must possess enough "world ideas" to live in association with his neighbors. Every man and woman of social position above the lowest is compelled to form some kind of a judgment, favorable or adverse, in regard to scores of ameliorative and reform movements started by specialists or fanatics. By appeals in circulars, newspapers, letters, and interviews citizens are made to say "yes" or "no" to these multifarious calls. A refusal is a judgment and a decision involving responsibility. It is evident that answers to requests ought to be as intelligent as possible, whether we help or decline to help with time, money, influence, labor. An intelligent judgment is possible only after a survey of the entire field, and this survey cannot be made by any one person; it is a product of well co-ordinated rational labor.

The "practical" man who despises theory is the most obstinate theorist; he is sure of his experience, but he is sometimes slow to learn of the world's experience; he may lose years in trying an experiment which has often been tried by others.

All forms of science culminate in applied sociology. It is only when they co-operate that they are fully rational.

Sir H. S. Maine (*Village Communities*, p. 230) said: "It is

not the business of the scientific historical inquirer to assert good or evil of any particular institution. He deals with its existence and development, not with its expediency." But this aspect of science satisfies only one of the many needs of humanity, the desire for knowledge. Social technology does deal with "expediency," if by that we mean the actual adaptation of institutions to human welfare. In this wide sense a course of conduct is ethically "good" when it actually tends to promote all forms of welfare for the entire community under consideration; and "expediency," rationally interpreted, becomes the supreme test of conduct. Where the "scientific historical inquirer" leaves off, the practical sociologist begins; but he does not leave the solid ground laid in scientific inquiry; he judges by consequences.

A. Wagner¹ declares that the social sciences differ from the sciences of nature in the scope of their tasks. All the sciences in common seek to establish (1) the facts and (2) the tendencies of the phenomena studied, and (3) to explain these facts in a causal series. But the sciences of society go farther and inquire (1) What is the value of the facts for human society? (2) What ought to be? and (3) How can the end be progressively realized? In the purely theoretical sciences the task is to learn in order to know; in the social sciences we learn in order to control means and ends; but in both cases knowledge is the object of the scientific discipline.

The scope of practical sociology is indicated in this description of the objects of the study: "Those modifications of society which are brought about by the social will, equipped with adequate knowledge, using appropriate means, and striving toward an intelligently conceived goal" (E. A. Ross).

Social technology must start with an analysis of desirable ends of concerted volition analyzed by psychology, revealed in history, widely presented in art and literature, and justified by social philosophy. Human purpose directed to desirable ends is an objective fact, like a star or a crystal. Granted that not all social changes are due to concerted human volition, and that many changes can be traced to external nature and unthinking custom,

¹ *Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie*, 3. Aufl., 1. Band, 2. K., S. 144-45.

still men do co-operate consciously to improve their condition and they sometimes succeed. The ends are in human nature and they come out in deeds, laws, institutions, works.

These desires and volitions are themselves causal factors;¹ they act upon the materials and forces of nature, using them to accomplish desired ends. Knowledge, science, is the instrument of achievement.

Practical sociology attempts to comprehend in an intellectual system the complex of conditions in which the accepted ends of human life may best be realized. This "theory," or intellectual control, is necessary to furnish the most effective and economical method of actual achievement.

While the material objects of desire are beyond counting and infinitely varied, the ends or interests themselves may be analyzed and classified.² (1) There are the desires on whose satisfaction depend the physical integrity and power of the individual and the perpetuation of human life, as the appetites of hunger, thirst, sex. (2) There are the desires whose satisfaction in control of nature is necessary to all other satisfactions and whose activities are the special field of economics. These are means to other ends, but come to be almost idealized as ultimate in wealth, commerce, industry. (3) There are the higher desires which have been evolved in civilized man and are the springs of interest and achievement in science, art, companionship, morality, government, religion, and the social institutions which are created for their furtherance. (4) There are the agencies of order, security, and liberty which are idealized as political ends, but are really only means to social ends. The system of means and measures for the satisfaction of these desires may be studied in various ways. The complex whole must be viewed in various aspects, without forgetting that society is one and its interests not divided into independent parts. As soon as we attempt to invent and apply a "technique" we must find a different set of tools for each achievement. Analysis

¹ L. F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, rendered a great service in making this clear.

² This has been done many times, as by Plato and Aristotle, by ethical writers and psychologists; more definitely of late by A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, and by E. A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*.

is imposed on us by the limitation of our focal field. The division here offered is merely a convenience, a tentative device, which may easily be rejected for a better. We may in turn inquire how the ends of welfare (desires, interests) may best be promoted in the family, the rural community, the urban community, the commonwealth, the nation, the world of international law and civilization, humanity. This study may be followed or accompanied by an investigation of the regulative principles found in the best methods of dealing with particular groups of human beings having many traits in common: the depressed, the abnormal, the anti-social. We may also isolate for study the interests of the wage-earners and the "social politics" which have grown out of attempts to improve their conditions.

We select for illustration of the procedure of practical sociology what might be done by a large group of men and women of light and leading for their commonwealth. The very name "commonwealth" shows that we are not making an appeal to credulity but to common-sense; for the word is proof that Aristotle's definition still has vital meaning: the state is a people living a common life to a noble end. We can easily imagine a conference of persons representing science, business, art, religion, government, recreation, uniting to make a working program for the welfare of the whole people. It is not necessary that they should be formally elected; their decisions would have no more authority than the wisdom they embody. Such a conference would agree that all the elements of welfare should be considered; that no group of persons should be neglected; that health, wealth, and culture for all citizens should be taken into account. Then they would adopt some natural division of labor. The physicians and engineers would be regarded as responsible for leadership in matters of public health, and they would formulate the demands of modern sanitary science. The teachers would be requested to standardize the work of the schools. The artists would agree upon the requirements of the people in relation to the works of beauty. Those who cared specially for the destitute, and had studied their needs, would draw up one part of the program and justify it. Those who had given long thought to the wage-earners would set up a standard

of treatment for them. In each group "practical" men of wide vision would be an essential factor, as nitrogen in the atmosphere is necessary lest the oxygen, in a fit of academic enthusiasm, burn up the breathing organs. Such a conference would bring together all these specialists and experts, from time to time, and, with the help of a small committee, would seek to systematize and combine all the recommendations into a consistent plan. By repeated discussions and critical tests the economic physical and constitutional tests would be applied. The rudiments of such a process may be found already in the legislative reference bureau in Wisconsin; but legislation is only one method of furthering the general welfare.

Recent decisions of our Supreme Court encourage us to develop our social technology; for that august body, more respected than any other in our land, has distinctly taught that ultimately the Constitution will not be found in antagonism to any proved measure for achieving general welfare.¹ Indeed the Constitution itself was framed for this high purpose and nothing lower. Thus we see the relation of practical sociology to law and to the teaching of law; it is the discipline which reveals what law ought to become. Courts of final resort are not ruled absolutely by precedents and legal fictions, and legislatures may change law in the direction of improvement. To confine the study of lawyers entirely to decisions and precedents is to render them incapable of keeping pace with the vital process of a noble science. Here also is the test of the pretensions of practical sociology; it must become competent to give proof beyond reasonable ground for doubt that its program will actually promote the common welfare.

Practical sociology offers a method of criticism of any complex of social arrangements. Its standard of judgment is the degree of adaptation of institutions or conduct to the conditions of general welfare. Thus it helps to correct the vision of the Overman who regards other men as his tools; the estimate of the manufacturer who looks upon his employees as only so many "hands"; the philosophy of the exclusive trade unionist who considers bombs as fair in war; the pedantic Brahmin, who has contempt for the

¹ F. Kelley, *Some Ethical Gains through Legislation*; Goodnow, *Social Reform*.

unlettered. The "economic interpretation of history" is shown to be partial, and the economic end as only a preliminary means. No doubt all this involves immense intellectual labor; but a view of life less comprehensive cannot be accepted as satisfactory; and so long as any interest or any group of humanity is ignored, so long our judgment of a tradition of social conduct must fall short of being scientific as well as ethical.

It is not an objection to our claim for practical sociology that no one man can master it in all its details and applications. That is true of all the sciences and scientific disciplines. A scientific discipline is justified if it furnish an instrument of analysis and synthesis and disclose the fundamental principles of the subject. Encyclopedias of information and monographs of intensive specialists are also necessary to furnish humanity with the knowledge which has been discovered by myriads of investigators in the republic of letters and of practice. One of the intellectual needs of the world is also a practical need,

Nur im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen
Resolut zu leben.

The problem of practical or applied sociology is the rational and just division of the inheritance of civilization. The value of the sciences lies in their service as means of control of all forces and materials for the satisfaction of human needs. The diffusion of knowledge of science is certainly one of the essential methods by which members of the race can come into the enjoyment of what belongs, not to a few men, but to the race.¹ A people intellectually stagnant, stupid, indifferent can have neither the ambition nor the skill to take possession of the vast material and ideal wealth which has come down to us from the past or been achieved in recent times. The general diffusion of knowledge must, therefore, form a part of the program upon which practical sociology is working. It may or may not be inconsistent with this statement, but only an application, if we insist that improvement of the race also depends on bringing into the range of interests of the people the objects of art, the works of literature, the expressions of spiritual vision, the interpretations of the values of existence.

¹ L. F. Ward makes this the fundamental method. See his *Applied Sociology*. For elaborate analysis of the field of social technology, see A. W. Small, *General Sociology*.

THE VARIABILITY OF THE POPULAR VOTE AT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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The stability of political tradition is a condition of considerable sociological importance. If political traditions are relatively stable they will furnish under ordinary conditions the guaranty of a consistent public policy. If political traditions are rigid and inelastic then public policy will not be likely to show a progressive adaptation to the changing social and economic conditions of national life. From being a source of strength their inertia will become an obstacle to advancement. If they find their only justification in precedent, in use and wont, their approval in mystic sanction and appeal to sentiment alone, then these political traditions will cease to be guaranties of progressive public policies. If, on the other hand, political traditions are unstable and vaporous, if they rest upon wild fancy divorced from fact, and if they depend for their potency upon emotional display or mob action, then the situation is equally unfortunate.

The group of partisans which adheres to a political tradition is a composite aggregate. It is never an unmixed product consisting entirely of those who follow its tenets with blind allegiance. Nor does it consist alone of individuals whose stand is the result of reasoned action. Large numbers have ranged themselves by personal feeling or class prejudice. Professor Giddings voices my idea when he says, "the membership of a political majority exhibits a complete gradation of mental development, from a quick and sensitive intelligence at the margin, where independent voting occurs, to stupid bigotry in the unstimulated interior of the mass."¹ This description of the composition of a political majority applies equally well to the composition of the tradition-adhering group. Indeed, it would be illuminating to compare political groups with

¹ Franklin H. Giddings, *Democracy and Empire*, p. 183.

reference to the numbers of individuals constituting this margin. We could say that the group which contained the largest margin of independent voters was, on the whole, a group with more elastic political traditions than the group with a smaller margin of independent voters. If historical analysis showed an increasing diversity in these margins we could safely assume the change as evidence of a decreasing rigidity in political tradition.

It is a statistical fact that the variability of the popular vote for president as between the States of the Union is on the increase. Instead of the popular vote for president as between states becoming standardized as time goes on, it is actually becoming diversified. We have a situation in which the response of large numbers of individuals, geographically grouped, is increasingly variable with reference to a given political stimulus. If the political action of these individuals grouped by states showed increasing numerical agreement, we might say that it was due to the standardizing effect of political tradition. The fact of the matter is that the political action of these individuals grouped by states shows an increasing numerical variability, and it becomes important to determine whether this increasing numerical variability is evidence of independent political action.

The variability of the popular vote for president is shown by the series of standard deviations in Table I, columns II and III. The variability of the Republican vote for the Republican nominee for each presidential election since 1856, is shown by the series, 73-100-98-103-96-111-127-131-147-143-202-194-224-203. The variability of the popular vote for the Democratic nominee is shown by the series, 51-73-91-95-81-107-114-123-141-143-142-152-130-148. The real significance of these two series is better grasped after an examination of Chart I where the standard deviations are plotted as ordinates over the corresponding presidential year as abscissae.

The essential point to be noted is the rapid increase in the variability of the popular vote since 1856. This increase has been steady with but minor fluctuations and holds for both Republican and Democratic votes in almost equal degree. The apparent divergence since 1892 should not receive too serious consideration.

In connection with the increasing variability of the political votes of the two principal parties, it is interesting to note the




CHART I.—Variability of popular vote (median taken)

behavior of the variability of the percentages of those of voting age who actually voted these years. This variability series is given in column IV of Table I and the plot for this series is shown

in Chart II. It will be seen that the variability of the percentages of those of voting age who actually voted increases in practically the same ratio as that of the other two series and follows closely their fluctuations. See Chart III.




CHART II.—Variability of percentage voting (based on median)

The extent to which this increasing variability is evidence of real independence in voting must now be considered. The question of causation is here concerned with what I shall term statistical causes and extra-statistical causes. If the increasing variability of the series is due to mere chance arrangement of the figures then we have a case of statistical causation. If the increasing variability is due to independent voting then we have a case of extra-statistical causation.

If the increasing variability is due to mere chance arrangement of the figures then the two most powerful statistical causes are:
(1) The admission to the Union from time to time of new states




CHART III.—Variability of popular vote and variability of percentage voting

with a small voting population. This would serve to intensify the divergence between the number of votes of the small states and the number of votes of the large populous states and would increase

TABLE I
VARIABILITY OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC VOTES AT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
BY STATES AND VARIABILITY OF PERCENTAGES OF MALES OF
VOTING AGE VOTING AT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR	STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF		STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF PERCENT- AGES OF MALES OF VOTING AGE VOTING	MEDIAN OF PERCENT- AGES VOTING	NUMBER OF STATES SHOWING IN PERCENTAGE VOTING		
	Republican Votes	Democratic Votes			For Period	Decrease	Increase
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
1856....	73	51
1860....	100	73
1864....	98	91
1868....	103	95
1872....	96	81	177	64.4	1868-1872	19	9
1876....	111	107	124	75.9	1872-1876	2	38
1880....	127	114	134	73.8	1876-1880	20	10
1884....	131	123	148	71.3	1880-1884	21	11
1888....	147	141	157	74.0	1884-1888	9	22
1892....	143	143	153	66.8	1888-1892	26	8
1896....	202	142	190	71.1	1892-1896	15	25
1900....	194	152	198	63.4	1896-1900	28	11
1904....	224	130	209	58.4	1900-1904	34	3
1908....	203	148	205	60.5	1904-1908	18	17

EXPLANATION OF TABLE I

Column II, Standard Deviation of Republican Votes, was obtained by computing the standard deviations of the votes by states for each election year. For example, the figure 73, opposite the year 1856, was obtained as follows: the Republican votes by states for 1856 were arranged in series of descending magnitudes; the figure 53 is the standard deviation or mean square variation of this series. The procedure was similar for the other figures in column II. Column III was obtained in manner similar to column II.

Column IV, Standard Deviations of Percentages of Males of Voting Age Voting, was obtained by computing the standard deviations of the percentages in the columns of Table II. Only the standard deviations of the percentages for the years 1872 and following were computed, as it was believed that the accuracy of the percentages for years prior to 1872 was uncertain.

Column V, Medians of Percentages Voting, gives the simple medians of the series of percentages of the columns of Table II.

Columns VII and VIII were obtained as follows: a careful study of the percentages of Table II showed that for the period 1868 to 1872 a certain number of states showed decreasing percentage voting while others showed increasing percentage voting and some remained practically constant; the figures in columns VII and VIII represent the number of states showing this increasing or decreasing percentage for the period indicated.

SOURCE

The source used by the writer for the number of votes cast by political party, by state, by presidential election was the compilation published in the *Fact Book* (published by the Current Literature Magazine Publishing Co.) under the direction of Dr. Francis Rolt-Wheeler of the Current Literature Publishing Co. of New York. The data were compiled for the first time from official figures provided especially for the purpose by the secretaries of state for every state in the Union, by the respective chairman of the Republican, Democratic, Socialist, Labor, Prohibition, and other parties for every state, by the chairmen of the national committees of the political parties, by the personal records of presidential candidates, and forms the most authoritative data upon the subject.

the variability of that year's series. (2) The unequal increase of population of voting age as between different states. Thus, a very large increase in the voting population of the most populous states would intensify the divergence of potential voters as between the states and might cause the increasing variability of that year's series.

That the variability is not a result of the first consideration is shown by Table III. The year of greatest increase in the Democratic variability was 1876, when the figures increased from 81 to 107 and yet no new states voted Democratic in 1876. In 1880, when Colorado voted for the first time, Nevada was already a member of the Union and cast a smaller Republican and Democratic vote than did Colorado. In 1892 five states voted for the first time, but were obviously not the cause of the Republican variability because Nevada, already in the Union, cast a Republican vote smaller than any of the five. The variability of the Democratic vote for 1892 may have been increased by the voting of the new states, Wyoming or South Dakota, because these states brought a new vote smaller than any other vote, thereby increasing the divergence. But it is to be noted that 1892 was a year of decreasing variability for the Republican vote and the year of slightest increasing variability of the Democratic vote, so that it cannot be claimed that the admission of the new states was a cause of the variability. Table III also shows that the admission of Utah in 1896 and of Oklahoma in 1908, was not the cause of vari-

ability for those years, for at both of those years there were other states in the Union with smaller votes, i.e., Wyoming and Arkansas. Table III therefore demonstrates that the variability of the popular vote is not due to the admission to the Union of new states with small vote.

That the variability is not a result of the second consideration is shown by Table IV. The second statistical cause assumed that a very large increase of the voting population had occurred, increasing the divergence and hence the variability. Taking the year 1876 for the largest increase in Democratic variability (from 81 to 107), we find by Table IV that the increase in voting population for the decade 1870 to 1880 for the four populous states was considerably less than the increase in the decade 1880 to 1890 at which period the Democratic variability did not increase so rapidly. Taking the year 1896 for the largest increase in Republican variability (from 143 to 202), we find by Table IV that the increase in the voting population for the decade 1890 to 1900 was not as great an increase as that for the decade 1900 to 1910, at which period the Republican variability did not increase so rapidly. Table IV therefore demonstrates that the increasing variability is not due to the unequal increase of the population of voting age as between states of the Union.

Since the increasing variability is not due to these two statistical causes it is probably due to extra-statistical causes. Is the increase due to a growth of political independence on the part of a margin of voters? I will examine two considerations:

- 1 If a majority of the states show at the years of greatest increasing variability a higher percentage voting than at the preceding or succeeding election year, then we have evidence that the increasing variability is due to intelligent voting.

2. If, at the years of greatest increasing variability, there has been the shifting of a margin to one political party or to the other, then we have evidence that the increasing variability is due to intelligent voting.

For the more careful study of the first consideration Tables A and B have been constructed based in turn upon the more extensive data presented in Tables I, II, and V. It will be seen that for 1876

TABLE II
PERCENTAGE VOTES CAST ARE OF TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES OF VOTING AGE BY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

State	1856	1860	1864	1868	1872	1876	1880	1884	1888	1892	1896	1900	1904	1908
1. Alabama.....	46.1	51.0	75.3	79.6	74.4	58.5	54.2	57.9	68.4	52.1	37.7	23.4	20.1
2. Arkansas.....	42.0	63.4	63.8	58.6	59.5	64.7	54.7	51.6	40.7	33.5	40.1
3. California.....	97.5	79.0	58.8	51.4	38.3	54.0	50.0	52.4	58.1	55.2	62.6	55.7	50.3	61.1
4. Colorado.....	57.1	53.3	60.3	56.2
5. Connecticut.....	72.7	64.2	65.8	76.7	63.5	74.0	74.3	70.3	72.2	70.6	67.5	86.4	61.0	57.0
6. Delaware.....	48.6	53.7	56.4	61.9	72.7	75.4	76.8	83.6	72.6	80.2	77.2	77.7	78.3	80.0
7. Florida.....	69.9	68.3	75.4	88.2	83.6	81.4	75.9	34.5	38.3	28.4	24.4	25.9
8. Georgia.....	82.3	69.5	72.3	55.8	62.2	49.0	41.0	36.3	52.7	35.4	23.4	22.9	22.1
9. Idaho.....	51.0	63.0	96.7	98.1
10. Illinois.....	61.5	74.4	66.4	70.6	69.7	75.9	78.0	73.5	72.7	80.2	97.5	80.7	70.1	70.4
11. Indiana.....	99.6	89.0	95.1	90.7	90.0	94.4	92.8	92.8	89.2	95.1	92.2	90.1	88.1
12. Iowa.....	63.8	68.3	59.4	71.2	64.4	80.0	77.4	84.0	81.1	82.0	88.3	83.4	74.8	70.8
13. Kansas.....	24.4	36.0	71.5	62.0	75.7	85.6	91.4	83.0	83.4	85.5	67.0	71.6
14. Kentucky.....	81.8	69.9	38.2	57.5	62.4	77.2	71.0	68.4	78.3	72.3	87.2	85.6	77.5	81.8
15. Louisiana.....	46.6	43.5	78.8	69.7	72.8	48.0	47.1	47.9	42.5	34.3	20.7	14.9	19.1
16. Maine.....	74.1	63.5	65.8	68.0	52.6	65.6	76.7	68.3	64.7	57.0	56.1	48.5	42.9	45.6
17. Maryland.....	68.9	64.2	45.2	52.2	68.5	77.2	74.5	74.9	79.5	72.3	83.6	82.1	67.3	67.9
18. Massachusetts.....	78.8	63.1	54.6	52.9	47.4	56.4	56.1	53.4	54.9	55.7	51.6	49.1	59.0	48.0
19. Michigan.....	98.0	84.1	62.8	56.6	62.2	78.7	75.3	76.3	80.9	73.1	80.2	75.6	66.8	64.6
20. Minnesota.....	66.3	71.3	70.6	67.7	77.8	67.1	82.0	62.4	53.2	53.0
21. Mississippi.....	87.7	73.5	74.4	82.3	48.4	47.8	41.7	17.2	18.2	16.9	15.3	15.8
22. Missouri.....	39.5	55.7	30.7	41.4	63.3	72.2	73.4	72.3	77.8	74.0	76.5	79.7	71.8	74.7
23. Montana.....	59.6	60.4	62.4	54.6	52.5
24. Nebraska.....	58.3	44.3	58.0	67.7	67.7	75.3	66.5	74.1	79.9	61.3	66.3
25. Nevada.....	77.1	89.5	52.7	44.1	55.5	57.2	54.1	57.5	46.6	63.1
26. New Hampshire.....	91.8	81.4	81.9	76.7	73.4	79.3	82.1	76.1	77.5	73.8	66.1	75.0	67.2	65.8
27. New Jersey.....	97.6	81.4	84.5	67.4	81.2	81.8	74.7	77.5	76.0	74.5	71.8	67.6	64.7
28. New York.....	60.8	66.1	66.1	72.0	69.1	77.2	78.8	75.3	77.9	77.8	71.1	70.8	66.1	60.0
29. North Carolina.....	70.9	64.4	94.4	70.7	89.5	81.8	85.6	86.0	78.2	81.4	70.0	45.6	51.3
30. North Dakota.....	55.7	59.2	60.7	58.4	67.1
31. Ohio.....	99.8	94.4	87.9	84.9	77.7	87.0	87.7	86.3	85.4	79.7	88.8	85.7	76.5	82.4

TABLE III
COMPARISON BETWEEN VOTES OF STATES NEWLY ADMITTED AND VOTES OF STATES ALREADY IN THE UNION

YEAR	STATE ADMITTED*	VOTE CAST AND POSITION				COMPARABLE STATE	VOTE CAST AND POSITION			
		Republican	Position	Democratic	Position		Republican	Position	Democrat	Position
1880.....	Colorado.....	27,450	33	24,647	33	Nevada.....	7,878	38	8,619	38
1892.....	Idaho.....	8,599	40	2	41	Nevada.....	2,811	42	714	40
	Montana.....	18,838	34	17,534	35					
	South Dakota.....	34,880	32	9,081	38					
	North Dakota.....	17,159	36					
	Wyoming.....	7,722	41	8,454	30	Wyoming.....	10,072	41	10,861	43
1896.....	Utah.....	13,461	38	67,053	28	Arkansas.....	56,679	31	87,015	24
1908.....	Oklahoma.....	110,558	23	122,406	20					

* Colorado was admitted in 1876; Idaho and Wyoming were admitted in 1890; Montana, North and South Dakota were admitted in 1889; Oklahoma was admitted in 1907.

the variability of percentage voting is smaller than in 1872 or 1880, and that combined with this, 1876 shows a higher median percentage voting. We have a case of lower variability around the higher median—an index of intelligent vote as compared with 1872 or 1880. It will also be seen that for 1876 more states showed their highest percentage voting than in 1872 or 1880. Moreover, while a majority of states, 19 as to 9 and 20 as to 10, showed decreasing percentage voting in 1872 and 1880, the year 1876 showed a large

TABLE IV
INCREASE IN POPULATION OF MALES OF VOTING AGE
(From the U.S. Census Volumes)

State with Small Population	1870-1880	1880-1890	1890-1900	1900-1910
Colorado.....	67,314	71,312	20,788	85,940
Idaho.....	4,482	16,695	22,440	56,931
Delaware.....	8,263	9,261	6,459	7,889
West Virginia.....	43,844	42,239	66,570	90,379
State with Large Population	1870-1880	1880-1890	1890-1900	1900-1910
New York.....	249,850	360,808	415,316	651,808
Pennsylvania.....	228,401	367,585	355,370	491,787
Illinois.....	171,708	275,816	328,793	341,726
Ohio.....	185,757	190,887	195,757	272,043

Obtained from census figures of number of males of voting age for decades.

majority of states, 38 as to 2, having an increase in percentage voting. For the year 1896 there is a higher median percentage voting than in 1892 or 1900, and 13 states show high for 1896 as against 1 and 3 high for 1892 and 1900, respectively. Moreover, the majority of states in 1896 show increase percentage voting 25 to 15, as against majorities showing decreasing percentages in 1892 and 1900. For these reasons it is believed that the increasing variability is due to increased percentage voting, which in turn is evidence of increasing political intelligence.

Tables VIII and VI show respectively, the position of any state at every election year with reference to the percentage voting, and compare the states showing the highest and lowest percentages of

TABLE VI

COMPARISON OF STATES SHOWING HIGHEST AND LOWEST VOTES CAST IN
1876 AND 1896

STATE	1872	1876	1880	STATE	1892	1896	1900
Highest Percentage in 1876				Highest Percentage in 1896			
Indiana.....	90.7	96.0	94.4	Illinois.....	80.2	97.5	80.7
South Carolina....	60.2	96.1	83.0	West Virginia.....	88.6	96.2	80.9
Nevada.....	77.1	89.5	52.7	Indiana.....	89.2	95.1	92.2
North Carolina....	70.7	89.5	81.8	Ohio.....	79.7	88.8	85.7
Florida.....	75.4	88.2	83.6	Iowa.....	82.0	88.3	83.4
Ohio.....	77.7	87.0	87.7	Kentucky.....	72.3	87.2	85.6
Wisconsin.....	70.6	82.4	78.6	Wisconsin.....	76.9	85.0	77.5
Mississippi.....	74.4	82.3	48.4	Kansas.....	83.0	83.4	85.5
New Jersey.....	67.4	81.2	81.8	Maryland.....	72.3	83.6	67.3
Iowa.....	64.4	80.0	77.4	Minnesota.....	67.1	82.0	62.4
				Texas.....	72.8	82.0	56.0
Lowest Percentage in 1876				Lowest Percentage in 1896			
Rhode Island.....	31.1	38.5	38.0	Mississippi.....	17.2	18.2	16.9
Texas.....	42.6	49.6	63.5	South Carolina....	28.6	25.9	28.5
California.....	38.3	54.0	50.0	Louisiana.....	42.5	34.3	20.7
Massachusetts.....	47.4	56.4	56.1	Georgia.....	52.7	35.4	23.4
Nebraska.....	44.3	58.0	67.7	Florida.....	34.5	38.3	28.4
Kansas.....	71.5	62.0	75.7	Rhode Island.....	50.1	47.6	44.4
Georgia.....	55.8	62.2	49.0	Arkansas.....	54.7	51.6	40.7
Arkansas.....	63.4	63.8	58.6	Massachusetts....	55.7	61.6	49.1
Maine.....	52.6	65.6	76.7	Alabama.....	68.4	52.1	37.7
Oregon.....	53.0	69.8	68.4	Washington.....	56.0	53.4	54.9

TABLE A

	1872	1876	1880	Source
Democratic variability.....	81	107	114	Table I, col. III
Percentage voting, variability.....	177	124	134	Table I, col. IV
Medians of percentage voting.....	64.4	75.9	73.8	Table I, col. V
Number of states showing high or low percentage voting.....	12 Low	12 High	5 High	Table V
Number of states showing decrease or increase percentage voting.....	19 9	2 38	20 10	Table I, cols. VII and VIII

TABLE B

	1892	1896	1900	Source
Republican variability.....	143	202	194	Table I, col. II
Percentage voting, variability.....	153	190	198	Table I, col. IV
Medians of percentage voting.....	66.8	71.1	63.4	Table I, col. V
Number of states showing high or low percentage voting.....	1 High	13 High	3 High	Table V
Number of states showing decrease or increase percentage voting.....	26 8	15 25	28 11	Table I, cols. VII and VIII

TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF VOTES CAST REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC FOR THE TEN MOST POPULOUS STATES*

Year	Illinois	Indiana	Iowa	Massachusetts	Michigan	Missouri	New York	Ohio	Pennsylvania	Wisconsin
1872.....	+56,465	+22,515	+60,387	+74,212	+59,179	-32,318	+53,455	+37,531	+137,548	+185,15
Republican.....	241,237	186,147	131,566	133,472	136,199	119,116	440,736	281,852	349,589	104,992
Democratic.....	184,772	163,632	71,179	59,260	77,020	151,434	387,281	244,321	212,041	86,477
1876.....	+10,631	-5,515	+59,205	+41,286	+25,439	-58,048	-32,742	+7,516	+17,984	+6,141
Republican.....	278,232	208,011	171,326	159,063	166,534	145,029	489,207	330,608	384,142	130,068
Democratic.....	258,601	213,526	112,121	108,777	141,095	203,077	521,949	323,182	366,158	123,927
1880.....	+40,716	+6,642	+78,059	+53,245	+53,889	-55,042	+21,033	+34,227	+37,211	+30,263
Republican.....	318,037	232,164	183,904	165,205	185,190	153,567	555,544	375,048	444,713	144,897
Democratic.....	277,321	225,522	105,845	111,960	131,301	208,609	534,511	340,821	407,502	114,634
1888.....	+22,104	+2,348	+31,726	+32,037	+22,918	-25,701	+14,373	+19,599	+79,458	+21,321
Republican.....	370,475	263,361	211,603	183,892	236,387	236,253	650,338	416,054	526,091	176,553
Democratic.....	348,371	261,013	179,877	151,855	213,469	261,954	635,965	396,455	446,633	155,232
1892.....	-26,993	-7,125	+23,429	+26,001	+20,412	-41,866	-45,518	+1,072	+63,747	-6,224
Republican.....	399,288	255,615	219,795	202,814	222,708	226,762	609,350	405,187	516,011	171,101
Democratic.....	426,281	262,740	196,366	176,813	202,296	268,628	654,868	404,115	452,264	177,325
1896.....	+142,607	+17,542	+55,552	+173,265	+56,078	-58,727	+268,460	+51,109	+295,072	+106,612
Republican.....	607,130	323,748	289,293	278,976	293,072	304,940	819,838	525,991	728,300	268,135
Democratic.....	464,523	306,206	223,741	105,711	236,994	363,667	551,369	474,882	433,228	165,523
1900.....	+94,924	+26,482	+98,543	+81,889	+104,584	-37,830	+143,551	+69,036	+288,433	+106,597
Republican.....	597,985	336,063	307,808	238,866	316,269	314,092	822,013	543,918	712,665	265,760
Democratic.....	503,061	309,581	209,265	156,977	211,685	351,922	678,462	474,882	424,232	159,163

* These figures were obtained from the *Fact Book's* compilation.

EXPLANATION OF TABLE VII

The data for this table were obtained from the *Fact Book's* compilation: The italic figures above the Republican and Democratic votes represent: + the Republican plurality, and - the Democratic plurality.

TABLE VIII
POSITION OF EACH STATE AT EACH ELECTION YEAR WITH REFERENCE TO PERCENTAGE VOTING

State	Percentage Variation	1872	1876	1880	1884	1888	1892	1896	1900	1904	1908	δ^*
1. Alabama.....	59.5	2	21	30	29	31	21	35	37	39	42	40
2. Arkansas.....	31.2	22	30	29	28	25	36	30	36	35	36	14
3. California.....	24.3	36	35	34	32	30	31	28	31	23	22	14
4. Colorado.....	31	31	28	35
5. Connecticut.....	29.4	21	22	19	20	22	19	24	2	21	25	23
6. Delaware.....	11.0	8	20	14	7	21	5	15	13	4	6	17
7. Florida.....	63.8	5	5	3	10	18	42	39	39	38	39	39
8. Georgia.....	26.9	30	31	35	37	37	38	40	40	40	40	10
9. Idaho.....	39	27
10. Illinois.....	27.8	12	19	12	17	20	6	1	10	11	10	19
11. Indiana.....	7.9	1	2	1	1	2	1	3	1	2	2	2
12. Iowa.....	23.9	19	11	13	6	7	4	5	7	7	9	15
13. Kansas.....	29.4	9	32	16	4	3	3	9	5	15	8	29
14. Kentucky.....	24.8	24	14	21	22	12	17	6	4	5	4	20
15. Louisiana.....	57.9	13	24	37	34	34	41	41	41	43	43	30
16. Maine.....	33.8	32	29	15	23	26	30	32	34	33	35	20
17. Maryland.....	16.3	15	15	18	14	10	18	8	8	13	13	10
18. Massachusetts.....	9.0	33	34	32	30	33	33	37	33	26	30	11
19. Michigan.....	18.7	25	13	17	11	9	15	13	15	16	20	16
20. Minnesota.....	29.0	17	26	23	24	14	22	10	22	25	26	16
21. Mississippi.....	67.0	6	9	36	33	36	44	43	42	42	44	38
22. Missouri.....	16.4	23	25	20	19	15	13	16	12	10	7	18
23. Montana.....	27	20	23	24	27	..
24. Nebraska.....	35.6	34	33	26	25	19	23	18	11	20	15	23
25. Nevada.....	45.4	4	3	33	35	32	29	33	27	31	21	39
26. New Hampshire.....	16.3	7	12	5	12	16	14	25	16	14	16	20
27. New Jersey.....	17.1	16	10	6	15	17	11	17	17	12	19	13
28. New York.....	18.8	14	16	10	13	13	9	22	18	18	23	14
29. North Carolina.....	23.9	10	4	7	5	4	8	12	19	32	28	28
30. North Dakota.....	34	31	24	22	14	..


* Median δ at 18½; $Q_1=29$ (upper), $Q_3=14$ (lower).

31. Ohio.....	12.3	3	6	2	2	5	7	4	3	6	3	5
32. Oklahoma.....	17	..
33. Oregon.....	29.7	31	27	24	26	29	25	20	26	34	29	14
34. Pennsylvania.....	20.7	26	17	9	18	23	24	19	21	19	24	17
35. Rhode Island.....	19.0	37	37	38	38	35	40	38	35	28	32	12
36. South Carolina.....	77.3	28	1	4	36	38	43	42	38	41	41	42
37. South Dakota.....	20	14	6	8	11	..
38. Tennessee.....	31.0	20	23	22	21	11	26	21	29	29	31	20
39. Texas.....	54.1	35	30	27	16	24	16	11	30	36	37	26
40. Utah.....
41. Vermont.....	23.0	29	28	25	27	27	37	30	28	30	34	12
42. Virginia.....	55.9	18	18	28	9	6	12	23	25	37	38	32
43. Washington.....	32	34	32	27	33	..
44. West Virginia.....	35.6	27	7	8	3	1	2	2	9	3	5	26
45. Wisconsin.....	14.0	11	8	11	8	8	10	7	14	9	12	7
46. Wyoming.....	28	26	20	17	18	..

voters voting for 1876 and 1896 with preceding and succeeding election years.

The second consideration must be studied in the light of the data presented in Table VII. A study of the Republican pluralities (+) for the ten most populous states for the year 1876 shows that in seven states out of ten the plurality for 1876 was less than for 1872 or 1880 and the Democratic plurality of Indiana was less than the Republican plurality for Indiana in 1872 or 1880. For 1896, as compared with preceding or succeeding election years no such relation holds. Republican pluralities decrease and increase, and Democratic pluralities become Republican pluralities. But it is this very change in the size and allegiance of pluralities that is indicative of a shifting margin of intelligent voters. The increasing variability is in large measure due to this shift, because a study of the size of the pluralities of 1896 shows greater divergence between them than between the pluralities of 1892 or 1900, and a much greater divergence than between the pluralities of 1872, 1876, 1880, or 1888.

From the analysis of these considerations it can be concluded that the increasing variability of popular vote at presidential elections is real evidence of an increasing independence in voting. Intelligent political action seems to be on the increase in approximately the ratio shown by the increasing variabilities of the popular vote at presidential elections. The other aspect of this change is the evidence it presents that the rigidity of our political traditions is decreasing. The increasing variability of the popular vote in so far as it is evidence of increasing independence of political action shows a growing impatience with the restraints of political tradition. The marginal shift is excellent proof of this. The negative aspect of the increasing elasticity of our political traditions is shown by the increasing number of political parties since 1856.



Map of Chicago showing districts in which large numbers of colored people live; the four colored districts are numbered and indicated by single lines, the neighboring districts of segregated vice on the lower south and west sides are not numbered and are indicated by heavy double cross lines.

CHICAGO HOUSING CONDITIONS, VI: THE PROBLEM OF THE NEGRO¹

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Although the colored population of Chicago is a little less than 2 per cent of the entire population, the problems connected with it are far reaching. The Negro's economic and social limitations have brought peculiarities of living conditions in the colored sections of the city which are the concern of the white sections as well as of the colored. For this reason it was believed that an intensive study of the housing conditions in the two largest colored districts would throw light, not only upon the general conditions under which the Negro lives, but upon the larger housing problem of Chicago.

There are in Chicago four relatively well-defined districts in which a large proportion of colored people have resided for a number of years. The largest of these is the section on the South Side known as the "black belt." This section lies mainly in the Second, Third, and Thirtieth wards, the three wards which have the highest percentages of colored inhabitants.² This section has gradually extended southward from the business district, with State Street as its main thoroughfare. It now lies on both sides of State Street, from Sixteenth Street almost as far south as Fifty-fifth Street, with a center at the corner of State and Thirty-first streets, near which many of the colored professional and business men have their

¹ This article is one of a series dealing with housing conditions in Chicago which has been published in this journal by the directors and students of the Department of Social Investigation of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy. Other articles in the series will be found in issues of September and November, 1910, January, July, and September, 1911.

As in the case of the articles previously published, the material was obtained by the students of the department in a house-to-house canvass of the selected districts. The work of tabulation was done by Grace P. Norton, assistant in the department.

² According to the School Census of 1910, the colored population comprises 92 per cent of the total minor population of the Second Ward, and 80 per cent of the total minor population of the Third Ward. The Thirtieth Ward is third with 53 per cent.

offices. The older and poorer dwellings are as a rule found grouped in the section west of State Street, following the two lines of railroad tracks. Many of the colored people who desire a better neighborhood have moved east of State Street; Wabash Avenue is for two or three miles largely occupied by Negroes; and Indiana, Prairie, and Forest avenues, and a few streets even nearer the lake, also have colored colonies, mostly of recent growth. The members of the colored groups have shown a tendency to follow main lines of traffic and to keep close to the railroads, due probably to the character of their occupations; for the Negro's work is seldom connected with an industry peculiar to a certain community, as is so often the case with the immigrant, but is most often on the railroads or in the downtown business section.

The second largest district, that on the West Side, has followed the main lines of traffic running west from the business section. It lies in the Fourteenth Ward, which has 32 per cent of its population colored. The district may be said to be bounded by Lake Street, Ashland, Austin, and Western avenues. Parts of this tract are occupied by factories employing other nationalities; consequently the neighborhood has not the conspicuous characteristics of the South Side "black belt"; the small shops are not so generally in the hands of the Negroes; and even the groups on the street corners show the cosmopolitan character of the neighborhood.

The two smaller districts are both in the southern part of the city, although distinctly separate from the largest district, which is usually called the South Side district. In Englewood, southwest of the largest section is a small residence district from Sixty-first Street to Sixty-fifth Street, between Center and Ashland avenues. It is not yet thickly settled, and has almost no business establishments. The fourth and smallest district is in Hyde Park, close to the Illinois Central tracks, and not far from the lake shore. This district extends from Fifty-third Street to Fifty-seventh Street along Lake Avenue, which at this point is lined with small shops and cheap amusement places.

In order to obtain detailed information with regard to housing conditions in a small area in the two largest districts, a house-to-house canvass was made in four blocks in the South Side "black

belt" and in three on the West Side. The blocks on the South Side chosen for investigation were the three bounded by Dearborn Street, Twenty-seventh Street, Armour Avenue, and Thirty-second Street. These blocks are in the poorer section, close to the tracks; they are farther south than the district of segregated vice, but it is hardly possible that the residents of these blocks can escape its influences.¹

The blocks chosen on the West Side were the three bounded by Fulton and Paulina streets, Carroll Avenue, and Robey Street. These lie in a neighborhood which has a large number of old houses whose owners and agents, awaiting the inroads of the manufacturing district, have declined to make extensive repairs, and white and colored alike have been making use of houses ill-suited either for lodging-houses or for small flats. Here also an effort was made to choose blocks as indicative as possible of the situation over a large area. The families in these blocks are probably more nearly normal than those in the South Side blocks, for the influence of the district of segregated vice has been less distinctly felt.

For the colored families who are able to move out of such districts as these, the situation is difficult enough. If a man wishes better influences for his growing children than the South State Street saloon or cheap amusement place provides, he can sometimes get an apartment in a better neighborhood, or sometimes even buy property, secretly, or through a friendly white man. Then, though he may have to live with almost no fellowship of his own kind for years, he will have improved his children's surroundings. But for the colored families who cannot afford to move away from such districts as these, the situation is far more difficult; even the fundamental matter of health must be disregarded in the problem of making both ends meet; tenants have neither the money nor

¹ The report of the vice commission of Chicago emphasizes this fact: "The history of the social evil in Chicago is intimately connected with the colored population. Invariably the larger vice districts have been created within or near the settlements of colored people. In the past history of the city, nearly every time a new vice district was created down town or on the South Side, the colored families were in the district, moving in just ahead of the prostitutes. The situation along State Street from Sixteenth Street south is an illustration." "Any effort to improve conditions in Chicago should provide more wholesome surroundings for the families of its colored citizens who now live in communities of colored people." See "The Social Evil in Chicago," pp. 38, 39.

the influence to bring about necessary changes and improvements; they must take these old, dingy, frequently broken-down houses and endure the consequences with small hope of being able to better their condition. It is for these families, in the poorer neighborhoods, that the question of housing conditions is of foremost importance.

The two districts chosen were known to differ in the character of the population, a difference which shows at once in Table I.

TABLE I
NATIONALITIES OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS

NATIONALITY	NUMBER OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN	
	South Side	West Side
American, white.....	6	67
American, colored.....	408	81
Irish.....	..	17
Other English-speaking.....	5	18
German.....	5	26
Foreign, miscellaneous.....	10	19
No report.....	2	7
Total.....	436	235

In the South Side blocks which have a nearly homogeneous population, 94 per cent of the heads of families are colored; while on the West Side only a little over one-third are colored, and the remaining two-thirds represent sixteen different countries and nationalities. The South Side Negro lives in a Negro community, while the West Side Negro may live next to an Irishman or a German and sometimes in the same house with him. Here the white man can get advantages or improvements for his house which the Negro cannot obtain; while on the South Side, the almost solid Negro blocks have equal advantages, or equal lack of them. This difference between the two sections in the composition of the population goes far to explain some of the differences in the minor characteristics of the two neighborhoods, and the fact that several of the peculiarities of the first neighborhood are less marked in the second.

In the South Side district for example, the number of children is remarkably small. There are less than one-half as many children as lodgers. The lodgers constitute in fact 31 per cent of the total block population.

TABLE II
COMPOSITION OF BLOCK POPULATION

DISTRICT	NUMBER IN FAMILIES		LODGERS	TOTAL
	Adults	Children		
South Side.....	1,031	202	542	1,775
West Side.....	589	187	122	898
Total.....	1,620	389	664	2,673

The West Side district shows the characteristics of a more nearly normal group, namely, a smaller proportion of lodgers, and a larger proportion of children. In the district which was investigated in South Chicago,¹ which showed a population mainly Polish, children formed nearly a third of the population. Here, on the South Side, they form only a little more than a tenth, and on the West Side a little more than a fifth. The explanation is far from simple. The economic and social pressure of modern life may have forced down the birth-rate among the Negroes as it has among the native-born whites; or it may be that a high death-rate, due in part to the conditions under which the colored people are forced to live, accounts for the small number of children in the families.

The high percentage of lodgers, 31 per cent on the South Side and 14 per cent on the West Side, is significant when compared with such districts as the Bohemian and the Polish, where only 5 and 4 per cent of the population were lodgers. Only in two other districts investigated, those near the Stockyards and in South Chicago, where in each case more than a fourth of the group were lodgers, were such high percentages of lodgers found.

The houses in the colored blocks are often low, one or two-story

¹ See *American Journal of Sociology*, XVII, No. 1, p. 150.

buildings. On the whole there is a considerable amount of vacant space in the lots. One-half of the lots in both districts had less than 50 per cent of their space covered.¹ Instead of the small irregular paved courts, such as one sees in the Polish section on the Northwest Side, these houses often have fairly large back yards, sometimes with grass and shrubs growing in them. The yards are almost always dirty and disfigured by rubbish, but at least they afford more air space than if they were crowded with buildings. In all of the foreign districts except South Chicago, which is, of course, of comparatively recent growth, the buildings are crowded more thickly upon the lots; here the property-owners are not making improvements, or utilizing the land space either by extending old buildings or by building new ones.

The colored people in these districts do not to any great extent live in large tenement houses. The houses are small, and some of them, with their boarded-up porches and shaky board walks, resemble the Negroes' cottages in small villages. Here, too, the windows are sometimes filled with plants, and sometimes a straggling vine has been trained over a porch, but the Negro's taste for beauty can usually find little with which to gratify itself in these dingy sections.

The houses are usually frame, and as a rule have only two stories. Some of them were intended for two-family houses, but others were plainly built for single dwellings, and have been converted into two-flat houses regardless of the fact that they are not fitted for

¹ The following table shows the percentage of lot covered in both districts:

PERCENTAGE OF LOT COVERED	DISTRICT			
	South Side		West Side	
	Number of Lots	Percentage	Number of Lots	Percentage
Less than 50.....	106	57	58	53
50 and less than 60.....	22	12	13	12
60 and less than 70.....	21	11	13	12
70 or more.....	35	20	25	23
Total.....	184	100	109*	100

* The percentage of lot covered was not obtained for ten premises.

two families.¹ A large number of them are "front" houses, that is, open directly upon the street. Out of the 209 buildings on the South Side, only 4 were on the middle of the lot and 21 at the rear and out of 131 on the West Side, 3 were on the middle of the lot and 14 at the rear. The few alley houses have probably been moved back from the street when new houses were built in their places. The rooms in such houses are usually poorly lighted and ventilated; the houses are much more dilapidated than the front houses; sanitary provisions are often inadequate; and the alley and ground

TABLE III
STATE OF REPAIR OF HOUSES INVESTIGATED

State of Repair	South Side Number	West Side Number
Good.....	55	44
Fair.....	102	39
Bad.....	52	41
Total.....	209	124
No report.....	..	7

around the house are usually disfigured with rubbish and refuse. The mere passer-by in the colored districts is impressed with the dilapidation of the buildings. Outside stairways and porches seem to be almost falling apart. The house-to-house canvass showed the houses to be conspicuously out of repair in other respects also. The following table shows that on the South Side 52 houses or 25 per cent of the whole were in bad repair, and on the West Side 41 houses or 31 per cent of the total number, were in bad repair.

¹ The following table shows the number of houses occupied by one or more families:

Number of Houses with	South Side	West Side
One apartment.....	37	44
Two apartments.....	111	50
Three apartments.....	33	18
Four apartments.....	7	6
Five or more apartments.....	11	4
No apartments*.....	10	9
Total.....	209	131

* That is, houses not used as dwellings.

Inside and out they compare unfavorably with those in the other districts. The percentage of houses reported in "good repair" was 71 per cent in the Polish district, 57 in the Bohemian, and 54 in the Stockyards, while in both the Jewish and the South Chicago districts it was only 28 per cent. The South Side colored district (the more nearly homogeneous district, it will be remembered) falls even below the percentages of the two last-named districts, with only 26 per cent of the buildings in good repair. On the West Side, while 44, or 35 per cent, were said to be in good repair, 31 per cent were absolutely dilapidated—a state of disrepair greater than in any district investigated except the Jewish section. Broken-down doors, unsteady flooring, and general dilapidation were met by the investigators at every side. Window panes were out, doors hanging on single hinges or entirely fallen off, and roofs rotting and leaking. Colored tenants reported that they found it impossible to persuade their landlords either to make the necessary repairs or to release them from their contracts; and that it was so hard to find better places in which to live that they were forced either to make the repairs themselves, which they could rarely afford to do, or to endure the conditions as best they might. Several tenants ascribed cases of severe and prolonged illness to the unhealthful condition of the houses in which they were living.

The sanitary provisions in these districts are in many cases inadequate. Since most of the houses are one- and two-family houses, it might be expected that a large proportion would have private toilet facilities. Table IV shows that one-third of the families in each district, however, do not have closets within the apartment, and use yard, basement, and hall closets, which though illegal for new-law tenement houses, are still allowed in old-law houses and in one-family houses.¹ Since only 5 "new-law" houses, that is, houses built since 1902, were found on the South Side, and only one on the West Side, the hall, yard, and basement closets found by the investigators are not illegal. They are, however, no more conducive to the good health or morals of the tenants when found in old houses than in new; and most of them are of the antiquated "long hopper" variety which is now outlawed. Moreover, although the privy vault has been outlawed since 1894, there

¹ Tolman, *Municipal Code*, sec. 434.

were found in the West Side blocks six privy vaults, three unused, and three used by five families.

TABLE IV
NUMBER OF APARTMENTS WITH SPECIFIED TOILET ARRANGEMENTS

Provision	South Side Number	West Side Number
Privy vault.....	...	5
Yard closet.....	118	48
Basement or cellar closet.....	13	10
Hall closet.....	34	11
Private (within the apartment)....	282	151
No report or vacant.....	11	29
Total.....	458	254

The colored families do not as a rule live in the small and cramped apartments in which other nationalities are so often found. Even the families who apply to the United Charities for relief are frequently living in apartments which would be considered adequate, as far as the number of rooms is concerned, for families in comfortable circumstances. Of course the opposite extreme is sometimes met with; several colored families live in one-room apartments; and sometimes houses are so crowded with lodgers that members of the family are reduced to such schemes as that of one South Side housewife who, having rented all her rooms, puts her ironing-board across the bath-tub at night and sleeps on it. The following table shows that the majority of the families in these blocks have five- or six-room apartments.

TABLE V
NUMBER OF APARTMENTS HAVING SPECIFIED NUMBER OF ROOMS

Number of Rooms	Number	Percentage
One room.....	5	*
Two rooms.....	13	2
Three rooms.....	41	6
Four rooms.....	143	20
Five rooms.....	205	29
Six rooms.....	204	29
Seven rooms or more.....	91	13
No report.....	10	1
Total.....	712	100

* Less than 1 per cent.

In four other districts investigated the majority of the families live in four rooms, while in the Jewish neighborhood the ordinary family lives in three rooms. Many colored families lease these large apartments in the hope of filling them with lodgers; others, seeking smaller and less expensive apartments, find that they apparently do not exist; for many of the houses have been built for use as single houses and are not easily cut up into more than two apartments. Cellar and basement apartments are seldom utilized. No cellar apartments were found in either district, and only fourteen basement apartments on the South Side and seven on the West Side.

One of the most important provisions of the tenement code is that which relates to overcrowding. According to the present ordinance any room in a tenement is illegally crowded if it does not contain 400 cubic feet of air space for each adult "living or sleeping" in it, and 200 cubic feet of air for each child under twelve.¹ This regulation applies to old-law and new-law houses alike.

Table VI shows that 29 per cent of the rooms used for sleeping were overcrowded; that is, that the law specifying the minimum of air space was violated in nearly a third of the sleeping-rooms. The numbers above the black lines in this table indicate cases in which the law was found to be violated. Such cases are those on the South Side, where three adults and one child were sleeping in one room, with less than the minimum for two adults, or that on the West Side where four grown persons and one child were sleeping in a room not large enough for two persons. They mean, in actual life, a lack of privacy which can hardly fail to be demoralizing, especially for the children.

Some of this crowding would be unnecessary if the colored people were willing to follow the customs of other nationalities and use all of the rooms in their apartments as sleeping-rooms. In only six apartments on the South Side and two on the West Side were all the rooms used at night. This means that unlike the immigrant, even the poor colored people like to keep a kitchen and "parlor," and occasionally a dining-room, distinctly as such and not crowded with beds.

When overcrowding takes place in an inadequately ventilated

¹ Tolman, *Municipal Code*, sec. 420.

sleeping-room, the level of health must eventually be depressed. A room without a window, or with a window opening only into another

TABLE VI
NUMBER OF PERSONS SLEEPING IN ROOMS OF SPECIFIED CUBIC CONTENTS
SOUTH AND WEST SIDES

CONTENTS OF ROOM IN CUBIC FEET	NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED BY									TOTAL
	One Child	One Adult*	One Adult and One Child	Two Adults	Two Adults and One Child	Three Adults	Three Adults and One Child	Four Adults and One Child	Five Adults	
Less than 400.....	...	9	4	8	21
400 and less than 600.....	8	231	27	155	21	6	448
600 and less than 800.....	12	233	35	191	17	9	2	1	...	500
800 and less than 1,000.....	4	106	6	91	12	4	3	226
1,000 and less than 1,200.....	3	41	5	50	4	1	104
1,200 and less than 1,400.....	7	50	4	38	5	5	1	...	1	111
1,400 and less than 1600.....	5	48	7	27	...	4	91
1,600 and less than 18,00.....	2	37	4	17	2	3	65
1,800 and less than 2,000.....	2	18	2	20	2	1	45
2,000 or more.....	1	20	4	15	1	1	42
Total.....	44	793	98	612	64	34	6	1	1	1,653

* To avoid confusion, one adult is used also when two children were occupying the room, since, according to the law, two children require the same cubic air space as one adult.

room, or upon an outer wall without space for fresh air to enter, cannot be a proper place for sleeping. Fifty-one of such rooms were found on the South Side and seventeen on the West Side.¹ The

* NUMBER OF PERSONS SLEEPING IN ROOMS WHICH CANNOT BE VENTILATED
A. SOUTH SIDE (4 BLOCKS)

NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS	NUMBER OF ROOMS HAVING			TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS
	No Window	Interior Window Only	Outer Window Inadequate	
Unoccupied.....	11	6	9	..
1 person.....	1	..	8	9
2 persons.....	3	6	3	24
3 persons.....	..	1	1	6
4 persons.....	1	4
5 persons.....	1	5
Total number of persons.....	48
Total number of rooms.....	16	13	22	51

[Footnote 1 continued on p. 252

ordinance providing that every habitable room shall have its window area equal to one-tenth of its floor area, and all windows opening directly to the outer air¹ applies only to new-law tenements, but the necessity of good air and light, like that of adequate sanitary provisions, is as important for a family living in a house built in 1900 as for one living in a house built in 1903. Rooms without windows, of which sixteen were found in the first district and five in the second, are illegal in both classes of tenements and in private houses.

A large number of rooms were found to be inadequately lighted. "Dark" and "gloomy" are at best only relative terms, but an attempt was made to standardize them as far as possible; the investigators recorded a room as "dark" when it was possible to read only when standing close to the window, and "gloomy" when one could read only a few feet away from the window.

TABLE VII
DARK AND GLOOMY ROOMS

CONDITION OF ROOMS	SOUTH SIDE (4 BLOCKS)		WEST SIDE (3 BLOCKS)	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Light.....	1,621	68	1,006	78
Dark or gloomy.....	769	32	278	22
Total.....	2,390	100	1,284	100

Table VII shows that 32 per cent of the rooms in the first district were inadequately lighted, and 22 per cent of those in the second.

Footnote 1, continued from p. 251]

B. WEST SIDE (3 BLOCKS)

NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS	NUMBER OF ROOMS HAVING			TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS
	No Window	Interior Window Only	Outer Window Inadequate	
Unoccupied.....	3	2	3	
1 person.....	1	2	1	4
2 persons.....	1	2	1	8
3 persons.....		1		3
Total number of persons.....				15
Total number of rooms.....	5	7	5	17

¹ Tolman, *Municipal Code*, secs. 285, 413.

The large number of dark rooms is due here as in most other sections to the shape of the lots; they are very long and narrow, and are often called "shoestring" lots. The houses, though open at the front and back, have almost no space at the sides. Table VIII shows that nearly all of the poorly lighted rooms open upon a passage, which is almost always that between the house and the one next it, facing the street. With a lot of this shape, all the light must come from the front or rear, and often the rear is so close to the rear of another house that the light is poor even there.

TABLE VIII
OUTLOOK OF WINDOWS IN DARK AND GLOOMY ROOMS

OUTLOOK	SOUTH SIDE (4 BLOCKS)		WEST SIDE (3 BLOCKS)	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Room or hall.....	13	2	7	3
Alley, yard, street, or roof..	57	7	18	6
Porch, court, or stairway...	17	2	19	7
Shaft or wall.....	36	5	32	11
Passage.....	628	82	197	71
No window.....	16	2	5	2
Total.....	767*	100	278	100

* The outlook for two dark rooms was not reported.

Probably the most significant problem in the matter of the housing of the colored people is the question of rent. This investigation confirms the general impression that the rent paid by Negroes is appreciably higher than that paid by people of any other nationality. Instances are given of the actual doubling of rents when a building is given over to colored tenants. The general range of rents in these districts should be significant, for each district is probably typical in this respect of an extended area and a large number of people. Table IX shows the rents for each of the districts in detail, indicating the extremely high rents paid in a few cases for apartments in these dingy and poorly kept neighborhoods.

Since the apartment most frequently found in these two sections contains two or three more rooms than the ordinary apartment in five other districts investigated, it was found, as is to be expected, that the rents in these two districts ranged higher. Moreover, it was found that the rents for even the four-room apartments were

conspicuously higher than the rents for the four-room apartments in the other districts. The relative range of the rents may be seen in Table X which presents the median rents, that is, the points halfway up the scale of rents when they are arranged in an ascending series, for four-room apartments in the seven districts. The rents in the South Side district are conspicuously the highest. Those on the West Side are nearly the same as the Jewish, but have a wider range. While half of the people in the Bohemian, Polish, and Stockyards districts were paying not more than \$8.50 a month for their four-room apartments, half the tenants on the South Side were paying at least \$12 for apartments of the same size; moreover, as we have previously seen, the houses in which the colored people live are in poorer repair. That is, a larger proportion

TABLE IX

NUMBER OF APARTMENTS FOR WHICH SPECIFIED MONTHLY RENTALS ARE PAID,
TOGETHER WITH NUMBER OF ROOMS

A. SOUTH SIDE (4 BLOCKS)

RENT PER MONTH	NUMBER OF ROOMS							TOTAL
	3 or Less	4	5	6	7	8 or More	No Report	
\$ 6.00.....	2	1	2	5
7.00.....	3	2	5
8.00.....	7	7	1	1	16
9.00.....	1	2	2	1	6
10.00.....	7	16	6	5	34
11.00.....	2	3	1	..	1	7
12.00.....	..	14	14	3	..	2	..	33
12.50.....	..	3	1	4
13.00.....	..	9	9	18
14.00.....	..	5	12	9	26
15.00.....	2	9	15	15	41
16.00.....	..	5	29	26	3	63
17.00.....	..	1	3	6	2	1	..	13
18.00.....	14	15	..	1	..	30
18.50.....	1	1
19.00.....	1	1	2	1	..	5
20.00-24.00.....	13	41	11	3	..	68
25.00 or more.....	9	4	9	..	22
Vacant or rent unknown.....	10	7	15	7	1	1	3	44
Number of apartments rented.....	34	84	138	139	25	18	3	441
Number of apartments owned.....	..	1	5	4	3	4	..	17
Total.....	34	85	143	143	28	22	3	458

B. WEST SIDE (3 BLOCKS)

RENT PER MONTH	NUMBER OF ROOMS							TOTAL
	3 or Less	4	5	6	7	8 or More	No Report	
\$ 3.00.....	I	I
4.00.....	I	I
5.00.....	2	I	3
6.00.....	I	I
7.00.....	3	5	8
7.50.....	I	I	..	I	3
8.00.....	3	10	4	2	19
8.50.....	I	I
9.00.....	3	5	3	11
10.00.....	4	8	7	5	24
11.00.....	..	2	4	2	8
12.00.....	..	11	14	6	31
12.50.....	2	2
13.00.....	..	4	I	3	I	9
14.00.....	5	6	I	12
15.00.....	..	2	8	11	3	I	..	25
15.50.....	I	I
16.00.....	4	3	3	I	..	11
17.00.....	I	I	2
18.00.....	..	I	..	7	4	4	..	16
20.00 or more.....	3	2	..	5
Vacant or rent unknown.....	6	7	4	7	5	3	7	39
Number of apartments rented.....	25	57	57	54	22	11	7	233
Number of apartments owned.....	..	I	5	7	3	5	..	21
Total.....	25	58	62	61	25	16	7	254

of the colored man's wages goes for rent, with disproportionately small return to him; the immigrant, for a smaller amount of money, may live in a better house than the Negro. The explanation for this condition of affairs among the colored people is comparatively simple; the results are far-reaching. The strong prejudice among the

TABLE X
MEDIAN RENTALS FOR FOUR-ROOM APARTMENTS
FOR SEVEN DISTRICTS

District	Median
Jewish.....	\$10.00-10.50
Bohemian.....	8.00- 8.50
Polish.....	8.00- 8.50
Stockyards.....	8.00- 8.50
South Chicago.....	9.00- 9.50
Colored (South Side).....	12.00-12.50
Colored (West Side).....	10.00-10.50

white people against having colored people living on white residence streets, colored children attending schools with white children, or entering into other semi-social relations with them, confines the opportunities for residence open to colored people of all positions in life to relatively small and well-defined areas. Consequently the demand for houses and apartments within these areas is strong and comparatively steady, and since the landlord is reasonably certain that the house or apartment can be filled at any time, as long as it is in any way tenantable, he takes advantage of his opportunities to raise rents and to postpone repairs. The districts are still further limited in area by the fact that the Negro's place of work, if it lies within the city at all, is usually the big building in the business district, where he serves as porter, waiter, or servant, and accordingly the downtown district must be easily accessible for him.

Colored families not only find it difficult to obtain a flat of three or four rooms, but are unwilling to live in so cramped a fashion. They express as great disapproval of a way of living which they term "foreign" as they do of the haphazard meals and poor clothes with which the immigrant contents himself for a season in order that he may the more quickly make his way in the new land. Accordingly the colored family accepts the larger flat with several rooms, hoping that some turn of fortune will provide the rent. Sometimes, however, the colored family in the large flat is in fact living in as crowded quarters as the immigrant, while paying for more rooms. One family on the West Side is paying for seven rooms, while using only four, because the other rooms are too damp to be used; but the rooms are comfortably furnished, and the mere presence of the unused rooms seems to be a factor in keeping up the status of the family.

The great resource in meeting rent is not in small economy, but in taking lodgers. As has been shown, lodgers form nearly a third of the population on the South Side, and on the West Side a seventh. Not only do the lodgers cause crowding in the sleeping-rooms, but they are the occasion of a more enduring evil. The pressing necessity of taking lodgers often means that the householders cannot choose the lodgers who are to be admitted. Failure to take in a lodger

may mean failure to meet the next rent-day, and possible ejection. Consequently if a lodger demands to be "allowed privileges"—to be allowed to take a "lady" to his room and have no questions asked—the needy householder has small choice. In this way a questionable element is admitted into the house, and it becomes impossible to maintain standards of family life safe either for the boys or for the girls in the family.

The Negro does not seek to escape the problem of rent by becoming a property-holder. On the South Side only 4 per cent of the apartments were occupied by owners of the houses, and on the West Side 8 per cent. This proportion is lower than that in any of the five other districts investigated. In the South Chicago and Stockyards districts, where the highest percentage of ownership was found, 18 per cent of the families owned their houses. The Negro of this class cannot save the money necessary for property holding, nor does he desire so strongly to be tied to the soil as do other races. He moves frequently from house to house, in fruitless effort to find a house which is in better repair than the one in which he has been living.

The results of this study, then, indicate that the colored tenant pays disproportionately high rent for his apartment, which he is liable to find in poorer repair than his immigrant neighbor. But it does not follow that this fact is entirely due to the simple raising of rents in certain districts. The Negro, with a weekly wage no larger, and usually smaller, than that of his immigrant neighbor, endeavors to maintain a standard of living more similar to that of the native-born white citizen than does the immigrant. He does not consent to so large a degree of crowding for the purpose of increasing the ratio of income to rent, and he demands a place of residence which shall be easily and quickly reached from his place of employment.

SOUTHERN SOCIOLOGICAL CONGRESS

Upon the request of Miss Kate Barnard, commissioner of charities and correction, of Oklahoma, Governor Ben W. Hooper of Tennessee issued in February last to the governors of fifteen other southern states and to various public and private civic and social organizations a call for a Southern Sociological Congress to be held at Nashville on May 7-10, to study and discuss social and civic problems of the South. On the date set more than seven hundred delegates and many visitors met, carried out a pre-arranged program, and effected permanent organization. The following general subjects were discussed by more than fifty speakers: child welfare, courts and prisons, public health, Negro problems, enemies of the home, education and co-operation, the church and social service, the call and qualifications of the social worker.

As might be expected by those who know the needs of the South, the program was thoroughly practical in character. The general purpose of the Congress is "to study and improve social, civic, and economic conditions in the South." The Congress declared for the following principles:

The abolition of the convict lease and contract systems, and the adoption of modern principles of prison reform.

The extension and improvement of juvenile courts and juvenile reformatories.

The proper care and treatment of defectives, the blind, the deaf, the insane, the epileptic, and the feeble-minded.

The recognition of the relation of alcoholism to disease, to crime, to pauperism, and to vice, and the adoption of appropriate preventive measures.

The adoption of uniform laws of the highest standards concerning marriage and divorce.

The adoption of the uniform law on vital statistics.

The abolition of child labor by the enactment of the uniform child labor law.

The enactment of school attendance laws, that the reproach of the greatest degree of illiteracy may be removed from our section.

The suppression of prostitution.

The solving of the race question in a spirit of helpfulness to the Negro, and of equal justice to both races.

The closest co-operation between the church and all social agencies for the securing of these results.

Officers of the permanent organization were elected as follows: president, Governor Ben W. Hooper; vice-presidents, A. J. McKelway and Miss Kate Barnard; general secretary, J. E. McCulloch, Nashville. Additional members of the Executive Committee are Mrs. W. L. Murdock, Alabama; Professor C. H. Brough, Arkansas; Dr. Wickliffe Rose, District of Columbia; Professor L. L. Bernard, Florida; Mr. W. Woods White, Georgia; Mr. Bernard Flexner, Kentucky; Miss Agnes Morris, Louisiana; Mr. H. Wirt Steele, Maryland; Mr. A. T. Stovall, Mississippi; Professor C. A. Ellwood, Missouri; Mr. Clarence Poe, North Carolina; Mr. H. Huson, Oklahoma; Judge J. A. McCullough, South Carolina; Mr. W. R. Cole, Tennessee; Professor C. S. Potts, Texas; Dr. J. T. Mastin, Virginia; and Governor W. E. Glasscock, West Virginia. Mrs. W. E. Cole, a wealthy southern woman of civic spirit, has made the Congress a substantial gift and has been named Founder by the Executive Committee.

The Congress will meet yearly in some southern city. Membership is open to anyone interested in the purpose of the Congress. The fee for the active member, which entitles the subscriber to all publications including the annual reports and to all privileges, is two dollars yearly. The organization maintains a permanent secretariat and expects to operate a general clearing-house of information for social workers and students and legislators.

L. L. BERNARD

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

REVIEWS

Sociological Study of the Bible. By LOUIS WALLIS. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. Pp. xxxv+308. \$1.50 net, postpaid, \$1.68.

This book is not a detailed presentation of Semitic, and particularly of Hebrew, culture along the lines marked out by Wellhausen, Robertson Smith, and Barton in their well-known works. One must seek elsewhere for an exposition of the religion of Israel on its external side, or for an account of the methods and results of the higher criticism. The author is interested in the evolution of ideas rather than of social institutions. He here attempts the difficult task of explaining in sociological terms the process by which the religion of the Bible came into being. His main contribution to this subject will be found in Part III dealing with the "Development of Bible Religion." It is unfortunate that Mr. Wallis did not devote all his space to the elucidation of this theme. One could easily spare the extended "Prefatory" which tells us nothing not set forth in the body of the book, the unnecessary "Forewords," and the very sketchy chapters which discuss Christianity and the social problem.

Mr. Wallis has developed a novel thesis in an ingenious and original manner. The problem is to explain how the religious experience of Israel arose from lower to higher things, how the Yahweh idea worked itself out in the consciousness of the Hebrew people. Most modern writers have been content to refer to the prophets as the chief agency in the reconstruction of biblical religion. Mr. Wallis argues that this view is inadequate, since it ignores the peculiar circumstances, both social and religious, under which Hebrew nationality developed. The Hebrew people came into existence in the land of Canaan as a result of a lengthy process of fusion between migratory, clannish Israelites and settled, civilized Canaanites, or "Amorites," as our author prefers to call them. A great and long-continued opposition arose between the standpoints of these two divisions of the Hebrew people. It was symbolized as a struggle between the national god Yahweh and the various local gods or Baals of the Amorite communities. Yahweh was identified with warfare against these "other gods." He was further interpreted by the greater prophets as the patron of that *mishpat*, or customary

morality, which belongs to primitive clan groups. The contest between these opposing religions and social ideals continued throughout Hebrew history until the period of the exile. The destruction of Hebrew nationality by the captivity came to be regarded as a vindication of the prophetic teachings; it enlarged the spiritual outlook of the Hebrews, and prepared the way for the conception of a redeeming God, the Savior of mankind.

Whether or not Mr. Wallis be held to have proved his thesis, he certainly deserves much credit for an insistence on sociological factors in the making of Hebrew religion. His work will doubtless form a starting-point for future investigation in this field. To the reviewer it seems that the author has not sufficiently reckoned with all the aspects of what is, confessedly, an intricate situation. For instance, he treats Hebrew religious and social evolution as if it were unaffected by contact with either Babylonian or Egyptian civilization. The possible influence of Egypt is dismissed in a single note (p. 100, note 1); the very probable influence of Babylonia, not only on Hebrew institutions but even on the Hebrew idea of Yahweh, is not discussed at all. It is not necessary to be either a pan-Babylonian or a pan-Egyptian in order to emphasize the fact that the spiritual development of the Hebrews, a people situated at the center of the ancient oriental world, must be studied in its cultural relations. Archaeology and history, as well as sociology, can throw light on the "development of Bible religion." Furthermore, it may be questioned whether the antagonism between Amorite and Israelite was so prolonged and deep-seated as the author argues. There seems reason to believe that agricultural customs and agricultural laws were of much earlier date than the monarchical period of Hebrew history. It would follow, therefore, that the nomadic ideal and clan organization of the Israelites could not have been so momentous a factor in Hebrew religious evolution during the pre-exilic period. This conclusion, if accepted, would cut at the roots of Mr. Wallis' argument. The whole subject of Hebrew social customs requires, indeed, more investigation than it receives in this volume.

The book is marred by faults of presentation which will detract from its recognition by scholars. It is very loosely put together. There are only 300 pages, yet these are divided into as many as 37 chapters of which 15 contain 4 pages or less. In consequence of this arrangement, the reader is not impressed, as he should be, by the continuity of the argument. Some unnecessary repetitions occur. The paragraph on p. xxxii reappears as a footnote to p. 3, and also on pp. 296-97. The quotation on p. xxiii confronts us again on p. 14. Other instances of the

same sort are found at pp. xxix and 96, at pp. 86 and 99, and at pp. 159 and 243 (notes). One finds, too, throughout the work a number of expressions which, however permissible in popular lecturing, seem out of place in a professedly scientific treatise. Thus, "the Hebrews had no patent on ethics" (p. xxix); the contest between Israelite and Amorite *mores* was "a head-on collision between moral codes" (p. 146); the prophets who upheld the kings and wealthy classes were the "regulars," while the Amos-prophets were the "insurgents" (p. 165); the Bible is one of the "best sellers" known to the book trade (275), etc. Only two misprints have been noted: "Fraser" (p. 64, note) should be "Frazer"; "Heidentumes" (p. 299) should be "Heidentums."

HUTTON WEBSTER

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

The New Democracy. An Essay on Certain Political and Economic Tendencies in the United States. By WALTER E. WEYL. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. viii+370. \$2.00.

The author starts with a discussion of the fact that after more than a century of independence we have modified our attitude from that of teachers of the world to one of profound discontent with the results of our institutions and are now looking to some of the newer and formerly more insignificant nations for lessons in the real democratization of politics and industry. At the point at which we might have developed a democracy the conquest of the continent made a more imperative demand upon us and we forsook the former task for the latter. The author describes the movement of the frontier and the political and industrial pre-emption of country and finally of city by bosses and financiers. The individualistic spirit which this conquest of the West gave to Americans retarded the attainment of a socialized democracy. Dr. Weyl does not bring out here the favorable effect upon democracy of the frontier which Turner and others have so strongly emphasized. He describes the growth of a powerful plutocracy first in industry and then in politics and gives an estimate of its influence at the present time. He admits the service which the industrial combination first performed for our economic life, in bringing order out of chaos and in substituting utilization of our resources for reckless waste. He does not fall into the error of asserting that they have performed a similar service for politics, but very strongly emphasizes their control of courts and legislatures and of public opinion through newspaper and magazine.

The author is extremely sanguine, however, regarding the evolution of a new social democracy in America. He points to our vast and increas-

ing material wealth resting upon our great natural resources as the condition of democracy and the weapon with which to obtain it through wider and wider educational opportunities and through the use of the findings of science. While he admits the "ignorant, wasteful, and inefficient exploitation of our resources" in the past, he is perhaps a little too sanguine as to their endurance in the future, for he does not show that we have as a nation committed ourselves to a thoroughgoing conservation policy.

He brings out great and increasing democratic gains along economic, intellectual, and political lines and presents abundant statistics to show increasing amounts spent upon education and rises in real wages. It is perhaps unduly critical of the reader to suggest that, encouraging as is the amount of money spent yearly by Americans on education, the mere size of the figures must not blind us to the inefficiency of the expenditure of much of it, nor to the comparative ineffectiveness, so far, of efforts to functionalize and vocationalize the public-school curriculum. Nor must the increasing size of incomes or the number of prosperous people cloud the fact that wise individual spending has not increased proportionately.

The author believes the restriction of immigration to be imperative in the struggle for democracy. He says: "Under proper economic and social conditions, we could easily take care of two hundred, or even more, millions of people. The crux of the difficulty, however, is that a too speedy and unregulated immigration tends to prevent the very adjustments which would make the prosperity of greater millions possible." The author's optimism leads him to think that the policy toward immigration is coming to be restrictive, although some recent pronouncements of the National Conference of Charities and Correction and of other bodies, as well as the policy of government agencies, may leave the average student of public affairs doubtful on this point.

He holds that socialized democracy will come slowly through the efforts of many co-operating groups of people pursuing slightly different ends. It will not, he thinks, take the form of a class war, as the socialists contend. In spite of the evident optimism of the book, it may be doubted whether the author realizes that only through the incessant vigilance and activity of those who see the adjustments necessary for a truly socialized democracy can such a democratic socialization of life be assured. The impression left by the book is that the author is almost too secure in his feeling that things will work of themselves toward the desired goal.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

The Social Basis of Religion. By SIMON N. PATTEN. New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. xviii+247. \$1.25 net.

The author's professed purpose is to combine the economic interpretation of history and social psychology. Religion is the union of the two. Degeneration is objective and economic, while regeneration is psychic and personal (p. v). The discussion in fifteen chapters of such varied subjects as scientific method, the will, the social process, the social mission of the church, does not aim at consecutiveness, but at bringing together several points of view which have been separated heretofore. Two viewpoints among many interesting ones stand out prominently.

First, the author holds strongly to an objective view of morality and to the necessity of this objective view as the basis of religious thought and work. The only valid tests of action are not personal tests but the results of a study of the objective effects of any proposed measure upon society. The ultimate tests are health, wealth, and efficiency. Consequently, the social mission of the church is not to save individual souls but to promote movements and measures which will increase health, wealth, and efficiency, to adopt a definite social program and engage in such work as improving the family type, furthering public health and temperance movements, and industrial legislation promoting the health of women- and child-workers and the greater efficiency of all workers. The church must learn "that evils have specific causes that may be regulated and removed. They never arise from the general laws of nature. . . ." Not only, however, must the mission of the church become a social mission, but religious thought must be socialized as well on this same objective basis. A religion of authority must be given up and a social religion or social morality, that looks to consequences, must be substituted. And here again the author strongly asserts that the end and test of morality is not happiness or culture but race perpetuation, that is, increased vigor and longevity.

A second conspicuous point of view in the book is the economic interpretation of history which constitutes almost a distinct bias especially in the more theoretical parts of the discussion. The author says: "While many good things are natural, most bad things are economic," and sin, misery, and poverty are one problem and their antidote is income (p. 40). Here the author's bias leads him to exaggerate the importance of poverty. His explanation does not seem to account for some of the prevalent and conspicuous types of evil of the present day, for instance, political corruption and immorality and vice among the well to do. In the former case not even the fondest adherents of the

economic interpretation would allege poverty as the cause. The jack-pots in various states, and the costs of presidential campaigns are too patent refutations. And recent investigations of vice in our cities and of women in industry seem to show that poverty-vice is not the nexus even in as many of these cases as we had supposed it to be, much less in the case of the patrons of vice. Nor does it seem that the author's emphasis upon the naturalness of goodness is wholly justifiable. In our complex social system the primitive order of things, as Ross and others have pointed out, must be changed to meet the conditions of a new and more artificial civilization before goodness as we understand it can be attained. However, the author does not follow these principles relentlessly throughout his discussion but includes many other factors in his analysis of the religious situation.

Many other views of more or less academic interest are to be found in the earlier chapters. The defect of the book lies in the indirectness and brevity of the discussion of the actual present status of religious thought and church work. The inadequacy of these two phases of religion in the present situation is so patent and the remedies so plain that the reader becomes impatient of the rather long and painstaking analyses that furnish a theoretical basis for statements that are admittedly true.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

A Peasant Sage of Japan: The Life and Work of Sontoku Ninomiya.

Translated from the *Hotokuki* by TADASU YOSHIMOTO. Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. xxviii+254. \$1.50.

The book consists of thirty-three short chapters and five divisions of an appendix. It is the story of the life-work of a remarkable peasant of Japan, Kinjiro Ninomiya, called after his death, "Sontoku," meaning, "The Virtuous." The story is simple and essentially human, and emphasizes in a forceful way the unity of disinterested service for mankind the world over. It presents a picture of social service of an almost modern type and almost more than modern idealism carried on a hundred years ago by a follower of Buddha and Confucius in a country then closed to the civilized world.

The volume is a translation, more free than literal, of another written the year following the death of Sontoku by his greatest disciple, Kokei Tomita. That volume was entitled *Hotokuki* meaning literally "A Record of the Return (Repayment) of Virtue." It was widely distributed at the instance of the emperor, and has been recently republished

by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, and is now read all over Japan. The translator says the book "is still proving a light to hundreds of thousands in Japan, and a great help and inspiration to all kinds of social workers. Hence this translation." There may be in the book some slight idealization of Sontoku's work such as one might expect from a favorite disciple.

The Peasant Sage was born in 1787 and died in 1856. The student of heredity will be interested to note that his father was called "The Good," and made himself poor by giving away his property. From the earliest efforts of the orphan child to support himself, on through his whole life the lesson that industry, frugality, and most of all disinterested service with men and material possessions was increasingly demonstrated to Sontoku and to those who knew him. His life-work was that of building up ruined and bankrupt agricultural estates for various feudal lords, communities, and the central government. In undertaking each of these various tasks "he studies the local conditions, the possibilities of soil and situation, the numbers and habits of each family. He inspires confidence, stimulates courage, and renews hope. He aims at restoring prosperity by re-creating character, evoking energy, and insisting on regularity of work and continuous industry. He himself shared the life of those among whom he toiled; ate their simple food and wore their cotton clothes; refused all official dignity, and bore the burdens of his people, asking no reward."

Like all successful leaders of men, Sontoku was a shrewd observer. He everywhere seemed to understand cunning, selfish flatterers, and frequently was able to convert them to lives of honesty and industry. He dealt very generously with the honest, industrious, and faithful, and tried repeatedly to convert the malicious and lazy. He studied carefully the character of the needy before giving them financial aid. He said one did more harm than good by gifts to the undeserving poor; but he also said: "There is some good in every man's heart and few people are so bad that they cannot be converted."

Sontoku's doctrine of conduct and work were summed up by his disciple under four heads as follows: First, its foundation is sincerity, "even as God is sincere"; second, its principle is industry, "even as heaven and earth and all creation are ever at work without repose"; third, its body is economy, "to live simply and never exceed one's rightful means"; fourth, its use is service, "to give away all unnecessary possessions, material, or other, in the service of heaven and mankind."

The great practical result of Sontoku's work during his life was the restoration of many large estates which had fallen into ruin, the opening-

up of much land new to agriculture, the general improvement of agricultural labor and life, and the stimulation of thousands of people to a life of industry, frugality, and unselfish service. The practical result which has followed the death of the Sage is the widespread formation of a society called "Hotokusha"—virtually a co-operative society which has proved "a great boon to the poorer classes of people."

The Hotokusha was organized by Fukuzumi, a strong disciple of Sontoku, in harmony with the latter's instructions. It consists of a central society and many widespread branches.

The purpose of this society is to help the poor and to aid them to unite in helping one another, first by opening their hearts and developing goodness of character among them, and secondly by assisting them to open wild lands, improve irrigation and roads, repair bridges and river banks, and, in general, by doing all that is of benefit to the poor. It begins by helping the poorest and by encouraging and rewarding the good. The function of the central society is to give financial help, as well as advice, to the branches; so its members are well-to-do persons who freely give their money and services in order to show their gratitude to heaven by helping their fellow-men, and they expect no material reward for themselves. The branch societies consist of poorer men who pay a small subscription known as the "daily subscription money." The money thus subscribed by the poor, together with money received from the central society, forms a fund from which loans are made to members. No interest is charged, because the purpose of the society is to help the needy.

Sontoku emphasized the value of preaching, as well as living, his doctrine. Disciples were always about him, and he often taught them far into the night. Once when his lord asked him to open up some wild land, he said to his disciples: "My wish is to open up the wilderness of men's hearts."

The life of the Peasant Sage of Japan seems to be only another evidence that among any people and at any time independence, self-sacrifice, and spiritual vision give a man power.

ALBERT ERNEST JENKS

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Changing America. Studies in Contemporary Society. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York: The Century Co., 1912. Pp. 236. \$1.20.

Like the *Foundations of Sociology*, the present volume is a group of occasional papers on subjects with sufficient unity of content to be combined under a general title. There, however, the resemblance ceases. These pieces were nearly all originally written for popular periodicals

and, with some exceptions, contain little serious scientific work. They may be grouped into three divisions. In the first will fall the two papers on the spread of democracy and the one on "Commercialism Rampant." Another group includes the studies on the falling birth-rate, divorce, women in industry, and the suppression of important news, while a third contains an attempt at interpreting the social characteristics of the Middle West.

This book is likely to augment the prevailing regret among sociologists that Professor Ross has latterly chosen to turn his attention away from strictly scientific work in order to reach that larger public which demands striking popular presentation rather than fundamental analysis. Much may doubtless be said for the popularization of sociological knowledge, but the present state of sociology is such that what is most needed is expert knowledge of the social situation. Now the sociological expert, owing to the character of his subject-matter, is in peculiar danger of ceasing to be an expert if he listen to the allurements of popular applause. Professor Ross of course possesses an amazing faculty of vivid imagery, and there are throughout these pages brilliantly illuminating flashes of insight which are almost uncanny in their power of characterization. But his fatal gift of phrase-making leads him constantly into the danger of making generalizations whose chief merit is that they are well put.

One might easily make an anthology of his sayings that would add interest to the popular phrase-books. Thus, "science pricks certain pink balloons of pretension"; the feudal classes "spoiled the people like a Front de Bœuf, the corporations today filch from us like Fagin"; "the real enemy of the dove of peace is not the eagle of pride or the vulture of greed but the stork"; divorce is "matrimonial surgery"; the present is the "glacial epoch of journalism"; certain middle-western communities "remind one of fished-out ponds populated chiefly by bullheads and suckers"; the ranks of wealth in the east "are continually reinforced by coupon-clippers 'sugared off' from the rest of the country"; impecunious western students "by stretching on tiptoe contrive to pluck the college sheepskin"; costly pleasure-centers are "the cream-pots of the country's wealth-production."

While his tone is rarely pessimistic, Professor Ross has often unconsciously fallen into the spirit of the "literature of exposure." Sometimes, too, he openly deprecates the critical attitude toward social problems. Of his own position he says: "I can look back to the time when I thought that certain abstract principles were the thing; that we did not have to consider what degree of happiness they gave to people,

but that, planting ourselves upon these immutable principles, we should just shut our eyes, go ahead, and all would be well. I assure you the older I grow and the more I explore different social systems the more fluid these principles become, until now, in social policy, I do not see anything at stake but the welfare of men and women and children."

It is to be hoped that all sociologists agree with him in this view of the final purpose of investigation, however much they may insist that scientific principles are the prime essential in achieving the welfare of people.

The papers on the spread of democracy are thoroughly typical of both the sound and the specious elements in the current discussions of that over-abused subject. Always virile in his thinking and vigorous in expression, Professor Ross escapes most of the prevailing sentimental cant about democracy. He wisely says that democracy is not the sovereignty of the average man, who is a rather poor creature, but of a matured public opinion which at its best "substitutes the direction of the recognized moral and intellectual *élite* for the rule of the strong, the rich, and the privileged." Moreover, this is no longer the era of crowds, but of publics. But in the paper on "Commercialism Rampant" he has indulged in a bit of sublimated muck-raking by falling back on the assumption which he so fully exploited in *Sin and Society*, that social and economic abuses are wholly personal to rich offenders and not in any degree inherent in the social system. Demos is not always and necessarily right and oppressed. To prod his ignorance and self-satisfaction is as useful a task as to lash the buccaneering high-financier.

It is with more satisfaction that we turn to the studies of the birth-rate and divorce. Here Professor Ross goes definitely counter to popular judgments and discards the prevailing shibboleths. The lessening of fecundity among occidental peoples, although it has some pathological aspects, is shown to be predominantly beneficent. It enhances the value of man, and it is the deadly foe of poverty and war. Likewise is the growth of divorce, evil as are some of its aspects, both a cause and a proof of the enhanced value of woman. The paper on "The Suppression of Important News" has already, since its periodical publication, aroused much healthful discussion of the whole modern newspaper situation. Whether or not one accept the author's plea for an endowed press, there can be no question of the gravity of the evils he discloses.

It is exactly because they best appreciate the value of the scientific work which Professor Ross has done that sociologists claim the family privilege of chiding him for work like much of this; not that it is poor of its kind but that he is capable of better things. However sane his

own point of view, it is inevitable that his authority as a leader of sociological thought should be exploited by less balanced exponents of emotional and ill-digested social philosophies.

U. G. WEATHERLY

THE UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA
BLOOMINGTON, IND.

Beyond War. A Chapter in the Natural History of Man. By VERNON LYMAN KELLOGG, Professor in Stanford University. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1912. Pp. 172. \$1.00.

Professor Kellogg has in this little book performed a service which he was encouraged to undertake by the president of the university, David Starr Jordan, the author of *The Blood of the Nation* and *The Human Harvest*—the two books which heretofore have constituted almost the only studies of the biological effect of war. To the pacifist the book should prove thoroughly satisfactory; in those whose sociological interest lies in other fields, the regret cannot but arise that the author confined himself within so strict a limit. Probably nowhere else in so brief and non-technical a form can a survey of biological evolution be found. Professor Kellogg applies this excellent review of a difficult branch of science only to the extinction of war, but he who is interested in eugenics or any branch whatever of "social altruism" will find no difficulty in using the material for his own purposes.

The author succinctly describes the natural history of man, in whom he finds a growing altruism due in this age somewhat to his gregarious specialization. He says (p. 166):

Man should help men—wisely. Charity should be reasoned. Men should take a special care of all useful individuals, of all clean-blooded, clear-minded, strong-bodied, disease-resistant, long-living individuals. From them should the race find its chief renewal, for through them, and through them alone can the race actually advance; advance in terms of evolutionary time and evolutionary progress. This is the biological basis of rational eugenics. This is the biological basis of rational socialism, internationalism, pan-humanism, or whatever we may call the encouragement of and movement toward men's general kindness, helpfulness, and fraternation toward all other men. And this is the biological reason why the opposite of all these things is subversive of human evolutionary progress.

It is obvious that a study whose conclusion can be as broad as these quotations indicate should contain many suggestions for social workers other than those to whom it is specifically addressed, the pacifists. As an argument that war is an anachronism doomed to extinction, the book

is conclusive. Throughout, the author has taken pains to show what part the warlike instinct has played in the past, and then shows that at present resort to arms is already an evolutionary vestige.

The author, considering that he is a scientific man, has a very good popular style. He is perhaps more fond of technical terms and casual references than he should be. Biologists entirely unknown to the general reader, to whom the book is directed, are casually mentioned by the score and by their last names only. Such a book is designed to excite the readers' interest and it is regrettable that either footnotes or a bibliographic note was not added to the volume.

DENYS P. MYERS

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
BOSTON, MASS.

A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil. By JANE ADDAMS, Hull House, Chicago, Ill. Macmillan, 1912. Pp. 219.

The characteristic quality of this small volume is its truthfulness enlivened by hope and illumined by knowledge. It is utterly free from the morbid taint which lessens the value of much recent writing on the subject. The book grows out of the author's first-hand contact with neighbors whose daughters are, by their poverty, peculiarly exposed to the ravages of this ancient evil. Miss Addams' personal acquaintance of more than twenty years with a congested neighborhood is supplemented by active work in the Juvenile Protective Association, an organization unique in all the world in its scope and its efficient protection of the youth of the city which is its field of activity.

The author's thesis is that there "are many indications of a new conscience, which in various directions is slowly gathering strength and which we may soberly hope will at last array itself against this incredible social wrong, ancient though it may be."

The argument is suggested by the six chapter heads as follows: A new conscience in regard to an ancient evil (1) as inferred from analogy; (2) as indicated by recent legal enactments; (3) as indicated by the amelioration of economic conditions; (4) as indicated by the moral education and legal protection of children; (5) as indicated by philanthropic rescue and prevention, and finally (6) as indicated by social control.

The volume contains no bibliography, no analysis of the existing literature of the subject, no statistics. It makes no attempt to deal with the quantitative aspects of the evil. It is wholly human and interpretative and, like all the author's work, it is an appeal to the social

and ethical forces of our time for fresh zeal and energy applied to the transition from our social chaos to that noble and orderly social life of the future which inspires our hopes.

FLORENCE KELLEY

NEW YORK

The Boy and His Gang. By J. ADAMS PUFFER. With an introduction by G. STANLEY HALL. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912. Pp. 12+187. \$1.00.

In this book, after thoroughly familiarizing himself with the literature pertaining to the subject, and out of a first-hand acquaintance with, and appreciation of, boy nature, Mr. Puffer has made a valuable contribution to the thought of parents, teachers, and all workers with adolescent boys, in calling attention as well as he has to the gang instinct as an important social factor in boy life which has not been sufficiently recognized in home, school, and church.

G. Stanley Hall quite appropriately says in the introduction: "Now that we are coming to understand and realize what the gang life means, and what can be done with it, the surprise grows that until so recently it has been left almost entirely out of account in the work of helping and saving boys."

Perhaps no other author has so well placed before the reading public the meaning and possibilities of the gang as a basic element in the social control of the growing boy.

The practical and universal adoption of the point of view here presented will lead to reforms in dealing with normal boys which are as radical as the reforms we have experienced in the past few decades in dealing with defectives: the reforms in both instances having their impetus in the turning-on of more light.

The testimony of sympathetic and intelligent students of boy life is that the gang often has more influence over the boy between the ages of ten and eighteen than any other social force. Granting the truth or even the partial truth of such opinion, this book is deserving of wide and careful consideration.

The statistical data in several chapters form an important part. These data show that while some gangs are predominantly hurtful to their members, and others are predominantly helpful, all gangs are alike in that they exist for the sake of a definite set of activities which are as natural for the boy as caring for a doll is to the girl, and which are in large degree wholesome, or may easily be made so. The ordinary

gang is said to teach the spirit of democracy, loyalty, and co-operation through group activity.

The problem before the parent and teacher is shown to be not that of stifling the gang instinct, or of attempting to direct boy life by ignoring it, but rather that of satisfying the instinct in such manner as always to make the gang serve a useful end.

ROY WILLIAM FOLEY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

L'Egoïsme humain. Par A. LUGAN. Paris: A. Tralin, éditeur.
Pp. ix+167.

Written by a missionary priest, this book is devoted primarily to a criticism of selfishness, in the individual, in the family, and in society at large, for both individual and collective ends. The discussion is distinctly from the ethical standpoint of Christian individualism rather than from the causal viewpoint of the social psychologist. There is much admonition as well as condemnation of types and attitudes, but little analysis of social causes and effects. A number of social types and subjects of general interest—such as the confirmed bachelor, the fashion-loving daughter, the demagogic politician, match-making and self-sacrificing mothers, the caste system, class consciousness, and syndicalism—are discussed, and some of the descriptions are very pertinent, but too frequently the author allows his opinions to be colored by his preconceptions. The book is best adapted to the edification of the communicant.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Genossenschaftsleben der Säugetiere. Eine psycho-biologische Studie über die Beziehungen der Säugetiere zu ihren Artgenossen. Von DR. PHIL. ALEXANDER SOKOLOWSKY. Leipzig: Weigel, 1910. Pp. 148, 6 plates.

The title of this work looks most promising to anyone interested in the social life of the higher animals. One's expectations are further raised by the statement that the author is "Zoologischer Assistent in C. Hagenbecks Tierpark." But the contents of the book are disappointing. It is not a work of original observation, but a compilation, a brief, popular natural history, without references to sources, and its statements are not always reliable. The six colored plates are artistic, but without scientific value.

WALLACE CRAIG

MAINE STATE COLLEGE

Les foyers nouveaux. Par DR. REMY COLLIN. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1912. Pp. viii+176.

A physician of Nancy, an enthusiast in the movement to secure dwellings for working people in which they can bring up families under wholesome physical and moral conditions, describes the French co-operative building societies and furnishes the most recent statistics of their progress. His argument is that these co-operative societies have a high social value because they are adapted to the beliefs and sentiments of the people, they satisfy the desire for individual property, they provide for large families, and their separate houses are best for health and morality. He tells of the obstacles encountered, appeals to employers to subsidize the associations and aid them with counsel, and urges government to promote the movement by loans from the national savings funds.

C. R. HENDERSON

Die Irrthümer der Strafjustiz und ihre Ursachen. Von DR. ERICH SELLO. Erster Band: Todesstrafe und lebenslängliches Zuchthaus in sichterlichen Fehlprüchen neuerer Zeit. Berlin: Decker's Verlag, 1911. Pp. 523.

This large volume is the fruit of laborious examination and reproduction of cases when courts have made mistakes and where the life of the accused was at stake. It would seem unnecessary to prove that judges are human and therefore fallible if many of them and their flatterers had not set up for themselves exemption from such infirmities. Indeed no sensible man expects of courts entire freedom from error. If there is a high degree of fairness, patience, and learning it is all the public has a right to ask. But just because we must look for no more than the highest degree of probability we should abolish irreparable penalties, like mutilation and capital punishment, and we should provide indemnities for persons manifestly the victims of public injustice. The vast collection of facts here presented ought to have consideration by those who think, or act as though they believed that courts can do no wrong, that the public agent is always right.

C. R. HENDERSON

La protection des faibles. Par GEORGES ROUDEL. Paris: Dorin et Fils, 1912. Pp. 291.

The General Secretary of the International Bureau of Public and Private Relief, inspector for the French Government, has published

the essential facts relating to the French system of charity. His name is a pledge of accuracy. The plan of the work is interesting: (1) before the struggle; (2) during the struggle; (3) after the struggle. In the first part dependent children and youth are discussed; in the second, methods of aiding adults at home, or by work, or by special ministrations. In the third part attention is directed upon relief for old and incurable people, pensions, and asylums. A good bibliography is provided. While the descriptive matter is confined to French agencies and methods, the author penetrates beneath the variegated colors of local circumstances to the principles implied in practice, and his book becomes valuable to students of the subject in all lands.

C. R. HENDERSON

Mouth Hygiene. By JOHN SAYRE MARSHALL, M.D., Sc.D. J. B. Lippincott Co., 1912. Pp. 262.

Now that the gateway to the digestive apparatus has become a fashionable "social problem," and school authorities, parents, and institutional charities have condescended to look into the mouth, we have discovered the need of a book which is at once authoritative and intelligible. An eminent representative of oral medicine and surgery has met this need in an admirable way.

C. R. HENDERSON

The Present Day Problem of Crime. By ALBERT H. CURRIER. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1912.

After a brief discussion of the problem of crime, a century of progress in prison reform and the reforms demanded, the author gives sections to the saving power of philanthropy, and a sketch of the career of the Earl of Shaftesbury.

C. R. HENDERSON

List of Works Relating to Criminology. New York Public Library, 1911. Pp. 362.

Students of criminology will hail the appearance of this immense collection of references with gratitude. The citations are not merely of books but also of articles in magazines in various languages. It is at once a catalogue by authors and by subjects, carefully analyzed.

C. R. HENDERSON

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Volkskraft und Sozialpolitik.—The social-political and economic reforms in Germany of the past generation were the outcome not of scientific study but of popular sympathy with the lower classes; that is true of such statesmen as Bismarck and of the economists Brentano, Wagner, and Schmoller. The prevailing reformers aim to influence the distribution of wealth in the interest of the weaker element in society, but to do so by controlling the wage system, not by removing it. The recent health exhibit in Dresden illustrates the need of thoroughgoing investigations of the housing, food, clothing, and working conditions.—Richard Ehrenberg, *Archiv für exakte Wirtschaftsforschung*, Heft 2, 1912. Y. S.

Der Mensch.—G. Sergi, the Italian anthropologist, has arrived at important conclusions as to the habitat and characteristics of the primitive race of man. The older theory of the Asiatic origin of the European Aryan race is discredited by Sergi; furthermore he sets up the hypothesis of the African origin of the dolichocephalic European; the European race is a species of the *Notanthropos* genus whose original habitat was central Africa. There is a close relationship between the short, dark Mediterranean and the blond, northern Baltic types, showing one origin for both. Another theory in contradiction to the current one is that the dark, dolichocephalic Aryan type of Asia and India had its origin in Europe. Sergi's classification of races, which establishes the polygenetic origin of man, could be modified without violation of the facts by making the European (*Neanderthal*) species distinct from the *Homo afer* (Negro) species.—H. A. Wieth-Knudsen, *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie*, March and April, 1912. Y. S.

Das französische Gesetz über die Altersversicherung der Arbeiter.—In passing the old-age insurance bill of April, 1910, the French government was mistaken in regard to the attitude of the working classes toward the act. It was expected that ten million would avail themselves of this legislation, but only about one-fourth that number have been insured. Although the bill made the insurance of all employees obligatory, the government cannot enforce the measure since the court held that the employer could not deduct the employee's share from the wages without consent. The features of the bill which were distasteful to the socialists were that the age at which benefits were paid was fixed at sixty-five years, which was already a reduction of five years as compared with the English, Belgium, and German laws, and that the employees were compelled to pay a share toward the fund. To meet the desires of the people, the age limit has been reduced to sixty years, and the government has increased its quota to the fund from sixty francs to one hundred francs per capita.—Charles Gide, *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung*, Heft 2, 1912. Y. S.

Die deutsche wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Literatur und der Ursprung des Marxismus.—The economic interpretation of history had its origin in a series of German writers before Marx's Manifesto of 1848. The historical, juristic, and Romanticist literature of the first half of the nineteenth century contains views similar to those found in Marx and Engels. Among those writers is Georg von Raumer, who expresses clearly the economic interpretation. It is difficult to estimate Marx's indebtedness to this rich German literature. Although critics have shown the influence on Marx of French and English works, no attention has been paid to this historical German literature, with the exception of Hegel and Lorenz von Stein. Irrespective of its influence on Marx, it is noteworthy that the economic interpretation of history originated not with Marx, as is generally held, but with a number of German historians and economists.—G. v. Below, *Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, May, 1912. Y. S.

Wieviel Menschen kann die Erde ernähren?—The question of how many people the earth could support depends on the extent of the available area of cultivation and the standards of life of the people. Only about fifty-six million square kilometers—a little less than one-half the total area of the six continents—are capable of cultivation. The standards of life are not uniform in the various countries; for the American standard of life about 1.2 hectares are needed per capita; this is twice as high as the German and about ten times as high as the Japanese standard. It is estimated that according to the American standard of life the earth could support a population of about 2,333 million, according to the German standard about 5,600 million, and according to the Japanese standard about 22,400 million. By more intensive cultivation and by securing new material for fertilizers it would be possible to increase the food supply.—Karl Ballod, *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft*, Heft 2, 1912.

Die Wurzeln des Syndikalismus in Frankreich.—Syndicalism in France is the outgrowth not of the French temperament, but of the undeveloped capitalistic and large-scale production. The trade unions are therefore weak and impractical organizations; their hostile attitude toward the government is inconsistent with their policy of accepting governmental subsidies in strikes; their finances are unsound because the members object to being taxed. For a long time the syndicalists refrained from strikes and elections, waiting for the ultimate revolutionary general strike. With the development of industry the party will become more practical and more like German socialists.—Gustav Eckstein, *Die Neue Zeit*, May 17, May 30, and June 7, 1912. Y. S.

Die Entstehung der Exomachie.—Monogamy and endogamy were the earliest marriage institutions; only after the institution of exogamy did polygamy arise. The theory of Morgan and Fraser as to the exogamous marriage is untenable because it imputes a rationalist motive to primitive man; the biological theory of Atkinson and the anthropological hypothesis of Lang, also, fail to explain the origin of exogamy. The correct hypothesis is probably that of MacLennan—from the sociological phenomenon of the rape of women in war time—with the modification that the rape took place in times of peace among the members of the same tribe. After this arose polyandrous and polygynous marriages (*Gruppenhe*) at one and the same time. This was followed by monogamy.—W. Wundt, *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie*, January, April, and July, 1912. Y. S.

Die Motive der Zunftbildung im deutschen Mittelalter.—A study of the *Zunftbriefe* of the twelfth century shows that the economic was the only possible motive for the formation of guilds, and that the general explanation of the motive is erroneous. With the increase in the population and in the flow of immigrants into the towns a rise in industrial competition made it necessary to prohibit outside competition and to control the sales within the town; this led to the combination of artisans. Other purposes, such as religion and sociability, are secondary.—G. v. Below, *Historische Zeitschrift*, Heft 1, 1912. Y. S.

Die Grundlage der Ethik.—From sociology we learn that there is no universal moral principle, but that all manners and customs have at some time been regarded as moral. Morality is relative, yet the evolution of moral ideas has been along a certain line. In this progressive development of the human consciousness has appeared the principle of the unfolding of personality. The root of this principle of humanity is not material well-being, nor egoism and altruism. It springs from the aesthetic nature of man. This principle is the impelling force to action and art.—A. Eleutheropulos, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, June, 1912. Y. S.

Recent Discussions of Moral Evolution.—During the last five years the literature on moral evolution has given very important assistance in answering the questions: (1) What is the origin of the idea or feeling of moral obligation? (2) In what respects has there been evolution and what are the chief stages in the process? (3) What are the causes of moral evolution? (4) What criterion shall be used in judging the evolution?—J. H. Tufts, *Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1912. E. H. S.

Die Struktur des französischen Geistes.—There are always certain tendencies common to the people of a given nation in their activities in the most different fields of culture. The reactions of the French people have been determined by arbitrary, uniform, and stereotyped norms, which lack adaptation to local conditions. This national characteristic is evident in the symmetrical division of the territory, uniform governmental organization, uniform work-day for all industries, centralized executive power, analytical and ideological type of thinking, development of utopian socialism, and of the Esperanto language, straight lines and symmetry in gardens, etc.—Ernst Bernhard, *Logos*, Heft 1, 1912. E. H. S.

Modern Social Changes and Legislation as They Affect the Medical Profession.—In the past the relationship between the doctor and his patient was always direct, with the object of restoration of the patient to health and of guidance for the future. Modern social and legislative changes have interfered with this personal and direct relationship and introduced other purposes to the harm of both patient and doctor. The most important of these changes are the friendly societies, workmen's compensation, midwives act, and the national insurance act.—E. N. Nason, *British Medical Journal*, July 13, 1912. E. H. S.

Sanity and Insanity.—The great increase of insanity in London is more apparent than real and is due to (a) raising the standards of sanity, (b) the declining death-rate of registered lunatics, (c) the fact that asylums are being substituted for infirmaries for aged persons because of the better care given in asylums. The first step in prevention is the study of causes of insanity; this study has so far revealed neuro-pathic heredity as the most important result. Statistics from the London County Asylum show that there is a diminishing risk of the child of an insane parent becoming insane after he has reached the age of twenty-five. When the first attack of insanity occurs in the parent, the children for the most part have all been born; sterilization would therefore be applicable to relatively few parents admitted to hospitals; those offspring of insane parents who are afflicted with adolescent insanity would be disqualified for propagation by marriage by their incurable mental affection in a large number of instances; for them also sterilization would not be generally applicable. From a eugenic point of view the higher-grade imbeciles and moral defectives are the dangerous cases.—F. W. Mott, *Journal of the Royal Sanitary Institute*, July, 1912.

Changes in the Conception and Treatment of Insanity during the Past Twenty-eight Years.—The early confusion in regard to the nature of insanity was first resolved by the pathologists who aimed to establish a pathological basis for the different forms of insanity; this was supplemented later by the work of the clinical school, which attempted to differentiate the forms of insanity by careful study of symptoms. In the latest period, associated with the names of Freud and Jung, pathology is no longer tolerated; insanity is explained psychologically, as the dissociation of the ego. Though there has been progress in our knowledge of insanity, there has been little progress in our treatment of it; state regulation of marriage, sterilization of the unfit, and psychotherapy are proposed as prophylaxis, but they are of doubtful value because they fail to recognize that we cannot make progress without that condition of the brain which makes for insanity.—John Turner, *British Medical Journal*, July 13, 1912. E. H. S.

The Regulation of Midwifery.—In regulating midwifery the following problems must be met: the inadequate obstetrical education in medical schools, the dirty and untrained midwives, and the ignorance and prejudice of the immigrant population. There should be a uniform standard of medical education for all persons who take the responsibility of obstetrical cases. There should not be one standard of obstetrics for the poor and ignorant and another for the intelligent and well to do.—J. L. Huntington, *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, July 18, 1912. E. H. S.

Competition, Natural and Industrial.—The doctrine of the survival of the fittest has no bearing upon the permanence of competition in industrial society or the desirability of its maintenance as a method of human progress. While competition might long remain in socialized industry, it is not a necessary factor. Its necessity will decline with the increase of intelligence and public spirit. Full and voluntary co-operation is the ideal.—Ira Woods Howerth, *The International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1912. J. E. E.

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XVIII

NOVEMBER, 1912

NUMBER 3

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF THEOLOGY

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Theological reconstruction is commonly said to wait upon philosophy. While there is much truth in such a belief, a study of creative periods in theology will show that its fundamental doctrines and systems are only incidentally the outcome of philosophy. Theology deals primarily with experience and experience is far more extensive than rational processes. Theology arises when men undertake to organize their religious experience, beliefs, and customs in harmony with other elements of experience. The organizing principle is all but invariably dramatic, a presupposition born of social experience which the community producing the theology has unconsciously accepted as a basis of social activity and the standard of social values. Most frequently such an organizing principle is that already operative in the state. A second, or apologetic, period begins when men undertake to defend their right to hold religious belief by means of appropriating current elements of culture. The creative and the apologetic stages of theology are indispensable, but the former is primarily social, the latter philosophical. It is the purpose of this paper to establish the former as preliminary to an examination of the principles of theological reconstruction.

I. MYTHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, AND THEOLOGY

Religion is personal, but it is also a phase of social experience. Although by no means to be identified with social custom, its

development involves such custom and particularly the preservation of tribal sanctions for various social activities. Yet to limit religion to merely social experience and to make God a symbol of an authoritative totality of social experience is to neglect outstanding elements of personality and its relations. Religion is a word of experience, but it has a correlate in an extra-experiential Reality which is a dominating factor in the situation out of which religion develops. To eliminate an objective God from religion is as illogical as to eliminate the soil and air from the life of a plant. A theology in the nature of the case must therefore contain its meta-experiential elements. A pragmatic view of the world is highly fruitful for the discussion of the psychological and social aspects of religion, but it is not sufficient for a theology which shall include the cosmic processes in which men find themselves.

But after this has been admitted it still remains true that the first creative attempts to rationalize religious experience into harmony with elements of culture have not found their organizing principles in metaphysical processes. Metaphysical treatment of religion has always been a second or even third stage in the rationalizing process. Prior to it are the mythology and theology, each structurally dramatic.

1. Recent discussions in the history of religion have made evident the fact that mythology has played no inconsiderable part in the early stages of religious development. Myths might be described as a method of combining rationalized religious aspiration with observed cosmic phenomena by the use of elementary experience, generally of individuals rather than of groups. In this, mythology differs from theology which organizes religious thought on more genuinely social concepts than combats, love-making, and individual careers. In the case of practically all religions with the exception of the Christian and other religions which like Mohammedanism have been derived from the Bible, the philosophical stage followed immediately upon the mythological and served to destroy confidence in the myth, even when, as in Greece, mythology continued as a form of popular religion long after Plato and Aristotle had all but universalized the philosophical attitude of mind.

In the case of the Hebrew religion, whatever may have been its roots in early Semitic thought, it is all but impossible to discover any period of myth within its biblical stage. Both in it and in Christianity religious syncretism, it is true, did to some extent show itself, as in the influence of Baal-worship upon the Hebrews, and in the appropriation of pagan customs and institutions on the part of the Christians. But Hebraism in its constructive principle was germinally monotheistic. It never was characterized by the mass of mythological details which most polytheistic religions have included. As will appear later, Hebraism used for its structural religious ideas not the adventures of individuals, as in the case of classical mythology, but the universalizing conception of monarchy. Zeus was never a law-giver, but Yahweh's relations with his people were always those existing between a king and his subjects. That is to say, while like mythology in being dramatic rather than philosophical, the material of Hebrew religious thought was organized about an essentially political experience.

2. A distinction between theology and philosophy is hard to draw in terms of definition, for both alike seek to give some sort of unity to the highest thought of mankind. Furthermore, philosophy like theology is largely conditioned by social experience. Of the two, philosophy is by far the more frequent framework for religious thought. Indeed one might even say that there never has been but one well-rounded theology, namely, that which has been produced by the Christian thought of western Europe. The other great religions which have used biblical material have resembled western orthodoxy to some extent, but in the case of Mohammedanism and Judaism no theological system has been developed in any way comparable with that even of the arrested theology of the Eastern church. Yet practically all religions have had their philosophies and in some cases, notably in Hinduism and the religion of Egypt, there has been developed an esoteric system of teaching for the cultured classes often alongside of gross superstitions among the masses. Western Christianity has, it is true, developed its secondary form in the practices of the Roman church, but this secondary Christianity has always become at length organically embodied in a real theology, the subject-matter of which is the

relationship of God and humanity, and which is only apologetically cosmological or metaphysical.

Further, while it is difficult to distinguish formally between theology and philosophy, the content and tendency of the two show marked differences. Philosophy as it has existed in the western world has been concerned primarily with the construction of some world-view which finds its unity in a general conception such as the Ideas of Plato and the Idea of Hegel. Once having gained such an a-priori principle, instead of working toward experience, it has by a process of abstraction worked away from experience. In the place of personal relations, it substitutes those of logic. Pragmatism, it is true, is an exception to this general tendency, but pragmatism itself is more concerned with the problems of reality and knowledge than with the systematic presentation of the relations of man and God as theology conceives them. And there is a further distinction between pragmatism and theology in that theology cannot be content to find its subject-matter wholly in the region of experience. Theology, since its subject-matter is primarily religion, must always involve a metaphysical reality and relations which condition experience.

A comparison of philosophies with theology will show still another difference. Whereas the organizing, unifying principles of philosophy are, with the exception of pragmatism, in the realm of the meta-experiential, in the case of theology the unifying principle is some presupposition which determines social experience as a whole. In giving form and rational acceptability to its formulations, the theology of the schools has utilized dominant philosophies, but this process belongs to the second rather than to the original and creative stratum of the organizing process. A theological *system* as distinguished from its amplification has sprung from the same subconscious social mind as that from which has sprung political theory. Interplay between politics and theology is always to be noted, but neither is strictly the origin of the other. The parallelism between the two is due to their common origin. It is this fact that in part explains the survival in highly developed types of theology of those concepts which are fully intelligible only when they are historically valued as drawn from the experience of differ-

ent economic and political stages through which the people creating the theology have passed in its development.¹

Such a fact is easily appreciated. Theology is essentially concerned with *relations* or *situations* in which man and God are both involved. But to describe relations men inevitably make use of relations already in experience. In religion men seek help;² they justify that search by the use of those categories of social experience in which help has already been found and its methods of operation organized.

Such control exercised by the non-religious presuppositions of social experience over a theological system, whether it be simple or highly developed, is inevitable, since such a system is only one phase of a social mind. A philosophical treatment of religion and particularly a philosophy of religion are always apt to overlook this fact because of their tendency to deal with concepts abstracted from experience. But speaking strictly, there is no history of doctrine; there is only the history of men who hold doctrines. A "doctrinal man" is as impossible as an "economic man." Theology has been even slower than political economy to recognize this fact, but as soon as the doctrine-making process is seen to be only one phase of an evolving civilization, its social aspect at once appears clear and the approach to theology is seen to be through history and sociology rather than through philosophy. Indeed, it may be said that when philosophy becomes dominant in theology the period of creative theology like the period of creative mythology has closed.

II. THE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY THE SAME AS THAT OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

1. The creative periods of theology have been those in which *subconscious* social presuppositions are becoming organizing

¹ See the interesting but not always accurate discussion of Patten, *The Social Basis of Religion*. See also King, *The Development of Religion*, chaps. ix, x; Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 113 f. Andrew Lang, *The Making of Religion*, furnishes a corrective to some of the generalizations of those who minimize the meta-physical element of even primitive religions. It should never be forgotten that theology is only one phase of a religion, important as it is in determining the course of religious development.

² Cf. my article, "The Evolution of Religion," in *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1911.

principles of religious thought and experience as well as of political forms. For example, in Hebraic theology the periods of theological development were those also of political development. Yahweh-worship developed theologically always *pari passu* with the development of the Hebrew state. In the earlier stages Yahweh appears, not as a true monarch, but as the head of a clan. As Hebraic civilization developed he became the head of a tribal confederacy. As an incipient nationalism developed and particularly as the Hebrew people came under the influence of the more highly developed monarchies of Babylonia and Assyria he became a monarch and his relations with the world were similar to those of the ancient oriental conqueror with his subjects and enemies.¹

It would be a mistake to think that there was any deliberately reflective use of new political ideals in the systematizing of religion. While it is true that the religious teachers of the Hebrews never undertook to organize a scientifically complete system of religious instruction, their religious thinking was none the less within a theological schema. And this schema was essentially the same as was being developed in the region of politics. Theology and the ideals of the Hebrew state alike sprang from the experience of the people. The experience of one was the principles of the other because both alike expressed the developing dynamic social presuppositions. Jehovah dealt with his people as a monarch. He gave his law to Moses as Shamash gave his law to Hammurabi. The Day of Yahweh, which at the start was hardly more than a day of battle, became a day of judgment, in which Yahweh was the supreme judge of Hebrew and Gentile alike. As the monarch was bound by nothing except his own will to which he must ever be true, so Yahweh made promises the keeping of which was conditioned only upon the loyalty of his people. It was this transcendentalized politics which shaped Hebraic religious thinking and passed on to the later Christian theology. So far as philosophy emerged, as in the case of Philo, it was a means of adjusting the fundamental theological concept to the culture of the Greek world. And no matter how much Philo might speculate regarding the

¹ For a detailed study of that struggle between civilizations which shaped Hebrew religious thought, see Wallis, *Sociological Study of the Bible*.

Logos or with what freedom he allegorized the history of his people, he never changed those underlying political concepts which constituted the schema of his national religion. Sovereignty and subjects, law and judgment, punishment and rehabilitation, these great rubrics which express the presuppositions controlling the highest social activity of the Hebrews, became the skeleton of their religious thought.

2. Christianity considered theologically perpetuates this transcendental politics of the Hebrew. It springs genetically, however, not directly from the Hebraism of the Old Testament, but from the Judaism of New Testament times. Its principles are those of Hebraism re-expressed in the messianic hope.

How far Christianity at its start was from being a philosophy appears not only from the teaching of Jesus but also from the expressed hostility of Paul to what he called "the wisdom of this world," a hostility which was vigorously urged by such church fathers as Tertullian. The latter's treatise *The Prescription of Heretics* is a plea for the supremacy of a dramatic theology as over against a philosophy. But neither Paul nor Tertullian was apart from other Christian writers. The theology to which they held was the limit within which philosophically minded Christians like Justin and Origen debated. This theology epitomized in *regula fidei* was nothing more nor less than a transcendentalized theory of that conception of government which was an unconscious but determinative presupposition of the entire social life of the ancient world. And its schema was the messianism which had been brought over from Judaism.

Messianism undoubtedly had deep roots which must be traced back into the hopes and mythologies of ancient nations, particularly those of Babylonia and Persia, whose civilizations had affected Judaism. But there is no chief root that does not finally end in social practice. However great or, as it seems to me more probable, however slight may have been the rôle of the Gilgamesh epic in Jewish messianism, it is colored by the political habits of the age in which it arose. Similarly in the case of the influence of the Persian religion. Whatever may have been the relative importance of the reciprocal influence of Mazdaism and Hebraism, the outcome:

in either case was a religious hope that involved transcendental politics.

The Jewish messianic hope passed through two stages both formally political. In the first the Jews believed that Yahweh would re-establish through ordinary methods the Jewish state as supreme over all its enemies; and in the second they hoped that the same triumphant nation would be established, not in the ordinary course of history, but by the miraculous intervention of God through his Anointed. Messianism is as truly political in its transcendental as in its politico-revolutionary stage. A sovereign God who seeks to establish his kingdom by the conquest of the rival kingdom of Satan; a vice-gerent through whom the divine sovereign works and who is to conquer the hostile kingdom and establish the kingdom of God in which the law of God is to be established; a new age in which God is to be the supreme sovereign and his people supremely blessed while the arch-antagonist is bound and punished with his followers; a day of judgment in which the triumphant king metes out the fate of all mankind in accordance with its loyalty or disloyalty: these are the fundamental elements of the program of messianism. The resurrection simply assured the disposition of all mankind in the final world-order. It requires no argument to show that this schema is fundamental to Christian theology, and that it is indeed the organizing principle of theology as it subsequently was developed in the western world and less imperfectly in the Greek church. Whatever else philosophy may have accomplished in the development of doctrine, it has never obscured these fundamental rubrics which were carried over into religion from the social presuppositions on which the ancient civilization was ultimately based. Indeed Christian theology as an organized system might be described as a political dramatic scenario in which the future and present relations of men and God are set forth in terms drawn from the political experience of the Jewish people.¹

3. At two points this schema is modified in the New Testament and by later writers by the addition of non-political elements which

¹ A striking use of the strict political concept to prove polytheism is quoted by Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*, I, 37 n., from *Macarius Magnes*, iv. 20. A god, Porphyry insists, if he is to be a monarch must rule over subjects of his own genus.

are really the most essential in Christianity. There is first the spiritual experience of the Christian. This is in turn twofold. Those phenomena which are called in the New Testament the gifts of the Holy Ghost have never been thoroughly worked into orthodoxy and have always been emphasized among groups (e.g., the Montanists) who have been to a considerable degree regarded as heretical. The reason is very plain. The general schema of historical orthodoxy is transcendental politics redefined by the use of other elements of social experience and rationalized in detail by current philosophy. In such a schema there is no room for mysticism. That must always be extra-orthodox.

Yet the second sort of spiritual experience, the actual transformation of the believer by God, has always been emphasized by theology. In Greek Christianity this element played a very large rôle. We see it in the "recapitulation" by Jesus, so attractive to Irenaeus, and even more in the conception of salvation as the theizing of human nature into incorruption. At one time it even bade fair to become the organizing principle for an entire system. But the development of Greek theology was arrested in its christological epoch, and western theology became so far committed to a forensic outline of teaching, that the saving transformation of the believer was attached to the idea of the church and its sacraments instead of being allowed to organize Christian teaching into a vital system. Yet it has always persisted in western theology as a sort of parallel orthodoxy. If it instead of the messianic drama had become really central in orthodoxy, doctrinal development would have been far more vital and less authoritative. In modern theology this spiritual and vital element is assuming a new importance and constitutes one of the great constructive principles for a theology which shall be more in accord with the presuppositions of modern social life so radically different from those expressed in absolute monarchy. Completely outside of the inherited messianic drama, it is essential Christianity itself.

A second element, too little used by orthodoxy because it also lies outside of the politico-religious drama of messianism, is the experience of Jesus himself. All theologians, it is true, have generalized this element of historical Christianity in the same

proportion as they have not been dominated by the transcendental politics of messianism but the really personal life and significance of Jesus have lain outside of the norm of doctrinal development. Indeed, Christology has never been whole-heartedly interested in Jesus, even though it has devoted itself to his natures and person. The reason is simple: in the messianic schema the Christ is essentially functional. He must perform the work of God's vice-gerent. For such an office his earthly life was of small significance. Even his resurrection, which, if once accepted as historical, has a meaning wholly independent of the messianic argument, has been made contributory to the proof of his divine office. The chief interest in the anti-Arian movement out of which orthodoxy rose lay in the desire for assurance that the Savior was divine. The ethical implications in the belief were all but overlooked.

Yet in the actual experiences of the historical Jesus with their wealth of religious and moral appeal, there was overlooked another organizing principle which modern theology recognizes, but to which historical orthodoxy was blind because such experiences were not readily systematized in the messianic-drama theology.

The reason that the messianic drama became the vertebral column, so to speak, of Christian doctrine is not far to seek. It is primitive Christianity itself, minus only these experimental elements. The New Testament and other early Christian literature make it plain that the conquest of Christianity was due primarily to an enthusiasm born of the belief that the entire messianic program was to be immediately fulfilled and that those who accepted Jesus in his messianic capacity would participate in the joys of the literal kingdom which he was to establish. The beliefs with which Christianity started on its conquest of the Roman Empire were utterly foreign to philosophy and were as dramatic as the social experience in which the early Christians shared. Recall only the impassioned hopes and arguments of Ignatius. To think of Christianity as originally an ethical, sociological, or philosophical movement is to misinterpret it completely. The elements of its hope were concrete and their unity was the unity of a drama. Therein was Christian theology in outline.¹

¹ Cf. Augustine's treatise on *The Faith and the Creed*. This fact emerged wherever orthodoxy came into sharp contrast with philosophy. Thus Origen *Ag. Celsus* i. 7: "Who is ignorant of the statement that Jesus was born of a virgin, and that he was

4. The philosophizing of theologians never destroyed these fundamental elements. By the middle of the second century, however, this messianic expectation had ceased to be concrete and had become transcendental. True, there were those like the Montanists who fought against this transformation and sought to maintain the messianic drama-theology in full literalism. But so strong had become the tendency to revalue the messianic program as a philosophy that this more primitive type of Christianity was repeatedly relegated to the limbo of heresy. Notwithstanding the contributions made by Tertullian to Christian doctrine and vocabulary, the line of theological development runs not through him, but through that remarkable group of Alexandrians who made *regula fidei* the basis of a new philosophy by synthesizing the messianic drama with Hellenistic culture.¹

This transition can be observed primarily in two particulars. (1) With the disappearance of the hope that the heavenly kingdom would be immediately established, the Christian teachers passed from the heralding to the rationalizing of their message of deliverance. At once they became involved in disputes with representatives of contemporary philosophies, all of them profoundly interested in cosmological speculations.

We have so little first-hand knowledge of men like Marcion that it is unsafe to speculate as to what Christianity might have become had the church leaders not stood manfully by the messianic outline, but it can hardly be doubted that the new religion would have been lost in the swarming gnostic sects. The line of defense as laid down by Tertullian was simplicity itself. "Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary

crucified and that his resurrection is an article of faith among many, that a general judgment is announced to come, in which the wicked are to be punished according to their deserts, and the righteous to be duly rewarded."

¹ In a way the beginning of this recasting of the gospel may be seen in the later Pauline literature, in which the apologetic against heresy led to the ascription to Jesus of a cosmic significance which included whatever truth may have been conceded to the views opposed.

faith, that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides."¹ Tertullian's final appeal is to *regula fidei*, which is the very quintessence of an unphilosophical, dramatic summary of Christian messianism.

(2) But the Alexandrine teachers chose quite another method. With them *regula fidei* was final, but it was also defensible philosophically. Accordingly, for centuries the defense proceeded in the way of giving the Messiah a cosmological value. Materials for such redefinition lay close at hand in the New Testament terms, Son of God and Logos.

In the New Testament usage, the term Son of God was simply a synonym for Messiah and the Pauline usage by no means served to modify the politico-dramatic expectation of messianism. In the hands of the Alexandrine theologians, however, it passed from the social presuppositions of politics to the even more universal presupposition of generation. A study of Justin Martyr and Origen will enable one to trace this clearly. Instead of the conquering king we have the incarnate God foretold by the prophets; and this doctrine of incarnation which played practically no rôle whatever in Paulinism becomes a central feature of the new interpretation of *regula fidei*. But the transition from the political to the parental-filial presupposition may be seen even before Justin in the struggles of Docetism to reach a rational Christology. Indeed, the dangers inherent in this heresy appear in the Johannine epistles, where a test of genuine Christian belief is to be seen in the assertion that the Christ has come in the flesh. The question under discussion did not concern the Godhead but the historical person Jesus. How could the Son of God be genuinely human? The source of the difficulty in accepting the Hebraic conception of unction is doubtless to be found in the fact that Christianity had passed from the Jewish people where messianism in its full content was a religious presupposition, to the gentile world in which the possibility of incarnation through divine generation was a universally accepted presupposition. But even here it will be observed that the transition is from one social presupposition to another—from politics to paternity.

¹ *Presc. Haer.* vii.

A more genuinely philosophical concept appears in the Logos. The most significant transition in the history of Christology occurred when the Logos of cosmological significance was identified with the begotten Son of God, and the new conception was injected into the old messianic formula of *regula fidei*. The Logos then with Justin became the revealer of a new and sacred philosophy.

This tendency to elevate concrete dramatic expectation into a transcendental, philosophical formula reached its culmination when the contest over the sonship of the Logos passed from the realm of history into the realm of the metaphysics of the God-head and the center of interest in the Son became not Jesus but the second person of a trinity. Just as the kingdom of God ceased to become a definite social order upon the earth and became a transcendental heaven, did the doctrine of divine sonship pass from the stage of history into the stage of metaphysics. But again the mold in which the new doctrine was shaped was not in itself metaphysical but one of social experience. The great discussion of the century that culminated in the Council of Nicea centered about two terms, "eternal generation" and *persona*. We are accustomed to overlook this fact because so much attention came to be centered upon the metaphysical term "consubstantial"; but consubstantiability was only a marker for the genuine content expressed by the sonship of the Logos through eternal generation rather than creation. And as any fair study of Athanasius will show, it is the expression "begotten, not made" which is the real heart of the Nicene Creed. Consubstantiability was simply a dangerous metaphysical concept blurred by Latin philistinism, used as a shibboleth against Arianism to protect the content of "eternal generation." The organon, so to speak, by which "eternal generation" was rationalized was the legal term suggested by the lawyer Tertullian, *persona*. While it is true that in the entire trinitarian controversy the tendency was toward abstraction, it is beyond question that the final decision of the Nicene Council was regarded not as a completely metaphysical, but rather as a dramatic and symbolic expression. The opposition which Athanasius felt to the word "consubstantial" was largely due to his fear lest the word should involve Christian theology in meta-

physical heresies. What he and his party desired was the maintenance of the actual relationship which the figure "eternal generation" expressed. The appropriation of *persona*, a term so essential to Roman law, was due to the fact that it connoted something that gave the theological truth a universalized social, i.e., forensic connotation. However metaphysical the language of the disputants in the Arian controversy, the synthetic rather than the definitive force of the term appears from the well-known expression of Augustine to the effect that the word is *persona* used to express a fact which really transcends formal definition.¹

But while thus the messianic term Christ lost much of its original content and became metaphysical, the entire schema of the Christian hope remained unchanged. The philosophizing of ecumenical Christianity never affected the dramatic program contained in the old Roman symbol and even its metaphysical Trinitarianism was itself determined by the analogies of social experience. The ecumenical creeds never passed beyond the relation of the Son to the Father except as regards the person of Jesus and, somewhat incidentally, in the matter of the procession of the Holy Ghost, and never attempted to reorganize the messianic program as a whole.

III. LATIN ORTHODOXY AS DETERMINED BY SOCIAL EXPERIENCE

When one passes from ecumenical to Latin theology the dominance of the original messianic program is at once apparent. Whereas the Greeks with their constitutional inability to organize politically turned to the concept of salvation as a gaining of immortality, the Latin world with its passion for administration and law undertook to develop the governmental presuppositions which lay back of the primitive Christian hope. Indeed the history of doctrinal development in the western world might be described as the construction of a theology on the basis of transcendental politics. Theology thus advanced parallel with the development of the church as an institution. As the Christian community ceased to be simply the group of those who were the expectant citizens of the kingdom which was to be established and became a

¹ *On the Trinity*, v. 9.

religious empire constructed in accordance with the precedents of the Roman Empire, so Christian theology became the theory of a transcendental state whose sovereign was God.¹

The course of this transformation involved the gradual formulation of Christian doctrines whose organizing principles were the dominant presuppositions on which society at different times itself was organized.

1. So far as the doctrine of God was concerned, the organizing principle was confessedly that of monarchy.

(1) The Christian God was first of all the universal creator.² The struggle with Gnosticism had settled this beyond peradventure, but the doctrine of God as related to humanity reflects the development of the social mind from which also sprang political theory. With Augustine the absolute sovereignty of God became the central element of the theology because of his struggle with Pelagianism, but the real distinction between the Pelagian and the Augustinian was not in the struggle between foreordination and the free will. It is rather to be seen in Augustine's *City of God* in which the entire Christian dispensation is definitely cast in the political mold. This unmodified absolute monarchy of God was the starting-point of all theological discussions throughout the Roman Catholic church and thence passed over into the Protestant Augustinianism of Luther and Calvin.

(2) The first modifications of this monarchical presupposition are to be found, not in Pelagianism, which rested fundamentally on philosophical and ethical bases, but in the political revolutions which caused the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of constitutional government. A difficulty is here, of course, apparent. Constitutional monarchy makes a very ineffective medium for the exposition of the supremacy of God, for religion instinctively refuses to worship a God who is in any sense limited in the exercise of his power by the will of his subjects. Yet in Deism

¹ The beginning of this process may be seen in the Apologists' insistence that the Christians were a "third race," the Gentiles and Jews being the other two.

² Yet even here God was spoken of as giving laws for the administration of the universe. Cf. Origen *Ag. Celsus* i. 18. Believers were his subjects, Origen *De Principiis* i. 6. For the development of this twofold position in scholasticism see in general, Taylor, *Mediaeval Mind*, II, 275 f.

the divine government is in a way constitutionalized. It is a striking fact that Deism arose in England practically at the same time that the English people, after revolting against the absolute sovereignty of the Stuarts and the constitutional anomaly of Cromwell, drew up the Bill of Rights and developed the politics of the seventeenth century. Deism sprang from the same social mind that gave rise to the political theories of Locke. Just as an English monarch was stripped of his absolute sovereignty and removed from the control of the state which was thereafter to be self-directing in terms of its own law, did Deism undertake to remove God from immediate control of the universe and permit the universe to take over its own self-direction. This is not to say that Deism was necessarily the product of the new political theory, but rather to say that both alike expressed the same developing presupposition dominating the social mind. The fact that Deism did not have anything more than a derived influence on the continent of Europe is doubtless due to the fact that in contemporary France absolute monarchy still remained the dominant social presupposition while in other continental countries the political development had hardly begun.

(3) A still further development of the idea of God is to be seen at the end of the period of revolution. If there is anything characteristic of the latter half of the eighteenth century it is the rise of the people against the hereditary and autocratic privilege of the monarchy and nobility. This spirit of revolution may be traced in all the French writers who carried on to further completeness the social-political theories of England. The Encyclopedists, Voltaire and Rousseau, are outstanding illustrations of the new social mind which believed in the rights of the people as over against the governing classes. But this development of belief in natural rights within the region of politics is no more pronounced than the contemporaneous development of the doctrine of the natural rights of humanity as over against a sovereign God. Deism was an untenable position religiously, but revolution in behalf of oppressed individuals found a natural expression in theology on the one side in the Methodist movement, and on the other in the rise of Unitarianism.

The former of these two noteworthy movements was not really theological except as it favored Arminianism of an unpolemical type. The situation was far different in the case of the second. The Unitarian movement was not fundamentally christological although it was drawn into christological discussion. It was something more radical. It was the religious correlate of the rise of popular sovereignty. As the masses of America, France, the Lowlands, and even Prussia undertook to demonstrate their rights as men over against an autocracy of privilege, so did the Unitarians undertake to set forth the rights of a proletarian humanity as over against the sovereign God. Though, because of a variety of causes, it never became a widespread religious movement, none the less its influence has been felt wherever the presupposition of social activity is individualistic and democratic. And with the spread of democracy as the presupposition of social activity, the need of recasting the doctrine of God has become increasingly apparent.¹

An illustration of this fact is to be seen in the development of the federal theology. This theology not only involves the theory of contracts which became such a favorite and dominating conception of early modern political theory, but also the newer political

¹ In this connection it is pertinent to recall that in the development of Roman Catholicism there was a reproduction of the general juridical aspects of the Empire. Roman law reappears in Canon law, not merely in the sense that the details of Canon law are so frequently the readjustments of the imperial formulas but also in what might be called its basal philosophy. Christianity in fact gradually became a new sort of legal system, not only in the sense that it developed an ethical legalism, but also in that its entire theological system reproduced legal ideals. Thus Origen says: "We admit that we teach those men to believe without reasons who are unable to abandon all other employments, and give themselves to an examination of arguments" (*Ag. Celsus* i. 10); "The union of Christians does not rest on reason or on a reason but on divine *energeia* shown in prophets who foretold Christ" (*Ag. Celsus* iii. 14). (Cf. also *Ag. Celsus* i. 2.) But the authoritative concept was more distinct than this. The Christians come to be regarded as a third nation as over against the Jews and the Gentiles. (Origen *Ag. Celsus* iii. 8 may be regarded as a typical usage.) As this point of view developed in the Middle Ages there emerged the conception of the Bible as the *jus gentium* of theology. (Taylor, *Mediaeval Mind*, II, 268.) In this way the Scriptures became a fundamental basis of all theology occupying the same relationship to the Canon law and the various ecclesiastical statutes that the *jus gentium* or *lex naturalis* occupied to the systems of imperial codes. (Gierke, *Mediaeval Political Theories*, p. 172, describes *lex naturalis* as a truly promulgated law.) It of course goes without saying that the Canon law gave new meaning to the terms of Roman law in the interests of theological system.

theories of representation. It is only what we should expect when we see this doctrine developing in those nations where representative government was similarly developing. The federal headship of Adam is not to be found in the theologies of countries where the monarchical and feudal conceptions remained in force. Cocceius, who may fairly be said to have introduced the representative principle into the theology, was thus utilizing a principle which was developing in the Calvinistic states in which alone representative government triumphed. The fact that it was proposed but vehemently rejected in the Council of Trent is a commentary on the difference in social presuppositions of theology historically understood. The Roman Catholic church has always clung to the absolute monarchical conception as a presupposition of its theology and administration. Thus again politics and theologies seem to spring from identical social minds.

2. Any discussion of a systematized doctrine of sin properly starts with Augustine. The Greek Fathers were not concerned with the guilt in sin, but rather with the corruption in the human nature which was to be overcome by the giving of immortality. In the case of Augustine we find this idea of corruption very definitely identified with concupiscence. But he is not content to leave sin in what might be called its quasi-biological definition. He carried it over and emphasized the element of forensic guilt which was in addition to such corruption. It is to be noticed that neither of these conceptions is strictly philosophical. In fact the motive and the chief effort of his discussion is the taking of sin out from the philosophical region into which the Pelagians would carry it, just as truly as out from the cosmological field into which the Manicheans placed it. That he was affected by the latter is of course obvious, but his systematic treatment of sin is steadily in terms of forensic conception.

Such a conception became dominant in Augustinian theology of a later date, a fact by no means surprising when it is recalled that so many of the creative theologians, among them Calvin, were trained as lawyers. In fact the whole conception of guilt as over against the corruption of nature is evidently forensic and characteristically western. Nor did this conception presuppose

general juridical habits alone. It is at least a fair question whether the conception of the corruption of nature so disagreeably argued by Augustine and so subtly elaborated by his successors would have been intelligible to a civilization unaccustomed to such a political conception as the taint of blood in the case of traitors and the more primitive but persistent legal conception that the individual shared in the guilt of his tribe or family. Doubtless one of the reasons which led to the modification of the doctrine of original sin lay in the rise of new political practices.

3. When we pass to the doctrine of justification we enter an admittedly forensic field. Attempts, it is true, have been made of late years to show that *δικαίω* means "to make righteous," but such a view is exegetically impossible. Justification means nothing more or less than acquittal. God as the king either directly or through his Messiah remits the penalty (as distinct from the consequences) of sin which was due to the sinner. It is this point of view that the Protestant theologies sharply emphasized although it lies beneath the teaching of the Roman Catholic church. Justification as a forensic act is not one of experience and as the argument of Paul in Galatians plainly shows was a status which could not be complete until the final judgment. In the meantime those who had faith could rest assured of the certainty of acquittal before the bar of Christ because of their experience of the Spirit. Protestantism in its sharp distinction between justification and sanctification has served to make the forensic quality of the term increasingly distinct. That it is thus an extension of social experience must appear without further argument.

? I don't
think this.

4. The history of the doctrine of the atonement exhibits more perfectly than that of any other the immediate influence of social experience on itself, doubtless because neither ecumenical nor Latin Christianity has formulated the significance of the death of Christ in any fashion comparable with trinitarian and christological orthodoxy.

(1) In the ancient church two social customs influenced the shaping-up of the doctrinal significance of the death of Christ, those of sacrifice and of ransom.

The use of sacrifice as a means of valuing the death of Christ

is evident in the New Testament. The reason for this is simple. The entire religious world was accustomed to feel the act of reconciliation completed only upon the offering of a sacrificial gift. Whatever may have been the origin of sacrifice, in New Testament times it had become thoroughly conventionalized as a custom concerning the utility of which there was no more doubt than of any other universal practice. Pagan and Jew alike sacrificed. In the new Christian religion no sacrifice was offered; and this fact, especially when Christianity passed beyond the limits of the Jewish Temple worship, must have given rise to serious questioning both explicit and implicit. The neglect of a universal custom would force the Christian, with his confidence in his reconciliation with a God who had previously threatened punishment, to query whether such reconciliation could have been accomplished without any sacrifice. The reply which the New Testament writers gave to such a question was very simple. Christ was a sacrifice, but offered not by men but by God.¹ Such a use of the historic death of Christ would have been quite as intelligible to the Gentile as to the Jew. Paul, Peter, and John use mostly the generic concept but sometimes the specific, the Passover. None of the New Testament writers, however, found it necessary to elaborate this view. The mere application of the entire sacrificial concept to the death of Christ could make real to a world actually practicing sacrifice the significance of an already experienced union of God. Like every sacrificial gift, it brought the assurance that reconciliation with God was complete.

What is true of the New Testament writers is true also of those subsequent writers who lived in a period when sacrifice was a common social practice. They never systematized, explained, or expanded it. There was no need. They had simply to use it as an interpretative medium, intelligible and effective in a world accustomed to a sacrifice.² It was only when sacrifice ceased that

¹ Rom. 3:23-25. Cf. I John 2:1-2.

² See, for instance, Ep. Barnabas, chaps. 5, 7, 8, 12. Similarly Ignatius refers to the blood of Christ and of God. But generally in the Apostolic Fathers the sufferings of Christ are used rather as an encouragement to suffer in behalf of the faith. In almost every case his death is mentioned, as in Paul, in close reference to his resurrection.

Reference to cleansing by the blood, e.g., Justin *I Apol.*, chap. 32, and elsewhere,

the sacrificial aspect of the death of Christ was developed through the sacraments into more complete dogmatic significance.

The second social practice by which the significance of the death of Christ is set forth is that of ransom.¹ At the first this figure was used without elaboration in the sense of the cost of the messianic vocation. The death of Christ in behalf of his kingdom is set forth as similar to the sufferings of some king in behalf of his subjects.² But the figure was too suggestive to be left undeveloped. But to whom was the ransom paid? Not to God,³ who had sent his son, but, naturally, to Satan.⁴ This conception so long-lived in patristic thought was simply an appropriation of a custom common throughout all undeveloped civilizations of restoring captives to their friends in return for some payment. As the race, or the saints, as the case might be, were held in captivity by Satan, they were purchased from him by Christ, who through his death entered into the lower regions, surrendering himself to Satan in order that certain persons might be set free and pass into heaven. The escape of Jesus himself from such a surrender naturally attracted the homiletic attention of the later writers and this conception was developed into a thoroughly unethical pronouncement. God was described as having used the humanity of Jesus as a sort of bait

are not infrequent but it is an open question whether such references are not rather akin to the mysteries than to sacrifice in the Jewish sense of the term. Cf. Justin *I Apol.*, chap. 61: "This washing, baptism, is called illumination because they who learned these things are illuminated in their understanding and in the name of Jesus Christ. . . . He who is illuminated is washed." See also *Dial. Trypho*, chap. 13. In this latter work Justin naturally finds the forecast of the sufferings of Christ in the various sacrificial practices of the Hebrews, e.g., chaps. 41, 43, 44, 54. Justin goes somewhat farther than other writers in his view that Christ vicariously bore a curse in behalf of the human family (chaps. 95, 96), but it is not the curse of God but of the Jews.

¹ Matt. 20:28.

² Clement, chap. 55: "Many kings and princes, in times of pestilence, when they had been instructed by an oracle, have given themselves up to death, in order that by their own blood they might deliver their fellow-citizens."

³ See the noble passages in Ep. Diognetus, chap. 7; and Irenaeus *Adv. Haer.* vii. 1.

⁴ The first clear expression of this theory is in Origen *Com. Rom.* ii. 13. 4. There is no need in this connection to discuss the interesting view of "recapitulation" set forth by Irenaeus, although in a complete history of the doctrine of the atonement it would deserve careful consideration.

by which Satan was caught on the hook of Christ's divinity.¹ It is not to our purpose to discuss this matter in detail, but simply to call attention to the fact that these two modes of interpreting the death of Christ were carried over from the social practice of the time and involved the presuppositions on which that practice rested. That there were other conceptions of the death of Christ in which the term "satisfaction" was incidentally used is true, but even in such cases it was not a "satisfaction" to God's honor or justice in the sense later given the term. And here again Tertullian, probably the originator of the expression, was utilizing the practices of law.

(2) It was approximately a thousand years before the death of Christ found a real place in the system of Christian thought. At that time it was introduced by Anselm in his famous work *Cur Deus Homo*. Even a cursory reading of that book shows how far the explanation involves the dominant concepts of feudalism. The death of Christ according to Anselm is not punitive but was the means by which humanity and God co-operated in the incarnation to render satisfaction to the "honor" of God which had been violated by the sin of humanity. Whether or not this conception was born of Germanic or Roman or, as seems on the whole probable, was a combination of the two elements, it is of a piece with the practice of the Middle Ages. Only from such a point of view is it intelligible. The student of feudalism, however, finds no difficulty in the general philosophy of the theory. God's relations to the world are those of a feudal lord to his vassals and subjects, and their relation to him is similarly considered as a part of a transcendental feudal system.

(3) The theory of the atonement held by the reformers involves a change parallel to that which occurred in the political history of the day. Strictly feudal ideas have been replaced by the claims of punitive justice. The change that came over the mediaeval mind as it became modern found an early expression in the right of those in authority to exercise vengeance in the name of justice. The death of Christ by the reformers is not conceived of as rendering satisfaction to God's "honor" but it becomes strictly penal.

¹ So, e.g., Gregory the Great and Gregory of Nyssa distinctly specify God's deceit in the transaction.

His punitive suffering makes it possible for the love of God to express itself without giving up the divine necessity of punishment. This fundamental conception varied with different writers, sometimes reaching the extreme form of a commercial substitution of a punishment borne by Christ mathematically equivalent to those sufferings which otherwise would have been borne by those who had committed sin. This commercial conception was particularly natural in an age which was feeling the great expansion of commerce, which developed with the discovery of the western world. The God of the theologians found his analogy in the relentless monarchs of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who could carry on wars of religion in Europe and a conquest of Peru and Mexico on the western continent.

(4) With Grotius this conception of God seemed to be impossible, and that great lawyer did for the doctrine of the atonement what he was at the same time doing for international law. Just as he expressed in the latter the growing conviction that law needed to be set forth in all its sovereignty wholly apart from the peculiar institutions or persons by whom it was enforced, did he express in the doctrine of the atonement the belief that the divine law needed to be vindicated.

(5) Alongside of this development there grew up the doctrine of the atonement which was based upon the religious practice of penance of the secondary Christianity which can be traced from the third century. According to such a view men may acquire merit by undergoing certain discomforts. It was an easy step, therefore, to extend the idea of merit already intimately ingrained in the social practice of the church to the work of Christ. His merit like that of the saints was transferable to his followers either directly through faith as in Protestantism or indirectly through the church as in Roman Catholicism.

(6) Since the days of the Reformation the satisfaction of God's justice or the vindication of his law has been the prevailing mode of interpreting the death of Christ, but as the ethical sense of humanity has developed, they have been felt to be by many insufficient.¹ To such persons the character of God which they

¹ This reaction appears as early as Abelard, but earlier writers approximated his "moral influence" point of view.

implied seemed inferior to the ideals which were demanded of men in their ordinary relations with each other. In consequence of this, among other causes, the theory of the atonement has become that of the social ethics which has been steadily working in the western world. As punishment has been conceived of increasingly as reformatory quite as much as punitive and as our whole penal system has minimized vengeance in the name of justice, so has the doctrine of the atonement passed to that of moral example and the revelation of the love and nature of God.

It is evident from this sketch of the six different types of the atonement that no one of them is, strictly speaking, philosophical, but that each is an extension of some definite presupposition governing social practice. Neither sacrifice, ransom, satisfaction of "honor," satisfaction of justice, vindication of the majesty of law, transfer of acquired merit, nor the vicarious suffering enforced by social solidarity makes the doctrine of the atonement a philosophical matter, and each one has been outgrown and abandoned by those who have come under the control of newer presuppositions which have governed social action.

IV. WHY THEOLOGY HAS NOT DEVELOPED PARALLEL WITH THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SOCIAL EXPERIENCE

While thus the influence of the presuppositions of social experience is to be traced in the development of doctrinal systems, it is also true that there has been no such complete parallelism in the development of theology and social institutions as might be expected. Theologies have not always been orthodox, but they have seldom reached wide acceptance when diverging widely. Furthermore, periods of intellectual and political progress have always been marked by distrust as well as transformation of theological systems.

The reason for these discrepancies between the logical and the actual relation of theology to the social mind are not far to seek.

1. In the first place, theology has always been checked in its response to the creative social forces by a tendency to become a philosophy. The history of theology on the one side may be

described as a struggle between these dramatic conceptions in which men have endeavored to make real to themselves the significance of their religious beliefs, and philosophy. Such a conflict was inevitable from the fact already noted that philosophy is both the product of the same social experience as theological thought, and at the same time is a phase of that social mind with which theology has to reckon. In its earlier stages theology was forced into conflict with systems of thought which undertook to organize Christianity in terms of some cosmological or metaphysical principle. Especially was this true in the case of the great contest lasting for centuries between Catholicism and Gnosticism. The gnostic movement, strictly speaking, was not theological. Combining the cosmological idea of emanation and the theosophical idea of dualism, it undertook to embody in itself such elements of the New Testament as it could. Its success was great and there resulted what might fairly be called a rival religion which was Christian only in the sense that it embodied certain elements of Christianity in a synthetic philosophical schema covering all phases of human thought.

In their struggle with this rival the Christian thinkers, as has already been pointed out, strove to do two things: first, to maintain the supremacy of the messianic schema which was involved in the baptismal symbol and *regula fidei*; and second, to show forth the philosophical significance of such doctrines as were in process of formulation. That Catholicism conquered was due to many causes, but doubtless as much as any to the fact that although cosmological significance was given to Christ reconceived as Logos, the second person of the Trinity, the Catholic scheme of doctrine was not subjected to that world-view which was the basis of the gnostic teaching. On one side Catholicism protected itself by the criticism of the extravagant ideas of Gnosticism, and on the other side by the appeal to that which had been "always, everywhere and by all" believed. This latter appeal was of course not an answer to the claim of Gnosticism to be the true philosophy of religion, but it did succeed in making clear that Gnosticism was not the Christianity which was contained in the New Testament. Furthermore in refusing to answer philosophical objections to Christianity by

philosophical arguments and by concentrating attention upon its strictly theological elements, Catholicism accomplished two things: it preserved the theological elements which it had inherited; and it repudiated the modernist's position of theology as of necessity adapting itself to current modes of thought at the expense of its own criteria.

Viewed in the retrospect it would appear that theology, from the third century, was in danger of sharing the same fate which philosophy had brought upon mythology. That such is not the case is not only due to the refusal already noted on the part of the Christian apologists to debate the fundamental schema of Christianity, but it was also due to the fact that when philosophy entered into Christianity it came as a defender rather than as an opponent. Justin, it is true, emphasized the philosophy of the revealed Logos, but the great theologians who followed him never swerved in their loyalty to the "principles," as Origen would call them, of the rule of faith. They saw in philosophy the means of making more tenable those theological positions which were inherited from Scripture rather than from philosophy. Their example has been followed by the theologians since their day and in consequence, no matter how dependent orthodoxy may have been upon philosophy in its intellectual appeal and in its method of developing individual doctrines, it has never allowed philosophy to replace the creeds. It has been inevitable, therefore, that in the same proportion as a philosophy has become identified with the strictly theological elements of a church system, the two should have been carried along together. A striking illustration of that is Thomas Aquinas, whose christianized Aristotelianism thoroughly identified philosophical method and point of view with theological positions. The current struggle of the Roman Curia with modernism is an illustration of how a theology which has grown rigid through the dogmatizing of philosophical concepts fails to respond to the new presuppositions which condition the evolution of social experience and philosophy itself. But similar illustrations could be drawn from Lutheranism and Calvinism. Each of these great systems has suffered a hardening of the arteries of theology because of the introduction into it of philosophical concepts transformed

into orthodoxy by ecclesiastical and political authority. In consequence neither system responds readily to the modern mind.

2. Thus we are brought to the second reason for the failure of theology to develop *pari passu* with social evolution. The philosophizing of theology might have been to a considerable extent rectified in the course of the development of Christianity had it not been rendered static by being transformed into orthodoxy.

A student of church history does not need to be told how this process proceeded. Generally speaking, it may be said to have begun in an attempt at some adjustment of the inherited Christian faith to a philosophical mode of thinking; this was followed by a period of controversy in which the defenders of the inherited *regula fidei* were forced to justify their position by the use of some philosophical concept; thereupon there occurred the holding of a council which formulated the doctrine in dispute in accordance with *regula fidei* or creed and the philosophy of its defenders, and then made the acceptance of its formularies the test of right belief. As the decisions of these councils were as a rule enforced by the state as well as by the penalty of excommunication from the church, theology steadily grew less responsive to the changing social mind. There ensued the lamentable situation so widespread at the present time in which the union of essential elements of Christianity with their philosophical elaboration and defense is so complete that to redefine the one by the substitution of new thought-forms is regarded as heretical if not worse. Protestantism here suffers with Catholicism. Orthodoxy is defensible simply because it is orthodoxy, that is, something made authoritative by an appeal to the past. In the same proportion as this authoritative element remains in theology is it compelled to oppose not only genuinely anti-religious movements like materialism but other movements which involve the modification of the philosophical elements which have been integrated into orthodoxy by church authority.

We see here the fundamental weakness of a doctrine which depends solely or chiefly upon authority. It of necessity perpetuates philosophical and social survivals. However serviceable it may have been to the age in which it was formulated; however it may have functioned helpfully because of its participation in the

dynamic presuppositions of the life of its day, it grows incapable of service and helpfulness in ages of different character. Indeed, we might almost say, in the same proportion in which it did function well does its rigidity render it incapable of vital service to those communities which are dominated by different social minds. For this, if for no other reason, there is imminent danger lest the essential and permanent values which orthodoxy expresses shall be lost to those who no longer accept the philosophy and no longer share in the social experience which orthodoxy has embodied in itself.

3. Yet this cannot obscure the fact which the history of the doctrine-making process discloses. Orthodoxy is the outcome of a process, unhappily arrested by ecclesiasticism, by which fundamental religious realities were mediated to religious needs of a given period by the use of the presuppositions of that period's social experience. Any theological reconstruction therefore that would be thoroughgoing and do for our age what the original creators of theology did for theirs in preconciliar periods must face two tasks: first, it must distinguish between the theological schema which came over from the messianic Christianity of the primitive church and that philosophical construction which has built up by it as defense an explanation; and second, it must evaluate the schema itself in terms of religious efficiency. This second is the primary task of today. As long as it is neglected will theology be in distress. Christianity can never dominate our modern world by merely changing its philosophical element. That is of course demanded, but the fundamental need is that of dramatic analogies by which religious thinking can be identified with those dynamic presuppositions on which our entire social activity depends.

The position which the theologian will take in the present moment of unrest will be very largely determined by his conception of the aim of theology. If, as many hold, the purpose of theology is to give final and lasting formulations for religious experience and so to express religious truth that it shall be as statically absolute as metaphysical reality itself, there is no appeal except that of orthodoxy itself to the authority either of councils, the pope, or an a-priori belief in an infallible Scripture. It goes without saying

that such an appeal will completely break with our modern world. If, on the other hand, the purpose of theology is held to be functional and if it is an ever-growing approximation to ultimate reality through the satisfaction it gives to the ever developing and changing religious needs of different periods, then theological method becomes to a considerable extent empirical and pragmatic. Theological reconstruction will seek first of all not philosophical means of adapting a theological schema to our modern world but will rather seek to reproduce the actual procedure of theology in its creative epochs. That is to say, as theology in such epochs has utilized the dynamic presuppositions conditioning all social activity in general, will it today seek to utilize such presuppositions as are now creative.

Nor is this a difficult task. The theologian who approaches his problem from the point of view of social experience rather than that of metaphysics will recognize two presuppositions which are reconstituting our modern world: evolution and creative democracy. Just how these two presuppositions can be used for theological reconstruction must be left for further discussion. ✓

THE CHILDREN'S BUREAU¹

JULIA C. LATHROP

Chief of the Children's Bureau, Washington, D.C.

On April 9 of the present year, the President of the United States approved the act creating the Children's Bureau under the Department of Commerce and Labor. The efforts that led up to this accomplished fact may be briefly reviewed as follows:

Five years ago the idea of a Federal Children's Bureau originated with Miss Lillian D. Wald, head of the Nurses' Settlement in New York. Mrs. Florence Kelley, secretary of the National Consumers' League, a former resident of Hull House now living at the Nurses' Settlement, drew up the first outline of the matters relating to child-care which should be intrusted to the proposed bureau for investigation—an outline corresponding closely with the enumeration of subjects contained in the law finally enacted. The genuine value of a genuine settlement is thus evidenced by the fact that this bureau was first urged by women who have lived long in settlements and who by that experience have learned to know as well as any persons in this country certain aspects of dumb misery which they desired through some governmental agency to make articulate and intelligible. They urged upon the National Child Labor Committee the possibility of undertaking a publicity campaign on behalf of such a bureau and that organization has for four years maintained an office in Washington, and, by wise and patient effort, has aroused and organized the public interest which has been an all-important factor in securing the law, so that no piece of governmental machinery ever went into operation with more harmonious and vigorous backing from public-spirited men and women.

The National Child Labor Committee took the lead only to bring together effectively the great associations interested in such

¹ Being an address before the Biennial Meeting of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, San Francisco, July 5, 1912.

an enactment and eager to urge the law. These associations represent, as was constantly admitted during the long debate in Congress, the most influential and the wisest views in this country on the care and protection of children. If the Bureau can continue to have their aid it cannot fail of usefulness and it will escape a danger which has been repeatedly mentioned; namely, the possibility that a federal bureau will relieve local bodies and volunteer associations of the sense of responsibility, will centralize the activities on behalf of children, and cool the ardor of those who would otherwise care tenderly and probably wisely for individual children. A distant office in Washington, filled with government employees, whose business it is to know about children, to gather and classify facts about them, instead of doing things for them, must make a constant effort likewise to avoid the faults of academic methods and aims. It is because my superiors at Washington wish this bureau to be vital, co-operative, serving the needs of the whole country, arousing rather than dulling the sense of personal responsibility, stimulating rather than usurping the functions of states and cities and counties and of volunteer associations, that I am here tonight.

Already the organization of the Bureau has begun. Under the strictest interpretation of the federal civil service law, as well as with the realization that no government agency can ever need more than this one will the steady precision of statistical accuracy, two important appointments have been made. The assistant chief is Mr. Lewis Meriam, a Harvard graduate, for six years employed in the Census Bureau, where he steadily advanced from a minor clerkship to the headship of a division. The chief statistician is Mr. Ethelbert Stewart, long identified with the Bureau of Labor, later with the Tariff Board, and known as a statistical expert and a field investigator of the highest class. The private secretary of the chief of the Bureau, although excepted by law from the civil service requirements, has been selected on the same basis of personal fitness. The final appointment of the other members of the present staff must await definite decision as to the precise work to be undertaken for this first year.

The Bureau needs, as has been said, the sternest statistical accuracy at base because its appeal to the noblest human passion of

pity must never be founded upon anything but truth, because it must guard against the easy charge of sentimentality and must be able to present all its statements dispassionately with scientific candor and faithfulness. In order that neither time nor money be wasted in repetition or duplication one of the most important positions which will be created in the Bureau will be that of a librarian-reader who will scan the current literature of the world and who can not only interpret the principal modern languages but estimate the social importance of the various movements relating to children. Such a position will require fine linguistic attainments, training in social science, a special interest in the work of the Bureau, as well as the usual knowledge of a trained librarian.

Before submitting for consideration specific suggestions of a fundamental character, attention should be given to the words of the law in which the duties of the Federal Children's Bureau are prescribed.

The first clause is comprehensive: "The said Bureau shall investigate and report to said department upon all matters pertaining to the welfare of children and child life among all classes of our people."¹ The next clauses are more specific: "and shall

¹ The full text of the law is as follows:

An Act To establish in the Department of Commerce and Labor a bureau to be known as the Children's Bureau.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there shall be established in the Department of Commerce and Labor a bureau to be known as the Children's Bureau.

SEC. 2. That the said bureau shall be under the direction of a chief, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall receive an annual compensation of five thousand dollars. The said bureau shall investigate and report to said department upon all matters pertaining to the welfare of children and child life among all classes of our people, and shall especially investigate the questions of infant mortality, the birth-rate, orphanage, juvenile courts, desertion, dangerous occupations, accidents and diseases of children, employment, legislation affecting children in the several states and territories. But no official, or agent, or representative of said bureau shall, over the objection of the head of the family, enter any house used exclusively as a family residence. The chief of said bureau may from time to time publish the results of these investigations in such manner and to such extent as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor.

SEC. 3. That there shall be in said bureau, until otherwise provided for by law, an assistant chief, to be appointed by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, who shall receive an annual compensation of two thousand four hundred dollars; one private secretary to the chief of the bureau, who shall receive an annual compensation of one thousand five hundred dollars; one statistical expert, at two thousand dollars; two clerks of class four; two clerks of class three; one clerk of class two; one clerk of class one; one clerk, at one thousand dollars; one copyist, at nine hundred dollars; one

especially investigate the questions of infant mortality, the birth-rate, orphanage, juvenile courts, desertion, dangerous occupations, accidents and diseases of children, employment, legislation affecting children in the several states and territories." It is plain that such sweeping powers must be very carefully used if they are not to result in costly waste. The next paragraph of the law defines the number of the employees at fifteen and the statutory expenses at \$25,640 a year. Small as this equipment appears, there could easily be waste of labor, and consequently of money; but here is seen the practical value of the federal civil service law which, permitting the choice of appointees on the basis of personal merit alone, is a protection against the wasteful appointments which thirty years ago would inevitably have been made. Indeed, it is well to recall the fact that such a bureau, requiring for real efficiency a staff composed of persons highly qualified and absolutely devoted to their work as a career, is only possible because there is a federal civil service law.

In the preparation of a program for the work of the first year, the fact has been brought out in a striking manner that the various bureaus of the government already possess an enormous amount of information with reference to child life which has been obtained at great cost and by the expenditure of large sums, but which is too detailed and technical for use by the general reader. There are likewise great private foundations carrying on studies regarding various phases of the life of children. For example, the Russell Sage Foundation is devoting a large sum annually to the study of children in institutions, the American Association for the Study and Prevention of Infant Mortality has undertaken a campaign to reduce the waste of infant life, and the work of the National Child Labor Committee directed against the industrial exploitation of children is familiar to all.

Those responsible for the work of the Bureau believe, therefore,

special agent, at one thousand four hundred dollars; one special agent, at one thousand two hundred dollars, and one messenger at eight hundred and forty dollars.

SEC. 4. That the Secretary of Commerce and Labor is hereby directed to furnish sufficient quarters for the work of this bureau at an annual rental not to exceed two thousand dollars.

SEC. 5. That this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

Approved, April 9, 1912.

that a careful survey of the field is its first duty. They think it proper that this task should precede original work on the part of the Bureau itself, and they therefore hope to present, in the form of brief, readable monographs, material now available or shortly to become so, originally too detailed and technical for the use of the lay reader. They are ready to accept the function of popularizing the wisdom of others and wherever such wisdom exists their own highest wisdom consists first of all in making that available.

If the subjects especially mentioned in the bill are now recalled it will be seen that certain of them have to do with the physical existence of the child—mortality, the birth-rate, disease, physical degeneracy. Questions of the birth-rate and of infant mortality, that is, death-rate of children less than one year old, whose fundamental importance and relevancy cannot be exaggerated, are wisely placed first. The great English statistician, Dr. Arthur Newsholme, has said:

Infant mortality is the most sensitive index we possess of social welfare. *If babies were well born and well cared for, their mortality would be negligible.* The infant death-rate measures the intelligence, health, and right living of fathers and mothers, the standards of morals and sanitation of communities and governments, the efficiency of physicians, nurses, health officers and educators.

And Professor Dietrich, the great German authority, is responsible for the statement:

It was formerly believed that the rate of mortality among children who had not reached the first anniversary of their birth was a wise dispensation of nature intended to prevent children with a weak constitution becoming too plentiful. Today we know that a great infant mortality is a national disaster—on the one hand because numerous economic values are created without purpose and prematurely destroyed and on the other hand because the causes of the high rate of infant mortality affect the powers of resistance of the other infants, and weaken the strength of the nation in its next generation.

The United States census of 1910 discloses the fact that in that year in the registration area 154,373 babies died when less than one year old. Moreover we are told on the authority of Dr. Cressy L. Wilbur, Chief Statistician of the United States Census Bureau, that the lives of at least one-half of these babies could have been saved by the application of methods which are within the reach of every community.

It will be noted figures are used for the "registration area" only.¹ What does that mean? It means that figures are to be obtained for about one-half of the area of the United States only, and that the Census Bureau must estimate the facts for the rest of the country by those recorded in the registration states. On the basis of such an estimate, the number of babies under one year of age dying yearly in the whole United States is stated conservatively as 200,000. Can a more satisfying purpose be conceived than that

¹ The "registration area" comprises such states as have "laws of a suitable character and are sufficiently well enforced to insure at least approximately correct returns and includes in addition certain cities in nonregistration states in which statistics of deaths are collected under effective local ordinances."

The states included in this "registration area" in 1910 were: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina (municipalities of 1,000 and over in 1900), Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.

There are 43 cities in nonregistration states which enter into the registration area. These are:

<i>Alabama:</i>	<i>Kansas:</i>	<i>South Carolina:</i>
Birmingham	Kansas City	Charleston
Mobile	Leavenworth	
Montgomery	Wichita	
		<i>Tennessee:</i>
<i>Delaware:</i>	<i>Kentucky:</i>	Knoxville
Wilmington	Covington	Memphis
	Louisville	Nashville
<i>Florida:</i>	Newport	
Jacksonville	Paducah	<i>Texas:</i>
Key West		Galveston
		San Antonio
<i>Georgia:</i>	<i>Louisiana:</i>	
Atlanta	New Orleans	<i>Virginia:</i>
Savannah		Alexandria
	<i>Missouri:</i>	Danville
<i>Illinois:</i>	Kansas City	Lynchburg
Aurora	St. Joseph	Norfolk
Belleville	St. Louis	Petersburg
Chicago		Richmond
Decatur	<i>Nebraska:</i>	
Evanston	Lincoln	<i>West Virginia:</i>
Jacksonville	Omaha	Wheeling
Quincy	<i>Oregon:</i>	
Springfield	Portland	

This "registration area" contained 58.3 per cent of the population of continental United States estimated as of July 1, 1910. It must not be forgotten that this is a death "registration area" and not birth registration. In very few of the states of the United States is there kept a record of births that can be considered even approximately complete or accurate.

of saving the 100,000 babies who are now lost plainly by our careless neglect, unless it be to learn to reduce the number to that "negligible" minimum of which Dr. Newsholme speaks?

But if there is uncertainty as to the number of deaths, there is still greater ignorance as to the number of children born. For not a single state, not a single city, has complete registration of births. In the words of Dr. Durand, head of the Census Bureau: "It is certainly both strange and shameful that the United States should be so far behind the other leading countries of the world in the registration of deaths and even more so in the registration of births."

In a pamphlet prepared by the Bureau of the Census, 1910,¹ it is stated roundly: "The most utterly worthless registration of births among all the great cities of the entire civilized world may be claimed by the cities of Baltimore, Chicago, and New Orleans," and San Francisco probably deserves the shameful honor of taking place as the fourth on equal terms with this disgraceful trio.

There are, of course, reasons why America lags behind European countries in the matter of noting the births of children. One reason is that the United States have not resorted to one expedient, the sternest, most hateful in all the world, by which at once faultless birth registration might be secured. Reference is made to the expedient which renders registration imperative in the great military countries. This expedient is the establishment of conscription and a standing army. God forbid that this country should ever count its children to the cruel and wasteful end of war!

But has peace no reasons for knowing authoritatively the advent of every citizen? Are not human lives in a civilization of peace worth enough each in turn to be dignified by such public record as shall preserve each precious link in the human chain?

Certainly property rights can often be economically and justly preserved only by the registration of births. Picturesque and tragic instances of the loss of property rights due to lack of birth registration could be cited; but a humorous and cheerful incident

¹ "Explanatory List of Diagrams Relating to Deaths of Infants," prepared for the annual meeting and exhibit of the American Association for Study and Prevention of Infant Mortality, Baltimore, 1910.—Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1910.

will make clear the point. Dr. John N. Hurty, secretary of the Indiana State Board of Health, tells the following story:

A farmer of Indiana, dying, left his valuable farm in trust to his unthrifty son, to go to his granddaughter on her twenty-first birthday. The girl had been told the date of her birth and always celebrated as her birthday the annual recurrence of the same. However, when she believed she was twenty-one, and claimed her inheritance, her father denied her age, saying she was only nineteen. The family bible was appealed to, but the leaf with the record was gone. The court was in a quandary. At last a neighbor remembered that a valuable cow, belonging to the grandfather, had given birth to a calf on the day the girl was born, and he could swear to the coincidence. Perhaps the grandfather had recorded the date of the birth of the calf. His farm books showed this to be the case, and the date of birth of the human being was established.

And in this connection one should remember Bernard Shaw's warning to novelists against the *deus ex machina* dénouement; for grandfathers in real life cannot be depended upon to keep herds of cattle.

Perhaps the most immediate necessity for birth registration in this country at the present time makes itself felt in connection with the effort to secure to every child his share of education and to protect him from premature and unguarded entry into working life. Mr. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, says in his annual report for 1910: "If laws providing for a free and happy childhood and the prevention of the ills which follow from the employment of children under legal age are to be enforced, there should be the means of obtaining evidence of age beyond doubt." Such evidence can of course be obtained by nothing short of birth registration.

Florence Kelley has epitomized the treatment of the child labor problem in saying that the best child labor law is a compulsory education law. It is certainly true that even if the children could be kept from working in factories, or working anywhere, the state has done less than half its duty toward them. It must in self-defense provide schools in which both mental and physical powers are enlarged, so that it is plain to parents that the child and the family are alike benefited by the postponement of the working age.

A tiny boy came into a hotel and asked a lady to buy a paper.

When she exclaimed, "Why! how old are you? Why aren't you in school?" this merchant, a recognized legal trader in most of our states, replied: "I am five years old. I am not old enough to go to school."

Many illustrations of the need of dovetailing these two kinds of law could in fact be drawn from any state, especially from any one of those states in which, in some localities, the 1910 census figures show that the school attendance of children from six to fourteen years is as low as 54.6 per cent.

Let me submit an example of this need of dovetailing, from surroundings with which I am personally familiar, the nineteenth ward of Chicago. I shall venture upon some detail because the instance relates to various subjects mentioned in the law.

An Italian family, father, mother, and eight children, survived the Messina earthquake and came to the United States. The father had been buried in the débris for several days before his rescue, and the horror of his imprisonment had almost turned his mind. When he first came over he was always thinking that the walls were coming in on him. Hull House first knew them when they applied for help a year and a half ago, stating that the oldest child, Chiara, who they said was nearly sixteen years old, was out of work because of the garment workers' strike then on in Chicago. The father was also out of work. Milk for the baby was bought on credit. They were trying to get a work certificate for the second girl, Giovanna, alleged to be fourteen years old, who was deaf and apparently subnormal, but the certificate was refused, and the child went back to school. Several months later the parents again tried to secure a work certificate for Giovanna, and then the district office of the Chicago United Charities wrote to Messina asking for birth records and received a prompt reply from the city hall of Messina, with a copy of the record which had undergone the earthquake. Chiara was born April 10, 1898, Giovanna was born on November 5, 1899, said the Sicilian record. Accordingly it became evident that the older girl was not yet fourteen, although she had been at work two years, and that the younger girl was twelve, instead of fourteen as the parents claimed.

Little Giovanna was thus captured for education, and, in the

hope of making her better able to learn, her tonsils were removed, and her deafness treated, and she has been returned for the two years' schooling which the compulsory education law and the child labor law of Illinois agreed in giving her.

Poor Chiara, convicted of being under fourteen, found her work certificate confiscated and herself returned to school by the compulsory education department; but she came to Hull House in the evening, saying she could not go to school with such small children, she, a "great big girl and would be married soon."

The mother too says Hull House ladies are "dreaming" to send a girl so old to school. If the Chicago public school and the Illinois factory inspection had utilized the Sicilian birth registration, Chiara would not have gone to work at twelve. She would instead have had two years for learning English and the art of keeping house in American fashion now so effectively taught in the lower grades of the best city schools. She might have worked for better wages the two years from fourteen to sixteen, and might have married at the remote age of sixteen without too much reproach from the Italian colony.

This is not the place for discussing the chaotic social economy shown by this story, for defending these parents from the easy but unjust charge of desiring to exploit their young daughters; but the case of little Giovanna turns us back to the item in the law relating to "defective children." How many dull or subnormal little girls and boys are thus lagging behind in school? No one knows. How can they be dealt with, in justice to themselves and their brighter and stronger brothers and sisters? Who knows? How far do they become the charges of a juvenile court? How far can they live self-directing lives as adults? No one can tell, although in New York and Chicago and elsewhere, these neglected problems are beginning to receive the attention they demand.

Since I have received the honor of appointment as chief of the Children's Bureau I have sought advice from all the people I could meet who have been interested in the Bureau or who are especially interested in the subject of the working children of this country. Many of those with whom I have counseled have warned me against making prominent the subject of child labor. They have said to

me that it is not a popular subject and that inquiries into the conditions of working children might cause prejudice against the Bureau among powerful people. This advice I know has been given disinterestedly. On the other hand, I have watched carefully the voluminous correspondence which has come to me and I find expressed so frequently the sense of wrong to the child and to the nation in permitting children to work during the years when conservative compulsory education states provide schooling for them, that I am sure this bureau will not be allowed without popular protest to ignore the child at work.

At present, as I have tried to say, there is a store of knowledge to be popularized; there are plans to be evolved for making the Bureau promptly responsive to popular demands for any relevant information, and there are fundamental propositions affecting every human being in the nation to be set out.

The registration of births seems to many of us the most imminent of these last:

To know anything about the birth-rate, we must register the children born.

To know anything about the death-rate, we must register the children born as well as the children who die.

To know how to stop the loss of 200,000 infants yearly, we must know first why they die, and when and where. We must register their births and deaths as the essential element of intelligent life-saving.

To know when the nation's children are entitled to attend school, we must know their ages by legal record.

To know when children can work legally, we must have legal certainty as to their birthdays.

To know about the diseases of children, we must register births and deaths.

All these are subjects which the Bureau is directed to study. Hence it is evident that vital statistics regarding children are essential to its work, and that an appeal to the members of the General Federation of Women's Clubs for their co-operation in securing vital statistics of this character is justified. Within twelve months the members of this great organization could secure

for this country effective birth and death records. The federal government cannot do this but the women could. Those who are proud of a long ancestry could learn if the births of their children are registered in the town where they were born; three in every four who looked for such records would find none. Yet family physicians would unfailingly register every new-born child if the parents requested it. However, of course, legislation is needed, and it is of interest that Virginia has just passed a model registration law.¹

The question has been asked if there could be a more satisfying task than that of saving the lives of 100,000 babies every year. Some may think it a more satisfying aim to make certain the welfare of those same children and of every living child. It is only a satisfying ambition to save life if we can see that health, education, recreation, work are all duly secured and harmonized to serve the true ends of life.

Where should a humble beginning be made to share afresh in this splendid task? Should one not begin with the expedient of securing registration of births and deaths? An affirmative answer has been already made by the adoption of a resolution, asking the Children's Bureau to prepare in brief popular form material to be used in securing proper registration of births and deaths in the large part of the United States where such records are neglected.

This resolution shows the spirit of co-operation which the Bureau needs. As soon as possible after the appropriation² which will enable the Bureau to begin work becomes available, it will comply faithfully with that request.

Evidently not all the subjects enumerated in this measure can be discussed thoroughly here. Some of the most urgent and important have not been mentioned. Nor am I able to present, save in the general terms I have employed, the plan of work of this new and unorganized bureau. We hope to be able as soon as possible to serve as a directory and bureau of information, and we shall welcome inquiries upon subjects within our scope and will do our best to answer them. We shall welcome advice. We will take it if we can.

¹ Approved March 12, 1912.

² The appropriation became available August 23, 1912.

And now lastly, in what spirit shall this service be performed? I have said that it must be done so as to be a stimulus and not a sedative to fresh-springing local action; but how? I think there is only one way. It must be done in a way to respect and to express the spirit of parenthood, not motherhood alone nor fatherhood alone, but parenthood. There will then be no risk of undue interference, no danger of overbearing agents forcing their way into homes over parental protest, as has been feared.

Not long ago in a meeting of delegates of many great foreign societies representing hundreds of thousands of recent immigrants, one of them rose to speak. He represented a race commonly accounted especially dull and ignorant. He told simply of the legal oppression which had for generations condemned his people to ignorance, he told how eagerly they came here because of the freedom and the chance for education, and he said, with an unconscious eloquence almost matchless in my experience, "I am a fader, and like every fader I want my child to go higher than me."

I think of the long line of immigrant fathers and mothers on American soil since the beginning of the wonderful seventeenth century and I realize that at bottom he spoke the common reason for their coming. The parents who came in the cabin of the "Mayflower" and those who sank in the steerage of the "Titanic" had the same profound impulse.

If this bureau serves the aspiration of that universal cry of human parenthood, if it really serves democracy, it will survive and grow. If not, it will perish, for that cry is as old and strong as time, as fresh and inevitable as tomorrow. That cry will be heard and will be served somehow, voicing as it does the invincible slow progress of humanity upward.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE COURTS

ROSCOE POUND

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The judges in the several courts of justice, says Blackstone, "are the depositaries of the laws, the living oracles who must decide in all cases of doubt." Hence, to the practical American, taught that law is law because the courts so decide, it may well seem clear enough, when the law lags in the social movements that are going on all about us, that the fault must lie with the courts. That he does assume this is shown by the vogue of crude schemes for overhauling our judicial organization, the currency of so-called reforms of the courts which disregard all judicial experience and legal history, and the popularity of the legal muckraker whose garbled accounts of decisions might have been written of our courts from the beginning of our government with quite as much truth, but a generation ago would not have been able to find a publisher. In other lands, however, where the courts have no such rôle in the process of government as they have with us, the problem of making the law an effective social instrument, a means of achieving social progress, is quite as real as with us. On the Continent, under the influence of Roman-law ideas, the courts or judges are not thought of as depositaries or as oracles of the law. Whereas we say a rule is law because the courts apply it in the decision of causes, they say upon the Continent that the courts apply the rule in the decision of causes because it is law. And yet the socialization of law is a problem the world over. A whole literature upon this subject has sprung up in Germany and in France. Our situation in America is in no way unique; and if it is more acute, the reason is to be found in our eighteenth-century system of checks and balances, in the legal, political, and philosophical charts called Bills of Rights by which our fathers sought to confine courts and legislatures and sovereign peoples for all time within the straight and narrow course of individualist natural law.

For a time there was need of propagandist agitation. It was necessary that the public, the legal profession, and the courts be made to recognize that our legal system was to be re-examined, many of its fundamental principles recast, and the whole readjusted to proceed along new lines. This task of awakening has been achieved. A generation ago it would have been hard to find anyone to question that upon the whole American law was quite what it should be. Some of the older members of the bar, indeed, still cherish the belief which was then universal. But first the economists and sociologists and students of government, and then the bar itself, have been thinking upon this matter freely and vigorously until criticism has become staple. Nowhere is this change more noticeable than in the reports and proceedings of our Bar Associations. Not long ago the dominant note was one of eulogy, of pride in our system and in its administration, and complacent comparison with what we took to be the legal systems of other peoples. Today each volume of such proceedings is filled with critical comments, upon every side, of the law and of its administration, and the more conservative are content with a tone of apology or with deprecating extravagant criticism. The need for propaganda has passed. Now for a season we need careful diagnosis and thoroughgoing study of the lines upon which change is to proceed. A change in juridical fundamentals must begin at the beginning. The problem of the sociological jurist lies far deeper than individual courts or judges and deeper than lawyers or courts and judges collectively.

Legal history shows that from time to time legal systems have to be remade, and that this new birth of a body of law takes place through the infusion into the legal system of something from without. A purely professional development of law, which is necessary in the long run, has certain disadvantages, and the undue rigidity to which it gives rise must be set off from time to time by receiving into the legal system ideas developed outside of legal thought. Such a process has taken place twice in the history of our own law. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the common law, through purely professional development in the King's Courts, had become so systematic and logical and rigid that it took no account of the moral aspects of causes to which it was to be applied. With

equal impartiality its rules fell upon the just and the unjust. As Dean Ames put it, the attitude of the law was unmoral. The rise of the Court of Chancery and the development of equity brought about an infusion of morals into the legal system—an infusion of the ethical notions of chancellors who were clergymen, not lawyers—and made over the whole law. Again in the eighteenth century the law had become so fixed and systematized by professional development as to be quite out of accord with a commercial age. As the sixteenth-century judge refused to hear of a purely moral question, asking simply, what was the common law, so the eighteenth-century judge at first refused to hear of mercantile custom and commercial usage, and insisted upon the strict rules of the traditional law. But before the century was out, by the absorption of the law merchant, a great body of non-professional ideas, worked out by the experience of merchants, had been infused into the legal system and had created or made over whole departments of the law. Today a like process is going on. The sixteenth-century judge who rendered judgment upon a bond already paid, because no formal release had been executed, and refused to take account of the purely moral aspects of the creditor's conduct, the great judge in the eighteenth century who refused to allow the indorsee of a promissory note to sue upon it because by the common law things in action were not transferable, and would not listen to the settled custom of merchants to transfer such notes nor to the statement of the London tradesmen as to the unhappy effect of such a ruling upon business, have their entire counterpart in the judges of one of the great courts of the United States in the twentieth century to whom the economic and sociological aspects of a question appear palpably irrelevant.

The parallel is so close that it is worth pursuing. Addressing himself to a doctor of divinity, a serjeant at law of the reign of Henry VIII disposed of the purely moral aspect of allowing recovery upon a bond paid but not formally released in these words:

In what uncertaintie shall the king's subjects stande, whan they shall be put from the lawe of the realme, and be compelled to be ordered by the discretion and conscience of one man! And namelie for as moch as conscience is a thinge of great uncertaintie; for some men thinke that if they treade upon two strawes that lye acrosse, that they ofende in conscience, and some man

thinketh that if he lake money, and another hath too moche, that he may take part of his with conscience; and so divers men divers conscience; for everie man knoweth not what conscience is so well as you Mr. Doctour.

In 1704 Lord Holt, when the question of negotiation of promissory notes was before him, spoke of "the mighty ill consequences that it was *pretended* would ensue by obstructing this course," and asked "why do not dealers use that way which is legal?" and proceeded to argue upon strict common-law grounds why the indorsement of a note could not be given effect.

In 1911 the Court of Appeals of New York, having a Workmen's Compensation Act before it, said:

The report of the commission . . . is based upon a most voluminous array of statistical tables, extracts from the works of philosophical writers, and the industrial laws of many countries, all of which are designed to show that our own system of dealing with industrial accidents is economically, morally, and legally unsound. Under our form of government, however, courts must regard all economic, philosophical, and moral theories, attractive and desirable though they may be, as subordinate to the primary question whether they can be molded into statutes without infringing upon the letter or spirit of our written constitutions.

The sixteenth- and seventeenth-century law was brought to take account of ethics. The eighteenth-century law came to receive the custom of merchants as part of the law of the land. May we not be confident that in the same way the law of the twentieth century will absorb the new economics and the social science of today and be made over thereby?

A developed legal system is made up of two elements, a traditional element and an enacted or imperative element. Although at present the balance in our law is shifting gradually to the side of the enacted element, the traditional element is still by far the more important. In the first instance, we must rely upon it to meet all new problems, for the legislator acts only after they attract attention. But even after the legislator has acted, it is seldom if ever that his foresight extends to all the details of his problem or that he is able to do more than provide a broad, if not a crude, outline. Hence even in the field of the enacted law, the traditional element of the legal system plays a chief part. We must rely upon it to fill the gaps in legislation, to develop the

principles introduced by legislation, and to interpret them. Let us not forget that so-called interpretation is not merely ascertainment of the legislative intent. If it were, it would be the easiest instead of the most difficult of judicial tasks. Where the legislature has had an intent and has sought to express it, there is seldom a question of interpretation. The difficulties arise in the myriad cases with respect to which the lawmaker had no intention because he had never thought of them—indeed, perhaps he could never have thought of them. Here under the guise of interpretation the court, willing or unwilling, must to some extent make the law, and our security that it will be made as law and not as arbitrary rule lies in the judicial and juristic tradition from which the materials of judicial law-making are derived. Accordingly the traditional element of the legal system is and must be used, even in an age of copious legislation, to supplement, round out, and develop the enacted element; and in the end it usually swallows up the latter and incorporates its results in the body of tradition. Moreover, a large field is always unappropriated by enactment, and here the traditional element is supreme. In this part of the law fundamental ideas change slowly. The alterations wrought here and there by legislation, not always consistent with one another, do not produce a general advance. Indeed they may be held back at times in the interests, real or supposed, of uniformity and consistency, through the influence of the traditional element. It is obvious, therefore, that above all else the condition of the law depends upon the condition of this element of the legal system. If the traditional element of the law will not hear of new ethical ideas, or will not hear of the usages of the mercantile community, or will not hear of new economics or of the tenets of the modern social sciences, legislation will long beat its ineffectual wings in vain. Probably all of you know this from experience. At the end of the nineteenth century, through the dominance of eighteenth-century philosophical ideas in professional thinking and of the ideas of the historical school in legal teaching, the leading conceptions of Anglo-American common law had come to be regarded as fundamental conceptions of legal science. Not merely the jurist, but the legislator, the sociologist, the criminalist, the labor leader, and even, as in the case of our

corporation law, the business man, had to reckon with them. A great part of the present dissatisfaction with our courts has its origin in decisions of the end of the last century, when ideas of finality of the common law were general—decisions which would be rendered by few courts, if by any, today.

If, however, the causes of the backwardness of the law with respect to social problems and the unsocial attitude of the law toward questions of great import in the modern community are to be found in the traditional element of the legal system, the surest means of deliverance are to be found there also. The infusion of morals into the law through the development of equity was not an achievement of legislation but the work of courts. The absorption of the usages of merchants into the law was not brought about by statutes but by judicial decisions. When once the current of juristic thought and judicial decision is turned into the new course our Anglo-American method of judicial empiricism has always proved adequate. Given new premises, our common law has the means of developing them to meet the exigencies of justice and of molding the results into a scientific system. Moreover, it has the power of acquiring new premises, as it did in the development of equity and the absorption of the law merchant, and as it is beginning to do once more today. For there are many signs that fundamental changes are taking place in our legal system and that a shifting is in progress from the individualist justice of the nineteenth century, which has passed so significantly by the name of legal justice, to the social justice of today.

Six noteworthy changes in the law, which are in the spirit of recent ethics, recent philosophy, and recent political thought, may be referred to.

First among these we may note limitations on the use of property, attempts to prevent the antisocial exercise of rights. At this point judicial decision has been an agency of progress. This is not time or place for details. I need only refer to the gradual but steady change of front in our case law with respect to the so-called spite fence, and to the establishment in American case law of doctrines with respect to percolating water and to surface water in which a principle of reasonable use has superseded the old and narrow idea that the owner of the surface could do as he pleased.

Second, we may note limitations upon freedom of contract, such as requirement of payment of wages in cash, regulations of hours and conditions of labor, and limitations upon the power of employers to restrain membership in unions. These have been matters of legislation. But our courts have taken the law of insurance practically out of the law of suretyship, and have established that the duties of public-service companies are not contractual, flowing from agreement, but are quasi-contractual, flowing from the calling in which the public servant is engaged. Not merely in labor legislation, but in judicial decision with respect to public callings, the whole course of modern law is belying the famous individualist generalization of the nineteenth century that the growth of law is a progress from status to contract.

Third, we may note limitations on the power of disposing of property. These are chiefly legislative. Examples are the requirement in many states that the wife join in a conveyance of the family home; the statutes in some jurisdictions requiring the wife to join in a mortgage of household goods; the statute of Massachusetts requiring the wife to join in an assignment of the husband's wages.

Fourth, reference may be made to limitations upon the power of the creditor or injured party to secure satisfaction. The Roman law in its classical period had developed something of this sort. In the case of certain debtors as against certain creditors, the Roman law gave the benefit or the privilege of not answering for the entire amount but for so much only as the debtor could pay for the time being. Naturally this doctrine was rejected in the modern civil law as being out of accord with the individualism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The new German code, however, has a number of provisions restricting the power of the creditor to secure satisfaction, such as, for example, the provision that the statutory liability of an insane wrong-doer shall not go so far as to deprive him of means of support. In the United States, the homestead exemption statutes which prevail in so many states, and the personalty exemptions, which in some states go so far as to exempt five hundred dollars to the head of the family, and usually make liberal exemptions of tools to the artisan, library to the professional man, animals and implements to the farmer, and wages to the head of a family, will serve as illustrations. There is a notable tendency

in recent legislation and in recent discussion to insist, not that the debtor keep faith in all cases, even if it ruin him and his family, but that the creditor must take a risk also—either along with, or even in some cases instead of, the debtor.

Fifth, there is a tendency to revive the primitive idea of liability without fault, not only in the form of wide responsibility for agencies employed, but in placing upon an enterprise the burden of repairing injuries without fault of him who conducts it which are incident to the undertaking. What Dean Ames, from the standpoint of the historical jurist, reviewing the gradual development of legal doctrines based upon free action of the human will, called "the unmoral standard of acting at one's peril" is coming back into the law in the form of employers' liability and workmen's compensation. There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame on either side, to ask in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the loss.

Finally, recent legislation, and to some extent, judicial decision, has begun to change the old attitude of the law with respect to dependent members of the household. Courts no longer make the natural rights of parents with respect to children the chief basis of their decisions. The individual interest of parents which used to be the one thing regarded has come to be almost the last thing regarded as compared with the interest of the child and the interest of society. In other words, here also social interests are now chiefly regarded.

It is true many of the examples I have just adduced are taken from legislation. It is true also that some of these legislative innovations upon the settled juridical ideas of the past two centuries have been resisted bitterly by some courts. Yet I am confident that every one of them would stand in the highest court of the land and in a growing majority of our state courts today. Moreover, what is more important, many of the most significant examples are taken from judicial decision. If, therefore, the disease is in the traditional element of our legal system, the cure is going on there under our eyes. It is an infusion of social ideas into the traditional element of our law that we have to bring about; and such an infusion is going on. The right course is not to tinker with our

courts and with our judicial organization in the hope of bringing about particular results in particular kinds of cases, at a sacrifice of all that we have learned or ought to have learned from legal and judicial history. It is rather to provide a new set of premises, a new order of ideas in such form that the courts may use them and develop them into a modern system by judicial experience of actual cases. A body of law which will satisfy the social workers of today cannot be made of the ultra-individualist materials of eighteenth-century jurisprudence and nineteenth-century common law based thereon, no matter how judges are chosen or how often they are dismissed.

A master of legal history tells us that taught law is tough law. Certainly it is true that our legal thinking and legal teaching are to be blamed more than the courts for the want of sympathy with social legislation which has been so much in evidence in the immediate past. One might almost say that instead of recall of judges, recall of law-teachers would be a useful institution. At any rate, what we must insist upon is recall of much of the juristic and judicial thinking of the last century.

For many reasons, which cannot be taken up here, our conception of the end of the legal system came to be thoroughly individualist. Legal justice meant securing of individual interests. It sought by means of law to prevent all interference with individual self-development and self-assertion, so far as this might be done consistently with a like self-development and self-assertion on the part of others. It conceived that the function of the state and of the law was to make it possible for the individual to act freely. Hence it called for a minimum of legal restraint, restricting the sphere of law to such checks as are necessary to secure "a harmonious coexistence of the individual and of the whole." This purely individualist theory of justice culminated in the eighteenth century in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Bills of Rights so characteristic of that period. The contests between the courts and the crown in England, which made the common law an effective political weapon in the hands of those who opposed the crown, the thoroughgoing Old Testament individualism of the Puritan in England and America, the rise and establishment of individualist

economics in the period of commercial activity, and the training of the Anglo-American lawyer in the Grotian theories of natural rights set forth in the first book of Blackstone, combined to fasten the notion of justice as a device for securing the maximum of individual self-assertion upon nineteenth-century legal thought. Continental Europe fell away from it first. The English were falling away from it before the work of Bentham's school was complete, and committed themselves to collectivist ideas in their legislation a generation ago. In the United States it persisted to the very end of the nineteenth century. Spencer's formula of justice, "the liberty of each limited *only* by the like liberties of all," represents the ideal which American law has had before it during its whole existence. In politics, in ethics, and in economics this conception has decayed, and has given way to a newer idea of justice. But it continues to rule in jurisprudence. For, although social justice, the last conception to develop, has taken hold of juristic thought in Europe, is making itself felt in legislation, has moved juries in groping for the new standard to render verdicts wholly at variance with the legal theories laid down for their guidance, thus producing a chronic condition of conflict between the courts and juries in certain classes of cases, and has even moved courts here and there in our case law to depart from the ancient landmarks, we must on the whole concede that the sociologists and economists are well warranted in contrasting the idea of justice in American legal philosophy with the idea entertained in all other related sciences.

In contrast with the juristic thinking of the immediate past, which started from the premise that the object of law was to secure individual interests and knew of social interests only as individual interests of the state or sovereign, the juristic thinking of the present must start from the proposition that individual interests are to be secured by law because and to the extent that they are social interests. There is a social interest in securing individual interests so far as securing them conduces to general security, security of institutions, and the general moral and social life of individuals. Hence while individual interests are one thing and social interests another, the law, which is a social institution, really secures individual interests because of a social interest in so doing.

Hence it would seem that no individual may claim to be secured in an interest that conflicts with any social interest unless he can show some countervailing social interest in so securing it—some social interest to outweigh that with which his individual interest conflicts. If we compare with the foregoing proposition the classical statement of Blackstone—

Besides the public is in nothing so essentially interested as in securing to every individual his private rights—

and if, contrasting these, we bear in mind that the latter represents not only the legal thought of the past but the doctrines to which our fathers sought to hold us for all time by constitutional provisions, we shall see how long a road our legal system has to travel.

In conclusion, I would repeat that study of fundamental problems of jurisprudence, not petty changes of the judicial establishment, is the road to socialization of the law. First of all, there must be a definition of social justice to replace the individualist or so-called legal justice which we have; there must be a definition of social interests and a study of how far these are subserved by securing the several individual interests which the law has worked out so thoroughly in the past; there must be study of the means of securing these social interests otherwise than by the methods which the past had worked out for purely individual interests. Second, there must be study of the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines. Courts cannot do this, nor can law-teachers or law-writers, except within narrow limits. The futility of a self-sufficing, self-centered science of law has become apparent to jurists. In politics and in sociology the results of centuries of judicial experience deserve to be regarded more than they have been in the past. But far more in jurisprudence the results of present-day social surveys and the knowledge gained by the activities of the army of social workers that have taken upon themselves to do what among other peoples would be left to the state, must be put in the very front of the materials of that science. Its main problem today is to enable and to compel law-making and also the interpretation and application of legal rules to take more account and more intelligent account of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied.

WALKER'S THEORY OF IMMIGRATION

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General Francis A. Walker is the originator of the theory that the arrival in the United States of large numbers of immigrants checked the natural increase of the native population and resulted in a substitution of foreign for native stock rather than in a reinforcement of the population of the country.

As foreigners began to come in larger number [says General Walker], the native population more and more withheld their own increase.¹ Now, this correspondence might be accounted for in three different ways: (1) It might be said that it was a mere coincidence, no relation of cause and effect existing between the two phenomena. (2) It might be said that the foreigners came because the native population was relatively declining, that is, failing to keep up its pristine rate of increase. (3) It might be said that the growth of the native population was checked by the incoming of the foreign elements in such large numbers.

After a brief consideration of the matter the author says:

The true explanation of the remarkable fact we are considering I believe to be the last of the three suggested. The access of foreigners, at the time and under the circumstances, constituted a shock to the principle of population among the native element. That principle is always acutely sensitive, alike to sentimental and to economic conditions. And it is to be noted, in passing, that not only did the decline in the native element, as a whole, take place in singular correspondence with the excess of foreign arrivals, but it occurred chiefly in just those regions to which newcomers most freely resorted.

And a little farther:

The American shrank from the industrial competition thus thrust upon him. He was unwilling himself to engage in the lowest kind of day labor with the new elements of the population; he was even more unwilling to bring sons and daughters into the world to enter into that competition.

And finally:

If the foregoing views are true, or contain any considerable degree of truth, foreign immigration into the country has, from the time it first assumed large proportions, amounted not to a reinforcement of our population, but to a

¹ *Immigration and Degradation*; see *Discussions in Economics and Statistics*, II, 422.

replacement of native by foreign stock. That if the foreigners had not come the native element would long have filled the places the foreigners usurped, I entertain no doubt. The competency of the American stock to do this it would be absurd to question, in the face of such a record as that for 1790 to 1830.

General Walker's contention has been generally accepted by writers on immigration and has, so far as I know, never been expressly refuted. Such authors as Prescott F. Hall, connected with the agitation for immigration restriction, have made a great deal of Walker's argument, which naturally carries considerable weight on account of the name of the eminent man who propounded it. The United States Industrial Commission says in its report: "It is a hasty assumption which holds that immigration during the Nineteenth Century has increased the total population."¹ Professor John R. Commons takes this view. F. A. Bushee, in an article on the declining birth-rate and its cause,² makes the statement that "it is true that the multiplication of foreign peoples has seriously checked the growth of the old American stock." A writer in a recent number of the *American Journal of Sociology* states the matter in the most uncharitable way when he says that "our immigrants are not additions to our total population, but supplanters of native children, to whom they deny the privilege of being born."³

On what evidence are these statements based? The statistical evidence is contained in General Walker's article, previously cited.⁴ It is brief enough. The gist of it is contained in the table on p. 344.

The population of the United States in 1840 and 1850 practically coincided with forecasts made by Watson before the immigration movement had assumed any magnitude, and that in spite of the

¹ *Report of the Industrial Commission*, XV, 277.

² *Popular Science Monthly*, LXIII, 355.

³ Henry Pratt Fairchild, "The Paradox of Immigration," *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII, 263.

⁴ A suggestion of what prompted General Walker to take this view of the influence of immigration on natural increase is obtained from his statement to the effect that "If the birth-rate among the previously existing population did not suffer a sharp decline coincidently with that enormous increase of immigration, and, perhaps, in consequence of it, the Census of 1890 cannot be vindicated." ("The Great Count of 1890," *Discussions in Economics and Statistics*, II, 121.)

fact that between 1830 and 1840, 599,000 immigrants came to the United States and between 1840 and 1850, 1,713,000. Watson's estimates are projections into the future of previous rates of increase and, so the argument runs, had the immigrants not arrived those previous rates would have been maintained, and the population would have justified Watson's forecast without any reinforcement from outside.

	Population of the United States	
	1840	1850
The Census.....	17,069,453	23,191,876
Watson's estimate.....	17,116,526	23,185,368
Difference.....	+47,073	-6,508
Foreign arrivals during the preceding decade.....	599,000	1,713,000

That this supposition is a possibility is granted, but that the figures produced amount to proof cannot be conceded. For support the defenders of Walker's theory turn to Malthus and the principles of population. They maintain that the American working man was accustomed to lead an independent and self-respecting existence, that the immigrant arrived and introduced his "hingeless and carpetless" standard of living, and that the American found himself unable to compete with the newcomer and consequently refused to have children whose lot would be worse than that of their father.

When this explanation is analyzed, it appears so overstrained and far-fetched as almost to appeal to one's sense of humor. Is there then no other way of accounting for the decline in the birth-rate? As a matter of fact birth-rates almost invariably decline when a country becomes more settled and its population more urbanized. General Walker himself says:¹

That which caused the growth of numbers through the earlier decades of our history to be so strikingly uniform was the principle of population operating absolutely without check among a people spread sparsely over the soil, with little of wealth and little of extreme poverty, and with nothing to make child-bearing a burden.

¹ "The Great Count of 1890," *Discussions in Economics and Statistics*, II, 121.

To cite just one example of a country which is somewhat similar to the United States in sparseness of population but which has only a small amount of immigration, Australia today is complaining of its constantly declining rate of increase and extolling the United States with its growing population as an example to be emulated.¹ The population of Australia is not dense, but the proportion of city dwellers is very high and the birth-rate is low and declining without the influence of immigration.

Perhaps the best statement of the reasons for a decline in the birth-rates of the American people is found in an article by John S. Billings, the leading authority on vital statistics in this country. Dr. Billings believes that the declining birth-rate is due in part to the migration from rural districts to the cities, the increase of wealth and luxury, the emancipation of women, all of which phenomena tend to diminish the proportion of early marriages and favor an increase in divorce and prostitution. Dr. Billings thinks, furthermore, that voluntary prevention of child-bearing is an important influence tending to diminish the birth-rate. There are more persons now than formerly who know how to prevent child-bearing, and the increasing cost of living, together with a constantly growing standard of expenditures, makes it desirable for an increasing proportion of families to consist of a small number of persons. The moral scruples against the prevention of child-bearing are being overcome by many families. In a word, the declining birth-rate is due largely to the growth of the number of families that find it desirable to restrict the number of children, together with the spread of information of the means to that end and the weakening of the power of moral objections to prevention.

These causes appear to be much more plausible than the contention that the arrival of immigrants is responsible for the decline in the American birth-rate. That the growth of the native population of the United States during the nineteenth century was remarkably large, in spite of this decline, is shown by the United States Census Bureau in its report on *A Century of Population Growth*, 1790-1900. A careful estimate made in this report shows

¹ *Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia*, Statistics for Period 1901-09, III, 126.

that of the 67 million white inhabitants in 1900, 35 million were descendants of the population of 1800, while 32 million were later arrivals, and their descendants. In 1800 the white population was about 4 millions, so that the population in 1900 was eight times as great as that of a century earlier, while the most rapid growth shown by any country in Western Europe was that of Belgium, which tripled during the century. The sturdy population of 1800 has made, it appears, a fairly good record of growth during the nineteenth century.

A necessary assumption of the Walker theory is that the first indications of a marked decline in birth-rates coincide with the first great waves of immigration. A valuable piece of evidence in this connection is contained in a paper presented to the American Statistical Association at its meeting in St. Louis in December, 1910, by Professor Walter F. Willcox of Cornell University.¹ Professor Willcox by a series of careful estimates obtains the following figures for the number of children per 1,000 women fifteen to forty-four years of age:

1900.....	541	1840.....	835*
1890.....	554	1830.....	877*
1880.....	635	1820.....	928*
1870.....	649*	1810.....	926*
1860.....	714*	1800.....	976*
1850.....	699*		

* Estimated.

The preceding table [comments Professor Willcox] shows that the proportion of children to women of child-bearing age and so probably the birth-rate in the United States was not stationary or increasing prior to 1860 as has usually been supposed and as the figures for 1850-60 taken alone would indicate. On the contrary that decade was probably the only one during the entire century marked by an increasing birth-rate, and the rapidity of the decline between 1810 and 1840 was about the same as that between 1860 and 1900. . . . The main conclusion that the decrease in the proportion of children began in the United States as early as 1810 and has continued at about the same rate ever since is clearly established by the evidence.

In view of this unequivocal conclusion of so careful a statistician as Professor Willcox, what becomes of the theory that the decline of birth-rates is primarily due to immigration? Did the native

¹ Walter F. Willcox, "The Change in the Proportion of Children in the United States and the Birth-Rate in France During the Nineteenth Century," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, XII, 491.

Americans of 1810 and 1820 anticipate the influx of the following decades and refrain from having offspring, for fear that their children might be obliged to compete with those who were at that time being reared in Germany and Ireland, but who were destined to invade these shores? Is there not every probability that the decline in birth-rates simply reflected the steady industrialization and urbanization of the continent, while the influx of immigrants was an independent movement having no direct connection with native birth-rates?

General Walker in the passage quoted above makes the statement that the decline in the rate of population growth during the past century and the increase of immigration either is a coincidence, or else the one phenomenon is to the other in the relation of effect to cause. This statement overlooks a possibility which seems to the present writer to contain the true explanation of the two parallel phenomena. The decline in birth-rates and the growth of immigration, according to this view, represent two effects of the same cause, namely, the industrial development and the urbanization of the continent. In 1790 there were in the United States two cities having a population of over 25,000; in 1910 there were 228 such cities. In 1790 the population of the cities formed 1.6 per cent of the total population of the country; in 1910 the city population formed 31.0 per cent of the total for continental United States. This growth of city population is easily susceptible of statistical measurement and is quoted here because it is an index to a complex mass of social and economic phenomena. It represents the rapid growth of industries, the development of educational facilities, the increasing demand for luxuries, the growing burdensomeness of large families, the emancipation of women—in a word, the rapid progress of all the causes which Dr. Billings assigns for the decline in birth-rates. On the other hand it is the rapid development of industries, the urgent demand for labor, that is the fundamental cause of immigration. The immigrant comes in reply to this demand and by his coming increases the possibilities of the rapid development of the country. Says Richmond Mayo Smith:¹

The third factor (besides land and railroads) in this development has been immigration. Thereby the growth of population has been reinforced by an

¹ *Emigration and Immigration*, New York, 1890, pp. 57 ff.

enormous influx of people from Europe in the most productive ages of manhood and womanhood, who have not only directly added to the number of inhabitants but have contributed to the power of natural increase. . . . It is not necessary to point out the immense influence which the rapid growth of population due to immigration has had on the material development of the country. It has supplied that labor force which was necessary to bring the soil under cultivation. It has enabled us to take up great stretches of territory. It has built railroads, dug canals, made highways, cut down forests, in short turned the wilderness into cultivated land. It is safe to say that without this immigration the growth of the country would have been very much slower and that we should now be where we were twenty years ago. It has quickened the pace of our development and made us do things rapidly and on a large scale. We are apt to attribute our prosperity too much to our own genius and talent. We forget the factors that have worked with us and in our favor. Unlimited land and an army of intelligent workers furnished with the best implements of labor have made great material progress almost necessary.

It has frequently been alleged as proof of the Walker theory that the geographic areas to which the majority of the immigrants go are the very areas where the birth-rate among the Americans shows the most decided decline. The paucity of data on vital statistics makes it impossible to make a satisfactory test of this assertion. The accompanying table, however, brings together three sets of relative figures which may throw some light on the question. The first column gives the percentages that the population of cities of at least 25,000 inhabitants forms of the total population of each state. The states are arranged in descending order of these percentages. The second column gives the percentages that the foreign-born population of each state forms of the total population. The last column gives for each state the number of children under five years of age per 1,000 native white women fifteen to forty-four years of age. The figures in the last column are estimated. The number of children under five years having native mothers and foreign-born fathers is not reported by the census, and the figures in the table are the result of a calculation based on the assumption that the ratio of such children to the total number of children having one or both parents foreign born is the same as the ratio of persons of all ages having native mothers and foreign-born fathers is to the number of persons of all ages having one or both parents foreign born. The assumption is a safe one and the figures may be accepted as substantially accurate.

States and Territories	Percentage of Population Living in Cities of at Least 25,000 Inhabitants: 1900	Percentage of Population Foreign Born: 1900	Number of Children under 5 Years of Age per 1,000 Native White Women 15 to 44 Years of Age: 1900
Continental United States.....	25.9	13.6	462
District of Columbia	100.0	7.2	280
New York.....	61.3	26.1	320
Massachusetts.....	58.4	30.2	268
Rhode Island.....	56.7	31.4	265
New Jersey.....	48.1	22.9	349
Maryland.....	42.8	7.9	433
Delaware.....	41.4	7.5	418
Illinois.....	39.7	20.1	415
Pennsylvania.....	38.3	15.6	433
California.....	36.5	24.7	308
Connecticut.....	36.4	26.2	291
Colorado.....	30.0	16.9	408
Washington.....	30.0	21.5	444
Ohio.....	29.2	11.0	397
Missouri.....	27.9	7.0	489
Minnesota.....	23.9	28.9	403
Oregon.....	21.9	15.9	424
Louisiana.....	20.8	3.8	645
Wisconsin.....	19.5	24.9	412
Michigan.....	19.3	22.4	368
Utah.....	19.3	19.4	602
Nebraska.....	15.8	16.6	476
Kentucky.....	14.1	2.3	596
New Hampshire.....	13.8	21.4	312
Indiana.....	13.7	5.6	452
Montana.....	12.5	27.6	470
Tennessee.....	12.2	.9	614
Iowa.....	9.8	13.6	453
Georgia.....	8.3	.6	642
Maine.....	7.2	13.4	369
Virginia.....	7.1	1.0	589
Texas.....	6.7	5.9	678
Alabama.....	5.9	.8	678
Kansas.....	5.8	8.6	492
Florida.....	5.4	4.5	641
South Carolina.....	4.2	.4	630
West Virginia.....	4.1	2.3	645
Arkansas.....	2.9	1.1	688
Arizona.....	.0	19.7	537
Idaho.....	.0	15.2	634
Mississippi.....	.0	.5	674
Nevada.....	.0	23.8	379
New Mexico.....	.0	7.0	661
North Carolina.....	.0	.2	677
North Dakota.....	.0	35.4	488
Oklahoma.....	.0	3.9	698
South Dakota.....	.0	22.0	484
Vermont.....	.0	13.0	386
Wyoming.....	.0	18.8	554

It appears from the table that there are fifteen states in which the percentage of city dwellers is higher than that for continental United States. Of these fifteen states, fourteen show a proportion of children below that for continental United States. On the other hand, there are twenty-four states where the proportion of foreign born is above the average; of these, sixteen states show a proportion of children below the average, while eight states show a proportion above the average. Of the sixteen states, ten have an urban population above the average and four more have fairly high proportions of city dwellers, while of the eight states where the proportions of foreign born and of children are both high, every one has a proportion of city dwellers below the average for continental United States, and four of the states have no city population at all.

The geographical argument that the pressure of immigrants depresses birth-rates is based on the evidence of ten states where the proportion of foreign born is high and that of children low; but it is significant that in these ten states the proportion of city dwellers is also high. It appears from a study of the figures that there is a much closer connection between urban growth and low birth-rates than between immigration and low birth-rates. It may be said that the native mothers in the table include a considerable number of descendants of immigrants, but in view of the well-known fact that natives of foreign descent are usually indistinguishable from their American neighbors in other respects, it is fairly reasonable to suppose that they conform to American standards in the matter of child-bearing as well. Had the influx of immigrants the tendency to depress native birth-rates that tendency would appear in the figures; as it is, the evidence seems to warrant the statement that the chief influence tending to depress birth-rates is the growth of urban population, and that immigration and birth-rates are correlated only to the extent that they are both related to the industrial and urban growth of the country.

All the available evidence points to the conclusion that, were it not for the immigrants, the present population of the United States would be considerably smaller than it is. Industrial development during the nineteenth century would almost certainly have been considerably less spectacular had the immigrants not contributed

their share of the human energy necessary to its realization. It is not, however, the object of this article to touch on the general question of the desirability of immigration, but merely to demonstrate that the theory according to which the arrival of the immigrants has checked the natural growth of the native population has no valid evidence to sustain it.

SOME SOCIOLOGICAL PHASES OF THE MOVEMENT FOR INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION¹

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To one who studies the present movement for vocational education, and especially that phase of it which we designate "industrial education," the conviction becomes more and more firmly fixed that its impulse springs from those profound forces which seem to be impelling a general social advance and which are dominated by the desire to secure for the less prosperous half of the population a larger share in the good things of life.

It is of especial importance to note that representatives of this less prosperous half are themselves contributing to the discussion and that they seem to be coming to the conclusion that their cause can be advanced only by securing a larger measure of social control of the people's institutions. They are also coming to feel and to say that they are entitled to a better opportunity for getting that contentment and comfort which should result from duty well done. To bring this about they are working for the establishment of minimum-wage boards, old-age pensions, industrial insurance, employers' liability laws, and *adequate education* for themselves and for their children.

It is equally significant that representatives of the so-called ruling classes are frequently found to be working for essentially the same ends with the belief that, in this way only, there can be averted a struggle between employers and employed which, wanting a more equitable adjustment of present conditions, may be fraught with grave and destructive consequences. At all events it seems to be reaching the social consciousness that individual efficiency and the individual's sense of his responsibility to society must be enormously increased.

In working out the solution of these complex problems there is probably no single institution in which society in general places as

¹ An address at the 1912 convention of the National Education Association.

much dependence as it does in the public schools. It is becoming evident, however, that an increasingly large percentage of all who are relying on the public schools in the emergency unhesitatingly express the opinion that the ideals of the schools must be modified if they are to play the important part in this social advance which they should.

It is one of the curious things about our American educational system that, conceived in a spirit of socialism, so far as its organization and administration are concerned, it has tended, nevertheless, in its subject-matter and in its methods of instruction, to emphasize and to promote extreme individualism. Supported by funds raised by assessment on all the property of the community, and organized in such a way as to make possible, if not compulsory, the attendance of all children, presumably for the common good and as a sure foundation for social democracy, the ideals of the schools have centered the interests of the pupils on individual advance and on the ultimate attainment of conspicuous success in the competitive social and economic struggle rather than on the desirability of giving the largest possible service for the common good.

Perhaps in no phase of recent scientific educational study has the purely individualistic ideal been more clearly seen than in the realm of child-study and psychology. It is not my purpose to state that such activity has been necessarily undemocratic, unsocial, or inadvisable. Quite the contrary, it can be shown that psychology has contributed in no small degree to the tremendous advance which education has made during the last quarter-century and that it has helped to bring into the schools the very elements which may be most effectively used in socializing education. So far as it has been worked over into terms of educational method, however, psychology has been distinctively individualistic. While social psychology—group psychology—is such a recent development that its technique and terminology are still in the making, it can hardly be doubted that its influence on public education is destined to be even greater during the next twenty-five years than the psychology of the individual on which we have thus far relied. It will demonstrate that our citizenship as a whole must be taught to have less interest in its *rights* and more in its *duties*; less thought for the possibility of

reaching eminent position for oneself and more for the desirability of securing the contentment and happiness of the less fortunate.

I believe that the present movement for industrial education has important contributions to make to this socializing of popular education and it is to this phase of the movement that your attention is asked.

It is an oft-repeated statement, but one which must nevertheless be briefly discussed in this connection, that many educators are strongly opposed to the vocational motive in education. In a discussion recently published in a leading educational journal is found the following statement of the "bread-and-butter" principles as seen by the classicist:

In obedience to popular clamor, [they] resolved to replace the literary education, which had held sway for centuries, by a study of exact science. They kept sternly in view the demands of the counting-house and workshop. We will not train the boy's mind, said they; we will pack his brain with useful facts. He shall not think; he shall remember. Strictly cut off from a knowledge of the past, he shall live solely in the present. Thus there will be no waste of force. A full pocket shall reward his industry, and if his head is empty of those general ideas which cumbered his father's, so much the better for him. He will get rich the more quickly.

It seems to me that the distinction here drawn between the "cultural" and the "bread-and-butter" aim of education, with the conclusion that the latter is wholly to be avoided as sordid and mean, has a perfectly natural origin, a brief discussion of which is pertinent to our subject. When these ideals were in the making, and long after they had become well established, the vast majority of students came from those classes of society whose members were economically independent even if not actually wealthy. The pursuit of knowledge for the sake of increasing an assured income, already sufficient, or with hope of improving, financially, a career sure to be rewarded by an adequate living and by social distinction, was very properly considered sordid and unsocial. To use education merely as a means of enhancing one's opportunity of gaining a larger measure of the material things of life, or of controlling and exploiting one's fellow-beings, was indeed justly condemned. The result of such action could only be to increase the gap between the

rich and the poor, the able and the incompetent, the wise and the foolish, and therefore to disrupt society.

Today, when universal education is our aim, "bread-and-butter" education for the masses of mankind will have exactly the opposite effect, will tend to bring the masses and the classes closer together, to secure unity in diversity by giving each a more genuine appreciation of and respect for the other. So far from being sordid and basely utilitarian, it represents one of the finest ideals which the human mind has conceived, and sets forth a philosophy of life which can be fully realized under no other conditions than complete solidarity.

Another important social phase of the industrial education movement is that it is bound to have a profound effect on the whole system of popular education. This will be true whether our traditional schools admit or reject the new forms of education. The conditions of industry are such that the employer can no longer afford to train his apprentices in the old way but must, instead, evolve new methods to meet the new conditions. Training must be had and if the schools refuse to give it the privately controlled schools will draw a large number of the youth away from the public schools, thereby greatly reducing the influence of the most potent socializing institutions of our times. What seems more probable, however, and what is infinitely more desirable, is that the more vital and direct methods which are being developed in connection with industrial training will modify and immensely improve the methods and ideals of general education.

Indeed there seems to be little doubt that this will be the outcome, since vocational training is even now to be found in almost every part of our school system. Great activity is to be observed in the elementary schools, where retarded and discouraged children have been brought to see the meaning and the need of education by the utilization of the vocational motive, and have been led by more interesting and stimulating pathways to the door of the high school. The high schools have modified entrance requirements and have arranged and administered with whole-heartedness less extended courses for those needing them and have not only shortened the courses but have vitalized them as well by relating them to the

possible future vocations of the pupils. Separate schools have been established for those who for any reason cannot be cared for in the vocationalized classes of the elementary and high schools, and part-time continuation schools and classes have been formed for those who must work while they study.

I am aware that some eminent educational authorities maintain that a complete separation of the education which is general and liberal from that which is special and vocational must be maintained for the success of either kind of education, but it seems to me that the evidences of the fallacy of this conception are to be found in scores of places today. It is not my purpose to deny the value of the separate industrial school or to insist that it is never necessary or advisable, but merely to affirm that it is possible and frequently highly desirable to develop together the vocational and the general to the infinite advantage of both, and, what is more pertinent to our discussion today, with much greater social benefit.

In fact the present demand for the enlargement of the function of the public school, through the introduction of industrial education, is but another step in the evolution of this popular institution. The advance has always been brought about through the effects of those seeking *social* ends and the betterment of the people, and, as often, has been opposed by conservatism. In this onward movement it is clear that we have reached a crisis similar in principle to others which have periodically confronted popular education when an advance at last has become imperative and when such progress has been opposed by the ruling interest, whether wealth, aristocracy, or sectarianism. Unless we are to reverse all previous precedents, the schools will again widen their sympathies and will receive and instruct a still larger proportion of the country's children, thus greatly increasing their social value.

Another sociological phase of industrial education is its relation to crime. That industrial education is to have an immense influence in preventing juvenile delinquency is the belief of those who have studied faithfully the lessons taught by the reform schools and penitentiaries. Certainly nothing could be of greater social significance than the reduction of crime and especially crime for which society, rather than the delinquent, is mainly responsible.

It becomes entirely clear, as one studies the methods employed in a modern reform school and the records of those who have been discharged from these institutions, that the same kind of training for the boy before commitment would, in the large majority of cases, effectually remove him from the probability of delinquency. When taught the satisfaction of work well done; when made to see that the way *through* is infinitely better than the way *around* a difficult piece of work, even though it be rough manual work; when he has once experienced the pleasure of actually carrying his own weight, economically considered, he is far less likely to proceed by the devious ways resorted to by those whose wit has been developed more than their skill. That "joy in work" is no mere sentimental phrase becomes a conviction on carefully observing large numbers of reform-school boys engaged in their somewhat skilled occupations.

It is obviously essential to the stability of society that intelligent contentment prevail throughout the group. One of the purposes of industrial education held, more or less consciously, by its advocates relates directly to the contentment of the masses. To my mind it is one of the most subtle and far-reaching aspects of the movement. We frequently hear the expression "social unrest." That social discontent exists no thoughtful person will doubt, whether he can assign the cause or not. It has been claimed that the schools are partly to blame because of the false ideals of pleasure which they have engendered. These ideals we are told give undue emphasis to the joys of consumption, the spending of money, and passive entertainment, and ignore almost entirely the sterner joy of useful productive *work*.

Our courses of study seem to be so devised that they develop the child to the point where it can enjoy, intellectually and aesthetically, many of the things which cultivated people prize, beautiful surroundings in the home, music, art, poetry, the drama, and travel. This is well, but where such *tastes* are developed without equal attention being given to the development of *ability to secure the means* whereby the desires may be satisfied there is brought about an unbalanced condition which frequently leads to the conclusion that money is the one thing needed to secure happiness. The joy

of consumption, rather than the joy of production, is the end which they seek, in common, it must be admitted, with American society in general. It is believed that a rational plan of education which lays especial emphasis on the constructive activities will enable many to know the pleasures which come from such work and to turn to that for some if not a large part of their recreative entertainment, as well as to have a clearer appreciation of the substantial satisfaction which their daily work may yield.

Finally industrial education is sociologically significant for what it is making possible in the way of collective control, that is control by the community, of the conditions of child labor. It is a matter of social concern that children are now being warped, degraded, killed, mentally, morally, and physically, by their early industrial experiences. It is of immense moment to the common welfare that these experiences are often wholly discouraging and unsatisfying to the young workers, thereby creating or strengthening the belief that work is a curse, a thing to be avoided as far as may be, and that the prizes of life are reserved for those who exploit rather than for those who serve. Industrial education is so successful in drawing attention to this matter that where such education is an established fact it is much easier to secure the extension of child-labor laws, the inauguration of systems of vocational guidance, the co-ordination of apprenticeship laws with those relating to education and child labor, and the establishment of minimum-wage commissions to fix and maintain suitable rates of compensation for children or minors. All these are of distinct social significance and the accomplishment of them will be impossible without a system of industrial education. In fact a thorough-going system of industrial education leads inevitably to vocational guidance, child-labor and apprenticeship laws, and public wage boards, and will serve to bind them together into a single function.

In conclusion I would express the belief that the masses of people are beginning to take an active interest in, and to lend genuine aid to, the general social and educational advance. We must not overlook the fact that here we may receive the most loyal support, for, after all, the "masses" are essentially idealistic. More easily than others they will accept the program for social

betterment and will bear their share of the necessary sacrifice of personal ambition in order to realize the larger common good.

Shall we doubt the truth of the statement that the masses are idealistic? What of the ages when the masses were bent on the achievement of the "beauty of holiness"? True, the theology of that day taught that this was to be attained only by submission to the sorrows and trials of the present life, but with what patience was the submission given! Later, in the patriotic struggle for the independence of the fatherlands, and for the liberty of the people, who were the idealists? Who gave much and, gaining only a little, were yet glad?

In the great problem which confronts civilization today, the working-out of right relations between man and man, these same "masses" will be the first to accept the conditions of advance and to work and sacrifice for it.

I repeat that I believe that industrial education, so far from being a narrow utilitarian movement, allies itself with the broadest and I may say the most spiritual movement of the century, the promotion of genuine brotherhood. Brotherhood is possible only where there is frankly accepted the ideal of unity in diversity. If the family means anything it means equal consideration, respect, love, and safety for its several members, even though the members vary greatly in ability, aptitude, interests, activity, and successes, as success is measured by the world's standards. Here are found a common love, a common interest, a common sharing in any good that comes to the family, a great satisfaction that all are *not* exactly alike, that each can contribute something peculiarly his own, yet all the members *together* form one family.

Unity in diversity: this is also the keynote of industrial education. Its promoters are learning to treat with equal respect, and to strive equally hard to administer to, the needs of the future factory worker, the future accountant, the future electrician, or the future engineer. I believe that one of the best values of the movement will be found in the lesson it teaches to general education, that real education consists, after all, in creating a curiosity, a consuming desire to find out, and that this curiosity may be excited in diverse ways but most effectively by recognizing the peculiar,

individual tastes or talents and from a sympathetic development of those peculiar, individual interests reaching out in ever-widening circles of related and interrelated interests. And, if education learns to dignify all vocational life by giving it consideration in its various forms and relations, who shall say that this will not have a profound influence in helping us as a nation to develop a unity of purpose out of the wonderful diversity of conditions and opportunities which our country affords and of which we are justly proud, and which, in a social democracy, should somehow be made to administer to the common good?

PATRIOTISM AND THE PACIFIC COAST

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I

The California state legislature in its late special session last December expressed itself regarding history and patriotism in a very amusing manner. In its Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 3 it regrets "that the Boston massacre was not the slaughter it was supposed to be," and other things of like nature. It makes patriotism rest on the facts and interpretation of history; and declares that any changes in facts or interpretations are disloyal and unpatriotic. History, the legislature feels, is taught and studied for no other purpose than patriotism; and even if it should be so studied and taught, it is patriotism that holds the whip of authority in deciding what is the true fact and the true interpretation. Though the resolution does not attempt to define patriotism, it does nevertheless give a negative definition, and thereby attempts to interfere with the freedom of thought, so dear to all Americans, and with the *Lehr- und Lernfreiheit*, equally dear to all college and university men.

This resolution was incited by a local Sacramento paper and urged by the local G.A.R. The journal was no doubt sincere in its attack upon a harmless teachers' institute talk, on "Both Sides of American History"; but the relation between the teaching of history in the school system of the state and patriotism, as presented by the journal, is quite another question. The G.A.R. was no doubt equally sincere in wishing to preserve in the hearts of the present and rising generations a deep sentiment of country-love. But to rest this patriotism on the facts and interpretation of certain historical facts, raises at once the question, What is patriotism, and is it rooted in the dead past or in the living present? The legislature was quite as sincere no doubt in demanding harmonious co-operation among all the activities of the state. But when it attempts to define patriotism (negatively), it is surely forgetful of

some of the past on which it wishes to base patriotism. It forgets the unpleasant attempt of a late Washington governor to direct university teaching; it fails to recall the Delbrück affair in the University of Berlin some years ago, and the Bernhard affair at the present time.

It is only a resolution; it is not a bill. It is one of the "hurrah, boys, hurrah" measures, as a legislator of long service explained it; a resolution whose passing is a passing into legislative oblivion.

II

Patriotism is a very difficult thing to define; yet it has been discussed from the days of Plato to the present. It seems to be a part of human affection, and may be said to be as old as attachment. It is earliest noted in the family and clan sentiment; its foundation is the blood-relationship; it has no relation to the land or country; for the home of the nomad or wandering tribe changes with water, pasture, and whim. The city of the burgher and the manor of the lord were localized, and the attachment to these has been called patriotism. The united manors, cities, and provinces—through royal conquest and compromise—resulted in the modern nations. And here it is that real patriotism in its modern sense begins. Some even contend that patriotism belongs alone to the nation or *patria*.

This blood-relation continues on through all the stages of development to the present. Today the "melting-pot" fuses the blood of most all of a nation's citizens; and where the "melting-pot" of blood fails, the "melting-pot" of interest and feeling completes the work. This blending process produces at least one product of great value: like-mindedness. If this is deep and widespread, a deep and widespread patriotism is the result.

To this blood-relation and to this interest-relation are added today two other things: country and history.

By country or *patria* is understood the land of the people's birth and rearing, the land that gives them home and livelihood. Their life is bound up in it and dependent upon it, so in struggling for life they are struggling for country.

By history, as an ingredient of patriotism, is meant the memories of the people in relation to their country—the known story of their

struggles, victories, and sufferings in making themselves and their land what they are or what they would like them to be. History acts here as a guide-post; from it the blood and country interests can, in part, get their direction. History is what it is; it cannot be changed. The better patriotism accepts the past from the hands of those whose business it is to know the past. The lower patriotism accepts tradition as history and resists any change in it.

Patriotism is a democratic sentiment; it is as varied as the culture of the people and develops with them in their march upward. The lower patriotism, that of the lower class, is visual, concrete, martial, and often chauvinistic. The higher patriotism, that of the better classes, is more ethical, ideal, peaceful, and more cosmopolitan. Between these two ends is the long line of patriotism actuating the middle class. All are patriotic in the manner that most consistently expresses their sentiment toward their fellow-countrymen, their *patria*, and their past.

III

A past, a history, is a true part of patriotism. But how far back from the present does this history extend as a live and effective factor in patriotism? The answer of many nations may be gathered from their treatment of their national archives. The living part of the nation is often kept secret; while the dead part is open to the public. Speaking very generally, 1815 may be taken as a rough date dividing living from dead history in Europe. America brings the date almost to the present; and the president, at his discretion, may bring it to the very present moment. The treatment of state archives also gives an answer: papers from three to ten years old are still alive; papers over that age go to the archives as dead matter. Another answer may be found in Lorenz' *Generationslehre*: that a historical period covers only three generations—the passing grandparents, their mature and active children of the present, and the grandchildren. Bergson has given his answer in his idea of consciousness: the living present and its immediate memories. The national consciousness may be stated in almost the same terms.

Patriotism is of the present; it lives and moves, defends and

conquers, raises ideals and struggles to realize them. In the field beyond this boundary patriotism can only hope; history alone can decide.

IV

THE PACIFIC COAST AS A *patria*

This term for America means the eleven states wholly or in part west of the Rockies. This contains about one-third of the area of the United States. It is about 1,150 miles east and west and 1,250 miles north and south.

Under the Indian the Coast remained in its natural state. The Spaniard entered it about four centuries ago and dotted it here and there with his missions, presidios, and ranches. The French held a part of it for nearly fifty years, but in all probability they scarcely set foot within its borders. The English were interested in it for nearly a century as a hunting-ground for the Hudson Bay Company. The Russian "passed in the night." The American entered it more than a century ago, and soon began to plant missions and ranches. Fifty years later began the great conquest that has not yet ended.

The fight for the home on the Coast has several phases. The fights with the Indian were neither long nor frequent. Conflicts between white people threatened several times, but actual engagements were short and not severe. The struggle with Nature has been constant and strenuous. She has claimed more energy and victims than Indian and white. And towns are not yet all planted; the roads and railroads are still in their early stages of building; the deserts have not yet fully surrendered; and there are places still awaiting the explorer.

Fights there were and are, but they are fights with Nature; and with such fights patriotism has little or nothing to do. Bones lie bleaching on the plains or buried in the mines; victories have been wrung from the soil and the mountains; cabins and trails still exist as ruined monuments of blasted hopes. These were parts of man's struggle for existence, livelihood, and fortune; only occasionally did any of these fights rise to the threshold of patriotism. The Coast has been bathed in sweat rather than blood.

The Coast has no Marathon, Lexington, or Sedan; in their

place it has the Mother Lode, the Roosevelt Dam, and a rebuilt San Francisco. It has no Stratford, Weimar, or Concord; but it does have places where the "last spike" was driven. It has no Abbey, St. Denis, or Mt. Vernon; but it does have its plains, its mines, and its Donner Lake. It has no "Badenland" or "Dixie"; but it does have a "Watch Tacoma Grow."

THE COAST AS A PEOPLE

It was the Indian to whom the Coast was a real *patria*. He fought man and Nature and filled it with his associations. But we hardly associate patriotism with the red man. He has gone and has contributed nothing to the present patriotism.

The Spaniard had his centuries of struggle against Nature and whites. The missions and presidios, in ruins or in memory, recall to the living Spaniard the years of toil and suffering and ideals and disappointments. Problems once solved in the Southwest or on Puget Sound recall to him the greatness and the valor of his ancestors. But he, too, has gone; only a few remain on the Coast, either blending their blood and past and patriotism with the new and dominant people or retiring before the possessors.

To the memory of Drake has been erected the Cross in Golden Gate Park; in the Pacific Northwest are a few remains of the fur hunters and traders. These are of patriotic portent only to the few Englishmen still resident on the Coast. A new patriotism has here also been buried by a succeeding people.

The Dutch-Austrians scarcely more than touched the Coast. The Russian had slight interests on the Columbia and a settlement on the Californian coast; but the center was in Alaska and Siberia and not in these southern outposts. He, too, has gone, and has contributed nothing to the existing patriotism. The French voyages to the Coast may have some slight patriotic meaning to a Frenchman; but of great patriotic possibilities were the factories and voyages, the songs and the jargon of the French-Canadian "coureurs de bois" and "voyageurs." They, too, have retreated with the retreating hunting-grounds; so that at present the people of Washington do not find the rivers recalling to them those "chansons" of the long ago.

The Americans have a fair beginning. They have fairly well begun to make the Coast their *patria*. The Little Big Horn, the Lava Beds, and the Oregon Trail are of patriotic meaning, though it be to only a very few. They had their mission stations in the Northwest as the Spaniards had theirs in the Southwest. Astoria in a way recalls the grand ideals of a century ago. San Juan Island and the Columbia in the north, old Mexican foundations and other places in the south, recall to a gradually increasing number of Americans the old questions with England and Mexico. The "forty-niners" and the pioneers are becoming each year more deeply blended with the country. Camp and trail, forest and mountain are yearly attaching themselves to the memories of thousands of the Coast people. Memories of poets and writers are just beginning to find local habitation.

The American, in the slow process of *patria*-making, has accepted nothing from the Indian; in the north he has received something from the English and in the south also something from the Spaniard. But in each instance it is either an indirect or a second-hand patriotism. The American today is interested in the *patria*, the relics, and the past of these other people; but it is from the love for antiques rather than patriotism—they are not of the American past.

V

The American patriotism on the Coast today is still almost wholly imported. The Coast patriotism smacks of Lexington, Lake Erie, and San Juan Hill, of the fourth of July and of the Monroe Doctrine—all an inheritance from beyond the Rockies binding us to other parts of our larger people and our larger *patria*.

Professor Royce, a son of California, in an article some time ago, urged a Coast loyalty—a sectional patriotism to protect the American from the deadening influence of a national type. He is quite right in his ideal. The South has a patriotism as old as that of New England. Old Louisiana has a type that persists through the numerous descendants of French and Spanish possessors. Aside from these, Kentucky alone has a patriotism that merits the name.

The Coast has had but little to bind it together into a deep, conscious unity. No shot has been fired in danger or in war that

has been heard around its borders. Abundant Nature has prevented the unifying famine. Freedom has not been threatened. Art and literature are in the early stages of their unifying influence. Trade and industry do unify—but no one can accuse them of being patriotic.

Patriotism has to grow on the Coast as it has grown elsewhere. The *blood-bond* must be closely drawn. The Coast American is from everywhere and the blood-blending is going on apace. The two generations of Americans have done well. They have added some of the Spanish, French, and English blood. But the great influx from the East and from Europe is faster than the blending can take place; and furthermore, the line is drawn at the Negro and the Oriental. To these limiting and retarding factors must be added the still greater retarding force of economic interest in the minds of the Coast people and the Coast immigrants. The *patria-bond* progresses but slowly; economic interests again interfere. There is scarcely a thing or ideal on the Coast as yet for which one can stake his life except the dollar. It is true that we are doing now what England, France, New England, and the South did either before or at the inception of their patriotism. The conquest of the land is a necessary step—but a step that must be so recognized and evaluated. The *history-bond* progresses still more slowly. The things that made possible a South, a New England, a Louisiana, and a Kentucky are impossible for the creation of a Coast. We had possibilities, perhaps, in the Chinese, Japanese, and Hindoo questions; the greatest possibility, however, is the frontage on the Pacific and the new world-life beginning on its shores. As yet our past is hardly available or adaptable to the cause of patriotism. The past is diverse and not centered in any common sentiment.

The lower patriotism finds here practically nothing; chauvinism must either import or create out of the blue. By nature this patriotism is interested in the static and in that which moves no more rapidly than itself and in the things as they were “supposed to be.” A general, native Coast lower patriotism does not exist. The middle-class patriotism is somewhat more fortunate. It recognizes the Spanish, French, and English inheritance; it sees the world changing; it is interested in the present and the future; and

is also willing to modify the imported patriotism. It sees the national patriotism as well as a possible Coast phase thereof. The higher-class patriotism is creative and leads the middle-class patriotism. It is sufficiently far removed from the East and the East's chauvinism to make a better evaluation of both the East and the Coast. It is demanding the entrance of "the West" into the histories and the textbooks; it sees the national errors and is striving to correct them. It leads in the initiative, referendum, and recall; in woman's suffrage and in juvenile courts; in insurgency and in the certification of high-school teachers. In coming west this patriotism left its chauvinism in the old home. The Coast is becoming the new center of the national life as the Middle West became the center after the War of 1812. This higher, better, and enlightened patriotism is a refining influence in the whole nation; in the future it may become (yet one must devoutly hope not) as old and staid and chauvinistic as the patriotism of the East or the lower patriotism of the Coast.

The cosmopolitan tendency in national sentiment has its effect on the Coast as elsewhere. Labor and socialism here are uniting with the labor and socialism throughout the world under the slogan: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" Art, learning, and science know no national boundaries. Ancestry and travel overlap the national lines. The Postal Union, the Red Cross Society, and the International Congresses are all making for a greater unity.

In conclusion, then: Patriotism is a natural, growing attachment of a people for *their* land; this attachment is felt by all the people, high and low. As yet there is no provincial patriotism on the Coast; the present patriotism is an importation; chauvinism finds here nothing at all. There is, however, the beginning of a high and a refined patriotism. This higher and better patriotism will eventually, it is hoped, permeate the middle and lower strata of patriotism until the great possibilities of the Coast produce a sectional sentiment that loves its own province, people, and past as deeply and dearly as it loves the great country as a whole.

THE CHURCH AND CHARITY

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One of the most interesting facts in the history of social and moral progress is the converging, into one great stream of activities, of streams which took their origin in different, and oftentimes in widely separated, parts of the field of human activity. The topography of history is much like the topography of the earth. As brooks and rivulets having their source in widely separated parts of a country at last flow together into a great river and then into the sea, so ideals and purposes conceived here and there on the surface of life generate activities which flow separately for a time, perhaps for ages, seemingly unrelated, though identical in their nature and at last converging in one great stream. The history of religion, for example, shows how without communication ideas have been conceived simultaneously in different parts of the world, have been developed in localities, and only after the progress of years, perhaps of centuries, have come together to constitute world-wide faith or practice. Sooner or later ideas and practices to have world importance must relate themselves to all other similar ideas and practices. The progress of history is toward unity, not the unity which destroys variety either of idea or of method, but the unity which is none the less unity because it embraces many varieties. The centralizing tendency of this age in practical affairs is only the surface expression of the centralizing tendency of the whole of life. And that variety is not sacrificed by this tendency to increasing unity is evidenced by an equally patent tendency to specialization.

These reflections are induced by a consideration of the fact which confronts church and charity workers today that the ideas and practices of charity which obtain in the church and those which obtain in what we may call the world of scientific charity

have not only not as yet flown together into one sustained, all-powerful effort to abolish pauperism and alleviate poverty, but are not even so related as to preclude unnecessary competition and conflict of method, and consequent loss of efficiency. From the beginning of the Christian era up to the beginning of the last half of the nineteenth century the Christian church was the sole charitable agency in the western world. The ideals and methods of the administration of charity were those which grew, not out of the study of charity as a science, but out of religious feeling. The practice of charity was a kind of inference from the Christian duty of love for one's neighbor, and was regulated and controlled by no specific conception of charity, indeed by no principles of judgment or knowledge other than those of the individual practitioner of charity. Church charity took no official cognizance of those causes of pauperism and poverty which lie outside of the realm of religion in the realm of the political or social or economic sciences. Indeed, it seems fair to say that the practice of charity in the church was not primarily for the benefit of the recipient of charity, much less was it an attempt to treat the causes of pauperism and poverty, but was primarily for the benefit of the doer of the charity. Christianity laid down two great commandments: The first, to love God with all the mind, with all the heart, and with all the soul; and the second, to love one's neighbor as oneself; and the administration of charity was a mode of compliance with the second commandment. I do not mean to say that it arose from a mere selfish desire to save one's soul, though in many cases it did arise from such a desire; but logically and actually it was an inference from a doctrine and a mode of compliance with command, its primary reference being for the sake of the person practicing it. That this is a fact is shown, I think, by the general failure, up to the time when scientific charity came into being, to study the problem of poverty objectively and to deal with it in the terms and according to the principles of those realms of thought and activity in which its causes lie. To be sure the benefit of the recipients of charity was aimed at in the lazar houses, the hospitals, the homes for the defective; but it seems to me absolutely fair to say that that was

not the primary thought, the primary purpose; the primary purpose was to comply with the command of religion. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. How can a man love his neighbor except by doing him good! Indeed, one does not do injustice to Christianity in so stating its principle of charity, since if a man be truly religious the primary motive of his conduct must be obedience to divine command. The things dictated by obedience must be secondary both in his affection and in his thought of the principle of obedience itself. And I venture to say that scientific charity, however much it may differ in method, ought not and cannot quarrel with that principle. It is one of the deepest of the world's thoughts that love and service to one's kind, personal and social morality, are results of the religious principle, which is love for God. But it is an unquestionable fact that the rise of ideas and methods of charitable administration other than the church's ideas and methods was due to the failure of the church to realize the nature of the problem of charity and to deal with pauperism and poverty according to the terms of their origins and of the realms to which they belonged. There would have been and could have been no such movement in history as the modern charity movement except as a result of a discovery that to be effective charity must be a primary and not a secondary activity; its reference must be relative to the causes of its problem and to the improvement and well-being of its human objects.

We come then to the necessity of defining the function of the church. The church was in the field first, and if it be generically a charitable society the existence of any other charitable society is a violation of the law of organization and an impertinence; for with its immense plant, its great and venerable history, its sacred traditions, its powerful and devoted membership, it can do with greater efficiency and with less expenditure of energy the charitable work of Christendom than all other charitable societies combined. They are but the upshoots of a day, and are themselves so imperfectly adapted and adjusted one to the other that conflicts of opinion and method and duplication of effort are still besetting faults.

But is the church a charitable society? In an important

sense yes; in an equally important sense no. It is a charitable society in a derivative sense, because it is a community of people brought together by their devotion to the ideals and methods of Jesus Christ and believing in the God whom he defined to them as love and grace. In other words, the church is a society organized for the purpose of promulgating the practice of the ideals and methods of Jesus Christ and of perpetuating and extending his influence and work in the world. It is a charitable society only in the sense that the God whom it worships and the Christ whose leadership it follows are represented to its consciousness as supremely loving and as requiring in worshiper and follower the spirit of love and service. The real function of the church, if we have defined it correctly, is an intellectual or a spiritual function, is the inspiring and fostering of the consciousness of God and of the ideals and methods of Jesus Christ. The implications of Jesus' example in the work of the modern church must be spiritually determined. Its logical meaning in modern life and under modern conditions and with modern resources are what we want, not its exact imitation. The law of modern church method and activity must be given to us by a spiritual interpretation of the meaning of Jesus' method and activity, and be given only by a process of spiritual interpretation and adaptation. The late Dr. Thomas Arnold said: "The true and grand idea of a church is that of a society making men like Christ, earth like heaven, and the kingdoms of this world the kingdom of God." Whatever will do that or will help to do that is the primary and fundamental concern of the church. A recent writer in the *American Journal of Sociology* has contributed an article on "The Church as The Maker of Conscience," in which the writer argues with a good deal of force that the church's real function is to make conscience. I do not believe that the primary concern of the church is to make conscience, but that it is rather to inspire and develop the idea of God and the sense of personal relationship with him. The church's primary business is to preach God and all that grows out of his existence and of his relationship to mankind, to unveil the divine ideal for the individual man and

for society. In putting the matter in this way I am not unconscious of the fact that the practical method of preaching God and of unveiling the divine ideal for an individual and for society is the preaching of the ideal mankind, is the unveiling of the soul itself and of the ideal society. The ideal of God is not simply a revelation but an evolution as well. Hence we may define the church in the words of the writer of the article to which I have referred as "the organized confession of the divine life of man." But it really makes no difference from which end we look at this function of the church; it is one and the same function, namely, to declare God and the human implications of his being and character. Secondly, the field of operation of the church is in the realm of the affections, of the reason, and the will. "By its teaching, its order, and its ordinances, it seeks to convince the reason, to stir the affections, and to persuade the will." Why should it attempt to go outside of this field into the realm of concrete social activity? Out of the heart are the issues of life; as a man thinketh in his heart so he is. The church's function is at the very center of human life and conduct. If its gospel is what it claims it to be, it is the inspiration and mainspring of all concrete personal and social activity, the regulative principle, the dynamic of life. What it inspires will find its way into personal character and activity, into civil statute, and into economic and social practice. No other institution, or coterie of individuals, can do its work; no other formulation of ideals can be substituted for its simple platform; no other body can occupy its place in life. Political consciousness can be developed by the state; economic practice can be formulated by the Chamber of Commerce; even conscience can be made by the school and the platform. But no institution, except the church, can open the spiritual eyes of men so that they view life from above, can give to them spiritual inspiration and power which shall be the mainspring of all social and moral activity. The modern church has fallen a victim to the idea that spiritual inspiration needs exemplification and illustration in concrete activity, but it does not. It is the one kind of teaching, the practical lessons of which are born

in the mind of the pupil. It is an awakener of practical efficiency not an instructor as to method. Experience is the great teacher of method.

But, to be practical, what is the function of the church with respect to charitable activity? It is to preach and to inspire that disposition out of which all charitable activity grows, not itself as an institution to engage in the concrete practice of charity. It is the business of church members as individuals and of societies within the church to practice all forms of charitable activity in accordance with those laws of charity which grow out of the principle of religion, that is, love of God and of one's kind, and also out of the principles of economic and social well-being. These latter principles may or may not be strictly contained in the principle of religion. They cannot be contradictory to it, but they need not be explicitly contained in it or directly suggested by it. Perhaps I should have said that the laws of charitable activity grow also out of the principle of moral well-being, but I think the principle of moral well-being is directly and explicitly contained in the religious principle. Love of one's kind means always right moral relations to one's kind. Accordingly, the practice of charity must always take account of, and be regulated by, the principle of moral well-being; that is to be taken for granted. It is an important distinction we are making between the activity of the church as an institution and the activity of members of the church as individuals. An institution must as such prescribe the method of its activity; it must work by a method which is peculiar to it as an institution and which may not be founded upon those economic and social principles which are not necessarily contained in the religious principle. Charity is a compound effort. The necessity of charity results from a violation of, or a failure to comply with, laws which are not necessarily religious but which may be economic and social. To get at the causes of a charitable problem requires oftentimes a special knowledge which is not in the possession of the clergyman as such, or of the individual church member as a church

member. In almost every instance of application by an individual or a family for charitable relief some of the causes are economic or social. If the man is out of work and consequently unable to render support for himself or his family, the cause may be moral, that is, it may be the man's intemperance or immorality; or it may be his economic inefficiency; or it may be that the kind of work which he can do is not demanded in the locality in which he is for the time being situated; he may have migrated because of false information that has come to him and have found an overplus of labor of the kind for which he is best fitted; the conditions of his trade may have changed so that in the place in which he has spent his life the kind of labor which he is competent to perform is no longer required. In all these cases, which frequently occur, there is needed a knowledge of economic or industrial conditions which is the peculiar possession, not of the clergyman or of the Christian as such, but of the economist or industrialist. Again the laws of method according to which charity should be administered are not necessarily given by the religious principle but by other principles not contradictory but different in their nature and origin. Charity does not mean simply love, as the religious etymologists would have it mean, but intelligent love; and the intelligence of the love takes its origin in a knowledge that is not simply religious, but economic as well. An individual or a society inspired by love of God and love of human kind and not bound by the laws and methods of the church will easily and naturally seek those other principles according to which charitable activity must be practiced. There is a law of adaptation of institutions; and the institution set to do charitable work will adapt itself easily and naturally to the laws of charitable work; its method will grow out of its functions. As the Master is reported to have said: Doing truth leadeth to the light. All constructive work in charity—and all charitable work should be constructive—should be done by the man or by the society whose business it is to know the laws of construction. We hear it often said that charity is not the giving of alms, but we fail to realize, I think, how fundamentally true that proposition is, and also what charity is if it be not the giving of alms. Real charity is an attempt to make a man or a family equal

to the economic and social battle of life. It is an attempt to stimulate and foster economic and social efficiency, to put a man into the condition in which he may use his natural powers to their utmost, and not only that, but to develop the natural powers to a higher efficiency. It is to give work to the workless according to the natural, not the forced, conditions of work, according to the economic laws of work. It is perhaps to move a man or a family to a place in which the work he can best do is to be found; it is perhaps to develop where the man or the family is, in accordance with the principles of sound economics, the condition and fact of the work he or they can best do; it is to teach the man who does not know how to regulate his expenditure to his income the right use of his income; it is to teach the woman who does not know how to use the normal earnings of her husband the law of thrift and prudence; it is to heal the sick, not by word of mouth or by anointing with clay and spittle, but by medical treatment and surgical operation; it is to provide care for the disabled and non-productive member or members of a family in institutions adapted to such purposes. All that is the function of the scientific specialist, not of the prophet or preacher, or of the church as an institution. It is not the business of a preacher to preach economics or sociology, the rights of labor or the rights of capital, nor the platforms of parties or the methods of treatment of the imbecile, insane, or criminal. It is his business to preach and inspire the love of human kind growing out of the love of God, which will combine itself with scientific knowledge of economics, sociology, politics, therapeutics, and criminology. Salt is good for savor, but salt is not bricks or mortar, not commerce or manufacture, not drug or surgeon's knife. Salt is salt; leaven is leaven; religion is religion, or, in another word, inspiration. There is a psychology of charity of which the believer in practical charitable activity for the church fails to take account. To inspire a man to do a thing is not the same act as to teach him how to do it. The method follows the inspiration. A different set of faculties comes into play when a man is being taught method from those which are in play when he is being inspired. Attention, accurate observation, and discrimination are not the uppermost activities in the man who is being

inspired. To teach a woman how to sweep a room rightly, how to make nourishing soups and good bread, is not the same as to inspire her to do those acts. The latter gives her a powerful motive for sweeping a room, or making soup, or making bread; the former teaches her how to do them rightly. To inspire a blind man to make brooms, a stoker to fire a furnace, a longshoreman to load a ship, a dago to dig a ditch, a carpenter to make a mortise and tenon, an engineer to run a machine, is not the same thing and does not call into play the same mental qualities as to teach any one of these men how to do rightly and efficiently his own proper work. The one calls into play the emotional and volitional faculties—the desire and the will; the other calls into play the intellectual faculties—attention, observation, and discrimination. It is just as much the business of the charity worker to procure for his beneficiary instruction in practical efficiency as it is to inspire the motive and will; it is just as much the business of the charity worker to procure for his beneficiary the knowledge as to when and how to find his work and how to do it when found as it is to inspire him with the desire and will to work and support his family. The charity worker, and the charity worker only, is required to procure this knowledge for his beneficiary; it is his business to know what kind of knowledge is needed and to procure it.

But it is for no mere economic reason that one who loves the work of charity, and the church as well, pleads that the church as such should cease from the administration of charity. It is for a deeper reason, and one which involves as much the interest of the church as that of wise and efficient charity administration. There is something almost pathetic in the plea of a man like J. R. Green, who was at the time he made that plea a hard-working London parish clergyman. In speaking of church administration of charity in London, he says:

I am simply horrified at the things I see going on this winter. That scoundrel with his "gold hidden under the ruins" and the like, and all I can do is to hold aloof and shriek. I must shriek, for I have held my tongue for fear of hurting the poor. Think of the West-End Pauperizing Fund with its "loaf and tract" system! . . . This newspaper appeal dodge is sapping all independence. . . . How I wish the clergy would strike and throw up the relief business altogether.

The fundamental objection to church administration of charity is that it sets a premium both on the spirit of proselyting by means of material subsidy, and on the spirit of selling ecclesiastical profession for material support. It is hard enough when treating the needy upon economic and moral ground—and money is given—to keep the minds of beneficiaries to the economic and moral significance of the treatment; but it is vastly harder, if not impossible, to keep the minds of the needy upon the religious significance of treatment when money or material gain is involved. The whole policy—and the church if it is to administer charitable relief cannot avoid the policy—of caring for those within the particular fold of a church is, on the one hand, an exclusion of others who may need care and relief more; and on the other, an invitation to hypocrites and to those whose moral vigor is depleted by privation and want to become hypocrites, and to sell their ecclesiastical allegiance for a loaf of bread, or for a meal ticket, or for cheap toys hanging on a Christmas tree. The church's attempt to overcome the necessary results of a policy of charitable relief by excluding those who do not belong to its fold from participation in that relief has not remedied the evil at all, but has created an even greater one, viz., the easy selling of ecclesiastical profession. The matter of tense in ecclesiastical profession is easily overlooked; for who can distinguish unfailingly, and especially what clergyman anxious for the growth of his church, can distinguish between that allegiance which is in the past tense and that allegiance which is in the present tense? But I hear the clergymen say: "To take away from the church and the minister the right of charitable relief to its own poor and to commit that duty to a secular charitable organization is to violate priestly confidence and that secret and relationship which exists between the clergyman and the needy members of his flock." That objection can, I think, be easily met by making the whole practice of church and ministerial charitable administration personal and not institutional. If a clergyman can administer relief to a needy person or family as a personal friend not as a minister, let him do so; or if he can find some other member of

the congregation who can administer that relief as a personal friend, let him do that. The aim of organized charity is, wherever practiced, to institute personal relationship between those who have somewhat to give and those who need to receive. Charity should always be a personal matter between personal friends. Institutionalism is as objectionable in a charity organization society as in a church, except that it does not involve the evil of buying and selling religious and ecclesiastical profession. For a church to cease at once and absolutely from every form of institutional administration of charity is not to violate personal relationship, but to preserve it. The church need not be afraid of full and free concession to that spirit of the age which demands differentiation of function and work. It is not the secularization of practical activity to make those responsible for it who are by nature and training best fitted to do it. No practical activity can be secular if the church remains true to her mission, that of teaching men to see life from above, that of inspiring them with a sense and with a love of God and of their kind. Religion means the inspiration and development of individual and personal relationship of every man to God and to duty; and if the church be true to that great central work which is hers, and hers only, she may courageously and whole heartedly concede to men and to societies inspired with the spirit which she has to give them the practical work of carrying out her ideals in the state, in business, and in society.

One last word as to the practical charitable function of the church. It is the church's peculiar function to develop in men love of their neighbors; or, to translate into the phrase of charitable activity, to furnish friendly visitors. If she does this she is fulfilling both the letter and the spirit of her Founder's example. His life was given in service to his kind, not as a whole but as individuals. His relationship was primarily with the individual men and women with whose lives he came into contact. The church could do nothing more Christian-like and nothing more serviceable to humanity than to train men and women to consecrate themselves to the work of friendly visiting, to the incarnat-

ing by the side of some person or family the spirit and the helpfulness of Christ. She should remember that real charity is not the giving of alms, but the reconstructing of individual and family life in order to make it adequate to the moral and social battle which every life and which every family has to wage. To enter into the life of a man or of a family depleted and devitalized by the stress of poverty and suffering, to inspire him or it with new hope and new courage, to teach him or it the divine law of service, by example and advice to show to him or to it the necessary results of efficient endeavor, and to provide for him or for it the opportunity which may be lacking—that is the real work of charity; and to furnish men and women who have both the spirit and the wisdom to do this work is the real and the only function of the church in charity.

THE SO-CALLED CRIMINAL TYPE

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To the average newspaper-reader criminals appear as a class of persons who, from their own bent, live by crime, and gather associates of the same character. This character he conceives as showing an ill-defined abnormality which, though not lessening their responsibility, tends to make of the criminal a distinct human type. Such a conception seems to find scientific support from the school of criminologists of which Lombroso is the originator and the best known exponent. The central tenet of this school is expressed in the following definition by Havelock Ellis: "The criminal is an individual whose organization makes it difficult or impossible for him to live in accordance with the standard of the community, and easy to risk the penalty of acting anti-socially."¹ Lombroso himself considers the "criminal by occasion"—the man who at one time or another gets arrested for some trifling offense—as the only offender in whom no trace of abnormality appears. Ferri, however, the ablest of Lombroso's disciples, concedes as normal persons not only the occasional criminal, but the "criminal by passion." What these criminologists regard as the criminal type must therefore be found among those whose motives for offending seem incomprehensible, or among habitual offenders. Ferri estimates this class to make up approximately from 40 to 60 per cent of the total prison population; but accurate statistics on this point await the day of perfect records, and of a complete system for identifying prisoners.

For the sake of clearness, let us consider among the habitual offenders, first the normal, and then the abnormal or pathological. Of really normal persons that drift into a criminal life

¹ *The Criminal*, p. 206.

the numbers are likely to lessen with improved social and economic conditions. Years of dissipation and crime, however, may make a person who would otherwise have passed as normal, indistinguishable from the admittedly abnormal. The abnormal or pathological convict is classed by the Lombrosan school as insane, epileptic, atavistic, or born or instinctively criminal. The criminal who is manifestly insane requires no discussion. In his case all agree as to the fact of disease. But the so-called atavistic or instinctive criminal—sane but out of date—and the “moral imbecile”—at once atavistic and pathological—call for special attention. The lines between these classes are not conceived as distinct: they merge into and cross each other. In the case of any given criminal the elements may exist together. His crimes, we are told, may be the result partly of a reversion to the characteristics of a far-back, savage ancestry, and partly of an insane or epileptic taint in his immediate inheritance; or his mental taint and his atavistic traits may come from the same congenital cause.

The conception of delinquents entailed by the theory of atavism or of the instinctive criminal is a discouraging one. If a proportion of the race numerically worth taking account of is reverting to savagery, if another and larger proportion of intellectually normal persons is steadily coming into being without the capacity to learn right from wrong, the outlook for society is indeed menacing. For such offenders reform is out of the question. Segregation for life would be the only effective treatment and this treatment could seldom be brought about for persons otherwise normal. As for atavistic criminals, each generation must expect to begin just where the one before it had begun. No social measures could appreciably lessen their number.

These corollaries of the theory making a distinct type of atavistic or born criminals are so grave that one requires special assurance that they have been established by sound reasoning. To begin with that of atavism: Since among criminals, as among the lower races, there appears a larger proportion of cranial variations than among the general white population,²

² Sir William Turner, quoted by H. Ellis.

Lombroso infers that an important cause of crime is atavism. Yet the connection between cranial and cerebral features and the mind is far from being established.³ Even in the extremes of abnormality scientists as yet understand their relation only in a general way. Criminals, again, kill and steal, even as primitive men kill and steal. But the distinctively criminal element in their behavior is that in civilized society it is antisocial. The savage who kills or steals in accordance with the practice of his tribe is doing nothing antisocial. His fellows would treat him as criminal if he did not observe such practices, which they regard as necessary to the survival of the tribe itself. How do we know that the man who acts antisocially among us would not also act in disregard of the opinion of others, could he be transferred to the middle of Africa or Australia? He might violate religious taboos or insist on committing his homicides in a manner contrary to tribal custom. Again, who can say that the normal members of a primitive race, if brought up from infancy in the midst of civilization, would show the anti-social traits of a criminal? Our criminals, whatever their surroundings, have grown up aware of standards of right and wrong which they have not chosen to follow. Had they grown up in a savage state, they would possibly have shown the same indifference to public opinion. The most that can be said for the theory of atavism or true reversion, as applied to sociology, may be summed up in the cautious words of Professor J. A. Thomson, the biologist: "It is undeniable that our ancestral traits may remain long latent, apparently but never really lost, and that . . . they may suddenly find their appropriate liberating stimulus, and assert themselves once more."⁴ Whether or not the anomalies observed in criminals are such ancestral traits requires more proof than has so far been forthcoming.

³ "In the accounts published [of the microcephalic] the psychical manifestations are often passed over in a very superficial way, while there are long descriptions, not easy to follow, of convolutions and lobes whose functions have not yet been determined. In general we have more measurements that would be required for a mantua-maker, boot-maker, stay-maker, spectacle-maker, all at once, while the mental characteristics are passed over in loose terms, though the interest consists in knowing what mental power he possesses with his fraction of brain."—W. W. Ireland, *Mental Affections of Children*, 95.

⁴ J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*, p. 523.

Lombroso grants that reversion to an ancestral type may be united in the same person with arrested development, or what he calls "moral imbecility." He regards the moral imbecile as intellectually normal, because to all appearances he can think rationally on any subject except the very important one of his relation to society. This view is widely current. Only recently the New York murderer Wolter has been described as a "moral imbecile." Such characterizing rests on the assumption that a man's moral nature is quite distinct from his intellectual; that his judgment may be at complete variance with the average man's as regards his daily conduct, without discrediting his mind. This reflects the old-fashioned psychology that divided the mind into separate compartments of activity. Conscience, after all, is only mind turned toward conduct. It takes mind to be good, and to reach unusual moral altitudes takes unusual mind. A sane man, whether able or not, who never gives particular thought to questions of conduct, will have the moral standards of the people among whom he is thrown. If they are decent people, his standards will be nothing worse than commonplace and expedient; if they are degraded, his standards will be that much lower. But if he is so born that he actually prefers evil for its own sake, or that he is instinctively criminal, can he be regarded as intellectually normal? Dr. Fernald of the Massachusetts School for the Feeble Minded says:

Some of the cases reported were considered as typical cases of so-called "moral imbecility" without intellectual defect, until long observation and close analyses demonstrated that they were cases of *true imbecility*, while the antisocial tendencies of the ordinary imbecile were exaggerated to such an extent as to overshadow the presence of intellectual impairment and the existence of the characteristic physical, mental, and moral signs of congenital mental defect. I have never happened to see a well-marked case of so-called "congenital moral imbecility" which did not exhibit many, or indeed most of the significant stigmata of *true imbecility*. . . . Is not the typical instinctive criminal of Lombroso a typical adult imbecile of middle or high grade, plus opportunity and experience in the community?⁵

As for Lombroso's criminaloid, an attenuated instinctive criminal, specialists and social workers will recognize in him

⁵W. E. Fernald, "The Imbecile With Criminal Instincts," *American Journal of Insanity*, April, 1909.

the "near feeble minded," that troublesome class which as yet can rarely be received into custodial care.

Since then, atavism, as an explanation of the criminal, is still unproven, and the instinctive criminal can be included under the head of the pathological, what classification remains? The occasional criminal, and the habitual criminal who develops from him, are normal persons. The insane, the epileptic or epileptoid, and the instinctive criminal are all pathological. Are not these two broad classes based more accurately on the facts, and quite as adequate for laboratory purposes as the artificial divisions of Lombroso? The first class is for sociologists to study, the second is for specialists in mental defect or derangement.

The conception of delinquents implied in this classification is an encouraging one. The pathological cases, being irresponsible, do not depress one's estimate of human nature. Normal criminals present a promising field for reformatory influences. These latter, instead of being, as is usually thought, creatures remote and of merely sensational interest, are much like the rest of us—on the whole, like the duller among us. The occasional criminal among girls—shop-lifters, for instance—is of a commonplace mind of very contracted interests, and of a weak and colorless, rather than bad character. On getting acquainted with such girls, I found that the one subject in which they were all interested was dress. They would know every slight change of fashion, and did what they could to adapt their wardrobes to prevailing modes. All of them were capable of earning a decent living, but only a very few could be called bright. They gave little evidence of thought in any direction except that of their immediate practical affairs. This, indeed, is true in my experience of all normal criminals. Out of some three hundred that I have known more or less, there were but three or four whose companionship for half a day would not be intolerably irksome. Once in a while I met a woman who put her own story dramatically. Usually, however, their stories showed a close resemblance to one another, especially in the case of petty crimes, and the extreme likelihood that they were false left

nothing to redeem their monotony. Of course any prisoner who should have the intelligence and the candor to know and to say just how she had been tempted, what struggle had gone on in her mind, why she had finally yielded, and what in her nature or past life had made her subject to that temptation, would be of absorbing interest. But she would be a bright woman. Self-knowledge and candor are rare in any walk of life, in prison or out. In order to come at the causes of a prisoner's offense, you must usually lead her to talk on, and draw your conclusions from her unconscious revelations of herself. As a social or pathological study, she will always hold attention. Yet so far as one can judge, she is no weaker in character than many girls who keep out of trouble. She is simply not trained to meet the circumstances under which she must live. Both training and circumstances, however, are in a measure within the control of society, and herein lies the encouragement of recognizing the largest class of criminals as normal persons.

This distinction between normal and pathological offenders emphasizes the need of a discrimination not at present shown either in laws or in court procedure. Unless the prisoner's derangement takes the form of raving lunacy, or outrageous delusion, he is likely, in a case not involving the death penalty, to be treated without question as responsible. I once knew a woman arrested for drawing a loaded pistol at an old acquaintance who, she thought, had swindled her out of her property. A searching investigation revealed not the slightest trace of her ever having had any property. Though her manner was perfectly quiet, her conversation was confused. She wrote a long letter, to tell in black and white what were her "proofs," as she called her muddled notions about her wrongs. The latter was a jumble of disconnected sentences. The means for determining insanity in that court were cumbersome and expensive; therefore, the woman was sent to the House of Correction for two months, with the expectation that her condition would be discovered by the institution authorities. Here I talked with the superintendent about her, and showed him her letter. Shortly after the doctor in attendance wrote me that he had examined her,

and found that she was "sane except in the one direction." A few months after her release she was again arrested for trying to shoot a woman—again from the notion about her lost property. This time she was examined by specialists, and was sent to the prison for criminal insane. It was just a chance that she had not committed murder.

A second deranged woman came under trial for perjury. The prosecuting attorney admitted her insanity, and was willing she should put that in as her plea. But while her brother-in-law was anxious that this disgraceful relative should be declared insane, her sister refused to consider it. She declared that she would rather have her sister in prison than in an asylum. As I talked with this sister, it became evident that she herself, though probably not actually insane, had the same nervous organization as the prisoner. Possibly she had wit enough to be aware of her own ill-balance, and so to wish in self-protection to conceal the family taint. The jail doctor, like the doctor at the House of Correction, gave the opinion that the prisoner's insanity was "only on one subject." These physicians must have had a low standard for the human intelligence. The fact was that the whole conversation of both these women showed some degree of mental disturbance. The outcome in the case of this insane perjurer, who had for years made trouble for everyone about her, was a sentence of two and a half years in the state's prison. Between the sister and the doctor a case plainly calling for medical care was turned over for punishment.

A more shocking case was that of a woman who was arrested for impairing the morals of her thirteen-year-old daughter. Six months before her arrest a physician, at the request of a certain charitable society, had examined this woman and pronounced her demented. For some reason she remained at large. On the day she was sentenced this physician came into court and repeated his testimony. The woman's family stated that her brother was in an asylum, and that they wished to have her deported. The court decided to give her six months' imprisonment and a \$500 fine, the fine to be remitted if she returned to Europe at the end of the six months. While in the penitentiary,

her state of mind grew rapidly worse. By the time arrangements for sending her to Europe had been completed, she could not be allowed to travel without an attendant. I was obliged to advise the court against her deportation. She served out her fine in the penitentiary and then returned to her husband in New York. Another pitiful case was that of a girl from a respectable family who was taken in one of the big department stores of New York for shop-lifting. She had picked up a silk skirt, hung it over her arm, and walked out of the store. The detective who caught her told her if she would promise never to do it again, he would let her go. She answered that she couldn't get work, and that so long as nobody would employ her she was going to steal. The detective told the court that he had no doubt about her derangement, and that he would be satisfied with a light punishment for her. It developed that in the establishment where she had worked off and on for a year past, she was considered insane, and that she had lost her position for this reason. Her family regarded her as peculiar and very annoying, but not as dangerous. She was placed on probation—for being insane, you may say. When she reported each week, she talked in a rambling way. She seemed not stupid, but dulled and rather depressed. At the end of two months she stopped coming. I found on calling at her home that a few days before she had broken out wildly insane late at night, and that her terrified family had been obliged to call in the police to take her off.

Now all four of these women would come under Lombroso's criminal type. Yet in each of their cases, if the woman's family or friends had placed her under special treatment as soon as her malady became evident to them, no crimes would have resulted. Carelessness, ignorance, and a mistaken kindness or family pride allowed disease to develop into crime. What is true of the insane is even more true of imbeciles of the higher grade, since the public is less alive to the dangerous character of these borderline defectives than to that of deranged persons. Social workers are coming to recognize that many delinquents on whom they have spent devoted labor to no avail are of this defective class. Girls and women of such a type are but too likely to bear

illegitimate children and thus not only to be a public burden and menace themselves, but to pass on a heritage of pauperism, vice, disease, and crime. Dr. Fernald says of defectives in this connection, "Every imbecile, especially the high-grade imbecile, is a potential criminal, needing only the proper environment and opportunity for the development and expression of his criminal tendencies. The unrecognized imbecile is a most dangerous element in the community."⁶ Yet the popular mind is quite unheeding of even the recognized imbecile as a source of danger. A lady said to me once of a defective girl who lived in the neighborhood, "Why, there's no harm in Carrie. I've known her all my life." In answer to a question, however, she admitted that Carrie did have violent attacks of temper, and had more than once been sent to an asylum. One may recall that the brother of the notorious Thaw wished him placed in an asylum some years before he became a recognized criminal.

One obstacle to the proper treatment of such deranged and dangerous persons is a prevalent sentimental unwillingness to take away anybody's liberty. This mistaken tenderness for individual freedom is at bottom a lack of civic imagination. A jail doctor in New York said to me that he would never swear away a man's liberty because he was insane "in one direction." I have met the same sentiment in other officials more kindly than wise or far-seeing. Another obstacle is the opposite fear in any serious case, lest a man should, via an asylum, get his freedom so quickly as to make his trial and conviction a farce. Between these two influences a good many cases go down in court and even prison records as criminal when they should be placed among the imbecile or insane.

As the courts and society at large gradually come to an enlightened understanding of the mentally defective and deranged, they will appreciate that civic welfare as well as kindness dictates that these most unfortunate persons should be removed from the community, and protected from their own irresponsible impulses. This course would take the most difficult element out of the prisons, and leave there only those who are capable of

⁶*Op. cit.*

reform. The number of true criminals can gradually be reduced, as seems probable, by improvement in the social and economic conditions of society. The number of the insane and defective can also be reduced, largely by a segregation that will prevent them from entailing their curse upon the next generation, and also, it may be hoped, by a higher standard of morality, a wider knowledge and observance of the laws of hygiene, and more wholesome conditions of labor. Meanwhile there appears no adequate ground for pessimistic theories of the working of heredity. In society as a whole we may expect to find operative the law thus expressed by the biologist Thomson: "Increasingly we find the organism—be it bird or mammal or man—much more master of its fate, able to select its own environment in some measure, able to modify its surroundings as well as be modified by them. As we take a bird's-eye view of the course of evolution, must we not recognize the gradual emergence of the free agent?"⁷

⁷J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*, p. 517.

THE BIRD OF PASSAGE

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Until within comparatively recent years the temporary migrant or "bird of passage," as he is familiarly called, has played an insignificant part in the industrial history of this country. Temporary migration demands ease and cheapness of transportation together with a wide knowledge of industrial opportunity. Until the working classes of one country are acquainted with the opportunities for employment in other countries, and until rapid and cheap facilities for transportation have made these opportunities available for laborers at a distance, temporary migration will not arise.

To the European the most common form of this phenomenon is seasonal migration, *Sachsengänerei*, i.e., the movement of laborers, and in particular of farm laborers, to take advantage of the opportunities of employment during the summer months. The laborers generally leave the home country in the spring and return in the autumn, taking their earnings with them. There is a considerable movement of this nature of laborers from Italy to France, from Ireland to England, of the Flemish to Holland and France, and of the Poles to Germany.

A common form of this migration is to be found where the supply of laborers in the home country is insufficient to meet the demands made by some extraordinary construction. Such tasks usually require low-grade labor upon some more or less permanent transportation project. The digging of a canal or a subway, the building of a railroad through some sparsely settled country, demands the presence of a large body of unskilled laborers during the period of construction. If the project is of great magnitude, like the digging of the Panama Canal, these laborers will be drawn from a large number of different countries. Temporary provision will be made for their support and entertainment during the period of construction, and at its close most of the laborers will return to

their home country. The advantages offered by the completion of this project may be sufficient to change these temporary into permanent migrants, and persuade them to settle in the localities where this work was done. Thus thousands of Irish laborers who had temporarily settled in New England and New York were used in building the railroads of this country and when this work was completed a large number of them permanently settled upon the lands which were made more available when communication with the rest of the country was possible.

By the term "bird of passage," as used in this article, is meant the male laborer who comes to the United States with the intention of earning and saving money while employed here, and who, satisfied with his competence or finding the opportunity for employment gone through the beginning of a period of industrial depression, returns home with his savings. Few of these laborers take all of their savings with them upon their departure, but in most cases out of their savings have been from time to time sending money to friends or relatives in the home country for their support, to pay off the mortgage on the home farm, to purchase land, or to improve the property already possessed. Improvements made with American money upon small farms are frequently seen in villages of Austria-Hungary and Italy.

When the only information concerning the opportunities for employment in the United States offered to Europeans came through occasional books by travelers or letters from friends and relatives, it was not to be expected that the illiterate working population of eighteenth-century Europe would look for the chance for temporary employment across the ocean. Nor were such opportunities available in the United States. Capital for large undertakings was scarce and the digging of canals offered the first opportunity for the employment of low-grade labor upon a large scale. From about 1840 date the large constructive operations of this country. Even if the demand for the "bird of passage" had existed in this country previous to 1850 and this demand had been known throughout Europe, it is improbable that it could have been met, because a means of cheap and rapid ocean transportation had not been provided. Transportation was slow, expen-

sive, and, with the facilities at that time, inconvenient and dangerous. The possibility of typhus fever was not to be encountered lightly nor with the possibility of small financial advantage. The population of Europe was land hungry and it was the opportunity offered by the cheap, fertile land of this country which attracted settlers. Labor was scarce and wages high in the United States but this was due rather to the presence of unoccupied land than to the demands of industry. It has been only since the Civil War that the conditions of demand and supply have been favorable to the "bird of passage" and it is not surprising that we should be confronted with an international movement of considerable magnitude. Although most students of immigration seem to be united in their belief that this country should welcome able-bodied, normal persons of decent habits who desire to settle permanently in the United States, there is a general feeling that the "bird of passage" forms a conspicuous exception to this rule and that this migrant to the United States is not to be encouraged. The objections which have been raised against him can be grouped under four heads:

1. Since he does not intend to settle in this country he is not likely to be interested in American institutions, to adopt American customs, or to acquire American ideals. He furnishes an alien element in our body politic.

2. The money which he saves in this country is not deposited in American banks to be used to develop our industries, but is sent abroad. This constitutes a permanent drain upon our resources, amounting to millions of dollars annually.

3. The competition of this laborer, accustomed to foreign standards, tends to lower the American standard of living and makes it difficult for the American laborer to compete with him.

4. The presence of a supply of migratory laborers tends, by stimulating the overproduction of commodities, to lead to industrial crises. If the supply of labor in a country were fixed, the increase in the demand for laborers would lead to increased wages which would make entrepreneurs more careful about increasing production.

There undoubtedly is truth in each one of these objections, but

there are accompanying advantages which have been but little emphasized by students of this problem. There is little doubt that this large number of temporary migrants tends to reduce the variations in the price of labor by keeping the ratio of demand to supply more nearly constant. When the coming of industrial prosperity causes an increase in the demand for labor, this demand is met, in part, by the immigration of Europeans. When the demand falls off and a period of depression approaches, the supply is diminished by the return of these immigrants to their home country. The statistics of the arrival and departure of immigrants for the past few years show this conclusively. The arrival of tens of thousands of this class in good seasons undoubtedly tends to limit the rise in the rate of wages in this country and thus furnishes grounds for the criticism of labor leaders, but when hard times come these same laborers return home and reduce the supply at the very time when the demand is beginning to fall off. Those who return are not the ones who have saved the most money and made the greatest advance in this country, but those whose departure is hastened by the insecurity of their position here. During the depression of 1907 nearly three thousand Italians left New Haven, Conn., for the home country, and a careful investigation showed that those to depart were the ones who felt themselves in the poorest position to withstand a period of depression. They earned their money in a country of high prices, but when employment ceased they preferred to spend their earnings in a country of low prices. The result of such migration during the crisis is to limit the fall in wages and to free the community from the necessity of supporting a number of unemployed who have made scant provision for the future. The labor union leaders were never so successful in combating a fall in the rate of wages during a period of industrial depression as in 1907-8, and it may be seriously asked whether this was not due in part to the reduction in the supply of labor caused by the withdrawal over-sea of so many thousands of temporary migrants.

It is undoubtedly true that wages in this country during prosperous times are kept at a lower level than would be the case if immigration were prohibited. It may be that crises are hastened

since entrepreneurs are not warned by an increase in the rate of wages that stormy times are ahead. But it is also true that certain of the most unfortunate effects of hard times, a decrease in the rate of wages and a great increase in the number of dependents upon charity, are less apparent when the supply of laborers decreases at the time when the demand for them reaches a low point. It is also difficult to prove that industrial crises are most frequent or most severe in those countries which are receiving these temporary migrants in large numbers.

It may be unfortunate that many employments are seasonal and that many operations can be conducted only in warm weather. But we must make the best of things as they are. There will continue to be a demand for seasonal labor in agriculture and construction in this country. This demand can best be met by single men, who, unhampered by family ties, feel free to accept temporary employment. Most of these laborers spend the winters in the cities where there is a continual surplus of unskilled labor. It is difficult to see how the interests of this country can be injuriously affected if these surplus laborers choose to return to the home country, there to remain until there is demand for their services in the United States.

Our country certainly owes a debt to Europe in that every group of returning immigrants contains some whose vitality has been impaired by severe labor. Others have been the victims of industrial accident and return to the home country with maimed bodies. Compensation for such injuries is a farce in many cases and if they have succeeded in saving something from their wages, and wish to spend their remaining days in a country of low prices, we should not consider that we have been wronged by such action. They came to us in the prime of life, filled with hope and enthusiasm, they performed heroic service in our mines and factories, and now are "scrapped" to increase the number of non-efficients at home. Perhaps we find it cheaper to import our workers than to raise them. It may be cheaper to send home the worn-out and disabled industrial veterans than to support them here. In either case we owe something to the "bird of passage" and the country which reared him.

That financial system is generally considered the best which is most elastic. A system which will not meet the fluctuations of trade is unsatisfactory. In the matter of employment the "bird of passage" serves as a sort of floating dock to rise and fall with the tides of industrial ebb and flow and render more stable the rate of wages.

This stability, however, is purchased at considerable cost. A study of the arrivals and departures noted in the reports of the commissioner-general of immigration for the past few years will show that in the spring of the year a comparatively large proportion of the immigrants are males and that in the fall of the year a comparatively large proportion of the emigrants are males. The "bird of passage" is a male. He may be married or single, but as far as this country is concerned he is single. The industrial unit in this country has been the family. We have gone on the assumption that the head of the household should, with his earnings, be able to support a household. The "bird of passage" has no such obligation resting upon him. He wants to save a maximum amount of money. He is, therefore, anxious at all times to increase his earnings, but greater attention is given to the problem of reducing his expenditure. A group of these individuals will unite in hiring rooms and purchasing food with someone to do the cooking and care for the establishment. There is overcrowding and unsanitary living but the cost is reduced to a minimum. If the objection can be made that among certain classes in this country there is a standard of high living, it certainly cannot be raised against the "bird of passage." The trouble with him is that he does not have a high standard of living and herein seems to lie the principal danger from this group.

This apparently unlimited supply of cheap labor has made us careless in certain respects in this country. We have continued to perform by manual labor much work which would otherwise have been done by machinery. In this way invention may have been retarded. We have become careless and wasteful of human life. We neglect properly to safeguard our machinery and protect the lives of our miners.

A plentiful supply of labor is undoubtedly desirable, but if an

appreciable proportion comes from temporary migrants, the brunt of the competition will fall upon the American father, and we may expect a still longer postponement of marriage and a further reduction in the size of the family. If the American laborer persists in maintaining or raising his standard of living, and it is to be hoped he will, the only way by which he can meet this competition will be by increasing his efficiency or limiting the number who are dependent upon him. If he escapes the evil effects of this competition by rising above it, all will be well. But if he is forced to approximate the standards of the celibate immigrant we shall have (among the native stock) a retardation in the natural increase which is none the less evident although we may be unconscious of its cause.

REVIEWS

Crime, Its Causes and Remedies. By CESARE LOMBROSO, M.D.
Translated by HENRY P. HORTON, M.A., with an introduction
by MAURICE PARMELEE, Ph.D. Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 1911.

For the general reader this is the most valuable work of the famous Italian student of criminals; and the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology has done an important service by causing it to be translated and published in English. Professor Parmelee's summary of the theories of Lombroso is sufficient to give a setting to this particular work in which the practical conclusions of the theories are argued with wealth of illustration. The recent work of Lombroso's daughter, Madame Ferrero, might well be read in connection with this volume.

The point of view is expressed in the title, and crime is regarded chiefly from the medical point of view as a disease requiring remedies. It would be unfair to press this point too far, for Lombroso in this work takes a very wide view of anti-social conduct and includes many social causes; but he constantly returns to the anatomical and physiological starting-point as the final explanation.

The eminent physician is generous in his appreciation of American institutions; perhaps if he had had the task of improving them he would have been less optimistic; we have troubles of our own. On every page one finds ideas which startle attention and challenge doubt; in many places antagonism is inevitable. But no one can read the book carefully without seeing that our criminal law, our procedure, and our systems of punishment are in great need of radical revision; and that the most promising measures for the prevention of crime are not found in the courts and jails, but in the profound changes which are made in conditions of health, education, recreation, and spiritual progress of the people.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON

The Criminal and the Community. By JAMES DEVO. London
and New York: John Lane, 1912. Pp. xxi+338.

A shrewd medical officer in a prison of Glasgow, familiar with the life and surroundings of the poor in Scotland and with the administration

of poorhouses, hospitals for the insane, and prisons, a pugnacious and polemical man of the people with a lance in rest for hereditary privileges, has set down his observations, criticisms, and recommendations. They are well worth reading, and the constructive suggestions in the closing pages point out the way of the future. Most of the treatises on criminal law are written by men learned in constitutions and statutes and often ignorant of criminals. The prison officer does not always have the intimate knowledge of human motives which is gained by medical practice. We need more discussion by psychologists and teachers who have lived with offenders.

The doctor analyzes his subject in the order in which he would deal with a patient—diagnosis, treatment, possible prophylaxis for the future; the study of the criminal, etiology of crime, treatment of the criminal.

Lombroso's method is regarded as useless. The prison does not reform and it does not prevent crime, and so fails in respect to any rational purpose; for retribution does good to no one and tends to harden all. The only proper use of a prison is as a place of secure detention until the offender can be trusted with conditional liberty under control. The first duty is to study each case carefully and deal with it on its merits. In most cases a well-managed system of probation would make it unnecessary to confine the offender. If public safety requires incarceration for a time, the offender can still be encouraged to hope for release on parole if he proves that he can be trusted. No criminal should be left at any time to do as he pleases after serving a definite sentence, but each one should be kept under effective supervision until his associates and neighbors come to trust him. For neighbors and fellow-workmen are far better judges in such matters than courts, police, and prosecuting attorneys. Thus Dr. Devo, on the basis of a long experience in Scotland, has come by an independent route to the essential conclusions of the "American School," conclusions which were approved by the Eighth International Prison Congress at Washington in 1910.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON

Fatigue and Efficiency. By JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK. Introduction by FREDERIC S. LEE. New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1912. Pp. 591. \$3.50.

The scientific character of the physiological teaching of this work is vouched for by competent authority. Indeed, a large part of the volume is given to exact citations of arguments and conclusions of renowned investigators of all civilized countries. The value of the collection to

practical sociology is beyond calculation. It will be an armory for students of reform and of social legislation for many years to come. A great part of the material has already been used by Mr. Brandeis and others in support of laws securing a shorter working-day for women. Courts of highest instance have been profoundly influenced in the consideration of cases brought under such laws. The famous epigram of an Illinois judge was inspired by this kind of appeal: "What I know as a man I cannot ignore as a judge."

The next step is to get this powerful book read by managers of industries. Senior and John Bright honestly believed that if the eleventh or twelfth hour were cut off from the working-day the manufacturer would be bankrupt. The day was reduced in spite of their prophecies of ruin to trade, and England advanced in riches. It now appears from recent laboratory and shop tests that a new mine of wealth is opened to the world, of which many managers are totally ignorant. This first mine of untouched riches is in the superior energy, accuracy, and regularity of working people who are protected from excessive strain, overtime, overwork, monotony, and given a chance to recuperate rhythmically from fatigue and its poisons by rest and refreshment. The publication of this book makes a great advance both in the improvement of the conditions of the operatives and also in larger productivity of machinery and in the intelligence, habits, and character of the people.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON

Fifty Years of Prison Service. By ZEBULON REED BROCKWAY.
New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1912.

It was well for the friends of Mr. Brockway to have exact information with which to defend his good name against cruel slander and misunderstanding; but his fame has always been secure since he established Elmira Reformatory. That institution has been both an experiment station and a demonstration for mankind. The autobiography of its distinguished founder throws much light on the evolution of the system in his own mind and in the institution, but very little on the historic movement of thought which preceded him and accompanied him. We can easily discover the points at which biblical criticism, the new laboratory methods of psychology, the manual-training and trade-school ideas, and the social-ethical purpose of criminal procedure began to affect his method; but we are not often told exactly when these

notions were suggested to his mind. This is not very important; for he worked upon a hint with entire independence of spirit.

One of the most instructive parts of a very instructive book is his explanation of the way in which he set direct moral persuasion into a secondary place and pushed forward the idea of formation of social habits through the daily routine of the reformatory. Here the authority of the psychologists is cited, but the method is his own. One is amazed at the persistence and industry of the man. He devoted his days to administrative duties and much of the night to personal interviews with the young men placed under his care. College presidents, deans, and teachers have much to learn from his procedure in this respect. It would be interesting to watch the trial of a secondary school or college, with trades taught, much in the same way as that in which Mr. Brockway conducted Elmira, the "college on the hill." Some of us would not object to see "spanking" tried on a certain number of spoiled boys who are impervious to any influence except that which gives a harmless but effective shock to the peripheral nerves. Most schools simply discharge such lads and do not care what becomes of them. Mr. Brockway could not expel his students and he was obliged to compel obedience. Between permitting a young man to go his own way to moral ruin without coercive discipline and the reasonable use of the paddle, Mr. Brockway chose the latter, fully aware that there would be a pseudo-philanthropic outcry against him for cruelty. The final official report of New York cleared him of all guilt; his managers and fellow-officers were loyal to him, and the acceptance of his doctrine of the "indeterminate sentence" by the last International Prison Congress of 1910 crowned his life with victory. These advanced ideas without his conscientious, protracted, devoted, and sagacious administration might long have struggled for recognition; their early triumph was due more to Z. R. Brockway than to any man who ever lived; and it is fortunate that he has lived long enough to know the outcome of his long and arduous labor to prove that a scientific method of re-forming habits is full of promise, and, in good hands, is sure of success.

Some matters connected with the methods of reformation are still in dispute, and universal agreement on all points of detail cannot be expected. For example, Mr. Brockway's mode of coercive "discipline," which was mere "punishment," is still discussed. His method of using the chief of police or sheriff as a parole officer is not accepted by all men of experience, and his reasons are not given. Perhaps other successful superintendents will make more of conscious co-operation with the pupil

in the attainment of the educational end, and relatively less of a "strait-jacket of habit" imposed from without. But, no matter what the ultimate issue of the controversy, the methods actually employed were always chosen for a worthy purpose, with vast knowledge of criminal minds, and on the basis of carefully thought-out plans. If ever any of his positions are overthrown it will be in consequence of equal experience with offenders and never merely on the ground of speculative and imaginative theories.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON

The Philanthropic Work of Josephine Shaw Lowell. By WILLIAM RHEINLANDER STEWART. New York: Macmillan, 1911.

The Life and Work of William Roger Litchworth. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912.

The public is fortunate in having access to the story of two persons who were conspicuous and worthy representatives of American philanthropy, and also fortunate in having the stories told by two entirely trustworthy and competent biographers. The volumes will be classics in the libraries of students of the history of our country and of its spiritual achievements.

C. R. H.

A Report on Vocational Training in Chicago and Other Cities. Pp. v-xiii+2-315.

This is a report of a subcommittee of the City Club of Chicago, the membership of which was as follows: Chairman Professor George H. Mead, of the University of Chicago, William J. Bogan, Albert G. Lane Technical High School, and Mr. Ernest A. Wreidt, Fellow in Education in the University of Chicago. Two of the specific studies were made by other research students of the University.

The City Club of Chicago is an organization which has for its main purpose the promotion of constructive studies of important civic questions. The report is in general accord with the purpose of the club and has for its immediate object the extension of popular education in Chicago.

In the words of the report it presents "an analysis of the need for industrial and commercial training in Chicago, and a study of present

provisions therefore, in comparison with such provisions in twenty-nine other cities, together with recommendations as to the best form in which such training may be given in the public-school system of Chicago."

The committee sought by its recommendations to present a complete scheme which would meet the situation in the city of Chicago today rather than to organize an ideally perfect plan which might ultimately be adopted. It stated that the recommendations were based on a classification of pupils with respect to their need for vocational training as follows:

1. Those who leave school in various grades below the high school.
2. Those who enter the high school but do not finish the course.
3. Those who complete the high-school course but do not enter college.
4. Those who finish the high school and enter college.
5. Those who are already at work in the industries.

The specific recommendations included the establishment of:

1. Two-year elementary vocational schools open to boys and girls thirteen years of age who have had the equivalent of the training given in the first six grades.
2. Elementary industrial schools for over-aged children below grade seven.
3. Optional industrial and commercial courses in grades seven and eight open to pupils who have finished grade six, and leading to high school.
4. A trade school for boys, open to graduates of the vocational schools and others who have reached the age of sixteen.
5. A trade school for girls admitting graduates of the vocational schools and others who have reached the age of fourteen.
6. Apprentice schools.
7. The enactment of state legislation promoting day continuation schools.
8. Co-operation with employers to secure day continuation schools.
9. The enactment of legislation to raise the compulsory age limit.
10. Technical and trade courses in the high school.
11. Co-operative technical and trade courses in the high school.
12. Industrial courses for girls in the high school.
13. A central high school of commerce.
14. Improvement of the present commercial courses in high schools.

The necessity for action along the lines recommended is shown by a series of statistical studies relating to the early elimination of pupils from school; to over-aged and retarded pupils in the grades; and to the results of educational tests given to children between fourteen and sixteen years of age and not in school. These statistics reveal a state of affairs perfectly well understood by many students of public education

but wholly astounding to the average layman and they go far to substantiate the claim now so frequently made that our schools are failing lamentably with 50 per cent of the children and that modifications of, and additions to, the present school system are matters of vital social concern.

A study was made of the interests and attitude of the employers and workmen of Chicago as represented by industrial establishments and by labor organizations. The report finds a large majority of manufacturers to be of the opinion that the organization of public schools devoted specifically to the instruction of future industrial workers and to the improvement of minors already employed would be an immense improvement to the school system and a decided advantage to the industrial interests of the city.

The investigation of the attitude of Chicago's labor unions indicates that they have a moderate interest in public trade education and a unanimity of opinion regarding the type of education desired and the principles by which industrial schools should be organized and controlled. It is sociologically significant that employers and employed are found to be in closer accord regarding this subject than almost any other in which capital and labor have a common interest.

The study relating to commercial education reveals the existence of problems somewhat analogous to those found in the industrial field. One important difference is noted, however—the competition of private commercial schools. The report discusses at length the evil results of solicitation by these schools.

The report is remarkable for the breadth of the theoretical discussions of the general situation; for the definite and carefully collated facts as shown in the numerous charts and tables of statistics; and for the mass of concrete illustrative matter. The excellent descriptions given of the several schools visited in other cities are especially noteworthy for their suggestiveness and accuracy.

While the purpose of the report is primarily to improve conditions in Chicago, this fact does not detract from its general value but rather adds to its effectiveness, affording as it does, not only an unusually complete study of an important public question, but as well, a striking example of the effective socializing work of a citizens' organization.

FRANK M. LEAVITT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Negroes and Their Treatment in Virginia from 1865 to 1867.

By JOHN PRESTON McCONNELL, PH.D., Professor of History and Political Science in Emory and Henry College. Pulaski, Va.: B. D. Smith & Bros., 1910. Pp. 126.

The author undertook a very definite task and performed it with satisfactory results. He attempted "to note the essential features of that upheaval through which the Negroes passed in two years, from chattel slavery to full citizenship" in the Old Dominion state. Although the material is not exhaustive, it is convincing and one can scarcely read it without coming to the very conclusion that is so admirably expressed by the author:

It is seen that the relation of the whites and blacks was during that period about as cordial as could have been expected; that they were adapting themselves to their new conditions; that the feeling of confidence and good will between the two races, although temporarily shocked by the events attending emancipation, was reasserting itself during the first year following the close of the war; that the laws had been so amended and modified as to secure for the freedmen all the civil rights and the most important political rights enjoyed by the whites.

The reconstruction acts enfranchising the Negroes and the other federal legislation in their interest destroyed the confidence and good feeling that had existed between the two races and arrayed them in a bitter contest for the political control of the state. In the election of October, 1867, the Negroes and radicals were successful. Of the one hundred and five delegates elected to frame a constitution for the state seventy-two were radicals. Of this number twenty-five were Negroes. The blacks attained full civil and political equality but were unable to secure social equality. These struggles engendered political and racial passions and antipathies that have not subsided after a generation.

THOMAS J. RILEY

Agricultural Education in the Public Schools, A Study of Its Development with Particular Reference to the Agencies Concerned.

With an introduction by CHARLES HUBBARD JUDD dealing with the present conditions of agricultural education in the United States. By BENJAMIN MARSHALL DAVIS, Professor of Agricultural Education in Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. The University of Chicago Press, 1912. Pp. vii+163. \$1.00.

In this volume Dr. Davis has brought together much valuable information concerning all the more important agencies contributing to agricultural education in the United States, with special reference to

those agencies which are promoting it in the public schools. The agencies discussed in the several chapters include the following: the United States Department of Agriculture, the United States Bureau of Education, state departments of education and state legislation, the agricultural colleges, the state normal schools, the National Education Association and other teachers' associations, educational periodicals, periodical literature, state organizations for agriculture, farmers' institutes, agricultural societies, boys' agricultural clubs, and textbooks.

Each of these agencies is considered with reference to what it has done and is now doing for agricultural education, and the information given is reliable and up to date. Considerable attention is given to recent state legislation on the subject, and to the work of the agricultural colleges and the state normal schools in preparing teachers of agriculture.

One chapter is devoted to the elementary and secondary schools—the need of redirection in the elementary schools, how agriculture is being introduced into these schools, and the various types of schools giving secondary instruction in agriculture.

Dr. Davis' book is entirely unlike any other that has been published. It will serve as a reliable compendium for those who want a reference book and as a valuable and interesting introductory textbook for students of agricultural education. For both of these purposes the annotated bibliography of over 200 references will be invaluable.

D. J. CROSBY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Problems of Boy Life. By J. H. WHITEHOUSE, M.P. London: P. S. King & Son, 1912. Pp. viii+342. 10s. 6d.

This book is a compilation of articles by a number of specialists, and confines itself largely to the problems of labor and education. In the earlier chapters it discusses the wide gap existing between the educational system and trade life. That this gap, plus the increasing subdivision of labor, the instability of industry, and the difficulty of controlling these factors, is reducing most labor to the level of common unskilled labor is clearly shown. The writers discover that in England conditions are very much like those observed by investigators in the United States. They find, for example, that the average boy laborer tends to become an industrial nomad, that he enters the so-called "blind-alley" occupations, gropes about in them for some time, and then becomes the victim of unemployment and frequently loses interest in work altogether.

It is especially shown that many displacements occur in the early industrial life of the young man because he is inadequately trained for work. The disadvantages or doubtful value of the messenger service, the street trades, and of work as errand boys, pages, etc., are boldly pronounced, and reform demanded. Such reform should begin with the elementary school. Half-time labor should be abolished, and the age of total exemption from school attendance be raised. This, at the present time, is only 13—lower by a year than in most progressive American states. A plea is also made for the supervision of children after they leave school, and a program of vocational guidance is advocated. The Munich system of education, as worked out by Dr. Kerschensteiner, is given an entire chapter, and complimented because of its success in preparing children for their subsequent industrial life.

In the middle of the book we find a chapter on "The Boy Criminal," which, while valuable as an independent chapter, is not closely related to the remainder of the book, and somewhat destroys its unity. The later chapters deal with measures of reform, "The Poor Law" and the "Administration of Child Care by the Board of Guardians," which are criticized because of relative inefficiency. Emphasis, however, is placed upon the new program in the public schools. The writers advocate the use of the schools for social service as well as education. They want children's care committees which would interest themselves in the welfare of children, would persuade parents to follow the advice of school nurses, would discover necessitous children and report them, and would advise children in respect to their after-employment—that is, furnish vocational guidance. In these respects the program outlined is quite as advanced as any so far suggested by American writers for the American schools. It is further suggested that the public schools be impregnated with university influence instead of continually carrying the tradition of the public school. This idea is developed in a chapter entitled "Cross-Fertilization in Schools." Another great menace which must be overcome is the development of class spirit and the increasing social stratification. Democracy can be promoted through the public schools and men must ever be on the alert to use them in such a way that the breaking-down of caste can actually be accomplished, for upon this fact largely rests the possibility of social progress.

The last two chapters deal respectively with parliamentary inquiries into the problems of boy life, and compulsory attendance laws in various countries. These chapters should really be regarded as appendices, the former being especially valuable because of its summaries of the results

of inquiries by numerous committees into various aspects of the boy problem.

The book does not deal with important boy problems, such as that of recreation, physical condition, and moral standards, and therefore is not an inclusive discussion of the subject. However, it does give a clear idea of the industrial difficulties of the boy in England, and has in it many suggestions for the American reader. The book, being a compilation, is not pervaded with a uniform style, but on the whole is written in interesting English. The American reader regrets that it does not cover more completely the various aspects of boy life.

GEORGE B. MANGOLD

ST. LOUIS SCHOOL OF SOCIAL ECONOMY

Études Bakango. Notes de sociologie coloniale. Par A. de CALONNE BEAUFACIT. Liège: Mathieu Thone, Imprimeur-Éditeur, 1912. Pp. 152.

In this handsomely illustrated volume, M. de Calonne has collected some notes of travel among the Bakango, an African people who occupy the islands and banks of the Uelé River in Belgian Congo. He writes no detailed and exhaustive monograph; he gives us instead an intimate, sympathetic account of an African community as seen from within and from the native standpoint. The author is less concerned with the description of specific customs than with the explanation of the conditions under which Bakango folkways have originated and developed. His book, charmingly written in limpid French, merits the attention of the sociologist equally with that of the ethnographer. Professor E. Waxweiler of the University of Brussels contributes to the volume an appreciative postscript.

HUTTON WEBSTER

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Social Aspects of Education. By IRVING KING. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. 425. \$1.60.

The growing realization of the social possibilities of our public schools and the recent widespread experimentation in this hitherto neglected field have resulted in an extensive literature dealing with the social aspects of education. This literature is to be found, however, scattered through innumerable books, periodicals of every kind, miscellaneous

addresses, government bulletins, the reports of commissions, of clubs, of civic, industrial, and educational organizations of every type, general and local. Much of it is descriptive of special movements, without giving social or educational background, perspective, or coherency; and it is tediously repetitious.

Professor King, in this source-book, has taken the inchoate mass in hand, assorting it and sifting it. He presents the best articles in each field, giving to each an interpretative setting that shows each movement in educational and sociological relationship and perspective. The book gives one a good general survey of the entire field without repetition and waste of time.

Each article is written by a man who is in intimate contact with the movement which he treats. Some of the names are: Dewey, Leipziger, Mero, Dean, Cooley, Royce, Burnham, Reeder, Kerschensteiner, Butterfield, E. J. Ward, Louise M. Greene, Colin A. Scott, Franklin W. Johnson, and George H. Mead.

The book is divided into two parts. The first discusses the school as a social institution in its relations to society in general and to the various other social institutions which it is expected to serve. The second part treats of the social life within the school in its bearing on the socialization of the pupils, the studies, methods, and school government.

In addition to presenting an excellent introduction to the field, the book points the way for more intensive study. Each chapter is followed by a list of topics and problems for further research, and by a full and carefully selected bibliography.

J. F. BOBBITT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The History and Problems of Organized Labor. By FRANK TRACY CARLTON. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1911. Pp. xi+483.

Though it is not indicated by the title—*The History and Problems of Organized Labor*—or by the preface, the book under review deals with the whole range of "labor problems." An introductory chapter on "The Significance of Organized Labor" is followed by four on the history of the labor movement in the United States, and these, in turn, by two on "The Government and Policies of Labor Organizations" and "Coercive Methods." Approximately three hundred pages (three-fifths of the book) are then devoted to the methods of industrial remuneration, methods of promoting industrial peace, labor legislation, immigration,

the sweated industries, child labor, woman labor, prison labor, unemployment, and industrial and trade education. Following each chapter is a list of "References for Further Reading."

As a text for the use of college classes where only one course is offered in labor problems, Carlton's book is the best available. It has been prepared with care, good judgment has been displayed in dealing with debatable subjects, and the reading-lists have been, on the whole, well selected. In places, e.g., in the chapter on the government and policies of labor organizations, the organization of the material might be improved; in some cases, as in the discussion of the "standard rate" (pp. 118-22), there seems to be confusion of ideas; a few statements, e.g., when he says (p. 129), "certain regulations relating to the use of machines also aim at restriction of output," and when he says (p. 132) the trade unionists still cling to the lump-of-work fallacy, may mislead the student; the theory of wages presented (pp. 5-6) is weak. The reader will wonder why many of the court decisions cited are not indicated specifically and references made to the reports rather than to such secondary sources as the *Bulletin of Labor* or the *Survey*, and why many of the magazine articles which find place in the reading-lists were not more definitely indicated and why they were not all entered according to a uniform plan, so that they might be found with the least inconvenience. In spite of such shortcomings, however, Carlton's *The History and Problems of Organized Labor* is more than an acceptable text.

H. A. MILLIS

LELAND STANFORD UNIVERSITY

La grande loi sociale de l'amour des hommes. Par A. LUGAN. Paris, 1912. Pp. 231.

The two great social laws are brotherly love and justice. In the present volume the author discusses the former, as enunciated and applied by Jesus Christ. Under the heads of the general law of love, the degrees of love, the love of enemies, and the practice of love of the neighbor, he covers the field fairly well, and in a simple and popular style. To the average social student the second and the last chapters will undoubtedly prove the most interesting and practical. Christ's command to love the neighbor as the self means that we are to regard and treat our fellow-man as a being who has the same eternal Father, the same nature, the same needs, the same individual sacredness as ourselves. Hence the neighbor is infinitely superior to anything in

the brute creation. From the parable of the Good Samaritan it is clear that the law of brotherly love extends to every human being, regardless of country, race, or sex. Obviously this doctrine is immeasurably above the teaching on the same subject by the Pharisees, the pagans, and Nietzsche. The last chapter deals with the complementary principle of the law of love, namely, the Golden Rule, and shows how Christ himself applied it to the different relations of social life. The author concludes the chapter with a brief but vivid outline of the improvement that would be brought about in society if men practiced these two principles according to the teaching and spirit of Jesus.

JOHN A. RYAN

ST. PAUL SEMINARY

The Modern Household. By M. TALBOT and S. P. BRECKINRIDGE.
Boston: Whitcomb & Barrows, 1912. Pp. 93.

Starting with the conviction that the family group is fundamentally important for the community and that home-making is a significant and responsible career, the authors discuss various aspects of the modern household, such as "The Household as the Center of Consumption," "Shelter," "Food," "Management," "The Household and the Community." The book is well arranged for use as a text in short chapters, with suggestive questions and a bibliography at the end of each.

Now that production in the home has practically ceased, the function of the housekeeper is largely that of spender of the family income. Spending has an important influence upon the lives of the workers who produce what woman buys and upon her own children. But the majority of women have not as yet trained themselves to be wise and efficient spenders. The authors suggest that in addition to acquiring a knowledge of present conditions of productions, women adopt a simple system of cost accounting and carefully compare expenditures for different items to determine the wisest division of income.

It is a virtue in the book that hard-and-fast rules for all environments are not given. The general principles established by investigation are stated, and other possible principles only suggested. Problems are raised, however, and questions asked which, if thoroughly considered, would make of housekeeping an interesting and absorbing occupation. Exception might be taken to the following statements: first, that the present tendency "is to lay less stress than in the past on the environment and more on personal contact as the medium for the spread of disease"

(p. 23). In making this statement, the authors have apparently had local conditions in mind, for certainly hookworm and the fly-borne diseases are environmental diseases. Second, the statement that the disposal of garbage is a matter of decency, order, beauty, and cleanliness rather than of health (p. 24) is not true where flies exist.

The suggestions in favor of simplicity of meals and their preparation are to be commended. One is curious to know, however, why, in the light of their advice against the use of high flavoring in foods, the authors advocate the use of harmless coloring matter when the latter makes as artificial an appeal as the former. The lack of standards in clothing and the iniquity of much modern advertising in contributing to this lack are emphasized. There can be no dissent from the authors' statement that the requirements of modesty demand that "the person shall be covered," although in view of the immodesty which modern woman has been able to develop in a dress which still "covers the person," a more explicit criterion might be demanded. Also, one may be justified in wondering why an exception to this criterion should be made in the case of the formal dinner or ball. Finally, the point of view emphasized in the book that home-making is not exclusively the woman's business, but must be shared by the man of the house also, is important. Men as well as women need some training in household problems, at least, for only through co-operation can these problems be adequately solved.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

Anthropology. By R. R. MARETT. New York: Henry Holt & Co.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1912. Pp. 256.

This book is one in the series of "The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge." It is intended for the man of general culture and not for the specialist. It contains ten chapters dealing with the antiquity of man, race, environment, language, social organization, law, religion, morality, and man the individual. It is a discussion of the problems of anthropology rather than a presentation of the date of the science. In this respect it differs from Tylor's classic work on the same subject. It has the stamp of high scholarship, and its style is clear and vigorous, with a facetious vein and some fine flashes of wit. It seems, therefore, to be admirably adapted to its purpose of introducing the subject and so engaging the reader as to leave him thinking and craving more light.

But, while primarily designed for the general reader, it is a book which the trained anthropologist may read with interest and profit, since it touches cautiously but significantly upon some of the mooted problems of modern science. The author, while admitting the difficulty of defining race and distinguishing differences in the mental capacity of races, is not carried away by the modern humanitarianism which would obliterate all race distinctions. He asks, "If the hereditarily long-headed can change under suitable conditions, then what about the hereditarily short-witted? No doubt [he adds] man moves forward partly because Nature kicks him behind. But in the first place some types of animal life go forward under pressure from Nature while others lie down and die." The natives of Africa, for instance, have not "reached as high a pitch of indigenous culture as the resources of the environment, considered by itself, might seem to warrant." And it may be said also of certain native Australians that, despite a very fair environment, away from the desert regions of the interior, they have on the whole stagnated. As to the soundness of these views, it might be suggested that a more careful reading of Ratzel's *Anthropogéographie* might convince the author that the Africans and Australians have quite measured up to their environment. The real question is whether races, in adapting themselves to their environment, do not, through natural selection, acquire different capacities, just as dogs and cotton seed, for instance, have acquired their special characteristics in different environments, so that varieties from different quarters of the earth can no longer attain to the same development in the same surroundings.

The author defines religion as a general striving of humanity, and agrees with McDougall in identifying it with morality. What is magic but a striving for the good? Psychologically speaking, religion is an effort to deal with the crises of life. Moral development has two stages: first, synnomic, wherein conduct is based upon custom and habit; second, syntelic, wherein man acts upon reflection.

JEROME DOWD

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

The New Politics. By F. B. VROOMAN. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1911. Pp. 300.

This sketch of tendencies in American politics is one of those few books which strike out clearly at the solution of a leading issue in modern life. The author contends that politics in America still rests upon

the doctrines of *laissez faire* and ethical hedonism, although these philosophies are now bankrupt and are bankrupting our American democracy. To the author, the most immoral thing in our social system—or our social anarchy—is that Machiavellianism which subjects all social policy to the test of economic opportunism and the plunderbund of greed operating under the shibboleths of individual liberty and states' rights. Over against this tendency he places the standard of liberty as a means, not as an end; individual liberty itself is not found in individualism and particularism but in social control and nationalism. He points out that the conflict of the future is not to be between individualism and nationalism, as it has been for more than a century, but between nationalism and socialism, and that only the hearty support of the rule of all the people over their institutions through a scientifically regulated social control can check the growing tendency of the people to seek protection from vested interests in socialism.

The author is scarcely justified in finding, as he does, that Hamilton was the originator of all the good and Jefferson of all that is evil in our modern conflict between social control and anarchy, nor can we agree with his assumption that the parties to the present conflict can always be labeled with accuracy. But his central insistence upon the superiority of a democracy of conservation and social control over the disintegrating tendencies of a democracy of individualism is almost a new departure in our writing on socio-political questions; and it is as commendable as it is new. Despite the numerous evidences of hasty writing and the fact that there are more references to the Greeks than is necessary, the author has hit upon what he is justified in considering our most vital social problem—that of injecting order into and of eliminating waste from the social process. That the solution lies in the general direction of the author's argument can scarcely be doubted.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Lame and Lovely. Essays on Religion for Modern Minds. By FRANK CRANE. Chicago: Forbes & Co., 1912. Pp. 215. \$1.00.

The author, well known for his previously published books and many writings in newspapers and magazines, has presented in this volume a collection of forty-five short essays which he calls "Preachments to the common folks."

These essays deal in a fragmentary manner with some of the mooted questions of the religious and social life. They have no definite plan and coherence, and no clear-cut argument.

The work abounds in original, catchy statements, and scrappy bits of philosophy, which, though containing an element of helpfulness, do not exert a wholesome influence upon the general reading public. The attempt to be attractive in dealing with these thought problems of the masses has resulted in sensationalism, and in much misstatement, overstatement, and contradiction.

Such a book may be inspirational, if by inspirational we mean that sort of dynamic and abiding power which the author attributes to Christianity apart from objective expression, but its real social value is to be seriously questioned.

ROY WILLIAM FOLEY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Some Recent Advances in Syphilis and Gonorrhoea.—Three advances of great practical importance have been made in connection with syphilis: (1) the discovery of the specific organism of the disease by Schaudinn in 1905 has made possible the early diagnosis by the ultra-microscope at least a fortnight before any secondary symptoms appear; (2) Ehrlich's salvarsan has proved to be the most powerful weapon for the cure of syphilis, but has not been used long enough to determine the permanence of its cures; moreover a number of deaths have been recorded which were due directly to its use; (3) the Wassermann test makes it possible to tell definitely and accurately when the patient is cured. The advances in gonorrhoea are not so revolutionary as in syphilis, but there has been increased accuracy of diagnosis of the site of the lesion, improvement in the treatment of the early cases, and improvement in the treatment of chronic gonorrhoea.—J. Swift Joly, *Practitioner*, July, 1912. E. H. S.

Treatment of Syphilis by Salvarsan.—By the use of salvarsan for syphilis, the chancre, the mucous patch, and the condyloma, which are the active carriers of the contagion, are in the majority of cases healed over in forty-eight hours, thus greatly diminishing the spread of the disease. It is not yet certain that these cures are permanent. In cases of congenital syphilis, since salvarsan is not well borne by very young children, the nursing mother must be injected. In nearly every case so treated the symptoms in the infant rapidly disappeared. There are dangers in the use of salvarsan and fatal results have occurred in cases which were in a hopeless condition prior to treatment, or in which the drug had been wrongly administered. Since this is the first year of the use of this drug, the results are exceedingly encouraging.—Percy E. and Stanley Tresidder, *Practitioner*, July, 1912. E. H. S.

The Wassermann Reaction in Infants and Children.—It has been impossible to determine accurately the prevalence of congenital syphilis because of the difficulty of diagnosis in certain periods of childhood. A study of 101 children in Chicago hospitals by the Wassermann test shows that 28 per cent of the children, selected mostly at random, were afflicted with congenital syphilis; this is a much larger percentage than has been found previously by less accurate tests, for 37 per cent of these had no symptoms when tested by other methods. It is evident from this that there is a very large amount of congenital syphilis among children in hospitals.—Frank Spooner Churchill, *American Journal of Diseases of Children*, June, 1912. E. H. S.

An Examination of Some Factors Influencing the Rate of Infant Mortality.—A study of infant mortality in the rural districts of Bavaria by means of multiple correlation shows (1) that a high birth-rate tends to be associated with a high infant death-rate and that this association cannot be explained by any interrelations between either variable and proportional poverty or artificial feeding; (2) that a considerable share in the causation of infant mortality should be attributed to a factor beyond the ordinary sphere of preventive medicine; (3) that there is a definite correlation between the rate of infant mortality and the habit of artificially feeding infants, but (4) no unambiguous association between poverty and infant mortality or breast feeding and the birth-rate.—M. Greenwood and J. W. Brown, *Journal of Hygiene*, May, 1912.

The New Era in Neurology.—The neurology of the previous generation, which was the era of diagnosis and localization, is passing away. We must now turn to another class of questions in neurology: eugenics, condition and care of the high-grade moron girl, study of the mentally deficient girl in school and in court, the prophylaxis of nervous breakdown. This enlargement of neurology means mutual co-operation and appreciation between neurology and other sciences.—W. N. Bullard, *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, July, 1912. E. H. S.

The Present Altitude.—The standard of human fitness varies with the epoch. The capacities, physical and mental, which are sufficient to qualify an individual for success in a rude state of society may be wholly inadequate in a complex one, and we have no knowledge that the human organism will be always capable of standing the increasing strain to which it is subjected. War and ruthless competition are a menace. If the race is to preserve the zest to live, it must be well that it should have confidence in its perfectibility.—F. Carrel, *The International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1912.

J. E. E.

The World's Most Important Conservation Problem.—The world's most important problem is the discovery of methods of conserving and increasing the brain power of mankind. The possibility of extending the scope of work carried on in the biological departments of our universities so as to facilitate and encourage investigations in the broad field of biological psychology would be an important factor in bringing these institutions into the closest touch with the subjects of most vital importance to humanity. The Phipps Psychiatric Clinic in Baltimore will mark a new era in this country, not only in the study of nervous and mental diseases, but also in advancing our knowledge of many questions of immediate importance for educators and those interested in the solution of social problems.—Dr. Stewart Paton, *The Popular Science Monthly*, August, 1912.

J. E. E.

The Sociological Survey.—The fundamental ideal in a sociological survey is to prosecute a study of the generation and the degeneration of man, so as to make it effectively subserve the supreme social purpose of his regeneration. In preaching the doctrine of education and of betterment, sociology makes no claim to novelty. But it does insist, with the strongest emphasis, on the elementary scientific axioms that diagnosis must precede treatment; that action must be based on adequate knowledge. The sociologist, no less than his predecessor, the theologian, asserts his faith in an underlying unity. He believes that the riddle of history may be read, and that man was intended to control his social tradition, to possess the heritage of good, and to cast off the burden of evil.—V. V. Branford, *The Sociological Review*, April, 1912.

J. E. E.

The Degeneration of Classes and Peoples.—It is very evident from our contemporary life that the large city is the hot-bed of degeneration and always will be so. History shows that the country stock preserves the power of culture-races longer than would otherwise be the case. Degeneration is the inevitable price we must pay for progress. The only way that the legislator can restrain the country population from yielding to the seduction of the town is by homestead laws.—Dr. Max Nordau, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1912.

J. E. E.

Public Opinion and War.—There is no prospect that wars will cease. In so far as nations are not prepared to fight they are going down hill. When the world has ceased to contain evil, war will cease; so will prisons and many of our other institutions. Until then those who argue that war is in every case wrong are advocating the acceptance of the mediocre in order to avoid the trouble of striving for the best.—Norman Whatley, *The Economic Review*, April 15, 1912.

J. E. E.

Harmful Effects of Industrial Combinations on Labor Conditions.—A comparison of labor conditions under our modern industrial system with those in existence before the era of large combinations shows conclusively that the conditions of the workers from an economic and social standpoint were much superior under the old method of independent operation. Their very opportunities for making a living have been largely circumscribed. The laborer's only hope of regaining his social and economic individuality is by uniting with fellow-workmen in a movement through which he will be able to secure a joint bargain with his employer for the labor he has to sell.—John Williams, *The Annals of the American Academy*, July, 1912.

J. E. E.

Amusements.—Most labor has become highly specialized and monotonous. With its shorter working-day has come an opportunity as well as a demand for wholesome amusement. Municipalities offer education, art galleries, and libraries, but have

neglected indoor amusement. The field is open especially to the public-house and the café, to the evening paper, the little theater, the music halls, and the church.—John Garrett Leigh, *The Economic Review*, July 15, 1912.

G. T. J.

The Voluntary Social Worker and the State.—England has more voluntary service than any other country. There is a great awakening of social interest and sympathy, resulting in legislative measures of social reform. The social volunteer has proved his worth with private concerns. Experience seems to indicate (1) that for the highest success in certain departments of public work voluntary service is necessary; (2) that volunteers will respond in a remarkable degree to the call of the state; (3) that the movement has many pit-falls before it. The fields offering the largest opportunities are those of the public health, of the poor law, of the juvenile labor exchange, and of education.—Ronald C. Davidson, *The Economic Review*, July 15, 1912.

G. T. J.

A Study of Australian Vital Statistics.—Has the British race settled in Australia shown signs of decreasing vigor and vitality? Vital statistics seem to indicate (1) that the birth-rates are equal to those of Great Britain; (2) that the death-rates are lower; (3) that the rates of infant mortality are the lowest in the world; (4) that Colonial-born lives exhibit greater vitality than those of European nativity; (5) that longevity is greater than in most countries; (6) that the answer to the above question should be made in the negative.—A. Duckworth, *The Economic Journal*, September, 1912.

G. T. J.

The Psychological Aspects of the Culture-Environment Relation.—Culture traits can be regarded neither as the immediate result of the physical environment, nor solely as the conscious constructs of associated individuals. Moreover, the analogy from psychological reaction does not sufficiently explain cultural differences, since the fundamentally uniform pattern of mental life in man would refer all such differences either to differences in the physical environment, as furnishing the raw materials of culture, or to psychic accident. The American school of anthropologists adopt the latter position, assuming a conscious constructive origin for cultures as opposed to a sociologic-evolutionary interpretation. While environment does influence technology, its elements are too objective to be available in the construction of the psychological culture values. What is significant, however, is the force of the cultural environment supplied by other social groups. Through imitation and suggestion culture elements are spread and transplanted, and produce new combinations on a new soil.—Clark Wissler, *American Anthropologist*, April-June, 1912.

P. W.

History-making Forces.—The forces concerned in history-making are more numerous and more complex than those involved in physical processes. The first law of social change is that social formation and deformation take place gradually. The revolution is a mere surface manifestation. Nevertheless, governmental structures may retard or modify the course of social change. Similarly, environmental conditions, such as the frontier in American history, the mixture of races and nationalities, social customs, tradition, religious, political, and ethical ideals and principles, exert a profound influence on national life and character. Education may be either a conservative or a progressive social force, according as a broad social or a narrow technical or class standard is applied to it. The social scientist is the future maker of history.—Dr. Frank T. Carlton, *Popular Science Monthly*, October, 1912.

P. W.

On the Principle of Convergence in Ethnology.—The application of the form-criterion supplemented by the quantitative test, as proposed by Graebner, in the determination of genetic relationships among similar cultural phenomena, is not entirely sound methodologically. The form-criterion of resemblance is liable to fanciful subjective interpretations, while the criterion of quantity is dependent for its significant use upon this, thereby surrendering its "unconditional objectivity." The comparison of form can never do more than establish the identity of forms. To explain such identity by a genetic relationship, it is necessary not merely to discover a

number of other resemblances or identical phenomena accompanying it, but to show a common psychological or cultural context within which these phenomena occur. Objective resemblances are meaningless for ethnology unless demonstrated as true homologies. For simple ethnological phenomena even of this type, provided the principle of psychic unity cannot be applied nor paths of diffusion definitely indicated, the hypothesis of independent origin or "convergent evolution" is as valid as that of historical connection.—Robert H. Lowie, *Journal of American Folklore*, January-March, 1912. P. W.

Intensity of Natural Selection in Man.—Natural selection applies very intensely, even to man in civilized conditions. When correction is made for differences in environment, English life-tables show that, as infant mortality increases, child mortality decreases; bad environment does not result in death for infants and children alike; the stronger survive, thus decreasing the death-rate in the later period.—Karl Pearson, *Proceedings of the Royal Statistical Society*, August 24, 1912.

E. H. S.

Les institutions d'assistance publique en Angleterre et en Allemagne.—In view of the increase of assistance granted in France to the aged, infirm, and incurable since the legislation of 1905, and ascribed by some to that legislation, it is important to compare the conditions in England and Germany with those of France. Such a comparison shows that the increase in expense increases more rapidly than the number assisted; the average cost has increased, due to the increased cost of living and to the change in humanitarian ideas. In England pauperism has been reduced by decreasing out-of-door assistance; in Germany it has been reduced by insurance.—L. Duge de Bernonville, *Journal de la Société de statistique de Paris*, July, 1912.

E. H. S.

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XVIII

JANUARY 1913

NUMBER 4

THE PRESENT OUTLOOK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE¹

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This paper is virtually a syllabus. It presents a conspectus of a piece of work which cannot be carried far by a single individual. Nevertheless the work is prompted by belief that the aim proposed, the method pursued, tentative results already obtained, and indications to which even these provisional conclusions point, are worth something as a contribution to knowledge, and to the formation of scientific and social purpose.

The study now to be indicated in outline is an inquiry into the methodology of the social sciences, not as it has been or might be developed abstractly, but as it has actually evolved in a single case, that case being regarded as to a certain degree necessarily typical of the logic of the social sciences in general. An important presupposition of the study is that we are far from having exhausted the instruction for present social theory which is to be obtained by study of the evolution of the social sciences.

The study concerns itself directly with the scientific experience of one people only—the Germans. It may be indicated by the question: “What does the evolution of the social sciences in Germany show about actual processes thus far experienced in gaining social sophistication?”

¹ Address delivered in outline before the American Sociological Society.

I will not defend, but I will explain, this choice of problem.

It is doubtless beyond question that, with the single exception of the ethical enlightenment contained in Christianity, the world has learned more in the field of social science since 1800 than it had learned before since Plato. This being the case, it is worth while to study the experience of the Germans in this field during the past century, in the first place, for the general reason that in their experience stages which everyone must somehow pass through in reaching intellectual maturity are more distinctly in evidence than in any other national experience. This is not to assert that the knowledge to be credited to the work of the nineteenth century within the field of the social sciences was all gained by Germans, or that it has been confined to Germany. On the other hand, the intellectual and moral crises in which the limitations of knowledge have become conscious, in which determination to remove the limitations has become deliberate, and in which pursuit of the resolve has arrived at larger outlook and deeper penetration—all these processes have been more visible and in the aggregate more systematically correlated among the Germans than anywhere else.

It may be that scholars among the English, the French, the Italians, and perhaps some of the other nations have actually passed from the eighteenth- to the twentieth-century plane of social enlightenment, on the purely intellectual side, by steps which were quite as independent and which would therefore be quite as instructive as the experience of the Germans. I venture no opinion upon that problem. I simply point out that the way-marks of the German progress are more easily detected and more variously attested. They are not as well preserved as we might wish, but, as compared with the memorabilia of other nations, they are as an intimate daily diary in contrast with those details of an ordinary life which would find place in public annals.

In other words, the Germans have put on record a relatively complete intellectual autobiography. Not because it is German, but because it is human, because it records the experience through which all men's minds have to find their way in order to arrive at our present stage of social sophistication, this German autobiography is the most voluminous introduction in existence to the

particular type of self-knowledge that is taking shape in the modern social sciences. It is a commonplace that we do not fully know what we know, until we know it as it was gradually discovered in the process of eliminating previous misconceptions or of filling gaps where there had been no conceptions. For this reason review of the thought-processes involved in the evolution of German social theories is invaluable.

More specifically, I find it worth while to study the progress of German knowledge in social science since 1800, second, because of the literal exhibit which this experience contains of advance in awareness that supposed facts which had satisfied might not even be facts, and if they were, they would not be sufficient; in awareness that previous solutions did not solve; that previous explanations did not explain; and that previous valuations did not convince. I find it worth while to study the expansion and deepening of German social science, not as the only textbook in which social science may be learned, but as the textbook in which the pragmatic process of learning social science is more explicitly exhibited than in any other available. Otherwise expressed, this German experience presents to us the plainest instance extant on a large scale of social science knowledge in the making. If this were the whole story, it would be reason enough for studying this German experience.

But there is a third reason for studying the nineteenth-century evolution of German social science, and in my rating it is far more important than either of the two just stated, namely, the history either does or does not furnish a series of confirmations of a cardinal theorem in social psychology: *Every social theory, and every type of social science is a function of practical problems which contemporary men are attempting to solve.* In other words, the thinkers of a generation are tackling in more abstract form the problems with which their whole society at the same time is busy in the concrete. The theories of scholars reflect the personal interest and the class bias of one or other of the groups that clash in the practical competitions of the same period. As these classes arrive at adjustments of their interests, as social institutions settle into arrangements accordingly, the corresponding theories become respectively orthodox and authoritative, or discredited and rejected. Domi-

nant dogmas in social science may accordingly be in effect the decrees of non-scientific men who have won social power by some kind of force not purely intellectual, and the dogmas may therefore have no better permanent right than that of might. The prevalent basic presumptions in the theory of economic distribution make a case in point, as I shall indicate later.

In other words, one of the reasons why social theories are not impartially objective is that in every age of the world social theory has been one of the weapons of the class conflict then waging. Whether with conscious or unconscious class bias, the thinkers have been trying to solve the social problems of their time by assuming as self-evident more or less of one or another partisan conception of life then trying conclusions in the arena of social struggle. Social theory has been an ally now of one party, now of another, in the constant social conflict, instead of being an impartial observer in the white light of dispassionate science.

We discover this vitiation of knowledge better in the past than in its manifestations in our own time. More precisely, if we make out this inexactness in our own time, the very perception is discounted by the possibility that our discovery is merely our own partisanship, bringing suspicion of improper bias against other partisans. We are much less liable to that charge when we point out the partisan preconceptions of men in the past, since there is less common interest between ourselves and partisans on either side of past conflicts than there is between ourselves and some living actors. We may therefore more conveniently learn the workings of men's minds when engaged on social problems in general, by analyzing their mode of dealing with stages of social theory which are now closed incidents.

The Germans are neither sinners above all others, in the matters just pointed out, nor are they exceptions to the rule. They have very strikingly illustrated the rule. Their experience, therefore, which as I have said is more plainly recorded than any other of equal scope, is the most instructive available evidence as to this ever-present human factor in knowledge processes.

In the fourth place, the actual growth of social science in Germany presents a specific case of the interdependence of different

phases of social theory, or, as it is more customary to express it, of the dependence of one social science upon all the others. In the United States the workers in the various social sciences have not yet very generally admitted this interdependence, and those who have admitted it have usually done so with such reserve that the perception has had much less than its full value as a working influence on their methods. The idea that no part of social science can progress very far at a time unless all parts of social science are advancing at the same time, and unless each part is keeping step with all the rest—this idea is still fighting for its life. Few scholars in the United States deny it outright, but few make it a part of their effective beliefs. A large part of the difference between dead scholarship and live scholarship in the social sciences of today consists in contrasted degrees of the vitality of this perception in different men's thinking. There is no clearer proof that objectivity and virility in social science depend upon actual evolution of social science as unified interpretation of a total human experience, than the nineteenth-century history of German social theory. I do not mean that many Germans made the generalization which I have stated, and acted consistently with it. I mean that the work which the narrowest German specialist did got its permanent rating in social science by serving or not serving to close some gap, or to improve some process, which had previously been defective throughout the range of the social sciences. This service as a subsidiary to social science in general is the final criterion of all presumed achievement in any division of social science.

The battle for the triumph of this perception is now on in the United States. The intellectual history of the next generation in our country will be a triumphal march or a disgraceful counter-march according as it succeeds or not in making this perception a commonplace in social science thinking. The line of advance in social science must follow a path to which this perception of the interconnection of all parts of human experience is one of the indexes. I am acquainted with no more immediately available equipment for this part of the impending struggle than familiarity with the facts in the case of German experience in the nineteenth century. That experience is all the more instructive because it was

not thought out in advance. In spite of all the attempts at classification and organization of the sciences, of which the Germans were so prolific, German social scientists exercised a degree of freedom in proposing their own problems and in selecting their own methods of work upon them, which left scarcely anything for the most extreme individualist to desire. Not because they wanted to, but because they had to in doing their best on the problems they had attacked, those free lances leaned one upon another and borrowed the one from the other, and co-operated with one another in proceeding from less to more knowledge of the social reality. We must, therefore, not make the mistake of treating this German experience as simply a solidarity, and therefore as only a single instance which could not serve as proof of a generalization. On the contrary, a multitude of independent German scholars, each following his own bent, sooner or later repeated, in some measure or other, the same experience. They found that each must be in turn historian, political philosopher, political scientist, political economist, moralist, etc., in order to satisfy his own conception of the procedure necessary to reach his results. This German experience then is not a single case, but hundreds of cumulative cases. Nineteenth-century German experience in the social sciences is a multitude of individual attempts to treat life analytically, resulting in as many conclusions that after all the last word about life must be synthetic.

I name a fifth reason for the importance of the study which I am reporting. Without assuming that the social science of the world is expressed at its best today in the social science of Germany, it is safe to say that elements of value in each of the social sciences which are also of value to every other social science are more vividly in evidence in Germany than anywhere else. If we are familiar, therefore, with the social sciences as they are at present developed in Germany, we are able greatly to abbreviate our necessary methodological inquiries. Instead of going over points of controversy which are necessary preliminaries to advanced thinking in social science, we are able to point to many concrete elements in the technique already adopted by German scholars which have only to be seen to be approved by everyone of sufficient training to be entitled to an opinion. At the same time, if we should attempt

to justify these same factors by formal argument, the great majority of social scientists in the United States would meet us with active or passive opposition. A large part of the strategy of constructive social science in the next few generations in the United States must consist in conscious and deliberate practice of the composite methods of research which have achieved prestige in Germany in place of methods of unreal abstraction. These composite methods may be adopted in practice long before scholars are willing to accept the general principles of social relations which are fundamental to the validity of these practices. To speak more concretely, no German scholar today of the first rank can be correctly represented by any label which designates a single one of the traditional academic divisions of knowledge. On the contrary, each of them practices the technique of each of the divisions of knowledge as it is demanded by the particular problem upon which he is engaged. More exactly, each one of them is psychologist, historian, political philosopher, political scientist, and sociologist, whenever his problems call for the technique or results of either of these divisions of labor. It would be invidious to select a few names in order to substantiate this proposition.

Assuming then this illustrative value of German experience, not because of specific doctrines which it has evolved, but because of inevitable tendencies in the logic of the social sciences which it has exemplified, it is first in order to make use of the work which has been done in reporting general German experience to get at the crises or problems in German society which German scholars, even the most abstract, were consciously or unconsciously attempting to control. It should go without saying that the minor crises incidental to these larger ones must be interpreted as the more immediate social environment of each particular theorist.

In the rough, then, I make out four cardinal problems which have presented the fundamental tests for German practical men and theorists alike since the middle of the eighteenth century. In a way each of them has been a factor in German life from the middle of the sixteenth century until the present moment. In another sense they have successively come into chief importance in the order in which I shall name them.

The first cardinal problem of the Germans was that of protecting the state against other states—the cameralistic problem. This task was more and more distinctly present to the German mind from 1555 to 1765, and we may say that it virtually dominated all other public problems until 1815.

The chronic condition of the European nations during the cameralistic period was war, and the primary task of government, especially in Germany, was creation of readiness for war. Under the circumstances, the most constant and pressing need of states was ready money. The men who elaborated either the theory or the practice of government for these German states had virtually to answer this question: "What program must a wise government adopt, in order first and foremost to be adequately supplied with ready money, and thus able to discharge the duties of the state in their various orders of importance?"¹

It came about that a big block of social theory was built up between 1555 and 1765, under stimulus of the distinct purpose to systematize programs of national conduct in such a way that the national governments might be as strong as possible in the military sense. Not only was there an extensive literature directly in the service of this purpose, but all the other literature within the field of social science in Germany was strongly affected by this dominating note of the military and incidentally the fiscal necessities of the German states. Involved in these cameralistic theories, and in the viewpoint of other types of social thinking not avowedly in the interest of this immediate civic purpose, were innumerable dogmas, presumptions, inferences, and impressions which were more than administrative in the technical sense. They were presuppositions in the fields of history, political philosophy, political science, political economy, ethics, and social philosophy. Accordingly, they were in some sort and degree attempts to occupy the ground later covered by each of those sciences. The point is that not merely those portions of cameralism which were direct attempts to formulate means to the fiscal and military end, and which were therefore rational adaptations of resources to that end, were shaped by consideration of that end; but that the same end was used as a criterion of other things, possibly more important than itself—things that might

¹ Small, *The Cameralists*, pp. 6-7.

show it to be a very temporary, local, and untenable end—in short that something merely incidental in the whole human process was allowed to take the place of arbiter over more important phases of the process, and thus to prejudice thought and action about the whole range of the social process. This sort of methodological fallacy was in possession of the ground until 1765, and to a considerable extent until 1815. The next great steps in social theory could not be taken until the grip of this fallacy could be weakened. Meanwhile, as a general proposition, all German thinking in social science was a more or less direct and conscious attempt to interpret and direct the conduct of the Germans, and to philosophize this interpretation and conduct, with reference to the dominating idea of strengthening the state for defense and aggression in conflict with other states. The point which I am now urging is that in principle this central fact of the cameralistic period is typical of all thinking. It is always a question, to be sure, in what degree the controlling public problem of a generation affects the specific thinking of a given scientist or school of scientists. The actuality of this relationship between the public problems and the specific scientific problem of all contemporaries is the main thing to be noted.

It is impossible in this paper to justify the conclusions which I have reached provisionally, about the controlling public problems in Germany after 1815. I venture, however, to indicate them in brief. It is probably unnecessary to mention that the mutterings of the French Revolution and then the Revolution itself set back the indicated course of German social science more than a generation. After the great problem of the cameralistic period had been temporarily solved, the problem next in order, and to a certain extent next in necessity, was how to protect the citizen against the state. As a rough general proposition, German public life and German social theory centered upon this problem from 1815 to 1850 as distinctly as it had revolved around the cameralistic problem during the previous period. Two special factors kept the citizen problem back and down for a length of time that would not have elapsed if the Germans had been a compact and detached group. These were, first, the local jealousies of the different quasi-

sovereign German states. These frictions were in the aggregate a more debilitating drain upon the material and moral resources of the Germans than the hostilities of alien nations. They helped to prolong the necessity of keeping every state in the condition of martial preparation, and this amounted to suppression of the civic problem because of the paramount urgency of the military problem. In other words, it prolonged the life of autocracy or the absorption of the citizen by the government. In the second place, the oncoming of the French Revolution obscured and postponed the civic problem. It made almost everybody in the upper classes, and even the majority in the lower, believe that the essential problem was to insure the state not only against the old foreign enemies, but further, against a new phase of domestic danger, that is revolutionists, who were held to be implacable enemies of all properly constituted government.

Added to these special factors, a third was the necessity of fighting against the Napoleonizing of all Europe. This accident in the situation kept the old problem of the cameralistic period to the fore to such an extent that, in the life-and-death struggle of nationalities against absorption in the Bonapartistic empire, absorption of the citizen by the government was made to seem a negligible evil so long as this more spectacular evil threatened. The orderly progress of social science in Germany was therefore arrested for a long time by necessary concentration upon the disturbing problems of revolution and Napoleonism.

The third period in nineteenth-century development in Germany was that dominated by the problem of protecting the majority of the citizens against the economically dominant class; namely from 1850 to 1871.

The fourth period, from 1871 to the present, has been occupied by the problem of committing Germany to a permanent policy of promoting human improvement.

Taking this general survey of public problems in Germany as its base of operations, the specific study which I am now sketching is an attempt to discover the most significant features in the course of the evolution of social science in Germany since the cameralistic period. I try to indicate the cardinal traits in this

development, or as I may say its methodological outcome, under four main propositions.

I. *German social science in the nineteenth century has become historical.*

On the whole, we may describe the general mental attitude of scholars throughout the world, as well as of the multitude, up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, as in a vague way conscious of the past, and respectful toward the past. While the past simply as past, however, always constituted a certain background in the consciousness of thinkers, they felt themselves on the other hand largely free to reconstruct this past, to give it a content and a meaning according as their own fancy or interest or a dominant authority might suggest. In other words, the rôle of the past in the thinking of men at the end of the eighteenth century was the rôle of the vicious circle: that is, men constructed a past to suit themselves, with little or no sense of liability to conform their construction to actual facts. Then having built up their fictitious past they used it as an authority to establish belief and control conduct. In this sense then they had hardly made the beginnings of finding themselves in the real world.¹

This attitude of unreality, of unguineness, of non-objectivity, with reference to the portion of human experience that was in the past, was an effect of many things and a cause of many other things that are important variants in social science. Without attempting to schedule these causes or effects, we may note that this condition of imperfect connection with reality on the part of scholars indicated in a still higher degree a similar condition on the part of men in general. This amounted to a state of maladjustment with all the processes of life, which was in itself an arrested development. In order that the thinking process in particular and the life-processes in general might develop, the time had come for a notable extension of human ability to look straight at human experience as it had been, to recognize it in its actual character, and to learn from it just those things which were involved in the record as thus intelligently and dispassionately read. The pace-makers in this

¹ Illustrations of this attitude may be cited in the case of Schröder, Small, *The Cameralists*, pp. 137-39; and Justi, *ibid.*, pp. 294-95 and 310-11.

pursuit of reality within the social realm were undoubtedly the historians.¹

In order to become responsible, reliable, and competent, in their part of the human process, it was necessary for scholars in the social sciences to detect all sorts of wishes-father-to-the-thought, all sorts of subjectively created substitutes for reality, all sorts of interested assignments of value to reality, and to recognize literal occurrences and actual connections between occurrences in the moral world. So far as discipline to this end was gained in and through the social sciences at all, work in the field of history was the most illuminating experience, and the historians consequently became for a time the most efficient preceptors of other social scientists. They thus indirectly contributed to increase of objectivity in social thinking in general. For reasons indicated above, historical study during the Napoleonic period was stimulated less by the purpose to grapple with the new problem of the enfranchisement of the citizen, than with the old problem of the security of the state. Nevertheless, the discipline of candid interrogation of the past, to find in the past its own reality rather than a reflection of the assumptions of the thinker, was the elementary thing, even though the lessons searched for in the past were applied more to a closed or closing incident than to the coming issue. Men could not form the habit of facing the past objectively without acquiring some increment of ability to face the present objectively. In this way the awakening of the critical historical spirit schoolmastered Europe in the realistic attitude toward all thought and conduct.

When I say that the work of vitalizing the social sciences was led by the historians, I mean at first no more than this: A few historians were the first of the German thinkers to descend from the clouds of confusion created by social upheavals in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and to apply themselves profitably to a

¹ The whole question of the interactions between the physical and the social sciences in this approach to reality may be waived here, not because it is irrelevant, if we were discussing all the factors of the early nineteenth-century movement in Germany or elsewhere; but because we are starting with the phenomena in the social sciences as we find them at a particular time. In pursuing the study it is of course necessary to investigate all the influences that shape the phenomena of social science from this time on. These factors have to be followed out into a detail which this paper cannot indicate.

field of real knowledge of human affairs. As it turned out, this program of the historians amounted to the laying of a foundation course in the structure of social science. It was probably the most efficient preparation within the social sciences themselves for what we know now as the "process conception of life." It taught men to think human experience as growth, as a succession of consequences following by some sort of physical or moral necessity from particular antecedents. It taught men that they must find a part at least of the explanation of every social situation or occurrence in the previous sequence of situations and occurrences in which the phenomenon to be explained is a late term. Merely for suggestive purposes, we may refer roughly to Savigny as illustrating this idea through use of Roman law; to Eichhorn as impressing the same lesson with growth of German legal institutions as the material, and as laying a stronger basis of historicity in relating German legal growth more vitally with the external experience of the Germans; to Niebuhr as setting a new pace in higher criticism of the archeological and literary remains of history; and to Ranke as enlarging conceptions of the sort of documentation necessary in order to make civic history authentic.

It is of course impossible in such a sketch as this to discuss the technique of any division of social science. We are concerned at present merely with cardinal factors in methodology. I must therefore emphasize a peculiar limitation in the method of the early nineteenth-century historians. In brief, while they contributed to realism in social science by emphasizing causal connections between chronologically earlier and later phenomena, they conspicuously lacked ability to interpret contemporary situations in terms of cause and effect, of means and end. Their attempts to do this ended with interpretation of the present as an effect of the past. They were panic-stricken when they found other men thinking of controlling the present with a view to causing the future.

Each of the historians whom I have named was a case in point. Let Eichhorn stand for all. He wanted to help solve the public problems of Germany at his own time, particularly to pave the way for reduction of the chaos of legal conditions into order, by resolving the nebulous past of German constitutional and legal

history into an intelligible process; that is, he wanted to do just what the faculties of the leading American law schools today pride themselves upon doing. They pursue the method of explaining all law by going back to its genesis, and of trying to discover the occasions and processes of its growth. This is a deliberate and conscious substitute for the method of treating each particular rule of law as having an absolute value within a system of logical constructions abstracted from all concrete circumstances in which parts or the whole of the system may have arisen. The thing which at last made this whole historical method revolutionary was utterly beyond the prevision of the so-called "historical school of jurists," Eichhorn and Savigny in particular. They rang the changes on the propositions "All law has its roots in the past"; "All law is a growth"; "All law is to be explained by the circumstances of its history." The initial effect of this attitude was a tremendous liberalizing of the minds of jurists who had to teach either public or private law. It made them treat it less as a rigidly formal affair, operating and to be operated with mechanical relentlessness. It taught them to consider law as in some measure elastic with the thrust and pull of circumstances. Compared with our present notions of the adaptability of law to changing conditions, the modifications in German legal conceptions at this time were microscopic. On the other hand, the change was considerable, when compared with the earlier attitude of German legalists. The same effect is easily traced in the minds of men dealing with other divisions of social science, and the effect has been cumulative up to the present time.

On the other hand, these men who did so much with the clue of historical growth were at their wits' end when the idea was carried over to the conditions of their own time with any thought of planning a continuance of the process of growth. Hard as it is for us to understand how it was possible so to handicap the idea at just the point where it promised to be most efficient, the truth is that these earlier interpreters of legal institutions in terms of growth seemed able to entertain the idea in full only with reference to the past. The moment they were asked to follow out the implications of the idea, in the way of making their own time an incubator

of more growth, they were frightened. The same phenomenon occurred later in the case of the historical economists. But this is the important matter now to be noted: These historians builded better than they knew. Growth is not a mere historical category. It is also proleptic. The idea of social growth, whether derived from the experiences of everyday men, or from the reflections of scholars, is dynamic. As a general proposition, the academic men who were historically minded, whether with respect to law or economics, wanted to use the past as a means of reconciling the world unto the present, or at most as a means of procuring a more orderly arrangement and smoother working of the institutions which the past had handed down to the present. But the dynamics in the idea of historical growth were not exhausted in that lame and impotent conclusion. The fashioning of the idea of historical growth into a tool of science set afoot the mischief of calculated social propagation. Men reasoned for a long time, more subconsciously than consciously: "If growth is the program of history what about the growth of our own moment? Every period of the past has been the present to the men who lived in it. Those men of the past had to be men of action in their own time and place, or growth would have halted with them. How should we act, in view of the circumstances of our own time, in such a way that the process of growth which we have discovered in the past may be continuous through us and beyond us?"

As a rule the men who have done most to develop the idea and to trace the actual processes of growth in the past have balked at this inference. They have taken refuge in some conception of impersonal forces producing change, even if they consented to entertain the idea that the institutions of their own time were eventually to undergo change in a series that should continue the changes involved in the growth of the past. These men have felt that the safety of society demanded stout resistance to any conceptions of past growth which would constitute sanctions for going about the improvement of social institutions in the same matter-of-fact manner in which one would plan to bring unimproved land under cultivation, or to remodel an old house, or to incorporate inventions into old machinery, or to introduce labor-saving methods

into old industrial processes. In short, ever since the historical law of growth has been recognized, men in every generation who have made it the means of enlightening themselves and their neighbors about the past have fought with all their might against permitting this element of growth to do all it could toward enlightening themselves and their fellows about the present. This is among the constant exhibits in the psychology of transition. The past retains the balance of power in the minds of all but the irresponsibly visionary advance agents of the future. This is one of the reasons why so much of the social progress of recent times has had to be stated, while it was going on, not in terms of the future, but in formulas reaffirming the past.

But this is growing into a digression. The point is that we find every one of these historical scholars presently setting himself against application of the very conclusions from their scholarship which, from our standpoint, it seems to have been unavoidable for them to draw. The psychology of their position, as of the cautious element in every passage of social transition, amounts to this: first, belief in a general principle, the continuous operation of which would produce readjustments of the contemporary situation—in this case, the universality of social growth; second, disbelief that the particular measures proposed by way of social modification are authentic operations of that principle. In the rough, every historian, and to a certain extent every other scholar who has had a place in the ranks of accredited social scientists in Germany during the past century has, sooner or later, and in a lesser or higher degree, illustrated both phases of this generalization.

In particular these path-breaking German historians reached strong convictions about that feature of human experience which they referred to in terms of "growth." To that extent they made splendid use of a category which has since been widened into the view which we now indicate by the phrase "the process conception of life." In their use of the concept "growth," however, they were relatively clear in their perception of the longitudinal phase of human experience, so to speak, and relatively dim in their vision of its lateral aspect. They thought of social growth chiefly as succession, as continuity, as persistence. Their attention rested much

less on growth in its structural aspects, that is, upon stages of temporary equilibrium of forces, upon correlations of adjustments, upon interdependence of activities in process of adaptation. This "growth" concept of the early historians thus visualized human experience principally as a process of sequences within relatively narrow grooves of causation, and in a vague and uncertain degree, if at all, as a process of unfolding in all contents and dimensions. How much the historians ever contributed at first hand to enlargement of the "growth" concept in these respects, I am not prepared to say. It is by no means certain that Droysen and Treitschke and Mommsen, for example, were in advance of Eichhorn, except in technique. It would be difficult to show that they were better acquainted than he with the whole range of factors co-operating in the social process. It is certain at all events that we can trace the reinforcement of the "growth" concept more easily through the work of other divisions of social science. This will appear under the next main proposition.

II. *German social science in the nineteenth century has become functional.*

Not to venture on detailed discussion of the functional concept at this point, it is enough to say that social science throughout the nineteenth century has on the whole tended away from methods which first divided the moral world up into blocks, then sorted those blocks of social stuff into categories, and finally separated the sheep from the goat categories by judgments of good and bad. On the other hand, the social sciences, of course including psychology, have tended to substitute methods which look after the work done by the different factors in the apparent social processes, and to pronounce that work good or bad according as it tends to promote or to retard the purposes which appeal to reflective criticism as on the whole in the line of the constructive movement first of the group primarily concerned and ultimately of humanity as a whole.

It would be rank falsification of the facts to make developments in the large outlook of German social science synchronous with the stages in the public problem which I have indicated. This clarification of scientific vision was a by-product of specialized experi-

ence in all the activities of life. Within this whole, the academic activities took on the effects of the common experience with their own particular variations in a tempo different from that in which German life at large evolved.

Thus it would be easy to support the special plea that German publicists in the eighteenth century and even later were accustomed to think in terms of what was known a century afterward as the "organic concept." Passages galore might be cited in which German writers before 1900 expound human relations with variations of the category "organism." Eichhorn in 1834 explained more distinctly than he had expressed it in his first volume in 1808 that his purpose from the start had been to set forth German history as "organic."¹ The technical difference between the category "organism" previous to 1850, and indeed for the most part long after Schäffle's *Bau und Leben* began to appear in 1875, and the rôle of the same idea since that time is that in the former period it was used in the most obvious popular sense, while in the latter it was elaborated and criticized and deliberately employed for what it was worth as a tool of analysis. The phases of social science which centered around the "organic" concept two or three decades ago have in consequence been merged into results that came mostly from quite different antecedents. Men who were almost diametrically opposed to one another while the "organic" concept was under discussion are now of one mind in the essential matter of interpreting life functionally. For reasons which I will exhibit a little more specifically in a moment, the precise combinations of intellectual processes by which this result came about—whether in Germany or in other parts of the world—may never be conclusively demonstrated. It is certain, however, that three distinct scientific factors, each in its way stimulated by instinct of responsibility within the principal social problems of their time, co-operated among the Germans in developing that type of intelligence which has come to visualize life under the aspect of function. For convenience, we may call these cardinal factors (1) the economic, (2) the political, and (3) the sociological. Until very recently these factors, especially the first two, have ostensibly maintained

¹ *Deutsche Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*, ed. 1834, Vol. IV, Preface.

most exclusively separate existence. The amusing reality is that there was always between them an unsystematized and unconfessed co-operation quite inconsistent with the presumption of separateness. It is only in recent times that the three factors have become so intelligently differentiated that they are aware of the necessity of co-operation, and that they are consciously moving toward consensus as to methods of co-operation.

Returning to the beginnings of this second phase of development, one of the naïve presuppositions of eighteenth-century German publicists, and one which was well-nigh universal and decisive, was the presumption that civic power, the state, sovereignty, was primordial in human experience, and that all other phases of community life were in some sort emanations from this "center and source." The spell of this superstition is by no means wholly broken yet, in Germany or elsewhere. Even men who use a thought-apparatus which in principle excludes such illusions still occasionally revert to it. The idea that the state was an instrument of control, invented by early types of interest, inherited and transformed to suit later types of interest, and always in principle a projection of human purposes and subsidiary to human purposes, had never for a moment held the respectful attention of orthodox scholars before the end of the Napoleonic period. On the contrary, until after the beginning of the nineteenth century, all the phases of social science which had been differentiated were virtually celebrants or acolytes or parasites of a ritual of civic sovereignty to which all other human activities were supposed to be subordinate and tributary. At the same time, in spite of the fact which is among the elementary data of social science today, that social structure is chiefly functional in its origin, theorists as well as practical men have always tended to settle back into the belief that social structures of their own day are somehow predestined to permanency to such a degree that they may not be hailed before any tribunal to answer for their functional efficiency. Thus in the eighteenth century there was a state of mind which largely determined the thinking of the nineteenth, to the effect that economic as well as civic institutions were in principle as they must remain forever. Yet in the eighteenth century the physio-

crats in France and the tendency culminating in Adam Smith in Scotland began to analyze the processes of life in a way which made for precisely opposite judgments so far as the state was concerned. That is, the tendency of the new publicistic philosophy was toward the conclusion that the state and political activities in general not only depend upon economic activities, but that the former are likely to be interlopers and disturbers within the field of the latter. It was not observed at this time that, with the development of post-economic interests, the state ceases to be a tool of economic interests exclusively, and becomes the instrument of evolving purposes.¹ If here and there that aspect of the case had been noted, it did not become influential.

The idea of the autocracy of economic factors in life has taken many shapes. It has been more or less absolute in its claims. In each and all of its variations it has served during the nineteenth century as a counter-thesis, challenging the political interpretation of experience, and proposing alternative versions of what was, is, and is to be, in human affairs.

Between this immemorial illusion of the state as clue to human experience, on the one hand, and the later conceit of economic activity as master-key to human experience on the other, the nineteenth century is memorable for revival in peculiar form of a belief which has never, within recorded times, been wholly without its witnesses; namely, that the ultimate interpretation of human experience is human experience. Among men who have accepted the necessary implications of their finiteness, and are docile enough to confine their efforts after knowledge within the bounds of the knowable, the conviction has spread that the outmost reach of our knowledge of anything is knowledge of the way in which that particular aspect of experience merges into the whole of all men's experience.

What actually occurred in the social sciences in Germany, after the battle of Waterloo permitted resumption of the main course of life, was both practical and theoretical attention to the

¹ Oppenheimer is now attempting to correct the generalization known as the "economic interpretation of history," by finding the place which "political" interests have always had in social control.—*Jahrbuch des oeffentlichen Rechts*, Bd. VI (1912), pp. 128 f.

social situation which Germans confronted after the Napoleonic period. This situation presented itself to Germans of practice and theory alike under two chief aspects, namely, first the economic and second the political. Under each of these aspects specific problems of immediate importance pressed for solution. The thesis which does most to disclose the treasures of instruction to be uncovered in the period then beginning is this: *The theoretical and practical experience forced upon Germans by their situation compelled them to an inspection of social cause and effect which at last resulted in scientific and practical objectivity in a plane at right angles with the plane of historical objectivity.*

This result was slow and through intermediate steps which have not yet been distinctly traced; but certain groups of processes are evident. On the one hand, the economic element in cameralism was so prominent that tradition up to the present time has treated that element as paramount. In fact, as I have pointed out, the political element in cameralism was principal, and the economic factor tributary. During the cameralistic period, however, pragmatic treatment of economic activities was unconsciously paving the way for economic science as we now understand the phrase. In particular, those divisions of cameralistic technique which worked out inventories and population rolls and tax lists were precursors of statistical methods and statistical science. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, under the preceptorship of Rau, the Germans were actually enrolled in the school of Adam Smith for generalized study of economic phenomena. In the minds of practical men and theorists alike, the immediately stimulating problem was: "How may the Germans become economically prosperous?" The big methodological fact about what followed was this: In the course of the century, German economic thought tried out in turn the classical, the historical, the "Austrian," and the socio-political ways of approaching economic generalizations. Whatever the specific conclusions, the universal result was uniformity of attempt to settle economic problems by valid reference of effects to their causes, by candid recognition that economic situations are reflections of contemporary as well as antecedent conditions. Translated into methodological terms,

this means, as I have said, that all the German economists had come to think of economic cause and effect not only under the aspect of before and after, but also under the aspect of coexisting action and reaction: or in a word *functionally*.

This common factor in German economic method is as general today, in spite of particular appearances to the contrary, as a certain common attitude among several million American voters who divided themselves among the parties in the recent national election. The members of this divided group voted in principle together; only in the application of the principle were they separate. Each subdivision of the group convinced itself that the man of its preference was the only candidate who was really born under the constellation of progress. There is much more unanimity among German economists today on the principle that economic relations must be judged at last by their workings than among the actually advancing element among American voters today as to who and what is progressive.

Meanwhile the second great factor in nineteenth-century German experience made its characteristic contribution to this functional preconception. I have designated it as the political factor. As I am now thinking of this influence it included all the activities of the plain people, of statesmen and their subordinates, and of academic theorists, with the status of public and private law as their center of attention. In some aspects it might better be called the juridical factor. Here the problem of interpretation on the practical side has to do with the whole process of social liberation along the lines foreshadowed in the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, in the struggles for constitutionalism, in the realization of imperial unity in 1871, and in the subsequent elaboration of the imperial code. On the theoretical side it has to do with a wide gamut of actors. They range from the brood of petifogging legalists, the men whose horizon was bounded by precedent and formula applied not even after the spirit but mechanically after the letter, through such intelligent systematizers of the law as Hugo, such historically minded searchers for the sources of the law as Savigny, to the abstract extreme of philosophy of law as represented by Hegel; and the scale then runs to the gradual develop-

ment of an objective philosophy of law as typified by Jellinek.¹ The force of external events, much more than developments from within, inexorably transformed this juridical element in German social science. Little by little the more far-seeing theorists on the political side were compelled to think of political institutions as machineries devised by men to serve developing human purposes. Expressed from the other side, they were forced to give up the illusion that political institutions are unalterable reflections of absolute principles. The most vital idea associated with this incipient functional conception of civic institutions was again the implication that they must be judged by their works.

I do not assert that German political science today has explicitly adopted abstract formulas of the functional character of life in general, and of civic institutions in particular, which would satisfy the sociologists. My claim is that the current literature of German political science is cast in a mold which in a marked degree presupposes, and to a certain extent expresses, the functional conception. As a typical case, I would refer again to Jellinek's volume just cited, and particularly to chap. iv, "The Relationship between Civic Theory and the Totality of the Sciences."

We must glance now at the third theoretical factor effective in this period. For want of a better name I have called it the sociological factor. I mean by it the phase of social science particularly represented by this society. It has fought its way into academic recognition during the past twenty-five years, in spite of inveterate prejudice that it was unheard of, and not desirable to be heard of, in the scientific world. If the historical training of the present generation of social scientists had been more complete they could not have made the former claim; and if their methodological knowledge had been more broad they would have been ashamed to make the latter. In a word the sociological factor in social science is the effort to visualize all the phases of human experience in their functional relations with one another, and to promote inquiry into all divisions of human experience with adequate attention to the interdependence of their functions. Whether this factor in social science is desirable or not, it is irrepressible unless we set arbitrary

¹ *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, Vol. I, 1900.

bounds to the working of our minds. Instead of being a parvenue of recent date, the sociological approach to the interpretation of experience was very pronounced in such men as Gerhard in 1713,¹ and Zincke in 1751.² At the middle of the nineteenth century a number of German scholars, who were sociologists in everything but name, projected reconsideration of human experience along lines which testified to relatively advanced insight into the functional nature of society.³ That the sociological factor did not develop rapidly until later is not because it is a superfluity in science, but because it had to overcome the inertia of scientists.

Not all that is obvious, still less all that is discoverable, from the historical and functional centers of attention, was to be brought to light by casual and semiconscious reference. The task demanded someone's specialized labor until a new rendering of experience becomes possible in terms of the new elements verified from the changed points of view. With more or less consciousness of their task, men whose successors adopted the name "sociologist" enlisted to develop a method and a technique appropriate to these new emphases. Whether or not it is proper to speak of their work as a distinct science is a needless question. It is true that their work was as inevitable in the progress of the social sciences as the work of the evidence-collectors and critics who had gone before. It is a work which must necessarily revolutionize previous results in social science, and it is already revolutionizing them as visibly as the objective conception of historicity revolutionized the homiletical type of history which came over from the eighteenth century into the nineteenth. In particular, it is no longer possible for gentlemen who call themselves by some sectarian scientific name to be taken seriously by completely conscious scholars when they assume that the traditions of their scientific sect are authority enough for the selections of objects of attention which they please to make. We now know that the interests of a conventionalized type of workers cannot say the final word about the objects of attention which are worthy of scientific notice. The whole movement of human experience, in so far as that movement has revealed its meaning up to the

¹ Cf. Small, *The Cameralists*, pp. 175 f.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 250 f.

³ Cf. *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, September, 1912, pp. 201 f.

present time, must be the arbiter of values when we choose to center our attention upon details within the movement. If we are to be veracious, we may not exercise an arbitrary choice about the items which we shall put in evidence when we are trying to reconstruct the processes that have actually occurred in human experience. In the long run the factors that function most meaningfully in the objective processes of life must figure in corresponding proportion in scientific interpretation of life. If individuals elect to resign the work of serious interpretation, and to seek their own private amusement through dilettantish trifling with the materials or the technique of knowledge, or if they prefer to cater to the entertainment of the public by fanciful and arbitrary construction of some of those materials into forms detached from the whole reality, they are exercising the same legal rights which permit vaudeville performers to pursue their avocations. If they aim to have a part in the work of interpreting human experience as it actually has been, and is, and is to be, their own tastes may no more dictate their objects of attention than those of a biologist when he is attempting to run down the antecedents of a mysterious disease, or when he is attempting to devise means for promoting eugenics. The decision as to program in either case must be rendered finally not by types of acquired tastes, developed in the investigator by a conventional training, but regardless of the preferences of the individual or of his scientific caste, the problems which he must tackle are questions of the kind and degree of work done in the process in question by the several factors which have co-operated for its results. In short, human experience is growing more and more articulate, and it more distinctly utters its protest against misrepresentation through versions which dismember the whole and then present the dismembered parts as the reality.

The mid-century sociological movement in Germany was not independent of similar movements, those in France and England especially, but it will prove to be peculiarly significant when it is explained in its special relations to the economic and political factors in German experience of which I have spoken. It was a direct consequence of the economic and political discussions of the first half of the century, and of the insight which those discussions had

given into the functional character of life. The questions "What is the state?" "What is society?" were spontaneous testimonies that the traditional theories about government had ceased to be conclusive, and that men were demanding objective examination of human relations, in place of reasonings from conventionalities.

In short, this sociological phase in the development of German social science was a direct resultant of the interworkings of the economic and political factors in German theory and practice. There has been no adequate investigation of the interrelations between these factors. Von Mohl, in 1855, stereotyped a fashion of treating the economic and the political factors in social science as segregated things.¹ German economists, political scientists, and historians have thus far been content to let that tradition stand in the place of thorough examination of the actual interactions between the economic and juridical factors.² The almost insuperable difficulties in the way of interpreting the course of German social science from 1815 to 1871 will not be surmounted until intimate co-operation can be arranged between scholars with the necessary legal equipment on the one hand, and men with adequate economic apparatus on the other. All the problems of political reform in Germany during this period involve a maze of legal institutions, imperial, ecclesiastical, territorial, compared with which our American system of federal and state jurisdictions is simplicity itself. At the same time, the economic and cultural interests of the Germans clamored for relief from hampering institutions. The more the legal institutions on the one hand and the economic institutions on the other were taken for granted as divine ordinations by the vested interests and their spokesmen, the more immanent was the sociological alternative. The sociological factor in social science is merely objectivity become conscious and comprehensive.

Foremost among the traits of social science as we think of it today is accordingly its federal unity. It is already archaic to

¹ *Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften.*

² The tradition is represented by the arbitrary and misleading division of territory between Roscher and Bluntschli in the two books, *National Oekonomik in Deutschland*, and *Geschichte des allgemeinen Staatsrechts und der Politik*. Cf. Small, *The Cameralists*, pp. xii f.

think of social science as represented in fact by the terms which are convenient indexes to its different divisions of labor. Social science is the whole extant body of approximate knowledge and the whole technical equipment for criticizing, increasing, and using knowledge of human experience. The most fundamental of the achievements of nineteenth-century scholarship is this perception, not yet very generally recognized of course, that valid social science cannot be many but it must be one. Obvious as the conclusion is to those who have reached it, other scholars see no meaning in it, and some still jealously deny it. We cannot justly evaluate even the specialization which signalized the last half of the nineteenth century until we survey and appraise it as correlated specialization. The chief synthetic achievement of social science may be formulated in the principle: *The last attainable interpretation of human experience is not to be found in abstractions from experience, but in composition of abstractions into a reflection of the totality of experience.*

In other words, we have behind us a century miscellaneous with attempts all over the world to find reality piecemeal. They have proved as futile as attempts would be to finance modern states by independent expeditions to find hidden treasure. In knowledge as in finance we have found it necessary to organize resources. We have learned that attempts to reach the last word in explanation of human relations in terms of abstracted fragments of human activity are foregone failures. The only interpretation that bears criticism, and that commends itself in the long run as a credible reflex of experience in its full meaning, is an interpretation in which every conceivable method of inquiry into parts or aspects of experience has been brought under requisition, and the results of all these segments or methods of investigation are assembled and co-ordinated so as to form a coherent report. Nineteenth-century scholarship gravitated toward this conclusion in spite of desperate resistance of specialists against the irresistible.

III. *German social science in the nineteenth century has become moral.*

By this I mean that German social science has deliberately and expressly repudiated that pseudo-science which virtually ended in impersonal treatment of institutions, or in a philosophy

of wealth as an end in itself, and it has passed into a philosophy of human obligation within a career which is assumed to be a task of promoting human well-being in all its dimensions. Here, in contrast with the case in England, the economists took the lead. The influences that were behind the change run back through all the public problems to which this paper has referred; but the adoption of a creed and a program was almost as dramatically abrupt as Saul's conversion on the road to Damascus. I am inclined to regard Adolph Wagner as the John the Baptist of this new dispensation. His address to the church congress in Berlin, October 12, 1871, was his wilderness call to repentance.¹ Within the inner court of the citadel of Prussian traditionalism, and in the assembly of its high priests, he sounded the signal for the new era. The keynote of his message was in the declaration: "The science of national economy is in the midst of a great crisis."² "Therefore, ethical principles must again come into force. In economic relationships between persons, the relation of man to man must come to its own."³

Wagner states the ultimate aim of "national reform" as follows:⁴

Such elevation of the lower classes has in view immediately the improvement of their material or industrial situation. This properly counts as a prerequisite, as an intellectual and moral influence. Whoever wants these must want the conditions of them. Improvement of the material conditions means richer satisfaction of the industrial needs that are making themselves felt . . . or in other words, command of a greater quantity, and, if possible, a better quality, of economic goods.

At a meeting which resulted in the organization of the Verein für Sozialpolitik the following year, Schmoller, as presiding officer, voiced the spirit of the movement in this way:

The prevalent view in the present congress is the historical view that the state is a part of the stream of becoming. For that reason its functions will vary from narrow to broad according to the circumstances of civilization. The state must always rank, however, as the most tremendous institution for the education of the human race. It is desirable, therefore, that the state shall be strong enough to predominate over the different interests within its field. It must exercise just protection over the weak, and should elevate the lower classes.

¹ *Rede über die sociale Frage.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Other propositions in Schmoller's address have since become familiar to all who have studied his writings of this period. For example:

We do not propose a program of leveling downward in the socialistic sense but there should be social gradations up which every man is at liberty to climb. We should not preserve the present social ladder, from which the middle rungs have been knocked out. . . . The ideal which should guide the individual, the state, and society, is the inclusion of a progressively enlarging ratio of the people in participation in all the higher goods of civilization. To realize this ideal, which is democratic in the best sense of the term, must be our present endeavor, as it seems to be the goal of human history in general.¹

These last sentences were taken up by Treitschke, the self-appointed spokesman of conventionalism. With correct instinct he treated them as the symbol of the new movement, but he failed in his attempt to discredit the movement as a betrayal of the higher cultural interests of Germany to "materialism" and "socialism." The Verein has included among its members practically all the German economists of eminence in the last generation. More than any other private organization it has represented the social creed of German scholars, and the social policy of the German state.

Twenty years later (September 23, 1901) Professor Brentano, as chairman of the session, spoke as follows of the founding of the Verein:²

The men whose meeting at Halle in the early summer of 1872 led to the formation of the Verein were all of the academic type. This fact was necessarily decisive both for their judgment about the contemporary economic tendencies in politics and life and for their aims, as well as for the ways and means by which they sought to reach the aims.

Up to that time only two ways of considering the world of material goods had come into application. These were the standpoints, first of technique, and second of thrift [*Wirtschaftlichkeit*]. The aim of the first is to realize a thought as completely as possible in matter [*Stoff*]. The supreme aim of the second is to gain the largest possible surplus over the expended costs. The human being engaged in economic life was not wholly ignored, to be sure, but he was considered only incidentally. At the same time, the prevailing opinion saw

¹ *Verhandlungen der Eisenacher Versammlung*, Leipzig, 1877. Cf. *Aufruf zur Gründung eines Vereins für Sozialpolitik*; *Schriften*, II, Anlage II.

² *Schriften*, XCVIII, 2 f. Because the statement is such a significant historical document, it seems worth while to present a substantially complete translation.

in the state not an independent personality, with a life of its own, but merely a sum of individuals; and according to the conception of the majority the purpose of the state was accomplished when it established the conditions under which the individuals were in a position to realize the largest possible profit.

This conception was widely prevalent in theory, and it led theorists to a complete change of economic doctrine from the clue of the endeavor of the individual to secure the largest possible profits. This theory controlled the press and parliaments. That proposition in the celebrated petition of the Manchester Board of Trade, which completely identified the interests of the whole community with the interests of the great managers of business in getting the largest possible profits, that proposition which gave the meaning to the campaign slogan "Manchesterism," characterized also the decisive viewpoint in the public opinion of Germany.

We should have been bad professors if we had not protested against this conception. The whole spiritual tradition of Germany was in contradiction with it. It would have amounted to the abdication of the universities if we had kept silent. A theory which took as its point of departure the acquisitive egoism of mankind could not but lead to doctrines which only partially coincided with reality. A policy which aimed at the largest possible profits, and not at the welfare of the human beings engaged in human activities, disregarded the fact that wealth is not an end in itself, but that it merely has the function of providing the preconditions for the attainment of the moral purposes of mankind. In view of these moral ends, our vocation was, in the field of theory, direct observation of all the phenomena of life, and of all the forces engaged in it; in politics, assertion that the paramount aim is not the greatest profits of operation, but the highest possible physical and moral well-being of men. For that very reason, because we made the situation of men carrying on the economic processes, not the gaining of the greatest amount of profits, the focus of our reflections and efforts, we called our organization the "Union for *social* politics."¹ Not as though we were disposed to neglect increase of national wealth; on the contrary we took this for granted. The material well-being of Germany was quite as fundamental in our view as it was in that of the Manchesterites. It was in our opinion the necessary presupposition of the bodily and moral well-being of the German people, and especially of the power of the German Empire and of its component states. Nevertheless, in our perspective this factor fell into the secondary rank in the sense that we regarded as the paramount purpose the well-being of men, and the power of our Fatherland. In case of conflict between this supreme end and the accumulation of wealth, the latter must give way to the former. It was, however, a matter of course that such a view must assign to the state a different rôle in economic life from that which belonged to it under the then prevailing conception. We did not necessarily, as a matter of principle, demand the intervention of

¹ Verein für Sozialpolitik.

the state in economic matters wherever it had previously been excluded. Our very ethical viewpoint made state intervention seem as undesirable in many cases as it appeared to those whom we were at that time opposing. Yet not only our conception of the state as an independent personality above and beside the individuals that belong to it, but not less our subordination of the economic viewpoint to the ethical and the political, made us champions of state intervention where, without it, purely economic interests would have triumphed over more important ethical and political interests.

I see among you gentlemen many youthful faces, and it is doubtless not easy for those among you who were not in the struggles of that time to realize what a difficult position we had in confronting the opposing views which then controlled public opinion. At first, as is usually the case, we were despised and we were often fought by means that were anything but scientific. Yet presently the effects of our attitude began to appear. At first they impressed themselves more in a negative than a positive way. Conscious that a hostile critic was on the watch in its rear, the ruling opinion no longer betrayed its former arrogance. It was not a long time before the number of our associates began to grow. At last the whole society gave evidence of being controlled by our views. Even the familiar by-phenomena of all triumphant tendencies began to appear. Our views were reflected in a multitude of more or less dubious and distorted mirrors. Even those against whose undertow we had set ourselves tried in many ways to appropriate our views, and in the caricature of them with which they often fight us today our starting-point and our aims are often misrepresented beyond recognition.

This is particularly the case where those who formerly, for the sake of their special interests, disfavored every sort of state intervention, today demand state intervention for their special interest, and try to brand as a Manchesterist everyone who, in the interest of the whole, opposes this favoritism. As though the essence of Manchesterism consisted in ruling out state intervention, and not in the spirit in which state intervention was either opposed or demanded! The same Manchester Board of Trade whose petition for the elevation of its particular interests above the interests of the totality had in its time evoked the term "Manchesterism" acted later in quite as Manchesterian fashion when, in the interest of the exportation of its cotton products, it demanded that the state should introduce bimetallism; and you may be sure that, if it ever became expedient for its particular interests, it would appear pleading for re-introduction of protective tariffs. This would not, however, be a contradiction of its old Manchesterian temper, but simply a new exercise of the same. One does not prove that he is not a Manchesterist by demanding protecting tariffs, nor does he who rejects them give proof thereby of his Manchesterism. It is the *temper* which determines the moral value of the transaction, not the negative or positive measures in which, according to circumstances, the temper is expressed. He who demands state

intervention in his own interests, may for that reason be quite as Manchesteristic as the Manchester Board of Trade when it made its original protest against state intervention; and he who opposes state intervention may thereby demonstrate that he is *not* a Manchesterist.

But it was not in its adulterations alone that our conception suffered the fate of all triumphing tendencies. So long as the problem is to dislodge a common opponent from his controlling position, it is in the nature of the case that tendencies which have nothing else in common but antagonism to the prevailing tendency will march in step with one another. In the midst of the common struggle, that which differentiates these co-operating tendencies often does not rise into consciousness, or does so at most in a highly inarticulate expression. When once the victory is gained, that which divides the co-operating forces naturally makes itself more and more felt.

I have already said that social polity fixes its attention primarily upon the condition of the laboring human beings, and considers the largest possible accession of wealth only in so far as it is the precondition of the bodily and moral well-being of men. This permits two sorts of socio-political tendencies.

The one starts from the classes which at the time set the standards, and finds its vocation principally in assuring and increasing the well-being of those classes, because those classes see in the welfare of their own kind a vitalizing of the welfare of the whole. Consequently, this tendency shows itself in promotion of technical and economic progress only when the leading position of these classes would not thereby be threatened. The tendency tries to prevent all other progress, or at least to arrest it and to neutralize its effects.

The other tendency does not consider the prosperity of the whole as linked with the permanent preponderance of the temporarily ruling classes. It sees in the whole something vital which renews its youth incessantly, through the emergence of new classes and forces. In its view this whole has prospect of permanent prosperity only in so far as such constant outgrowth of new forces and assimilation of the same with the Fatherland occurs. It consequently welcomes all real technical and economic advances, and seeks to realize the greatest possible well-being of men and the prosperity of the whole, within the condition created by these advances. Not as though the tendency were unsympathetic toward the hardships which social and industrial changes bring to the previously ruling classes. The tendency attempts, however, to mitigate these ills, and to remove them, not by seeking artificially to maintain untenable conditions, but by trying to facilitate the transition into new and wholesome conditions; and it welcomes the elements newly coming to the front as the bearers of the future weal of the nation.

Both tendencies are represented within our organization, for the Verein für Sozialpolitik is not a political organization in the sense that it would exclude or suppress all those who have not taken oath to support a particular program. All shades among those who discern the task of social politics in promotion of

the well-being of men, and in assuring the greatest possible prosperity of the whole, are represented in our membership. Our union is a scientific organization, and its objective is not the triumph of some one partisan opinion, but the truth. The speaking proof of this is furnished by our publications and our proceedings. Up to date our Verein has published ninety-seven volumes, and in order to afford a firm basis of discussion of the questions to which it gave its attention, it has always tried in an unpartisan spirit to draw into co-operation the most competent representatives of every socio-political tendency. Upon the questions which we shall discuss in this session we have already published four volumes on the housing question, and four on commercial policy. Merely a glance at the table of contents will show that we have tried to get a fair representation of all views on the subjects. In like manner, it has always been our policy to secure similar diversity of representation in our oral discussions. The contrasts of views which will doubtless appear in the present proceedings should show that in this respect at least we have been successful.

Yet great as the contrasts are that prevail among us, one thing is common to us all. However we may differ in opinion about the policy that should be adopted, that is, about that which the interest of the whole indicates, each of us has as his standard the interest of the Fatherland. May our proceedings of this year be a blessing to the German Empire, and to all its inhabitants!

German social science is frankly and positively searching into the past, present, and future of men as moral beings; and it is unashamed.

IV. *German social science has always been socially instrumental.*

Probably no one, from Herodotus to the war correspondents in the Balkans, has ever blocked out a piece of work on any level of social reporting, without some fragment of consciousness that there would be an element of social service in the enterprise. On the other hand, the motives of "knowledge for its own sake," at one extreme, and dilettantish desire to amuse or to be amused at the other, represent a gamut of essentially individualistic tempers in which reflection upon human affairs has often been pursued. These tempers are in contrast with the spirit of agency which gives tone to German social science. Largely perhaps because of the peculiar relation of most academic Germans to the state, the traditions and ideals of German scholarship have always been in a notable degree traditions and ideals of public service.

I tried to make it clear in the beginning that I find German experience worth studying not because of what I discover in it

that is peculiar to the Germans. If that were all, these German provincialisms would be worth studying merely as cases in social pathology. On the contrary I find historical study of German social science profitable because German experience so vividly exhibits some of the tendencies and results which are most vital in the social science of the world.

In connection with the last trait of German social science which I named, I venture to indulge in an old-fashioned hortatory conclusion.

When I think of the enormous aggregate of public service performed by American social scientists, in excess of the requirements of their positions, I am inclined to believe that, in spite of the absence of the same *esprit de corps* which stimulates German scholars, we compare favorably with them in our average tale of voluntary work.

On the other hand, I am impressed by the extent of our detachment from the biggest tasks which confront our nation. American social scientists are not making social science count as it might in shaping thought and action upon the most central problems of our life. When we look beneath superficial details in our latest presidential campaign, it is evident that two main questions are pressing for answers. The one is primarily political. The other is primarily economic. The former amounts to this: Shall we move in the direction toward more or less government of, for, and by the people? The other question may be reduced to its lowest terms in this form: To what extent is our industrial system rational? It is depressing to observe the degree in which exponents of the positive and the negative attitude alike support their position on both these questions upon grounds which belong essentially to the eighteenth century. The searchlight of social science, from the high outlook which our generation has gained, would dispel much of the haze which surrounds these problems, especially when they are treated with the thought-apparatus of a hundred years ago. Neither the conventional nor the revolutionary doctrines of the eighteenth century express the indications of the human lot which are visible from the present outlook of social science. No such monstrosity ever existed or can exist as the individual of eighteenth-

century theory. Governments have been oppressive, but government is as normal a function of human life as breathing. Government is rudimentary in the degree in which it is control of some by others, and it is evolved in the degree in which it is control of each by the justly correlated interests of all. Correlation of social interests is just in the degree in which each interest is as free as every other to exert its full functional value in settling the terms of control by the whole. Extension of the area of participation in social control is not anarchy, but advance in human realization. Representative government must at last represent not some of the interests but all the interests of the governed. If these rudiments of social science can have sufficient publicity, the only permanent cleavage that will remain on the political question is between self-seeking and unfaith in human destiny on the one hand, and normal human beings on the other.

But the economic question is not so simple. It is not a problem of ways and means. It calls in question the entire economic basis of modern society.

There is a crucial passage in *The Wealth of Nations* which apparently reduces to this sophism: *Land*, labor, and *capital* are the factors of production; the factors of production are the rightful parties in distribution; therefore: *landlord*, laborer, and *capitalist* are the rightful parties in distribution.¹ Opinions may always differ as to whether Adam Smith was actually guilty of this stultifying *non-sequitur*. At all events, the economic system of the civilized world rests upon presumptions fairly expressed by the false syllogism which Adam Smith's language seems to imply. The three terms in the major premise are economic; two of the three terms in the conclusion are not necessarily economic at all. They may be and in practice they often are legal and legal only. The title of many landlords and of many capitalists to an income rests, not upon their functioning as economic factors, but solely on their privileged status under our laws of property. In such cases the law turns out to have introduced a dual system of justice. Justice to the laborer consists in assigning him a share in the product

¹ Cf. Bax ed., I, chap. xi, pp. 262-63. I have discussed the passage: "Adam Smith and Modern Sociology," pp. 149 f.

of industry, provided he works. Justice to the absentee landlord or capitalist consists in assuring him a share in the produce of industry whether he works or not! With this dubious ethical sanction as our social premise, we adhere to derived economic judgments which impeach our intelligence if not our morals. For instance: in the *Boston Sunday Herald* of August 25, 1912, more than a page is occupied by an alleged interview with Mr. George W. Perkins, who expounds what he understands by "Progressivism." It is a strange medley of benevolent sentiments, timely opinions about industrial and political details, and archaic implications about social principles. Mr. Perkins is represented as saying:

Take the Steel Corporation, for instance. Mr. Carnegie, as the head of the steel industry in his day, made millions a year for himself. Judge Gary, a leading man of the steel industry in his day, carries a far greater responsibility than Mr. Carnegie ever did, and does it for a profit to himself that probably amounts to only a fraction of what Mr. Carnegie realized. The difference is going to an ever-widening circle of stockholders.

Without holding Mr. Perkins responsible for the reporting, the paragraph and the context as they stand call upon the reader to believe that we should be well along on our way toward the millennium, after we had so reformed our industries that the active factors would receive proportionally less of the product, while the passive factors would receive proportionally more, provided only that these absentee elements were sufficiently dispersed. By parity of reasoning, the way to cure cancer would be to make it general!

Academic social scientists in the United States appear to have only a languid interest in probing the industrial situation below the level of distribution.¹ Our consciences and our intellects were anesthetized for a couple of decades by Herbert Spencer's assurance that the change from status to contract had achieved a permanent basis for human relations. Meanwhile we have seen that under present legal conditions the régime of contract not only establishes another régime of status, but it is status more repugnant to modern ideas of social function than earlier types of status were to the moral standards then accepted. Most of the recent demands

¹ Even Sombart, in Germany, hardly more than hints at inferences which might be drawn from the history of capitalism, about principles of reconstruction. Cf. *Das moderne Kapitalismus*.

by various types of agitators for economic reform have accordingly spent their strength in challenging the justice of our distributive system and in proposing substitutes. Beneath these relatively superficial matters, however, is the antecedent question which has scarcely been formulated, namely: Whether capitalism, as we now know it, is compatible with *social solvency*. With the actual labor capacity of human beings limited, and with cumulative charges upon the product of labor to satisfy the legal claims of capital, all the western nations have arrived at a "high cost of living" which should act as a block signal. This incidental "high cost of living" should turn attention to the problem: How fast and how far can our practice of accelerated capitalization go, before it will overtake the capacity of productive operations to carry the increasing burden? In other words, does our capitalism, after a certain stage, involve something analogous with the Malthusian formula of population, namely: increase of productivity with the coefficient x ; increase of capital charges with the coefficient $x+y$?

The question challenges not economists alone. Our present knowledge that the *latifundia* system undermined the strength of Rome came through the combined work of our whole apparatus of social science. The most vital task of our period is confirmation or removal of the suspicion that the capitalism of our era is a social fallacy as patent and as fatal as the Roman *latifundia*. The task will not be finished without the co-operation of all our social sciences from the historical, functional, moral, and instrumental standpoints. The indicated function of social science is to be the chief organ of social self-examination. The changed outlook of the social sciences since the eighteenth century discredits the social science which is content to let eighteenth-century social interpretations stand unimpeached by twentieth-century conditions. We are in danger of mistaking capitalism mitigated by patriarchalism for capitalism corrected in principle. In no period of history has it been possible for social scientists to perform more fundamentally constructive public service than present conditions throughout the world demand. To seize the opportunity, we must learn how to relegate both surface phenomena and esoteric subtleties to their proportional place, and we must concentrate our forces upon radical problems.

SOCIAL VALUES

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FEELING AS AN ELEMENT IN ACTIVITY

In an earlier article, published in this *Journal* and in the *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, I discussed the false rôle which has been assigned to the feelings in sociology. By what seems to me a very serious error the feelings (spoken as of "the social forces") are regarded as the sufficient causes of social activities, so that sociological explanation is made to consist in referring actions to motives. I wish in this article to discuss what seems to me to be the true importance of feelings for sociology, namely their importance as the means, not of explaining, but of evaluating, the whole.

I am now to speak, not of social "valuations" or judgments of worth (which are a special kind of social activity), but of social values, or the elements in experience upon which such judgments are passed, the subjects of which valuations supply the predicate, and which are not a special kind of social activity but an element or quality found in activities of every kind.

Our actions are like a shield, one side of which is exposed to the world, the other pressed against the heart. The inner side of activity is desire and satisfaction and pain. Even the thought of an action is itself an activity with its lining of desire and satisfaction. When outward circumstances hinder our actions, still the inner activity may continue like the straining of a man in chains, and though it cannot show its outer side in overt deeds, yet its inner side be hot and vivid or cold and heavy to our own passionate or dogged consciousness. This mere thought of action is itself an action which is not wholly robbed of satisfaction so long as it is a thought of completer action that the future may allow; but when it is the thought of completer action that can never be, then deserted by satisfaction desire alone becomes despair. But our normal activity rushes on at the same time both tingling

with desire and warm with the glow of satisfaction. Without activity there is neither desire nor satisfaction, but only stagnation, stupor, death.

Desire and satisfaction both are phases of one element, the inner essence of our activity. They are one as water and steam are one, for the inner essence of our activity may be frozen to icy despair, or ebullient in satisfaction, or dissipated in satiety. Therefore we may be glad that we are capable of many kinds of activity, and that while some are volatile others simmer steadily. The steady pleasures are commonly and normally mingled with desire. The immediate gratification of every wish is not the way either to greatest satisfaction or to greatest strength of character. Hence the oft-learned lesson that parents who grant all the wishes of their children without any corresponding effort of the children, both spoil them and rob them. It is hard for the well-to-do city dweller to withhold enough, and to exact enough for the zestful happiness and the moral health of his children, though he should rejoice in his power to give abundantly. Justice is a finer, as well as a harder thing, even in the home, than mere impulsive affection which alternates indulgence with reproaches equally exaggerated and unjust. Mother Nature is wiser in her gifts and her exactions, until she is overcome by the inventions of her children. Then nations sink into discontent and moral anemia, unless they have developed other than mere physical wants, that keep them still desiring and zestfully striving.

There is no such thing as passive experience; all experience is active. What we call passive experience is that experience the conditions for which are supplied by others or by Nature. When you strike me my experience is active though conditioned by your action. If I suffer in silence the silence may cost me more intense action than would a violent outburst of resentment. When we are talking of experience we are talking of psychic action not muscular action, and all experience is action.

COMMODITIES HAVE NO INDEPENDENT VALUE

What do we live for? For money, men answer. But this is false; no rational being ever lived for money. Money has no value in itself. All value is in action, in experience, in life.

Robinson Crusoe carried away the bits of old iron, ropes, and pieces of sails from the wrecked ship that served him so well, but would he carry away barrels of Spanish gold? The sails could make a tent to cover him and give him the experience that is conditioned by dry and comfortable warmth in spite of rain; with iron he could smite and hew and toil with zest, and having toiled could eat and live to toil again, but gold is of no value unless it can yield experience. What would be the value of a gift of a million dollars in gold if the possessor could not show any part of it to anyone? If he could show it, it might give him a silly pride, and pleasure in the envy of others, which would be an experience, and experience has value but gold has not. Or even if he could not show it, if he had earned and saved it that achievement might make him proud, and then his pride would be an experience and as such would have its value; but gold, even a million pounds of it, that he did not accumulate and cannot parade—that is not the means of an experience—has none. Gold, as money, has its normal value because one can get rid of it for something that one really wants.

But any *thing* for which one can exchange it has no more value in itself than the gold had. Suppose one exchange a dollar of his gold for good beef and potatoes. They are not good in themselves, and if he have no digestion or appetite, or have just dined, they may even be a cause of vexation and disgust. It is the conscious satisfaction that one gets in eating with appetite, and from having eaten, that has value. For value can exist only in consciousness. It can never be seen, or weighed, and it can be measured only by comparison with some other satisfaction as imponderable as itself.

No material thing is good in itself, or good in any ultimate sense, it is only good *for* something, and that something for which it is good is always a conscious experience. Conscious experience alone is good in itself.

This is not saying that what is only good *for* something is of trifling account. On the contrary, since experience for which things are good, of which things are necessary conditions, is itself so good, is indeed the whole and only good of which we have any

knowledge, therefore things, just in proportion as they are good for experience, are valuable and important; only their value or importance is wholly secondary and derivative, it depends on the fact that they are good for experience, they have no value in and of themselves. Therefore things can never be the ultimate end of rational endeavor, but only a means to an end.

There is no economic motive. We are often told that the need of food and clothing is the economic motive, and keeps the wheels of industry revolving. But does the millionaire return daily to his office in spite of his physician's warning, until at length nervous prostration stops him, because driven by the need of food and clothing? The interest on the bonds in his safety deposit box, if he stopped business at once, would feed and clothe a regiment. No, he goes to his office because he has schemes on foot upon the accomplishment of which his heart is set, he is in the midst of activities that he cannot bear to suspend, his sense of power and achievement in these activities intoxicates him, his determination is set upon them, and it is like suicide to unclamp it, and he commits suicide in pursuit of it. He goes back to his office as the football player with a broken rib takes his place in the line. One thinks as little of his food and clothing as the other. American men make money as American boys play marbles in spring, baseball in summer, and football in autumn. The rich man toiling for more, as a rule, is simply trying to run up a high score at the national game.

The motives to economic work are as various as the desires of man and as manifold as man's capacities for desirable experience. A man may engage in economic work for the admiration of the spectators, his fellow-townsmen, or for the sense of power, the pleasure of "workmanship," or the mere sense of possession, or in order that he may pay for food to fill his stomach, for books to feed his mind, for music to solace his soul, for the support of religion which affords him experiences now and hoped for experiences in eternity. There is no human experience in the promotion of which material things can be used as a means that does not afford a motive for economic work. There is no specific economic motive since wealth is in no sense an end in itself; but every human

desire is an economic motive in so far as its fulfilment calls for the use of material things as means.

The motive that impels men to work is often a kind of *purée* of all desires, a generalized notion that desirable experiences are possible to the man who has money. The kind of desirable experience which stands out oftenest in his imagination as obtainable by the expenditure of what he earns depends on whether he is a gourmand, a libertine, a sport, a lover aspiring to marriage and home, an amateur of art, of music, or of books, a social climber, a political aspirant, a religious zealot, or what not!

Every man engaged in economic work, in so far as he is impelled by any rational desire, is impelled by desire for some imponderable psychic thing, that is, for some experience which is to be realized by himself or by others; but not all human action is impelled by any rational motive. Instinctive action is not, but is impelled by a blind prompting toward a deed that serves an uncalculated end. However, man is little impelled by instinct to his economic work, as the savage proves, but at first he mistakenly thinks that Eden is idleness and labor a curse. Neither is purely imitative action impelled by any rational motive, but it is a mere response of the sensitive machinery of man's psychophysical organism to an external stimulus.

Thus the man who makes business his career may or may not be guided by a rational aim. He may be so poorly educated, even in spite of a diploma and degree, that he has not discovered the real goods of life, is not acquainted and familiarized with, or adjusted to its desirable experiences, does not recognize and appreciate in their due proportion the values which are attainable. He may have engaged in business imitatively, because in his home and among his acquaintances there prevailed a judgment, by which talk and practice were guided, to the effect that business was the natural occupation and goal of mankind. Such an individual may be without any rational aim in life. A whole society, engrossed in business, may be without any adequate and balanced appreciation of life's aims, of the real values of life which are to be attained or lost, and may rush on in the imitative pursuit

of "goods" which are in fact good only as means to ends which are neither properly estimated nor understood.

Probably the statement that a society may lack any rational judgment of life's aims should have been more strongly put: probably there never was a society in which the popular group judgments, that each individual inhaled with his breath, embodied a rational conception of the aims of life. Moreover we are all imitative, and only occasionally anything else. Only now and then do we make for ourselves estimates of the unseen realities of experience. Therefore in a society whose members in general judge each other and themselves by the number of marbles in their pouches, or the number of scalps at their belts, or the number of skulls over their doors, or the number of dollars in their bank accounts, even one who does not play that particular game may find it hard not to estimate his own success by the same standard, and impossible to prevent his neighbors from doing so, and more or less difficult to convince them that he is at heart pursuing any higher aim.

It is not wrong to play the game of business, provided it does not supplant worthier purposes and occupations, and our work may have play interest as activity and competition, while at the same time having a further aim. But business may not only be what war once was, the game in which strong men wreak themselves and compete for glory, but also an intelligent means of all good ends and even a method of service, entirely worthy of the exercise of great powers.

Not only would the character of business be elevated but the joy of it would be increased if this last fact, the fact that business is properly a method of service, were more considered. Why does a man run a shoe factory? To make money. But does it occur to him that he runs it to make shoes, that to make shoes is an indispensable public service without which misery, disease, deaths, and the impeding of our whole civilized life would ensue, and that after forty years of making excellent shoes, though no money had been accumulated, he would have achieved a success? Every wage-earner deserves to share in this motive and this satis-

faction. That manufacturer may well have had it who when a visitor remarked: "After twenty years' experience you ought to be able to make a pretty good hammer," replied: "No, we never make a pretty good hammer, we make the best hammers in the world."

The "captain of industry" performs a service, not only in the output which he places on the market, but also in that he organizes the lives of his fellow-workers. It may or it may not be that he is abler or better than all of those working under him, still it is essential that some one occupy the directive position, and by no means all can do so with success. He who can, performs a great service to all the rest. He ought to rejoice in this also, and make the excellent performance of this service a chief part of his conscious aim. Here as among warriors, *noblesse oblige*, power is opportunity and responsibility. An employer has no more right to consider only his own profit in the business in which others also spend their days, than a captain has, like Napoleon, to consider only his own glory in warfare in which others risk their lives. Laborers and employers are necessary to each other; all industry is co-operative in fact, even if it is not and perhaps cannot be co-operatively managed, and that the power to manage is in the hands of one does not nullify the rights of the rest.

With these things in mind the business man will realize that he may attain the highest success though he accumulate no more money than the teacher and the scientist. In these callings, and in others that might be named, there are men who regard the money that they earn as a by-product of their work and not its main purpose, a necessary by-product without which the work could not continue, nor their own proper satisfactions be secured, but still not the main product of the work; these men would not leave their task though assured of double the financial returns in an occupation that had no aim but money. The business man, whose sole and ultimate purpose is to get from the public and from his laborers the biggest profits, exhibits disregard of the true aims of business, namely the uses to which his profits or earnings can be put, the serviceableness of his product to the consumers, and the usefulness of his leadership in the organization

of industry; and, further, a business which yields profits without furnishing to the public any utility is related to proper business as piracy is related to the merchant marine. It is a foolish social conventionality that allows a man's success to be measured by income alone, and his business to be treated as if it were a useless game with no purpose but the score. Business is a far worthier thing than that. The amount and character of the product, the level of wages paid, and the profits must all be regarded, in order to have a just or truthful measure of business success, and the third, when excessive, may even be an evidence of failure.

THE MEANS TO LIFE

Human life may be said to contain five different kinds of desire and satisfaction which are rational ends of endeavor, and there are two kinds of means which may be employed in promoting those ends, namely work and material goods.

Of the two kinds of means the first, then, is work, or more broadly, conduct, that is, activity put forth, not merely for the satisfaction which the activity itself contains as an experience, but also in part or wholly as a means or condition of some further experience. Concerning work as it exists for the worker, or conduct, it is to be noted that since it is a human experience it may be good as well as good for something. The words good or bad as ordinarily applied to conduct, just as when applied to any other means, have not the same signification as when applied to experience regarded as an end in itself. Good conduct as such is only relatively good, that is, good as a means to some ulterior experience, and it may be either good and desirable or hard and bad in itself. Good conduct is that which, even if hard and bad in itself, yet on the whole and in the long run, serves to increase the net sum of good experience. The goodness of conduct is defined by reference to its results, but that other goodness, the goodness of results, cannot be defined in terms of anything beyond itself; it can no more be defined than red or the sound of a cornet can be defined; it is ultimate, but like those sensations it is vividly known in experience. Each of us has had enough experience that for consciousness was good, and enough that for consciousness was bad, to

know what good and bad are, and to find inducement or deterrence in the words of others who tell us of experiences which they have found good or bad. Activities, that is experiences, which for consciousness are good constitute the only conceivable ultimate good.

The second kind of means is composed of material things, goods and chattels, inanimate objects or animals, and men who are enslaved or exploited in violation of Kant's principle of ethics that "man is never to be treated as if he were a means only, but always as being an end in himself." The acquisition of these means and their adaptation to human uses is economic production, though that phrase is of late sometimes given a wider and less consistent meaning.

The distinction between land and capital is, for our purpose, relatively unimportant; the fundamental division is between work and things. Work is never a mere commodity, it is an experience. It is always a part of a life, which is to be regarded as an end in itself. All other means are things. Economists have laid great stress upon the difference between the direct and the indirect employment of material means, that is, between "consumption goods" and "capital" used in producing consumption goods. A similar distinction exists in regard to work; for as things may be used to produce things, so work may be applied to eliciting and adapting the work of others. Work of that sort is organizing work, method in such work is the art of organization, and capacity for such work is organizing or administrative ability. Organization on the greatest scale is politics or government.

Each kind of means may be used in securing the other, that is work in securing commodities or commodities in securing work. Commodities so used are commonly called "wages."

Wages include two elements which it is highly important to distinguish: necessary or compulsory or what at times deserve to be called exploitive wages, without the payment of which the co-operation of the laborers could not be secured; and differential wages, that is a return over and above necessary wages but as a rule ultimately paid out of the product of the labor of the wage earners. There is no economic law to compel the payment of

differential wages. Generally speaking it depends upon the action of the manager, in his capacity as the agent of secondary distribution, that is distribution of the proceeds resulting from the sale of output, among the participants in the production of output. There is no ethical claim to property which is clearer than the claim of the laborer to differential wages, whenever the productivity of his labor is such as to yield more than the necessary wages, interest, rent, and wages of superintendence, the amounts of all four of which are approximately determined by economic laws. The manager is as justly entitled to differential wages as any laborer, though not in excess of the proportion indicated by the proportion of necessary wages of superintendence to the total necessary wages of all the laborers who co-operated with him. The salaries of hired managers often include a large differential above their necessary wages. Favoritism to a hired manager which gives him differential wages while denying them to other laborers is unjust. Not every industry is productive enough to yield any differential wages. If distribution were just, the interest of the laborer in the efficiency of management and in the productivity of all the labor employed would be as great proportionally, as the interest of the manager himself. Justice in the distribution of differential wages may be voluntary on the part of the employer, or may be compelled by the bargaining power of the united laborers, or by law.

THE FIVE ULTIMATE VALUES

Having said so much about the two great means of human satisfaction, labor and goods, we now come to our main question: What are the five kinds of desire and satisfaction that can be realized in human experience, that *are* human experience as it exists, not for the observer or bystander, but for the person experiencing it, and that in their proper union and harmony constitute the good of life?

The first class of good human experiences are physical, and represented by the comfort of warmth and ease, the exhilaration of muscular movement, and the gratification of bodily appetites.

All our experience has a physical basis, but in experience of this

first kind a material excitant is usually in evidence, and the physiological character of the experience itself is obvious, instead of being concealed in the minute and hidden functionings of the brain and nerves and interior organs.

Here as well as anywhere that which we pronounce good is an experience existing in consciousness, a psychic reality, of which the physical is only a means or condition; but it is bound up with sensation, that is psychic reality of the least evolved and differentiated sort, and may contain little or even none at all of the more evolved cognitive elements, perception and judgment, which are found in other good experiences.

It is customary to cry down these physical pleasures, and to call them low and coarse. This is in part because they do engage those powers of man which are less evolved, and are shared by lower orders of animals. The sensuous pleasures are however a *réal* good by no means to be despised, and they are ennobled in man, when with the exercise of sensuous powers there is mingled the exercise of man's other and higher powers, and when there is allowed nothing in the exercise of the former which violates the latter or prevents the realization of the whole sphere of good human possibilities.

A second reason for the general practice of decrying the physical pleasures, a practice much declined since the days of our too austere forefathers, is the fact that the human individual is far more certain to be a craving animal than to be an aspiring soul, the powers later evolved often compete precariously for their due place in his attention with the basal beast in him, and need to have on their side all the reinforcement of social suggestion, lest they be crowded out and overwhelmed and man remain a beast. And civilized man cannot be a good beast, he must either be far more and better than a mere beast or else fail miserably.

Some say that a third reason for decrying physical pleasures is that the desire for them gives brutal intensity to economic competition; but physical gratifications are not extremely expensive until they become aesthetic; and it is a false standard of social and personal success, more than desire for physical gratification, that overstimulates the pursuit of wealth.

Physical pleasures are by no means to be omitted from an enumeration of the classes into which the real goods of human experience are divided, but they are coupled with an awful capacity for physical pain.

Man as a mere animal is utterly unfitted to live in a "pleasure economy." Under a "pain economy" where man's activities are mostly directed against discomfort, and hunger, and bodily peril, he may do fairly well with little heed to higher interests, he may secure the coarse and powerful physical gratifications at their strongest, and in war against want and pain may feel the zest of bodily and mental activity; he may taste other pleasures also, he may exult in personal prowess and the admiration of his fellows, practice by force of physical necessity and social pressure the simpler virtues, and feel an untaught gladness in the beauty of field and sky. But let him once triumph over Nature, let him become rich and the attainment of physical pleasure easy, and its pursuit yields him neither zest in action, nor pride and honor in achievement, and even physical pleasure, in spite of luxury and artful stimulation, weakens and palls, and his body itself, or that of his offspring, if he have any, sinks in decay. Man, when once he becomes well to do, must care for other than bodily satisfactions; when the attainment of satisfaction, not the avoidance of pain, becomes his predominating motive, he must have discovered other satisfactions than those of ease and appetite, and always he must have a goal that evokes his powers, for life is action, and there is no passivity for man but death, and though the death may be slow it is pain.

Second may be named the aesthetic pleasures. The experience of beauty is at least as various as physical pleasure. At one time its chief character is tenderness, at another it is exaltation, yet it is one distinct class of experience which we know in our own consciousness, and the presence of which we evince to others, and which we with conscious purpose evoke in others.

Sensuous beauty, the pleasure in color, line and sound for their own sake, are as dependent upon material excitants, and as divorced from developed intellectual elements playing an essential part in the same experience, as are the "physical" grati-

fications. They are physiological responses as truly as the pleasure in food. How far we share them with the animals it is not our present province to discuss, but they are the possession of untaught men, though in varying degrees and subject to increase by the social suggestion of aesthetic judgments, and by the sympathetic radiation of aesthetic feeling.

The beauty of Nature affords perhaps the most universal of aesthetic experiences, both because the beauty of Nature is everywhere, at least in the sky, and because some responsiveness to Nature's beauty is common to practically all men. Not all can feel the beauty of a symphony or a sonnet, but few, if any, among normal human beings, are insensible to the beauty of dawn and sunset and the stars. Of this the folklore of savages does not lack evidence. Wordsworth did not "reveal" the beauty of flowers. Little children of the city slums feel it as well as he, though they cannot express it in verse, and South-sea savages twine flowers in their hair. At the same time no student of comparative sociology can overlook the power of social radiation to heighten aesthetic experiences even in the appreciation of Nature, and to create artificial and fantastic tastes, through the prestige of the aesthetic mentor and the influence of the mass of society over the likes and dislikes of its individual members.

In civilized society, except among the wretched class, the beauty of the home stands next to the beauty of Nature. It is largely due to a sweet familiarity, the positive of which homesickness is the negative, the same principle which enhances the beauty of a familiar quotation, or favorite song. Visible adaptation to cherished human uses is one principle of beauty, and it is heightened by evidences of actual use. The unceasing labor that preserves the cleanliness and order of the home is essentially a work of art, done for beauty's sake as truly as the practice of any other art, and in the aggregate contributing to the enjoyment of beauty at least as much as any other art. At the same time every other art combines with it to enhance the beauty of the home, as all arts combine with religion to reinforce its power.

The beauty or lack of beauty of the human person and personality are inextricably mingled, now reinforcing, now counter-

acting each other, and beauty of the one sort triumphing over ugliness of the other. Beauty of personality, or moral beauty, is everywhere to be seen, even though never perfect—the beauty of an unspoiled child, of a man as sturdy in character and intelligence as in body, of a woman worthy of that name, or of serene, magnanimous, and dignified old age.

It is likely to be the case that we justly appraise only our brief or unusual pleasures, which give us a shock of contrast, and fail to appreciate or even to name those which give light and warmth and color to the successive hours of our common days until they are cut off and we find how cold and dark it would be without them. If it were always day we should have the cheer of the light, but should take it for granted, and our experience would scarcely inform us that it is the light that gives us this cheer. And so in making an inventory of life's values it is well to emphasize the beauty of Nature, home, and people.

Of the aesthetic experiences which are ministered to by the arts usually called fine, one may remark with satisfaction that the American people have begun to admit that the promotion of these values is work worthy of real men having the manliest gifts; though it is still to be feared that a Michael Angelo, or Leonardo, or Beethoven born among us would be in danger of going into business.

Of these arts literature and music are the first to be appreciated by a new nation, because the former is diffused by the press, and the latter by the tours of good musical performers. The painter, sculptor, and architect do not take with them, wherever they go, their revelations of beauty. The printed picture now aids in the diffusion of taste for these arts, yet as a rule, in a new country it is only in the wealthy city that the original productions of these arts can be seen.

The third great class of values which life contains is made up of satisfactions that accompany the active exercise of the intellectual powers, the satisfaction of interest, the joy of comprehension, the zest of mental application rewarded by perceptions and insights. This is the distinctive delight of the reader, though in his case it is complicated with nearly every other kind of pleasure, as he imagines scenes and experiences portrayed and enters into

comradeship with the author and his characters. The pleasures of curiosity lure on the traveler also. Curiosity is as natural an appetite as hunger, and its gratification is a pleasure, often keener than that derived from food, and capable of being indefinitely more prolonged. The amateur scientist also partakes of intellectual pleasure, he reads Nature's own book, and looks upon all living things, material events, and even the dead but storied rocks with eyes that have been touched and opened. And the professional scientist is in the truest sense no less an amateur. Even those of us who are somewhat dull and ignorant, find wherever we go, something about which to question and speculate and wonder, and feed our hungry wits; it may be the interpretation of our neighbors' movements, the study of a stranger's physiognomy and dress, judging the contents of a package by the evidence afforded by its outward appearance, or solving the puzzles in the weekly paper. The pathos of ignorance is that the ravenous mind feeds upon husks instead of bread. Education makes life a feast. In our day some look upon education merely or chiefly as a means of making money—a means to a means. It is that, but it is chiefly an introduction to life's values, that without it would be largely missed, not intellectual values only but all those that escape the mere animal man. It is entering upon our heritage as sons of man and heirs of the ages.

Fourth among life's values are the social experiences, experiences of a peculiar character and flavor, which are conditioned by our thoughts of our associates. For intensity and permanence, in the case of most of us, they exceed all of the preceding three combined. To be wholly satisfying our thoughts of our associates must include thoughts of their thoughts or feelings about us. Imagine, if one can, a human being never noticed by any other human being, never receiving an answering smile, or greeting word or gesture, to show that his presence was observed, who, whether alone or in the crowd, was equally non-existent for his kind, as if forever wearing the garment of invisibility. No physical deprivation would compare with such a fate. Absolute isolation, if prolonged, causes hunger for this natural satisfaction which may become unbearable and induce insanity. Yet in isolation we may have

some social pleasures, for we are not wholly deprived of thoughts about associates, but only of the new and vivid ones which their presence would occasion. To pass from a community where one has been surrounded by friends and the marks of respect and esteem, to dwell in the midst of strangers, is like falling from a sunny shore into the North Atlantic. And what shall be said of one who suddenly finds the cordiality of friends diminished, silence, averted looks, suspicion, contempt? We expand under the favor of our associates like flowers in the sun; joy blooms and all our powers bear fruit; but their indifference blights, and withers us like a frost.

What is so precious as the friendship of one comrade whom we like, whose judgment we trust, who knows us thoroughly and likes, approves, and trusts us, what else is the occasion of so deep a comfort and joy, and what advantage is there in exchange for which we could afford to lose the trust of such a friend. Fame is the acquaintance, or esteem, or friendship, of a great number. As cold esteem it may be of the highest; as friendship it is likely to be thinly diluted.

Our personality is largely the fruit of social contacts. Conscious life is adjustment to a psychic milieu furnished by our kind, as animal life is adjustment to a physical environment which meets its needs; and it is scarcely too much to say that our higher and more constant satisfaction depends upon social relations as completely as animal pleasure depends upon material conditions. Probably the desire to love and be loved, to esteem and to be esteemed, to be thought successful and admirable, and the corresponding satisfactions, are the heartfelt side of more human striving and realization, than physical, intellectual, and aesthetic pleasures combined. Even the outcast criminal boasts to his pals of his success in crime, and the tramp prizes his reputation among tramps as a successful beggar. Physical desires are universal and urgent, but they are soon satisfied and even satiated, not so the appetite for social satisfaction. Whatever achievement friends and associates reward with approval and honor men will strive for. By its approvals society can turn its members to follow with eager feet any path it may select, and for this reward it may

have any service up to the very limit of human possibility. That is a wise society in which the mass knows what to frown upon and what to honor—none yet has been so wise as that.

The fifth form of value realized in experience is that which accompanies one's thought of himself. This we may call the personal satisfaction, for it is the sense of one's own personality. It has its roots in social experience.¹ We who pass judgments upon our associates are compelled by the logical consistency of the human mind more or less to judge ourselves by similar standards; having called another a villain for a certain act, straightway to view the same act in one's self is likely to produce a twinge, and having called another glorious for a certain act, one aspires to like action and commends himself if he perform it. We all are born into a society in which social interaction has equipped each adult with developed standards, which judge us and teach us to judge ourselves and others.

We find it hard or impossible to think well of ourselves when all others think ill of us. But we live in many groups, the home, the school, the shop, the newspaper world, each has its standards; the vicious gang, the boarding-house company, a single powerful personality representative of another circle than any in which we usually move, the characters in a story-book—we are impressed by the standards and sentiments of each; and concerning each we often ask half-consciously: What would these think of me? What would my sweetheart think? What would my boy think if he should see that in his father? What would my dead mother think, whose standards differed from those of my present associates? What would God think? And since the social contacts from which we derive our standards of self-judgment are so numerous and so diverse as to impose on us opposite requirements, we cannot be simultaneously governed by them all, but are compelled at any given moment to select some one course of conduct, making it *our* way, and its standard of judgment our standard of self-judgment.

The personal ideal may be shifting, and vague at points, wanting in standards applying to some situations, and in part irrational and absurd; but in no individual who is the product of any normal

¹ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chaps. i, ii.

social life, however primitive, is it absent, nor are its promptings at all points lacking in definiteness and urgency. I do not mean that every human individual, even in the most advanced society, has consciously formed and chosen a personal ideal. It may be a mere natural product, the result of reaction between inborn tendencies and external suggestions. But if the environment has been fortunate and the education wisely conducted, the personal ideal represents a working adjustment between the various interests of the individual and claims of society upon him, as they are understood by the group that has chiefly influenced him. What I am calling the personal ideal includes not only moral requirements but also ambitions and all standards of personal success and worth. It is the concrete concept of a satisfactory self. The individual measures himself by it when he dresses and looks in the mirror, when he has the feel of himself in company, when he plays a game at which he has some pretensions to skill, when he reviews a speech that he has made or a bargain that he has driven. His self-thought, if tolerably definite and stable, is the most central and determining thing in his character. It dominates his deliberate choices, and even in the busy hours where absorption in objective aims drives it below the threshold of consciousness, if he lives an organized life, it still is determining the direction and force of his activity.

We differ greatly as to the honesty with which we select our self-thought on its merits, and the deliberation and constancy with which we cherish any chosen standard. This honesty and constancy, or the lack of them, mark the path of our ascent or our descent.

We tend to cherish a self-thought that does not make us too uncomfortable by its exactions. Many experiment with ideals that prove too high for comfort. When their personal reaction upon some situation disagrees with their ideal, they say to themselves that under the peculiar circumstances under which they acted the ideal was not binding, or else that the ideal was impracticable anyway for real life as conditions now are, and comfort themselves with the opinion that most persons would have done no no better than they. Others are too honest for this, and here is

the supreme test of honesty. They admit the real character of their own act, make no apology for it and still cling to their ideal. This honest and valiant clinging to an ideal too high for easy attainment is the virtue of humility. Humility is not cringing. Only a soul of the toughest fiber can keep his humility in this true sense. The pain he suffers at the discovery of his own inadequacy, the revulsion against the hated act, and the desperate clutching of the standard of his resolve, are repentance, which alone enables such a soul to forgive himself. And such repentance resets his organic being with new tensions, so that in spite of the power of habit, strengthened by the last repetition, the natural consequence may be that he is less likely than before his fall to repeat the act repented of, and though habit and hereditary tendency combine against him he may at length conquer, and fulfil his ideal. For the key to the nature of man's psycho-physical organism is its adaptation to function under the stimulation of ideas. To have his idea of the self which his whole nature, when freed from clamorous solicitations of circumstance, approves, clearly enough and often enough before his mind so that it gives the set to his habitual conscious, and even subconscious, tensions, is to approach that ideal as nearly as his nature allows. And the extent to which man can respond to an idea, and be transformed into its fulfilment, is the supreme miracle of Nature.

But this implies the deliberate constancy as well as the honesty, which are the central soundness of personality.

Constancy is wholly a matter of attention. The dishonest mind winces from the facts, its attention fades away from unwelcome realities. All life is determined by attention; and the strong man who knows that this is so will see to it that the inspiring summoning thoughts are daily brought before the mind. The man who does not pause in the morning of every day, or at other stated times, to call to mind his chosen thoughts and aims, and who does not seek the environment that presents them to consciousness, but lets his attention be filled with whatever chance suggests—the morning paper, the chat at the club, the sights of the street, the routine of business, is like a farmer who lets his field be windsown, instead of selecting the seed; his ground will

be covered with growths and will bear some flowers and a little fruit, but mainly weeds unless the winds blow to him over the well-tilled fields of neighbors. Such people may seem as respectable or as despicable as their surroundings, but are in either case equally devoid of self-determined personality. In one environment they might be toughs or sneak thieves, slatterns or prostitutes, while in another they speak proper English, wear clean linen, and practice conventional morality. They are drifting derelicts, rotten hulks if environment so shape them, or with fresh paint and glittering brass by better fortune, but in either case without engine or steering gear, floating forever aimlessly or entering some harbor or crushed upon the rocks, as tide and wind determine. There are others whose nature reacts strongly to certain standards and stimulations, and holds to the course thus defined in spite of counter allurements. Their conduct is not determined from moment to moment by present opportunities and influences, nor even by old habits, but by an inner set of the organism, established and maintained by attention to an idea and purpose that is cherished and remembered notwithstanding the changes of circumstances, or with the aid of circumstances of their own choosing.

The only unpardonable sin is not to have, and keep before the mind an honest ideal. An honest ideal is one that its possessor adopts and holds with his eyes open, open to all that he can see of life's present and future meaning to himself and to all who are to be affected by his life. Such honesty and constancy require the courage and strength not to flinch from looking at one part of the truth while gazing at another part as if it were all, nor to let the ideal fade away into the background of consciousness; they imply the humility that admits the evil of one's own evil, and the good of the good unattained, and makes each error the occasion of fresh resolve. The man of integrity is true to his ideal, that is to his deliberate and honest view of what his life should be, just as the needle is true to the pole, which may oscillate indeed, but turns continually toward its star.

A schedule of life's pains and satisfactions would by no means be complete without including reference to that peculiar experience which is felt in the pain of self-mutilation and the peace of moral

consistency. There are satisfactions and there are pleasures. Satisfaction is the deep strong current of life, pleasures are its ripples. One may have pleasures and never know satisfaction, but have instead only the termination of pleasure in satiety, and the unrest of those who have never discovered life's deeper, fuller values. Satisfaction is for all who can frame and pursue intentions to which their whole nature consents as good enough to be the measure of their life, and *the pursuit* of which is in itself, a well-spring of satisfaction, and waters into bloom and fruit all other joys, in their due place and measure. When the realization forces itself upon the mind that one's action does not correspond to the approved self-thought, when some errant impulse has defied the cherished judgment centrally enthroned, and forced the admission: "I am not that which I thought I was and meant to be, but something other, which I disapprove," when there is a breach between one's judgment and one's conduct, a hiatus in one's personality, then there is wretchedness; but conformity and unity between conduct and the thought of life, the thought that is reaffirmed and approved whenever the whole nature asserts itself, and acts are viewed in their entirety—not when one clamorous impulse drowns all the rest and one single fragment of man's nature leads him captive and he is dazed by the present importunity of external occasion and reason utters faint protests from the farther rim of consciousness, but conformity and unity between conduct and the thought of life that stands forth when no external occasion clamors and the untroubled judgment holds in balanced regard all the interests of life, the concept of one's own life which each calls his better self, the experience of this conformity has a value that cannot be omitted from the inventory of the good of life—it is peace, it is moral health; without it one may have pleasures, as one sick or maimed may enjoy dainties brought to his bedside, but not the zest of sound life. Here is a kind of satisfaction wholly different from our enjoyment of eating or any physical experience, or our delight in intellectual interest and comprehension, or our appreciation of the beautiful, or our gladness in loving another or in being loved, respected, admired, or applauded. The applause and approval of others may be turned

to bitterness by the absence of this other satisfaction of self-approval, and great as our pleasure in applause is wont to be, we value it lightly if at all when we are applauded for that which we do not value ourselves. I have pointed out the intimate relationship between the personal satisfaction and social approval, and we should not forget how largely our standards of self-judgment grow out of the approvals and disapprovals that have been expressed by those who influence us, and how largely our self-approval is strengthened or weakened by the judgment that others pass upon us. Yet our standards of self-judgment, however derived, are our own after we have formed them, and the experience of self-approval is so distinct from the experience of social approval that it may incite one to stand *contra mundum*, rather than violate his own soul. It does incite every righteous man to stand against world, flesh, and devil. It is so distinct from pleasure in social approval that, perverted in the stubborn or erratic man, it leads him to defy the judgment of others for the sheer pleasure of getting a pungent self-sense. It sustains the thinker, at times the most solitary of men, in an honesty that may compel him to sacrifice agreement with his associates and the consolation of approval and companionship of both the God of his fathers and of men, so that some, facing that hateful loneliness, have walked out into it and dwelt there, for a time at least, in the belief that reason required it, and that to cling to the cherished belief would be the dishonesty of wilful self-deception, and to flinch from carrying to their logical conclusion the processes of thought would be the abandonment of their own integrity.

It may be that not many in a thousand would be prompted by this motive to stand against the world, but it is not true that the presence of this motive, in some degree, is rare. Every street boy who says to himself, "I wouldn't be so mean," has it. And though we cozen ourselves into the acceptance of easy standards, the mordant regret will now and then be felt, as we catch glimpses of the self we "might have been." Indeed our self-deception consists largely in retaining only those parts of the ideal that we find it easy to obey while denying the validity of hard requirements; thus we are seldom left—even the worst of us—without

some remnants of righteousness, and, far from being totally depraved, the demand for goodness competes with the other urgencies of our nature.

Moreover, it would be absurd to imagine that the gratified self-sense comes only in connection with the rare heroic experiences of life. It comes with conscious sincerity and right intention in the commonest day.

Still further, as already pointed out, it is not the peculiar accompaniment of moral excellence alone. It is the sense of power, for which all that is strong in us hungers, like every other craving of our natures, when indulged in disregard of other values realizable by ourselves or others, it becomes dangerous, in proportion to its strength as a motive. It gives power to every ambition, whether base or noble. As desire for wealth may prompt to theft instead of thrift, so this may prompt to mere self-aggrandizement in disregard of social values. It is the sense of every power and every excellence to which we aspire. Of all satisfactions it is the most constant and reliable, and the least subject to the tyranny of circumstances. In it the strong nature of the stoic takes refuge against all vicissitudes. One lives always with the self that one sincerely and consistently chooses. In small and great activities the self-sense gives color to an experience. The player winning his game, or stiffly holding against a superior antagonist, the tidy housewife, the carpenter surveying the perfect joint which he has made, as well as the legislator who has refused a bribe have the satisfaction of an acceptable self. The ditcher may have a thought of himself as a ditcher which puts into his toil a glow of idealistic satisfaction, as real as that felt by the artist. It is present in every sort of worthy lifework, and in a degree, in every activity of man, not of work only but also of play, which he approves as a part of that concatenated system of activities which he recognizes as his living self.

The folly of vanity consists not in appreciating one's own more trivial excellences, but in appreciating them disproportionately. Vanity is the trivial lightness which is uplifted by slight matters and indifferent to weighty ones. And vanity is commonly associated with petty injustice in the preference of that which is one's

own and the disparagement of that which is another's. The disparagement of another's excellence is one of two poles of meanness, of which the other is the hypocritical humility which pretends indifference to one's own excellence. It is absurd to ask men to value excellence everywhere except in themselves. Virtue is always proud and will not stoop. But it is always humble in the sense above defined; it sees the ideal shining ahead and counts itself not to have attained. It compares itself with the ideal, the good that should be striven for, and not with other men.

The fact that an exhilarating self-sense may be had in common work—by the ditcher and the carpenter—is emphasized by one of the most helpful discussions in this field,¹ which goes so far as to say that the economic motive, or wealth experience, is the joy of the workman who shapes material things to human uses. If the view expressed in earlier paragraphs is correct, there is no specific economic motive but appetite for the self-respect that comes of capable work, for the social applause that follows business success, and every human desire, the satisfaction of which requires the employment of material means fashioned by labor is an economic motive; but according to Professor Small the joy of productive labor upon material things is the wealth interest. In that view the wealth experience is not to be had by the possession of goods that derive commercial value from natural scarcity, but only those that derive it from the labor required for their production, nor is the wealth experience to be had by the *possession* of any goods, but only by the *production* of goods. And it is only the worker in material goods that has the wealth experience and not the man who appropriates those goods by trade, or earns them as the reward of his song or his wisdom. The good human experience which this teacher extols with impressive eloquence is a reality, but is it the exclusive possession of the producer of material goods, or shall we say that man discovers himself only in action, not in sleep or any negative state, that he realizes himself only in the fulfilment of his intention by his deed, and that whatever the nature of the deed he has the same essential satisfaction? Is not this self-sense of a functioning personality in its

¹Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 450 ff.

most essential quality the same kind of experience in the case of a carpenter helping to build a house, a scholar helping to build a science, or a statesman helping to build a constitution? If so, it is far from being the peculiar joy and dignity of those who are occupied in shaping material things for human uses, it is rather the common joy of *those who work*, and behold in the fruits of their labor the fulfilment of their intention.

The position of Professor Small, which was just noted, may have resulted from connecting economic satisfaction with the "instinct for workmanship." This suggests the general question of the relation between instincts and satisfactions. Instinctive action regularly includes an emotional phase. Thus the instinct of flight includes the emotion of fear, and the instinct of self-display includes the emotion of elation. The same variety of instinctive emotion may be either painful or pleasurable, according as the instinctive activity is obstructed or goes triumphantly to its object; and some varieties of instinctive emotion are predominantly painful, as fear, and others predominantly pleasurable, as elation.¹ Since the same instinctive emotion may be either painful or pleasurable, and some instinctive emotions are characteristically painful, it is clear that the instinctive emotions, as such, do not coincide with the satisfactions. It is the purpose of the instincts to secure survival, not joy. And the instinctive actions which are felt as fear, disgust, and anger are as necessary to survival on the instinctive level as pleasure and pleasurable activity.

Yet since instinctive actions are often pleasurable it is possible to note the kind of pleasure likely to be found in the functioning of any instinct. Thus the functioning of the food and sex instincts carry *physical* pleasures. Activities of the gregarious, parental, self-assertive, and loyalty instincts (granting that all these instincts exist) carry *social* pleasures. The *personal* satisfactions may be had in any course of action that the individual consciously adopts. They are particularly strong in connection with actions that objectify the fulfilment of one's intention in visible results, either in material things fashioned to the will of the actor or in the changed activities of other men. It is, I think, in controlling the activities

¹ Compare McDougal, *Social Psychology*, p. 48.

of other men that the sense of personal power is greatest, but because the sense of personal power comes also in exercising control over material things, therefore personal satisfaction is to be had in connection with the functioning of the acquisitive or hoarding and of the workmanship or constructive instinct (again granting the existence of such instincts). Psychologists have familiarized us with the fact that the self-thought includes whatever we include in our habitual description of self, and we have observed that self-satisfaction may rest on base as well as on noble grounds. The miser's self-satisfaction rests upon the thought of himself as rich. If he were impoverished his sense of identity would dwindle, and he might even go crazy, like Silas Marner when he lost his hoard.

It might be a pretty adequate statement to say that the food-getting instinct plus the collecting or hoarding instinct plus the workmanship or constructive instinct together constituted the *original* economic motive—or rather motives; but instinctive promptings soon become complicated with calculated aims of every sort, so that we have been forced to say that there is no specific economic motive because motives of every kind prompt economic activity.

Intellectual pleasure is found in the functioning of the instinct of curiosity, and here is the closest co-ordination between a particular instinct and a specific satisfaction.

The aesthetic pleasures, on the other hand, seem to be the most pervasive of all, that is to say, they seem to be quite divorced from the functioning of any particular instinct.

WORK, ALTRUISM, AND RIGHTEOUSNESS

All the values of life may be realized in work, or rather values of every kind. Work includes the zestful exercise of our powers, physical or intellectual, it very commonly includes an aesthetic element, it is a means of communication and co-operation with our kind and wins their recognition and esteem, and in work we see our own worth, power, and mastery proved and objectified before our minds. Moreover, work is purposeful, and contains not merely present realization of every kind but also hope and anticipation,

not only joy in the working but also joy in the product taking shape beneath the hands, or in the remoter end to which the labor is the means. And finally work is commonly of use to others and so secures the altruistic reduplication of satisfaction.

Some would say that the experience of altruism is a distinct value-element in life. And some of these would add that to be logical we must go farther and say that the altruistic experience, being a good in itself, is as selfishly sought as any other, thus arriving at the paradox that there is no such thing as an unselfish motive, because the man who obeys a sympathetic prompting is gratifying the craving of his own nature as truly as he who satisfies any other appetite. The altruistic man who gives a quarter to a beggar, they say, indulges in a luxury of benevolence, and to refuse he would have to deny himself.

The man who gives a quarter to a beggar merely as a luxury to himself does not do so from any altruistic motive at all, but in part from a social motive, because he winces from the beggar's scornful dislike and misjudgment but likes his gratitude, and in part from a personal motive because he enjoys the self-approval to be bought by an act of alms-giving. But what shall we say in case his motive is truly altruistic?

The altruistic motive does not appear to correspond to an additional kind of value element in life. Altruism is a social experience, and, in so far as it has value for the one experiencing it, it has social value, and also other values that may be of every kind, since the altruist, by sympathy, enters into the physical, intellectual, aesthetic, social, or personal experiences of another. In this respect the altruistic motive may be compared with the economic motive, for as the economic motive is desire for any good that requires for its attainment the use of material means, so the altruistic motive is desire for any good to be realized in the experience of another.

The altruistic man does differ distinctly from the selfish man, in that he desires good experiences for others as well as for himself. All thinkers recognize that it is not only present well-being that supplies motive, but also, and chiefly, the idea of anticipated well-being. And as we can be moved by the mere *idea* of ex-

perience, we can be moved by the idea of experience of another. Men differ by natural endowment and by habit in the degree to which their feelings are stirred and their action governed by the thought of remote experience. Some can hardly be much moved unless they see before them the actual external conditions of the possible experience, while others are governed by far-seeing aims. Likewise men differ by natural endowment and by habit in the degree to which they are stirred and prompted to action by thoughts of the actual or probable experiences of others. Some who are far-sighted in their regard for their own interests are obtuse to the interests of others; but to be stirred in some degree both by ideas of our own future good and by ideas of the good of others is a natural exhibition of the fact that the thought of a remote experience itself produces in some degree the reaction which the actual experience would produce; and impartial reason regards all values which it can apprehend. Thus sympathy is not only a real kind of motive, it is every kind of motive in so far as it can be aroused by thought of the experience of others; every human interest that can be sought for self may be sought for others. Sympathy is the tendency to be stirred by ideas of the experiences of other persons. It is not merely one particular interest, but it draws a line around all human interests and includes them in so far as they are turned outward and not inward. When the thought of others' pain or welfare stirs us the prompting is normally reinforced by the feeling of sociability—which requires only the thought of a fellow-being and not necessarily the bodily presence—and also by the feeling of self-approval—which, alas, may rise with the mere thought of a generous deed or sense of a generous prompting without a real act.

It is true that the difference between the narrow man who can see and feel no good but his own, and the generous man who desires also the good of others is often largely a natural difference. And as such is no more truly a discredit to the narrow man than is inherited bodily deformity or inherited stupidity, and native responsiveness of heart is no more and no less truly a credit to the generous man than is native bodily strength or native intelligence. Many seem to think that virtue to be admirable must be

contrary to Nature; this is much like regarding only that beauty as admirable which is due to the rouge box and the curling iron. The goodness that comes with struggle is more admirable than that which comes by nature only in so far as the duty to cherish an ideal is higher than any other duty which the ideal demands, and the power to do so is the central gift of personality which makes all others attainable, and without which man is mere clay molded by circumstance, or a mere automaton with springs touched off by his environment. The gift of sympathy is part of a normal endowment, a good and beautiful possession, but of all the gifts that man may have the gift of will, or the response of attention to ideas approved by reason though held only in memory, is the core of personality.

There are two kinds of altruism, first that inborn sympathetic generosity which it is impossible for all to possess in equal degree, and second that rational altruism which, with or without emotion simply admits that facts are facts whether they are facts of my experience or of another's, and resolves to choose the course of conduct with a reasonable view to all the foreseen effects, in the experience of whomsoever those effects are realized. The inborn altruism of kind-heartedness, though infinitely precious within the radius of personal intimacy, hardly extends to all those, often of different caste and race, who are affected by our conduct in the wide circle of business and political relationships. The political boss who corrupts the institutions upon which our welfare depends, or the titanic malefactor in business may possess instinctive kindness that binds in friendship to him his partners in spoliation, but because of lack of social education and sound moral idealism he is without the rational altruism which is adequate to humanize our big impersonal relationships.

Some mistakenly identify altruism with righteousness, and some would say that without including righteousness in the list of the kinds of good to be realized in experience our enumeration is wretchedly incomplete.

Righteousness is far larger than altruism. It is true the preacher of righteousness must preach altruism, for on that side

our righteousness lamentably fails, but not on that side alone. Our private impulses fight each other down and grow into self-destroying vices as much perhaps as our self-interest fights down and overwhelms our regard for the weal of others; and good private impulses being too feeble or wholly unaroused leave life to miss the mark as often perhaps as generous impulses fail to move us.

If righteousness were merely altruism, then each of us would be morally responsible for the values to be realized by others, and none of us responsible for the values to be realized in his own experience, when the fact is that each is morally responsible in proportion to his power, and our power is greatest over the fulfilment of our own good possibilities, and those of our own household. The Golden Rule would be reduced to an absurdity if it were made to mean that I and mine shall have no more of my income or of my effort than every neighbor, to the remote Samaritan. The Golden Rule means that we must estimate the values realized in the experience of every neighbor, to the remotest, at its full worth, and instead of caring only for the good to be realized by ourselves and our nearest, we must have regard for all the interests that can be affected by our deeds, and be governed by regard for them in proportion to our power over them.

Although one's responsibility for the worth of his own life is greater than for the life of any other one, yet his responsibility and power over all the other lives he can affect may in the aggregate exceed that which he has for his own life, and the other values that may be realized by his effort may far exceed those attainable in his own experience, and he that plans his life work with exclusive regard to his own good is a recreant member of the commonwealth. If each would be guided by reference to all the values which he could affect, in proportion to his power over them then, all would work together in the attainment of a general well-being, no values being disregarded or violated, but all values sought, even though realized by the Samaritans, and at cost to ourselves. There would be no fat obesity greedily gormandizing in the presence of the living skeletons of want. Not money only but the inestimably more

precious thought, work, power, of men would be spent in the co-operative enterprise of realizing the values which none of us in isolation can attain.

Righteousness is not mere altruism, nor is it mere triumph over self-destroying vices, nor is it mere pursuit of those higher values of our own lives which are most likely to be disregarded, but it includes all of these. Righteousness is not any separate additional good, any sixth kind of value attainable in life, but it is the attainment of all life's values. Unrighteousness is disproportion and disharmony, which exist when some forms of good, some desirable experiences are sought, out of their proper place, and beyond their due bounds, while other values are disregarded and violated and destroyed.

The effort to be righteous, merely to be righteous, as if righteousness were a separate good, easily if not inevitably becomes vain Pharisaism. The real pursuit of righteousness is following each common duty and fulfilling the requirements of each relationship, it is the embodiment of honest idealism and moral consistency. Honest idealism is inseparable from moral consistency, the consistency that demands the unflinching look, with open eyes at life's good, hard, possibilities, demands the habitual daily renewal of attention to the sane and total vision, and that carries the vision over into conduct, building up the weak and broken places in life's edifice. Thus is attained that symmetrical completeness of life, both as a result fulfilled in one's own rich and varied experience and as a causal factor in the common social process, which is righteousness.

As work is a concrete experience in which many value elements unite to make it a chief source of human satisfaction, so also in the pursuit of righteousness, or idealism, which includes work, all elements of satisfaction combine. It brings not only the satisfaction of a noble self-sense, but also an aesthetic joy in the beauty of the heavenly vision increasingly discerned and realized in common acts. And it brings also an ardor of devotion in whatever activity the ideal requires and a sense of fellowship with all high souls and even the sympathy of heaven itself with our humblest striving—if there be in heaven any sympathy with man or any

knowledge of or interest in any phenomenon that is within the compass of the world we know, it must be that heaven's interest is in consciousness realizing itself according to the laws of its being—and especially idealism gives to every other good regarded an added value by seeing it as a part of a system of good. Each common deed discloses its importance in proportion as its relations are discerned, and it is seen as part of that harmonious fulfilment of the whole of life, both individual and social, which is righteousness.

The desire for a reasonable harmony, not only between the parts and properties of one's life, but also between one's life and the whole of things, is by some persons of insight regarded as one of those deep cravings of our nature, unrecognized and undefined like all instinctive cravings, until its proper object is discovered. Thus Gustav Ratzenhofer¹ enumerates as the five fundamental interests of human beings: first, the reproductive interest; second, the nutritive interest; third, interest in the excellence and completeness of the self-conscious self; fourth, interest in the well-being of every other person actually accepted as an associate (though for the narrow mind that circle is but small, the interest in those whom it includes, he says, is as real and as natural to man as any, though perhaps less strong); and fifth, the "transcendental" interest of which he says that, whether the intellectual background be religious faith or philosophic thought, any consciousness that has attained a certain fulness of development includes a sense of dependence upon the great whole of being, and a desire for harmonious relations as a part of the whole; and that this interest which may be delayed or pushed aside by other interests may also reinforce certain interests, and together with these subdue the rebellious promptings and bring the life of man into harmony within itself as well as into harmony with the whole world.

We never comprehend the whole of life, still less the whole of the universe, but we need not comprehend the whole to fit the whole. We only need to fit into the relationships that come within the circle of the information possible to us, and these shade away into the vaster unity of Nature which we do not discern. We

¹ *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, p. 64.

fit the whole as the cog fits the gear, the gear the shaft, the shaft the power that drives the whole.

THE INTELLIGIBLE IMPERATIVE

In many minds the old foundation for a life of worth and dignity has crumbled, the old fountain of earnestness and noble zeal has dried up, for the typical son of the twentieth century the categorical imperative is no more. If that foundation was sand where is the rock? The only unassailable basis for an intelligently conducted life is sane general apprehension of life's values and the relation of our conduct to their realization.

As the thought of a single anticipated experience may move us to a single act, so the most general survey of human weal and woe which our experience and imagination enable us to make may stir us more effectually. It is true, the small concrete instances completely presented to the mind may stir us more directly and emotionally than any general survey of life's values. Yet the comparatively unemotional admission that the whole is greater than that part which moves us so will incite the well-trained man to fulfil the requirements of the larger vision. If the emotion that we feel at a single instance were multiplied by the whole number of instances of weal and woe, we should be overwhelmed and driven mad. The emotion that is aroused in us by a single instance serves to propel us in activities calculated to ward off similar instances of evil or to secure similar instances of good in a thousand repetitions. Moreover the realization that the world can be delivered from chaos and its rich possibilities fulfilled only as men act upon these general perceptions of reason, produces in the well-trained man the support of feeling for these reasonable demands, and a revulsion of feeling against disobedience to them. Further, our own self-sense reinforces this prompting, and one rebels at the thought that *he* should fail to be one of those who play the reasonable part. The motive of moral consistency adds its propulsion to any recognized requirement, but the generalized social imperative is peculiarly adapted to be reinforced by the whole power of that motive. Such causes may arouse in us not merely the prompting to a single act, but to a life of reasonable purpose.

The motive thus inspired is the prompting of the general conclusion of practical reason. Every practical judgment is hypothetical: if I put my hand in the fire I shall be burned; I shrink from burning, therefore I shrink from the act which would involve such consequences. If I follow one course I shall add to the sum of evil; if I follow the other I shall add to the sum of good and be a part of the force that makes for the fulfilment of the good possibilities of man. We all want the general good to be secured, but if the boat laden with the hopes of us all comes duly to harbor it will be because each one pulls an oar. Can I be boring holes in the bottom of the boat while others row? No force is adequate to hold each man in his place save each man's perception of his own duty; no law will suffice but the law of freedom, in which each one is a law unto himself. At the same time the lawlessness of one undermines the fidelity of others while each faithful soul is a center of soundness—this is the salt which saves the world. It is the sight of the self-imposed fidelity of the faithful that keeps alive man's faith in man wherever that faith does not die. The more others do not see or seeing do not obey the law of our common life the more cause for the fidelity of the one. Where others prove unfaithful he will fail of the ends which by their co-operation he might have reached, but failing so, though at the stake or on the cross, he will be a savior. Therefore let each so play his part, that if all should play their parts likewise, the good possibilities of the group in which he moves, and of humanity, would be fulfilled. There is no other way to save the world. The generalized rational, or hypothetical, imperative has all the majesty without the incomprehensibility of the categorical imperative.

It has been said that there is no sanction in reason for doing good to another at cost to the doer, and that all altruism depends upon a non-rational supernatural sanction. But is that not an abysmal absurdity? If my action affects the welfare of another as well as my own, then to act in disregard of his welfare is to choose my course in disregard of a part of its consequences, to "reason" while deliberately ignoring a part of the pertinent facts, and to be governed not by reference to the facts of the case but by emotional partiality. It is to claim that good is good only

when realized by myself, and that the only suffering is my suffering, for if the good and the suffering of others are real they cannot be ignored in a rational balancing of the consequences of conduct. This is the major premise of justice: the equal reality of good and of harm, in one person or in another, not the equal extent but the equal reality as far as it extends—justice is built by reason upon this premise. And he is not just nor reasonable who affirms the equal reality of good and harm between his two neighbors, but not between himself and one of them. If, when judging between my two neighbors, A and B, I must perceive that good and harm are equally real in the experience of both, then the fact of that equality does not evaporate and become non-existent when A is judging between himself and B. He alone is just who can enforce justice between himself and his neighbor.

The real reason why some thinkers hold that there is no rational sanction for righteousness is that they regard it as axiomatic that sacrifice is never reasonable. But in fact sacrifice is never duty unless it is reasonable, that is, unless a sufficiently far-seeing and impartial balancing of values would show that from the sacrifice a net gain in experience-values can be anticipated. To say that sacrifice is not reasonable from the point of view of the actor is the same as saying that the actor is expected always to take a partial, a one-sided, an unreasonable view, swayed by his own private interest and denying the equal reality of the interests of others. Impulsive instinctive and unreasoned goodness, precious as it is, will not suffice to save the world.

The conflict between the private interest of the good man and the demands of righteousness upon him is mitigated or resolved by two considerations: First, in proportion as society becomes wise enough to identify its benefactors and its malefactors, it makes the way of transgressors hard, and rewards the well-doer with approval, esteem, promotion, and advantage. It is true that society does not yet dispense its penalties and its favors with wisdom and justice, but it has made progress in that direction and will make more. Second, in making sacrifice the good man does only what he knows any man in his place is reasonably bound to do, and should he refuse he would violate his own reason, and

murder his own personality; seeking his life he would lose it. He would lose his self-respect, would cease to be the man that he could countenance, would sacrifice his own peace and worth, and his zest in the pursuit of life's aim, and that loyalty which is the heart of the life of a social being. Every true man knows that it is war time, and for the true man in war time sacrifice is a condition of the highest happiness. He is happier playing his part in the strife of good and evil, just as the loyal Dodson felt that it was but natural for him to ride behind to toils and perils when his Montmorency went to war, and he was far happier so than he would have been skulking at home.

No follower of the rational social imperative can ever think that it imposes a merely negative responsibility requiring him to do no harm. The source of life's reasonable motives is not merely that there is harm to be prevented but also in the fact that there is always potential good to be achieved, and that this potential good must largely be a co-operative social achievement, in which each man's work and the suggestions emanating from his personality play a part. The logic of the generalized hypothetical imperative requires him so to act as to fit into the general method of the social realization of good. In entering upon any situation in life, in joining a moonlight stroll or a parlor festival, in accepting a place on an athletic team, or membership in a home, or taking employment with a firm, or engaging a workman, or opening an office in a city, it is reasonable to ask both what can I get out of this situation and what can I put into it. Not to ask the latter as well as the former question is to be base and parasitic. Every social situation is a co-operative undertaking in which each one depends upon the rest and must be depended on, which each one can make worse and each one can make better. This realization makes men real. Moved by it one cannot make goods "just to sell," one will not speak or write moved only by the thought of the reaction of his public upon himself with praise or blame, reward or penalty, but he will speak and write and work for truth and righteousness.

Whatever may be true of women, with men it is the generalized social imperative rather than particular sympathy that evokes

the highest devotion, and lives of consistent and dependable usefulness. Saints, missionaries, and reformers are not likely to be persons whose benevolent life-purpose depends wholly upon sympathy with particular instances that chance to come within their observation, but they are likely rather to be persons who can feel enthusiasm for a general social campaign. So also is the ordinary good and fit citizen of an advanced and advancing society. Personal, as distinguished from social, sympathy, will not do; it is too short-sighted, it can feel a social pin prick, but it cannot see a thirteen-inch gun aimed across the social battlefield. Milk men who would die rather than strangle one pink baby have murdered innocents like Herod. Corporators who would passionately defend the property rights of an acquaintance have appropriated millions for which they have made no return. In the mind of the good man the generalization of the requirements of humanity must go beyond the particular instance. Suppose certain corporations are bound to use money enough to kill a bill which is pending before a legislature, and that the bill ought to be killed. Shall the legislator say: "I will take the thousand dollars offered for my negative vote; it will make no difference except that the money will be in my pocket instead of some other"? Or shall he say: "Bribery and the perversion of representative government can be stopped only when legislators refuse bribes; there is vastly more at stake than this strike bill, all strike bills, fit city charters, administration of health laws that could save thousands of lives annually, all laws, the general promotion of welfare realizable by pure legislation and administration, all are at stake—more than men have died for on many a battlefield is at stake. Progress waits for soundness; it is for me to help perpetuate the existing rottenness by being a part of it or to be one center of soundness and give back to the man who offers me the bribe his faith in men. It may do no good in the present legislation, but my sacrifice will be part of the cost of the coming better day." This is the meaning of the saying of Christ, "If any man will come after me let him take up his cross and follow me"—let him pay his part of the cost as I pay mine on my cross.

Enough of that cost has already been paid so that we have

begun to live in "a pleasure economy" We have still a "submerged tenth," and woman's lot is as yet too hard or too vacant, and in every broad social class there are inestimable possibilities of good still unfulfilled. Yet where reasonable bodily health exists a clear margin of good experience over evil is, for the great majority of us, attainable. But, in our pursuit of good, will our energies be guided by a wise conception of that harmony of diverse experiences in which The Good consists? Instinct does not equip us with the needed guidance, instinct affords adequate direction for the simple life of a lower animal, but not for the complex task of human life. The inborn tendencies of every generation require to be reinforced by the experience and reflection of those who have gone before. Each generation sets out with the illusion that brief and superficial pleasures are the substance of happiness, like children that, given one wish by the fairy godmother, desire barrels of candy. Inexperience does not know that it is in the zestful exercise of our powers and the deep tide of lasting social and personal satisfactions and the harmony of life which omits no good experience but includes each in due subordination to life's ideal completeness that our true fulfilment consists. Painfully men struggle for vanities, and pitifully they sell their birthright for a mess of savory steaming pottage, soon devoured; ruefully they gaze upon the ashes that fill their hands, ashes into which the apples of Sodom crumbled at their touch. From the time when Solomon, having taken every "pleasure" that his royal power could seize, cried in the end, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity and vexation of spirit," down to Goethe and his Faust the same old lesson has been learned by succeeding generations of men.

Why is Faust regarded as the supreme literary expression of the wonderful century of literature in which it was produced? Because it so masterfully treats the supreme question, "What in life is good?" and gives an answer which commends itself to that mature judgment of the discerning which is the final test of literary values. And this is the answer given: Faust tries the pleasures of knowledge, license, wealth, power, glory, beauty, and mastery over Nature, but finds no hour in which to say: "Tarry for thou

art fair," no hour of satisfaction, until at last he finds it in the sense that his work is of use; he discovers life in useful work.

Only action is life, only purposeful action is life in full tide, only a purpose that is of use, that is real, that is worthy of our powers, that disregards no values it affects, that weaves into the web of human realization, of which our own experience is a conscious part, ever truly and fully satisfies a rational, social, being. Such action is work, and such work is play, not "child's play," but the free harmonious play of all the resources of our being.

Work, home, friends, health—these are among the symbols of life abundant with its five-fold satisfactions: physical, aesthetic, intellectual, social, and personal. To be interested is to be alive and active, not to be interested is, to a conscious being, death or stupor. To have an aim worthy of one's possibilities, a sincerity at peace with one's own reason, a loyalty to that social whole which is immeasurably greater than any single self and membership in which conditions the worth of every individual life—these are essentials of a complete human existence, the experience of a true son of man, joint heir in man's rich inheritance and, with all true men and that supreme power which works through Nature, a joint savior of one's kind.

CHICAGO HOUSING CONDITIONS, VII: TWO ITALIAN DISTRICTS

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The Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy

Earlier articles in this series have dealt with the housing conditions existing among several of the great immigrant groups of Chicago—the Jews and the Bohemians on the West Side, the Poles and the Lithuanians back of the stockyards, the Poles on the Northwest Side, and the Slavic people clustering about the great steel mills in South Chicago; a more recent article has considered the housing of the Negro in Chicago. This article is to deal with the conditions among another and increasingly large group of immigrants—the Italians. In 1870 there were only 275 Italians in Chicago; in 1900 there were 16,008. The census figures for 1910 are not yet available, but the school census for 1912 shows 5,447 minors who were born in Italy and 37,833 who are the children of Italian parents. The largest group of Italians is settled in the Nineteenth Ward, in the district in which Hull House is situated; the second largest settlement is on the Lower North Side in the Twenty-second Ward. The Seventeenth Ward on the West Side, near the Chicago Commons, and the First Ward in the downtown business district each has large numbers.

In 1901, the City Homes Association investigated a large section of the Italian settlement on the West Side. During the present investigation a house-to-house canvass was made on the Lower North Side of the five blocks lying directly north of Chicago Avenue between Sedgwick Street and Gault Court. These blocks are of unequal size; block 3 between Gault Court and Milton Avenue extends from Chicago Avenue to Oak Street, equaling in length blocks 1 and 2 between Milton Avenue and Townsend Street and blocks 4 and 5 between Townsend Street and Sedgwick Street. The investigation was extended to the district in the First Ward, because of the different type of houses in which the Italians were

living there. Here a canvass was made of a part of the block on Plymouth Court between Polk and Taylor streets. Both districts are settled by Sicilians and South Italians.

The district on the North Side is popularly known as "Little Sicily" or sometimes as "Little Hell." It is familiar to the average citizen of Chicago because of the "Black Hand" crimes so frequently committed there. During 1909 and 1910, 19 murders were committed in this district, and six at a certain corner on Milton Avenue, called by the newspapers "death corner."¹

It is only fair to explain that although the "Black Hand" crimes may have caused the name to persist, the district was known as "Little Hell" before the Italians settled there. Previous to the great fire, the district lying between North Clark Street and the North Branch of the river was a network of narrow and unimproved roads crowded with poor cottages. The population was chiefly German and Irish. In the fire this district suffered more severely than any other. In the very blocks chosen for this canvass, the fire found its greatest number of victims. Almost immediately following the fire, people crowded into the frame cottages that were erected between the river and North Clark Street, either before the establishment of the fire limits (within which only brick and

¹ The frequency of these crimes in Chicago and especially in this district in the Twenty-second Ward is shown by the following items taken from the *Chicago Tribune* for a single month, June, 1911:

June 8: "Gun fight at 'death corner.' Four Italians exchange shots in Milton Avenue district at eleven o'clock. Police found 2,000 Italians walking in the streets, some crying in fear and others talking excitedly in Italian. Only one man injured."

June 10: "Shots aroused neighborhood of 1011 Larrabee Street. Alderman Clettenberg, living there, refused to be aroused. Said there was so much shooting near there, that he paid no attention to it."

June 16: "David Russo shot one block from Milton and Oak Street; supposed to be victim of 'Black Hand.' Had been in this country only three weeks. Slayers went free."

June 19: "Giglio murdered a little after midnight; had fled from police in Italy two years before. Started barber shop at 2016 West Harrison and lived in Gault Court. Had tried to cast off the Mafia yoke. Threatened by 'Black Hand.' Refused, when dying, to give information."

A more familiar "Black Hand" crime was the kidnaping, in August, 1911, of Angelo Mareno, a small Italian boy living in Gault Court in one of the very houses included in this canvass. The boy, of course, was eventually found, but not until many threatening notes had been received, signed with the symbol of the "Black Hand" and the whole neighborhood had been thoroughly aroused.

stone buildings were allowed) or in open defiance of them. It was at this time that the neighborhood was first called "Little Hell," owing to the lawlessness of its residents in the years immediately following the fire. As life again became normal, the Germans and Irish, especially those of the better class, began to move east into cleaner streets and more solidly built homes. Room was thus provided for Danish and Swedish immigrants, and a little later for the Italians who were beginning to find their way to Chicago. The following table shows that while there are still a considerable number of Scandinavians in the neighborhood, the district is becoming predominantly Italian. Table I gives the nationality of the heads of the households in the five blocks for which the canvass was undertaken.

TABLE I
NATIONALITIES OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS. LOWER NORTH SIDE

Block	Ameri- can	German	Irish	Italian	Scandi- navian	Miscel- laneous	Nation- ality Un- known	Total	Percent- age of Italians
1.....	9	27	20	168	72	45	10	351	48
2.....	7	5	12	112	35	10	..	181	62
3.....	2	3	16	377	11	6	5	420	90
4.....	19	28	46	31	83	35	13	255	12
5.....	15	19	20	55	98	12	12	231	24
Total.....	52	82	114	743	299	108	40	1,438	
Percentage.....	4	6	8	53	21	8	..	100	..

While the Italians constitute 53 per cent of the population of the entire district investigated, and the Scandinavians, the next largest group, only 21 per cent, a much larger percentage of Swedes and of Germans than of Italians was found in blocks 4 and 5, the blocks on the east side of the district canvassed. In blocks 1 and 2 the population was 48 per cent and 62 per cent Italian, and in block 3, which lies between Milton Avenue and Gault Court, 90 per cent Italian. As might be expected, it was found that the greater number of the Italian men were common laborers.¹

¹ Among the members of other nationalities, living in the same neighborhood and often in the same houses with the Italians, a much larger percentage of skilled mechanics was found. Among the Italians 58 per cent of the heads of households were unskilled laborers; among the Germans only 16 per cent and among the Swedes only 21 per cent.

In the five blocks canvassed in this district 6,326 persons were living. Table II shows the division of this population into adults and children and into members of the family and lodgers. In this table boys and girls under twelve years are counted as children.

TABLE II
COMPOSITION OF BLOCK POPULATION. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

BLOCK	NUMBER IN FAMILIES			LODGERS	TOTAL POPULATION
	Adults	Children	Total		
1.....	926	494	1,420	164	1,584
2.....	484	291	775	66	841
3.....	1,080	681	1,761	190	1,951
4.....	647	263	910	107	1,017
5.....	576	267	843	90	933
Total....	3,713	1,996	5,709	617	6,326
Percentage.	59	31	10	100

It is important to note the relatively small number of lodgers as compared with most of the other immigrant groups which have been studied in these articles.¹ Both in South Chicago and back of the yards 27 per cent of the total population were lodgers, as compared with 10 per cent among the Italians; in the Jewish district 21 per cent; among the Negroes 31 per cent. Only among the Bohemians on the West Side and the Poles in the Nineteenth Ward was the percentage smaller. We have to deal then with a neighborhood where the inhabitants are living a normal family life. This is evident, too, from the large number of children under twelve. It is of interest that the largest percentage of children was found in block 3, which Table I shows to be the most strictly Italian block of the district.

The prevailing type of house in this district is the two- or three-story frame cottage in a more or less dilapidated state. Interspersed with the wooden cottages are newer three-, four-, and sometimes five-story brick tenements, housing in crowded quarters a

¹ Here, as in other districts, the figures relating to lodgers are an underestimate. Questions about lodgers stimulate a rumor that lodgers are to be forbidden, and lead to the withholding of facts regarding them.



A STREET IN THE ITALIAN DISTRICT OF THE LOWER NORTH SIDE

large number of people.¹ Only 16 per cent of the buildings, however, are over three stories high. A similar condition prevails of course in many parts of Chicago, making a sharp contrast with the high brick tenements of New York. It should be pointed out that although the density per block is less under such conditions as prevail in Chicago, the overcrowding within the houses is apt to be greater.

Of the 404 buildings canvassed, only seven have been built since the tenement law of 1902. Only one of these new-law buildings has more than four apartments. This is a brick tenement in block 3, having eight apartments, varying in size from two to five rooms. Another one of those comparatively new buildings is a one-story brick building, having only a cobbler shop and one room in which the cobbler lives alone. Of the other five, one is brick and one partly brick; two are rear frame houses, and one is in the middle of the lot.

An important fact in connection with the housing is the grade of the yards below the street level. Only four buildings in the whole district have the yard on a level with the street, while 248,

¹ The following tables showing the material of the buildings and the number of stories are of interest in this connection:

TABLE SHOWING NUMBER OF BRICK AND FRAME HOUSES. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

Material	Number of Houses	Percentage
Brick.....	108	27
Frame.....	262	65
Partly brick and partly frame...	33	8
Total.....	403*	100

* Material of 1 building not reported.

TABLE SHOWING NUMBER OF HOUSES OF SPECIFIED NUMBER OF STORIES.
LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

Number of Stories	Number of Houses	Percentage
One story.....	41	10
Two stories.....	151	37
Three stories.....	148	37
Four stories.....	56	14
Five stories or over.....	8	2
Total.....	404	100

In block 3, which has the largest percentage of Italians, was found a much higher percentage of low frame buildings than in any of the other blocks.

or 86 per cent, are at least five feet below the street level. This is due of course to the grading of the streets after the erection of the houses. It leads naturally to a rather large number of basement and cellar apartments, which are likely to be dark and damp, although in many, perhaps most, cases, not actually below the level of the yards. Of the 1,462 apartments visited, 103 were cellar apartments and 117 basement apartments.¹ Occasionally this lowest story is boarded up and unused.

The buildings in this district cover a large percentage of the lots as compared with those dealt with in the articles on the stockyards neighborhood or South Chicago. There was considerably more unused space even in the Polish district of the Northwest Side. Only in the Jewish and Bohemian blocks on the West Side were the lots so crowded. It is especially to be noted that in 25 cases, or 9 per cent, the lot was entirely covered, and in 63 cases, 23 per cent of the entire number, 90 per cent or over of the lot was covered. In some of these lots where nearly all the ground is covered are high brick tenements; more often there are two or even three small frame buildings.

TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF LOT COVERED

Percentage of Lot Covered	Number of Lots	Percentage of Total Number
50 per cent or less.	37	14
Over 50 per cent and less than 60 per cent.	26	9
60 per cent and less than 70 per cent.	23	8
70 per cent and less than 80 per cent.	62	22
80 per cent and less than 90 per cent.	42	15
90 per cent and less than 100 per cent.	63	23
100 per cent.	25	9
Total.	278*	100

* Eleven not reported.

The crowding of the lot means of course lack of light and air. It also means that the families live much on the street, and that even more than in many other neighborhoods the street is the playground of the children. When in the summer of 1911, two little


¹ According to the Code a cellar is a story more than half below the level of the street grade, while a basement is a story partly but not more than half below this level.

children were run over in Gault Court within two weeks, the mayor was induced to close the traffic temporarily, and this block was converted into a street zone for children. Although the experiment has not been repeated, it was an interesting attempt to provide a place in which the children might play, and of course an acknowledgment that for these hundreds of small Italians there was no playground but the street.

As is to be expected in a district where so large a percentage of the lot is covered, the density of population is very high. This is especially true of block 1 and of block 3,¹ in each of which there were over 400 people to the acre. In blocks 2 and 5, there were from 320 to 330 people per acre; in block 4, about 235. Table I, it will be remembered, shows that the percentage of the population who are Italians is very much greater in blocks 1, 2, and 3 than in blocks 4 and 5. The two most densely populated blocks then, are ones where the percentage of Italians is high, and it is among the Italians, rather than among the Scandinavians or Irish, that the overcrowding is greatest. How great this overcrowding is, may be shown by a comparison with the density of some other congested districts in Chicago. When the City Homes Association made its investigation, the net area and the number of people per acre was computed for 54 blocks, part of them located in the Jewish and Italian district in the Ninth and Nineteenth wards, part of them in the most crowded section of the Polish neighborhood in the Sixteenth Ward. Forty of these 54 blocks had a density of less than 300. Among them all only two were found having a density as great as blocks 1 and 3 in this neighborhood; one of these was in the Italian district, one in the Polish.

In order to appreciate the seriousness of the overcrowding, however, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the density per acre, but the type of house in which the people are living. The large percentage of the lot covered, taken together with the shape of the lot prevalent in Chicago, a long, narrow lot, and the fact that so many more of the houses are separate cottages than large tenements, means of course a considerable number of rear houses. The canvass showed in these blocks 289 buildings fronting on the street,

¹ The net area of each block was used in the computation.



ALLEY TENEMENTS IN THE LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

five buildings in the middle of the lot, and 110, or 27 per cent of all the buildings, in the rear. These rear buildings are many of them old buildings moved back from the street. The majority of them are frame houses, dark and in poor repair. Only 42 per cent of all the buildings in this district are reported as in good repair.¹ In the stockyards district 54 per cent were in good repair; in the Bohemian district 57 per cent, and in the Polish district 71 per cent.

The large percentage of buildings not in good repair means that hundreds of people in this neighborhood are living in houses where the conditions not only cause great discomfort but are frequently dangerous to the health of the tenants. One of the worst features of the condition of the houses was the damp walls. Frequently the roofs leaked, destroying the ceiling and flooding the floors. In numerous cases the sinks were frozen and the water supply entirely cut off. The landlords refused to make even the most necessary repairs; in one case the tenant could not get a badly leaking gas jet mended. In one apartment the sink was frozen, the window was broken and partly boarded up, and the water-closet above was out of order so that water was flowing through the ceiling into the bedroom. This was in January; the woman said that the landlord promised to make all necessary repairs in May. In this building a baby had died within a few days, and there were three cases of illness, which if not caused by the condition of the house must have been rendered more serious by it. In one case a tenant had applied to the United Charities to help her move from a house in this neighborhood because she considered it unhealthful; within a year there had been seven ambulance calls from that one building. Some of the cellars were so damp that they could not be used; often they were in a condition

TABLE SHOWING THE STATE OF REPAIR OF HOUSES. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

State of Repair	Number of Houses	Percentage
Good.....	166	42
Fair.....	162	41
Bad.....	69	17
Total.....	397*	100

* In 7 cases the state of repair was not reported.

As is to be expected, block 3, which has the largest number of low frame buildings, has much the smallest percentage in good condition.

which made them dangerous not only to those living in the cellar apartment but to other occupants of the house. One cellar was flooded and the water had frozen into a solid block of ice so that a small boy said that he would be skating there if the ceiling were not so low. The water seemed to come from a toilet under the sidewalk. As soon as a fire was built in the building, the walls began to steam. The whole place was in very bad repair.

With the dilapidation of the buildings goes a general lack of cleanliness in the yards and alleys. The fact that the yards are below the street level makes it especially easy for them to collect heaps of old papers and rubbish, leaving one at the same time with the impression of a comparatively clean street. In some cases garbage thrown in the back yards gives sickening odors about the rear apartments. Not infrequently the air shafts are filled with rubbish. The photograph on page 520 is typical of the condition of many of the alleys.

Of the 404 buildings in the blocks canvassed the majority were used as residences only, but a large number were tenements combined with a shop, a saloon, or a small store, most frequently a market or a grocery. In 27 such buildings were saloons, two of which had poolrooms; in one tenement was a dance-hall; in another a five-cent theater. To a great extent the restaurants, saloons, and places of amusement frequented by the Italians of this quarter are on Chicago Avenue, the southern boundary of the district canvassed. The saloons and larger stores located on the streets running north and south are most of them near the intersection of these streets with Chicago Avenue.

Table IV shows the number of houses containing one or more families, together with the total number of apartments.

The Code defines a tenement as a building used as a home or residence for two or more families living in separate apartments. According to this table then, all but 53 of the 401 buildings are tenements and so subject to the provisions of the Tenement Code. The largest percentage of the buildings are the home of two, three, or four families, although frequently put up hurriedly for the use of a single family. A little less than one-fifth of the buildings have six or more apartments.



A TYPICAL ALLEY IN THE LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

Piles of rubbish and garbage under the snow

In connection with the number of apartments per buildings, the location of the apartment is of interest. The fact that there were a good many cellar and basement apartments has already been mentioned and accounted for. In one of these damp basement apartments 12 people were living, an Italian with his wife and six

TABLE IV
NUMBER OF HOUSES OCCUPIED BY SPECIFIC NUMBER OF FAMILIES.
LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

Houses Containing	Number	Percentage	Total Apartments
No apartment.	7	2	..
One apartment.	46	11	46
Two apartments.	93	23	186
Three apartments.	78	19	234
Four apartments.	68	17	272
Five apartments.	38	10	190
Six apartments.	27	7	162
Seven apartments.	14	4	98
Eight apartments.	17	4	136
Nine or more apartments.	13	3	138
Total.	401*	100	1,462

* There was no report as to the number of apartments in 3 buildings.

children, and two old couples, distantly related to them. One of the old ladies who was ill was in a dark bedroom with a dirty window which appeared never to have been opened. From another damp, dark, and rat-ridden basement apartment in this neighborhood, the United Charities has within one year moved three different families. Two hundred and eighty-two of the 1,462 apartments were in rear buildings, while 444, or 31 per cent, were rear apartments, some of them in front and some in rear buildings. These rear apartments are likely to be darker, more crowded, and more dilapidated than the front ones. Table V shows the number of apartments having a specified number of rooms. As in most of the districts visited, the four-room apartment is typical; a very small percentage of the families live in one-room apartments; a considerably larger number, however, 30 per cent of all, have only two or three rooms.

The question of rent is of course an important one in any study of housing conditions. The relation between the rent paid and the

accommodations secured is shown by Table VI, which gives in detail the rents paid together with the number of rooms. It will be noted that 64 per cent of all the tenants were paying under \$10.00 a month for rent.

TABLE V

APARTMENTS HAVING SPECIFIED NUMBER OF ROOMS. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

Apartments Having	Number	Percentage
1 room.....	16	1
2 rooms.....	142	10
3 rooms.....	277	20
4 rooms.....	566	40
5 rooms.....	227	16
6 rooms.....	160	11
7 rooms.....	13	1
8 or more.....	17	1
Total.....	1,418*	100

* In 44 cases the number of rooms was not reported.

TABLE VI

NUMBER OF APARTMENTS FOR WHICH SPECIFIED MONTHLY RENTALS ARE PAID TOGETHER WITH NUMBER OF ROOMS. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

APARTMENTS HAVING A MONTHLY RENTAL OF	NUMBER OF ROOMS						TOTAL	PER-CENTAGE
	1	2	3	4	5	6 or More		
Less than \$4.....	4	17	6	2	29	2
\$ 4 and less than \$ 5....	1	36	15	4	56	5
\$ 5 and less than \$ 6....	1	55	77	24	3	..	160	13
\$ 6 and less than \$ 7....	1	5	52	56	6	1	121	10
\$ 7 and less than \$ 8....	..	3	46	66	10	..	125	10
\$ 8 and less than \$ 9....	1	..	37	111	24	3	176	15
\$ 9 and less than \$10....	11	80	19	2	112	9
\$10 and less than \$11....	..	2	5	79	29	17	132	11
\$11 and less than \$12....	42	11	7	60	5
\$12 and less than \$13....	..	1	1	28	37	17	84	7
\$13 and less than \$14....	10	9	10	29	2
\$14 and less than \$15....	5	11	11	27	2
\$15 and over.....	..	2	1	7	23	74	107	9
Total.....	8	121	251	514	182	142	1,218	100
Vacant or rent unknown..	6	16	12	24	13	10	81	
Apartments owned.....	2	5	14	28	32	38	119	
No report.....	44	
Total.....	16	142	277	566	227	190	1,462	

Although the size of the apartment has naturally much to do with the rental, it is evident that the rents do not increase at all uniformly with the number of rooms. We find six-room apartments renting for \$6, \$8, and \$9, and two- and three-room apartments for \$12, \$15, and \$16. It is clear that the location of the apartment must influence the rent to a great extent; it must vary according as the apartment is in the front or the rear building, facing on the street or a passage, on the first or third floor, airy and light, or dark and almost windowless. That it is by no means entirely a matter of the size of the rooms was proved by a detailed study of the rental in connection with the area of the apartment.

A comparison of the rents paid by the Italians of this neighborhood and those paid by other immigrant groups in Chicago is of value. In order to make the comparison fair, the median rents, that is, the points half-way up the scale when the rents are arranged in ascending order, are given for the four-room apartments in each neighborhood, the four-room apartment, being, as already pointed out, the typical one in most of the districts investigated.

TABLE VII

MEDIAN RENTALS FOR FOUR-ROOM APARTMENTS FOR SEVEN DISTRICTS

Jewish.....	\$10.00-\$10.50
Bohemian.....	8.00- 8.50
Polish.....	8.00- 8.50
Stockyards.....	8.00- 8.50
South Chicago.....	9.00- 9.50
Colored.....	12.00- 12.50
Italian (Lower North District).....	8.50- 9.00

This table shows that these Italians pay a slightly higher rent in proportion to the number of rooms in their apartments than the Bohemians, Poles, or stockyards laborers, but less than the workers in the steel mills in South Chicago, the Jews on the West Side, or the colored people in the districts canvassed. Specific reasons for the higher rents among these people have been pointed out in earlier articles, the practice of taking lodgers in South Chicago, and the racial exploitation of both the Jews and the Negroes. The slightly higher rents among the Italians may be accounted for by the fact that their work makes it necessary that their homes should

be near the center of the city, together with their willingness to sacrifice much in order to stay near those of the same race.

Another interesting consideration suggested by a study of the tables showing the rental is the number of families who own their apartments. Only 8 per cent of the families in this district are living in buildings which they own. This is in sharp contrast with the Slavic neighborhoods in two of which 18 per cent of the apartments were owned by tenants. Only among the Negroes, who are usually not permitted to buy their homes, was the percentage so low. Table VIII shows that a large number of these owners have lived in their apartments for many years, while only a small percentage of the tenants as a whole have remained in the same apartment for as long as five years.

TABLE VIII

LENGTH OF TIME FAMILIES HAVE LIVED IN APARTMENTS. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

	NUMBER OF YEARS IN APARTMENT							TOTAL
	Less than 1 year	1 and Less than 2	2 and Less than 3	3 and Less than 4	4 and Less than 5	5 and Less than 10	10 and over	
Owners.....	11	10	14	9	8	13	51	116*
Other tenants...	580	186	138	98	52	124	82	1,260†
Total.....	591	196	152	107	60	137	133	1,376
Percentage.....	43	14	11	8	4	10	10	100

*Three cases not reported.

† 62 cases not reported and 24 apartments vacant.

As is to be expected in houses such as have been described, the toilet accommodations are inadequate. Although privy vaults have been outlawed since 1894, nine were found upon the premises canvassed. These were used by 16 families. Only less offensive are the semi-public toilets which have frequently replaced the vaults. These toilets are situated in the yards, often under the sidewalks, in the halls, and in the basements, and are used by several families in common. In all five blocks only 302 apartments were found with private toilet facilities. The Tenement House Code provides that each apartment must have its own water-closet with the exception of apartments of one or two rooms. This provision affects

only new-law buildings, however, of which, as has been noted, there are only seven in these blocks. The conditions existing therefore are not illegal but are as dangerous to the health and to the morals of the tenants, especially of the children, as if they were forbidden by law. Two hundred and thirty-seven yard closets were found upon which 536 families were dependent. The condition of these yard closets could hardly be worse. They are dark, dirty, and most frequently out of repair. Also they are often almost inaccessible. Those situated under the sidewalks in some cases can be reached only through a dark passageway through the cellar from the rear of the building. Upon such a closet in one instance 32 persons were dependent; in another instance 34. Upon another premise there were two yard closets, the only toilet accommodation for fourteen families. The menace of such conditions can hardly be overestimated.

The basement and hall closets were also dirty, dark, and poorly ventilated. They were very much out of repair; in many cases the pipes were frozen; in others there were bad leaks. Here, too, large numbers of people were dependent upon one closet. Three cases were found where six families used one hall closet. In one case, the closet on the stairway was frozen and had been locked by the landlord. For two weeks the nine families, 49 persons in all, living in the building had been dependent upon one basement closet, which was also frozen and very dirty. In another case a hall closet was used by a family of five and also by the patrons of a saloon in the same building.

A very much larger percentage of the apartment closets were clean and in good repair than of the more public toilets. In the apartments 28 per cent of the closets were reported as dirty or very dirty, while 22 per cent were in poor repair; of the hall and basement toilets 55 per cent were dirty and 47 per cent out of repair; of the yard closets 60 per cent were dirty (nearly half of these specified as "very dirty") and 58 per cent in poor repair. The difficulty of keeping clean and in order toilets used by so many people and for whom no one feels a special responsibility is evident, and is an additional reason for emphasizing the necessity for each family's having its own toilet within the apartment.

Since the provisions of the Tenement Code in relation to the overcrowding of rooms, to ventilation, and to light, have been fully treated in an earlier article in this series,¹ it seems sufficient here to point out violations of the laws in this district, without going into a detailed discussion of the provisions governing them. The Code provides that in neither old-law nor new-law tenements shall an adult person live or sleep in a room without having at least 400 cubic feet of air. That this provision is constantly disregarded is shown by Table IX, which gives the number of adults and children sleeping in one room, together with the cubic contents of the room. In this table buildings of one apartment are excluded, since they are not regulated by the Tenement House Code. Two children are used as the equivalent of one adult, since the law requires for them an equal number of feet of air.

TABLE IX
NUMBER OF PERSONS SLEEPING IN ROOMS OF SPECIFIC CUBIC CONTENTS. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

CONTENTS OF ROOM IN CUBIC FEET	NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED BY										TOTAL
	One Child	One Adult	One Adult and One Child	Two Adults	Two Adults and One Child	Three Adults	Three Adults and One Child	Four Adults	Four Adults and One Child	Five Adults or More	
Less than 400.	3	45	7	29	20	8	1	...	1	...	114
400 and less than 600.	12	240	66	343	143	85	13	4	...	1	907
600 and less than 800.	12	206	59	261	109	73	12	11	3	...	746
800 and less than 1,000.	7	104	31	109	58	28	7	5	...	1	350
1,000 and less than 1,200.	18	81	15	51	29	28	4	4	3	...	233
1,200 and less than 1,400.	17	69	13	43	20	10	4	3	1	...	180
1,400 and less than 1,600.	14	50	17	45	12	5	2	2	1	...	148
1,600 and less than 1,800.	9	35	6	19	5	3	...	1	78
1,800 and less than 2,000.	4	17	5	8	2	1	37
2,000 and more.	2	12	1	11	...	7	2	1	...	1	37
Total.	98	859	220	919	398	248	45	31	9	3	2,830

Total number of illegally overcrowded rooms:
1,384 (49 per cent)

All the numbers above the leaded line in the table represent cases of illegal overcrowding of the rooms; 49 per cent, that is, of all the persons in this district were sleeping with less than the mini-

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, XVI, No. 4, pp. 449 ff.

mum amount of air required by law. In some cases, especially in Gault Court, the overcrowding was appalling. In one apartment three adults and three children were sleeping in a room having less than 350 cubic feet of air, a room that could not legally be occupied even by one adult. In another case an Italian saloonkeeper had six lodgers who slept in a room containing only 504 cubic feet. One Italian family of three adults and three children slept in a room, also used as their parlor, which had only 718 cubic feet of air. The father was out of work at that time, and the family were taking a lodger who slept in the kitchen, the only other room in the apartment. This overcrowding not only means lack of sufficient air, but also involves a lack of privacy, sometimes of real danger to the morals of the family. It was found that 77 families were using all the rooms in their apartment, even the kitchen, for sleeping-purposes; 399 were using all but one room.

The overcrowding is of course especially objectionable when there are lodgers in the household. Although, as has been pointed out, the lodgers comprise a comparatively small percentage of the population in this district, over 600 were found in all. These were living in 309 of the 1,462 households; that is, 21 per cent of the families had living with them in their crowded quarters at least one person who was not a member of the family group. It was found that in 65 cases, these lodgers were sleeping with some member of the family. In one case a lodger was sharing a room with a family of seven.

The ordinance makes certain definite requirements in regard to the size of rooms in new-law tenements. No room may be less than 70 square feet in area, less than 8.6 feet high, nor contain less than 400 cubic feet of air. We have seen that 114 rooms used for sleeping did not meet the requirement in regard to cubic contents; this was also true of 72 other rooms. The investigators found 1,581 rooms less than 70 square feet in area and 721 less than 8.6 feet high. While these conditions, in so far as they exist, as for the most part they do, in old-law buildings, are not illegal, they are definitely below the standard which the community has set for itself, and, as has been pointed out, are more rather than less dangerous than when found in recently built houses.

The ordinance also attempts to regulate the light and ventilation of the rooms by requiring that each room shall have window space equal to one-tenth of the floor area of the room, and that the windows shall open direct upon a street, alley, yard, or court. These provisions, as so many of the others, do not apply to the old-law buildings, and of course were not met in a large percentage of the buildings of this district. The investigators reported 285 rooms as inadequately ventilated; of these 63 had no window at all, 87 had interior windows only; and in the other 135 the outer windows were inadequate for the ventilation of the room. Table X shows the number of persons, 390 in all, sleeping in these poorly ventilated rooms.

TABLE X

INADEQUATELY VENTILATED ROOMS AND NUMBER OF PERSONS USING. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

PERSONS	NUMBER OF ROOMS HAVING				TOTAL PERSONS
	No Window	Interior Window	Inadequate Outer	Total	
None.....	24	27	55	106	...
1.....	19	18	20	57	57
2.....	15	23	25	63	126
3.....	4	12	21	37	111
4.....	1	6	9	16	64
5.....	..	1	4	5	25
7.....	1	1	7
Total....	63	87	135	285	390

It will be noticed that in four cases three people were sleeping in a windowless room; in one case four people. In another instance where the family of an Italian barber were living in a two-room apartment; four members of the family were sleeping in a room of 646 cubic feet, with the only window opening into the barber shop. In an apartment above a saloon, a few doors south, two adults and three children were sleeping in a bedroom where the only window opened into the parlor, which was also used for sleeping. In another case, eleven Greeks were found living above a stable where several horses were kept. Seven of the men were sleeping in one inadequately ventilated room. The illustration on p. 529 illustrates the manner in which pantries are utilized as bedrooms.



A PANTRY USED BY AN ITALIAN AS A BEDROOM
The window has been boarded up

Eighteen hundred and seven rooms were reported as having insufficient light; of these 459 were called "dark" and 1,348 "gloomy." An attempt was made to standardize these terms by using "dark" to apply to rooms where one could read only when close to the window, and "gloomy" when one could read only a few feet away from the window. Only 323 of these rooms failed to comply with the provisions of the code requiring the window space to be equal to 10 per cent of the floor area. It is evident, therefore, that the lack of light is due rather to the outlook of the windows than to their size. This outlook is given in Table XI.

TABLE XI

OUTLOOK OF DARK AND GLOOMY ROOMS. LOWER NORTH DISTRICT

Number of rooms opening upon—

Another room.....	50
Hall.....	45
Air shaft or wall.....	192
Porch, stairway, or court.....	135
Passage.....	1,072
Alley, yard, street, or roof.....	239
Skylight.....	7
Total.....	1,740
Rooms having no windows.....	63
Outlook of windows not reported.....	4
Total dark and gloomy rooms.....	1,807

This table shows that 1,072, or 63 per cent of all the poorly lighted rooms, open upon a passageway. As was evident from the table showing the percentage of the lot covered, there is very little space between the buildings. The lots are very narrow, and the houses cover nearly the entire width of the lot, leaving passages frequently no more than eight inches or a foot wide. A window opening upon such a passage is practically useless for purposes of either light or ventilation. In one three-room apartment in this neighborhood, a widow was living with four children, the oldest one tuberculous. The front room was light; from this opened the kitchen, very dark because the only window opened directly upon

the wall of the next house. The third room was long and narrow, the only light and air coming from a window off the small entrance hall. This room was so dark and damp that the family did not use it; all five were living in the parlor and the kitchen.

As was mentioned near the beginning of this article, the conditions found in the block canvassed in the First Ward were markedly different from those in the Lower North district, which we have been discussing. In making comparisons, it is fair to remember that the statistics for the First Ward were based on the canvass of a much smaller neighborhood. Here fifteen premises were canvassed, facing Plymouth Court and backing on the alley between Plymouth Court and State Street. Opposite is the baggage department of the Dearborn Street station, into which come over two-thirds of the immigrants arriving in Chicago. Both the street and the sidewalk are very narrow. Near the corner of Polk Street are several buildings not used as dwellings and not included in the canvass; next is a large brick yard, fenced in, but used nevertheless as more or less of a dump; then come the houses canvassed. In this block the nationality of 119 heads of households was found. Of these one was a Negro; the other 118 were Italians. The Negro lived in a house which faced on Taylor Street, and was in the rear of one of the Plymouth Court premises. In the houses facing on Plymouth Court, therefore, the population was entirely Italian. Even block 3 in the Lower North district is less exclusively Italian than this Plymouth Court block. The neighborhood as a whole is, however, a polyglot territory. Just east of Plymouth Court on State Street are many Negroes; to the north are Chinese; at the Jones School, which these Italian children attend, probably more nationalities are represented than in any other school in Chicago.

In the streets of this neighborhood are still standing some of the fine old houses, originally designed for the well-to-do residents of Chicago. These buildings are now used as tenements for large numbers of families. Other buildings were put up as cheap lodging-houses of questionable character, poorly adapted for the use of the families who now live in them. To this group belong the Plymouth Court buildings canvassed. There are also larger and more recently built tenements, some of them covering completely the



THE "DOWNTOWN" OR PLYMOUTH COURT DISTRICT
Canvassed. Six hundred and twenty-eight people were living in this group of buildings.

lots upon which they are built. Although the canvass in this downtown district covers only a small territory, it is believed to be typical of a large part of this neighborhood.¹

Of the fifteen lots canvassed, seven were less than 80 per cent covered by buildings, five were from 80 per cent to 90 per cent, and three over 90 per cent. These figures show that so far as congestion is indicated by the percentage of the lot covered, this district is less rather than more crowded than the Lower North district. The type of building, however, is different; we are not dealing with low frame buildings such as housed the Italians on Gault Court. All but one of these buildings were brick, and all that were used as dwellings were at least three stories high. Four of the buildings contained over 10 apartments, one of them as many as 16. In all, there were 123 apartments, 36 of which were in the rear of the building, and 23 in the middle. These brick buildings were in an even more dilapidated condition than the frame buildings of the North Side district; not one was reported by the investigators as in good repair. This is in part due to the fact that there were no new-law houses in the block, that is, no houses that had been built since 1902. In the rear of the lots were a few buildings not used as dwellings; two of these belonged to the fire department; the others were sheds or stables. Two rear buildings were used as dwellings, each having three apartments; the remainder of the buildings faced the street. In one was a store, and in another a saloon; the others were used as residences only. Table XII gives the location of the apartments.

Only 8 per cent of the apartments were found to be basement apartments, and there were no cellar apartments. This is in contrast with the Lower North district, where 15 per cent of all the apartments were in basements or cellars. It will be remembered, however, that the large number of basement apartments there was accounted for by the grading of the street.

¹ The district of segregated vice which has now been moved south to Twenty-second Street and the adjoining territory formerly centered in Custom House Place, a block west of Plymouth Court. This whole neighborhood was disreputable, and old maps show that several of the buildings canvassed, where these Italians are now living, were originally houses of prostitution.

As is perhaps to be expected, the toilet conditions in the block could not well be worse. In only two apartments were there private water-closets; 85 families were dependent upon 22 closets in the halls; the rest upon 12 yard closets. These 36 closets were the only accommodations for 628 people. Not one yard closet was found which was clean or in good repair; some of them were indescribably filthy. One closet which was used by five families was in an outhouse, very dirty and in bad repair and with no door, so that there was absolutely no privacy about it. The hall closets were

TABLE XII
LOCATION OF APARTMENTS. PLYMOUTH COURT DISTRICT

Story	Number	Percentage
Basement.....	10	8
First.....	32	26
Second.....	32	26
Third.....	34	28
Fourth.....	12	10
Fifth.....	3	2
Total.....	123	100

nearly as public and insanitary as the yard closets. In nearly all cases they were dirty, in bad repair, dark, and poorly ventilated. In one building 11 families, 41 persons in all, were using one of these hall closets; in another case 15 families, 73 persons in all, were dependent upon one such closet. Under such conditions it would be impossible for the closets to be in any degree cleanly or sanitary. It would be difficult to overestimate the menace to the health of the people dependent upon them. That there is moral danger as well, especially to the children, was mentioned earlier in this article; it is impossible to describe the conditions in this neighborhood, so much worse even than those found in the Lower North district, without again emphasizing the grave moral dangers to which the children especially are subjected.

In the Italian district on the North Side, it was found that while bath tubs were of course exceptional (103 were found in all) nearly every family had a sink, and could, except in the more or less frequent cases where the pipes were frozen or the plumbing out of

order, avail itself of the opportunities for cleanliness and decency given by running water. In the block on Plymouth Court this was not the case; 81 apartments, 66 per cent of the entire number, were without sinks.

The composition of the population of the district canvassed is shown in Table XIII.

TABLE XIII
COMPOSITION OF POPULATION. PLYMOUTH COURT DISTRICT

	NUMBER IN FAMILIES				TOTAL POPULATION
	Adults	Children	Total	Lodgers	
Number.	309	250	559	69	628
Percentage ..	49	40	..	11	100

It is interesting to compare this table with Table II, which gave the block population for the five blocks on the Lower North Side. We find here a slightly larger percentage of lodgers, and a considerably larger percentage of children—40 per cent instead of 31 per cent.¹ Even the 31 per cent of children is high when compared with that found in the other districts investigated. We have then in this group of buildings 250 children living in quarters which cannot fail to be demoralizing; and we have throughout this downtown neighborhood a population with a large percentage of children growing up under conditions similar to those we are describing.

Although the lodgers formed only 11 per cent of the population, they were living in one-fourth of the households. With one exception they were all men, frequently newly arrived immigrants who were either unmarried or had left their families in Italy. In one three-room apartment, a woman who had recently moved away had kept twelve lodgers. In a seven-room basement apartment in which an Italian railroad laborer lived with his wife and two children were fourteen men lodgers, six of whom slept in one poorly ventilated room. In thirteen cases, the lodgers were sharing their bedrooms with one, or more than one, member of the family.

¹ It will be remembered that "children" as used here does not mean minors, but boys and girls under twelve years.

Table XIV shows that in this district the apartments are much smaller than in the others investigated. Here it is the two-room rather than the four-room apartment which is typical, while only 23 of the apartments have as many as four rooms, as against 69 per cent in the Twenty-second Ward district.

TABLE XIV
APARTMENTS HAVING SPECIFIED NUMBER OF ROOMS. PLYMOUTH COURT DISTRICT


Apartments Having	Number	Percentage
One room.....	7	6
Two rooms.....	49	41
Three rooms.....	36	30
Four rooms.....	20	17
Five rooms.....	6	5
Seven rooms.....	1	1
Total.....	119*	100

* In 4 cases the number of rooms was not reported.

In a one-room apartment in an adjoining block were living an Italian family with six children, the eldest a sixteen-year-old girl. The building was one of the handsome old brick residences originally used by a single family but now converted into a tenement. Except for the Italian family of eight, living in their one room in the rear of the second floor, the house was occupied entirely by Chinese. The toilet was situated in the hall and used by both the Chinese men and the Italian children. Such crowded living conditions, setting aside the question of race, must have a demoralizing influence upon the children, who live much in the streets in a neighborhood where street influences are dangerous.

The rent per apartment is higher in this block than in the Lower North district if the number of rooms is taken into consideration. In Table XV are given the monthly rentals together with the number of rooms.

It is perhaps hardly fair to make use of the median rental for four-room apartments, since we have the facts for only 20 such apartments. If this is done, however, the median is found to be between \$9.00 and \$9.50, higher than that for the Lower North district or for most of the other districts canvassed. If the two-



THE REAR OF A TENEMENT HOUSE ON PLYMOUTH COURT

room apartment is considered, as more typical of this neighborhood, the median rental is between \$7.00 and \$7.50; the median rental for two-room apartments on the Lower North side is between \$5.00 and \$5.50. The rents, then, in proportion to the accommodations secured, are high. This is, of course, to be expected in a downtown neighborhood in a large city.

TABLE XV

NUMBER OF APARTMENTS FOR WHICH SPECIFIED MONTHLY RENTALS ARE PAID
TOGETHER WITH NUMBER OF ROOMS. PLYMOUTH COURT DISTRICT

RENT PER MONTH	NUMBER OF ROOMS						No REPORT	TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	5	7		
Less than \$4.	4	1	5
\$ 4 and less than \$ 5. . . .	1	5	1	7
\$ 5 and less than \$ 6.	6	7	1	14
\$ 6 and less than \$ 7. . . .	1	8	2	1	12
\$ 7 and less than \$ 8.	18	9	4	31
\$ 8 and less than \$ 9.	4	3	3	10
\$ 9 and less than \$10.	3	6	9
\$10 and less than \$11.	4	8	5	3	20
\$11 and less than \$12.	1	1
\$12 and over.	3	3
Vacant or rent unknown..	1	3	2	1	4	11
Total.	7	49	36	20	6	1	4	123

In contrast with the condition in the Lower North district, where a number of the families are living in apartments which they own, is the fact that this whole block of houses is owned by one of the railroads. In spite of the fact that none of the Italians owns his own house, it was found that 43 of the 123 families had lived in the same apartment at least five years, a very large percentage when compared with that found in the Lower North district shown in Table VIII, or with that in most of the districts investigated. The Italian who once settles in this neighborhood seldom moves out of it. He is near his fellow-countrymen; he is close to the glamor and excitement of South State Street; and he is within walking-distance of work, so that there is no carfare to pay either for himself or for any member of his family. Ordinarily the possibility of moving into better quarters in another part of the city does not occur to him. The father of an Italian boy who had become an

habitual truant said that he would like to move into a neighborhood that would be better for his boy, but that rents out near the Parental School were too high. He was surprised to learn that there were other parts of the city where he might live, beside these two districts with which he was acquainted. Frequently the Italians accept such quarters simply because they do not know how to find better. A house-renting bureau such as is conducted by many of the German municipalities would be of great service to the immigrant.¹

Table XVI shows that in spite of some extreme cases the Italians on Plymouth Court are sleeping under less crowded conditions than

TABLE XVI
NUMBER OF PERSONS SLEEPING IN ROOMS OF SPECIFIED CUBIC CONTENTS.
PLYMOUTH COURT DISTRICT

CONTENTS OF ROOM IN CUBIC FEET	NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED BY										TOTAL
	One Child	One Adult	One Adult and One Child	Two Adults	Two Adults and One Child	Three Adults	Three Adults and One Child	Four Adults	Four Adults and One Child	Five Adults or More	
400 and less than 600.....	...	3	2	5
600 and less than 800.....	2	5	3	11	11	1	...	1	...	1	35
800 and less than 1,000.....	...	5	7	15	12	5	1	2	47
1,000 and less than 1,200.....	2	7	3	16	6	8	5	1	1	1	50
1,200 and less than 1,400.....	1	3	1	9	7	9	1	1	32
1,400 and less than 1,600.....	1	8	2	4	2	2	2	1	...	1	23
1,600 and less than 1,800.....	2	2	2	4	1	2	1	1	...	1	16
1,800 and less than 2,000.....	...	2	2	2	1	1	8
2,000 and more.....	...	3	...	4	2	2	2	...	1	...	14
Total.....	8	38	20	65	42	32	12	7	2	4	230

Total number of overcrowded rooms:
68 (30 per cent)

those of the Lower North district. Although 68 cases, 30 per cent of the entire number, of illegal overcrowding is far from negligible, it compares favorably with the 49 per cent in the larger district. Perhaps the less overcrowded condition of the bedrooms is partly due to the fact that a larger percentage of the rooms is used for

¹ In the city of Cologne the house-renting bureau (*Wohnungsnachweis*) rented in the year 1910-11 over three thousand houses.



A BEDROOM ON PLYMOUTH COURT

Three children sleep in this room. The only window opens upon a shaft which is closed at the top.

sleeping purposes; thirty-four per cent of the families utilize every room in the apartment for sleeping.

Forty-six rooms were reported as inadequately ventilated. Table XVII shows that 32 of these rooms were used as bedrooms and that 91 persons were sleeping in them. Sixteen of the rooms were without any window at all, and in these windowless rooms a total number of 51 persons were sleeping, frequently four or more in one room.

TABLE XVII

INADEQUATELY VENTILATED ROOMS AND NUMBER OF PERSONS USING.
PLYMOUTH COURT DISTRICT

NUMBER OF PERSONS	NUMBER OF ROOMS HAVING			TOTAL	TOTAL PERSONS
	No Window	Interior Window	Inadequate Outer Window		
None.....	..	1	13	14	..
One.....	3	..	2	5	5
Two.....	3	2	5	10	20
Three.....	3	1	3	7	21
Four.....	3	2	1	6	24
Five.....	3	3	15
Six.....	1	1	6
Total.....	16	6	24	46	91

The investigators reported 101 rooms, out of a total of 330, as dark or gloomy. This was a smaller percentage than was found on the North Side, as might be expected from the fact that a smaller percentage of the lots was covered. Table XVIII gives the out-

TABLE XVIII

OUTLOOK OF DARK AND GLOOMY ROOMS. PLYMOUTH COURT DISTRICT

Number of rooms opening upon—

Another room.....	8
Air shaft or wall.....	20
Porch, stairway, or court.....	36
Passage.....	18
Alley, yard, street, or roof.....	3
Total.....	85
No window.....	16
Total dark and gloomy rooms.....	101

look of these dark and gloomy rooms. The small percentage which open upon a passage is in sharp contrast with the large number found in the Lower North district; fewer of the houses are built with the long narrow passageways, which form one of the worst features of the housing in the larger district.

An attempt has been made to set down, with no more comment than is necessary to make clear the facts, the conditions which have been found to exist today among the Italians of Chicago in two of their largest settlements. These conditions have not compared favorably even with the worst of those existing among other immigrant groups. The Italian is paying a comparatively high rent for dilapidated, unhealthful quarters. He is living in illegally overcrowded rooms, in damp and gloomy apartments, and under conditions which, if not forbidden in the buildings in which he is living, are prohibited in newer tenements, and thus acknowledged to be dangerous and demoralizing. The facts suggest most clearly that the standard for old buildings in Chicago should be improved. There is no doubt that according to any reasonable standard many of these houses are unfit for human habitation. The community should insist upon a housing code which would make illegal the existence of the most harmful of these conditions. Furthermore, it should provide a staff of inspectors for the Board of Health sufficiently large and efficient to make possible the enforcement of the legislation already passed. Chicago has been criminally negligent in its failure to attend to the housing of its great immigrant groups; it is hoped that the facts set forth in this article may be of aid in arousing the city to a realization of its duty in providing decent houses for the constantly increasing number of foreigners who come to make it their home.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF PECUNIARY VALUATION¹

CHARLES H. COOLEY
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Pecuniary valuation is a phase of the general process of social thought, having its special methods and significance but not essentially different in nature: the pecuniary estimates people set upon things are determined in a movement of suggestion and discussion, varying with the group and the time like other phases of the public mind.

This is apparent *a fortiori* if we take what appear to be the simplest and most essential commodities. The estimation of wheaten bread as a necessity of life that prevails with us is a matter of opinion and custom; whether grounded in sound hygiene or not is irrelevant. Other countries and times have thought differently, and we know that foods may be regarded as necessary whose hygienic value is doubtful or negative, like beer in Germany or coffee with us. Consider in this connection the prepared foods known as cereals, for which vast sums are spent by all classes of our people; their vogue and value is clearly a matter of current, possibly transient, opinion, largely created by the psychological process of advertising.

I need hardly go farther into this. It is plain that even among the most necessitous an existing scale of pecuniary values can be explained only as a product of the same social forces which create other phases of tradition and sentiment; and no one will expect anything different in values prevailing among a richer class. I do not mean, of course, that these forces work wholly in the air, but that whatever physiological or mechanical factors there may be in demand and supply, these become active only through the mediation of a psychological process.

¹ The conception of the general process of valuation underlying this and possible future papers is set forth in an article on "Valuation as a Social Process," *Psychological Bulletin*, December 15, 1912 (social psychology number).

It is a common saying that values were formerly determined largely by custom, but that competition has supplanted the latter; and no doubt this is true in the sense that the stability of local custom is broken up. In a somewhat different way, however, custom—the influence of the past—is as great a factor in the market now as it ever was. Now as always it is the main source of the habits of thought that control demand and supply and so value. An obvious case is that of funerals. Why is it that so large a part of the expenditure of the poor goes for this purpose, so large that a special branch of insurance is carried on to meet it? Evidently the reasons are historical, reaching back in fact to prehistoric society. And although this case appears exceptional, because this particular convention has lost most of its force among the educated classes, it is none the less true that we draw our values from the current of historical influence. What we are willing to spend money for, as individuals, as classes, as nations, can be understood only by a study of historical influences and of their interaction and propagation at the present time.

I have elsewhere¹ explained the distinction which I think should be made between human-nature values and institutional values, the latter being those which have social antecedents of so complicated a character that we cannot understand them except as the outcome of a special institutional development. It is apparent that the values of the pecuniary market fall under the latter head. Their immediate source is a social mechanism, whatever their indirect relation to human nature may be. You do not find them wherever man is found, but only where there is a somewhat developed system of exchange, a commodity recognized as money, and an active market.

Pecuniary values, however, are by no means all upon the same level as regards the degree in which they are institutional. All are so in the sense just indicated—that they require the mechanism of the market to define and develop them. But if we go back of this we find that some are based (so far as demand is concerned)

¹ In the article on "Valuation as a Social Process" referred to above.

upon rather simple human-nature values, in which the factors of special tradition and organization play no very great part. It is remarkable, when you come to think of it, how few such values there are; but those of meat and flour, of lumber, fuel, and the simpler kinds of clothing are relatively of this sort. Some, on the other hand, are the outgrowth of a complex institutional history through which it is difficult to trace the threads which connect them with the permanent needs of human nature. Such are the values of ornamental or ceremonial dress, of many of our foods, of our more elaborate houses and furniture, our amusements and dissipations, our books, and those connected with our systems of education, our churches, political institutions, and so on. The same difference runs through the values set on the services of different kinds of men. Why society should pay a substantial price for farmers and carpenters is obvious; but when you come to lawyers, stock-brokers, promoters, men of science, advertising men, and the like, not to speak of the holders of capital, who seem to be paid large sums for doing nothing at all, it is clear that the explanation is institutional, not to be reached without a study of the organic growth and interaction of social forms. And it seems clear also that values of this latter sort greatly and increasingly preponderate in our social system.

There is a fallacious kind of reasoning often met with in discussions of value, which consists in taking the simplest conceivable transactions, generally those of an imaginary primitive life, noticing the principles upon which they may have been based, and then assuming that the same principles suffice for a general explanation of the complex transactions of our own life. "It is the same thing now, only more intricate," is the supposition. This, of course, overlooks the fact that even granting that such analyses are otherwise sound, which is very questionable, the social complexity is for many purposes the essential thing in the actual value process. It involves an institutional character, which changes with the social type, which may be understood only through a knowledge of institutional organisms, and which can be reformed only by working upon and through such organisms. The study of value-making

institutions becomes, then, the principal means of arriving at practical truth. It seems clear that such a character belongs to the pecuniary values of the present time.

The market (meaning by this the system of pecuniary transactions regarded as one organic whole) is as much an institution as the state or the church, which indeed it somewhat overshadows in modern life. I mean that it is a vast and complicated social system, rooted in the past, though grown enormously in recent times, wielding incalculable prestige, and, though manned by individuals like other institutions, by no means to be understood from a merely individual point of view. It would be as reasonable to attempt to explain the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, or the *Institutes* of Calvin, by the immediate working of religious instinct as to explain the market values of the present time by the immediate working of natural wants.

This is one of many points of view from which we may see the insufficiency of the usual treatment of the value-making process in treatises of political economy. This treatment starts with demand as a *datum*, assuming that each individual has made up his mind what he wants and how much he wants it. There is seldom, I believe, any serious attempt to go back of this, it being assumed, apparently, that these wants spring from the inscrutable depths of the private mind. At any rate it has not been customary to recognize that they are the expression of an institutional development. From most of the standard works the student would get the impression that if institutions and classes exist at all they have nothing to do with valuation.

The truth, I suppose, is that the idea of institutions, classes, and the like as organic forms or processes having a significance and power not to be grasped from the standpoint of individuals or of general human nature is alien to the philosophy underlying orthodox economics, and hence difficult of assimilation with orthodox theory. So far as such ideas are recognized they are, I should say, rather patched on, than woven into, the original stuff of the garment.¹ Economists, however, are latterly becoming aware of the

¹ They are recognized a great deal, and with the best results, by economists interested, as most are, in practical reforms.

somewhat obsolete character of the philosophy involved in the orthodox tradition.¹

At any rate the result of the individualistic treatment of pecuniary value has been to saddle the whole institution—the market—upon human nature. Commercialism as we find it had to be explained, and as there was nothing else available poor human nature had to bear it. The simple formula, “The people want it, and the law of supply and demand does the rest,” will explain anything. But if we allow ourselves to ask why the people want it, or just who the people are that want it, or why they can make their wants effective, we discover that we have everything to learn. The accepted economic treatment would seem to be equivalent to a renunciation of any attempt to understand the relation of value to society at large; or, in other words, of any attempt to understand value itself, since to understand a thing is to perceive its more important relations. I do not deny that the method of analysis in question has its very important uses, but if it is allowed to be the only method it becomes the source of the gravest errors.

Just what does it mean, from the individual's standpoint, when we say that the market, as a historical institution, is a main factor in values? Not merely that pre-existing individual estimates are summed up and equilibrated in accordance with the formulas of economic science, though this is one phase of the matter, but also that the individual estimates themselves are molded by the market, at first in a general way and then, in the process of price-making, drawn toward a somewhat mechanical uniformity. The individual and the system act and react upon each other until, in most cases, they agree, somewhat as in fashion, in religious belief, and the like. The influence of the market is not secondary either in time or importance to that of the person; it is a continuous institution in which the individual lives and which is ever forming his ideas.

¹ I need hardly refer in this connection to Dr. B. M. Anderson's penetrating study of *Social Value*.

It is curious that although orthodox economics has mostly ignored the importance of institutional processes, its own history offers as good an illustration of this importance as could be desired. I mean that the spirit and underlying ideas of the science can be understood only as the product of a school of thought, of a special institutional development.

The actual transactions are potent suggestions for new ones, and the actual transactions are the latest expressions of an institutional development in which class rule and a confused and one-sided commercialism have been chief factors. Thus the institution largely dictates the valuations which it afterward equilibrates. To neglect this and treat demand and supply as a summation of original individual estimates involves an inadequacy of the same nature as there would be in explaining fashion as due to a summation of individual ideas about dress. This would be true at a given instant, in fashion as in the market, but in the case of the former no one could fail to perceive how superficial, how delusive, such a method of treatment would be. This is obvious in the case of fashion because its changes are so rapid and conspicuous that we are compelled to notice them, and to see that the individual takes his ideas from the social current. The slower movement of ideas which determines our more stable wants is, however, of the same character, and the superficiality of treating it as originating in the individual is quite as great. It amounts to nothing less than ignoring the essential social factors in pecuniary value. The relation of the individual to the system is not essentially different in this case from what we may see in any institution. The ordinary man is a conformer; he lives in the institution and accepts its established valuations, but not without impressing some degree of individuality upon them. In this way we get our ideas and practices regarding religion, marriage, dress, and so on. So in pecuniary matters one accepts in a general way the current values but has a certain individuality in his choices which makes him to some extent a special factor in the market. There is no absolute conformity; we do everything a little differently from anyone else; but this does not prevent our being controlled, in a broad way, by the prevailing institutions. This is what the usual economic analysis ignores, or perhaps omits as beyond its proper range.

Along with this we have the phenomenon of nonconformity. Individuals of special natural endowment or unusual situation or both—as is commonly the case—depart widely from the type, and initiate new tendencies which, under favorable conditions, may grow, and modify or destroy the old type. These new movements

are likely to derive more directly from human nature than the old, and it is commonly true, though not always, that nonconformity represents human-nature values in conflict with those that are more institutional. We can see this process at the present time in the church, in politics, and in the family. It is taking place no less in pecuniary relations, and our expenditure is being humanized as radically, perhaps, as anything else. Things that seemed indispensable twenty-five years ago no longer seem worth while, and claims unthought of then have become irresistible. What changes have come over the budget of the household, of philanthropy, of the state and the church, during this period!

One might say much on this topic, but it would amount simply to an exposition, in this field, of the general relation between institutions and human nature.

Without taking into account this life of the individual in the institution we can never do justice to the general sway of the market, as a historical organism, over society at large. It is, as I have suggested, a structure as imposing as the political state itself, filling the eye with the spectacle of established and unquestioned power and impressing its estimates upon every mind.

We have to recognize, then, not merely that pecuniary value is, in general, a social value which derives from the social development of the past, but that it is the outcome, more particularly, of a special phase of that development, namely, the comparatively recent growth of industry and business, including also the growth of consumption. This is the special institution from which, for better or worse, the pecuniary values of today draw their character, very much as ecclesiastical values draw theirs from the history of the church. The phenomena of any institution are molded in part by the general conditions of the time, but they are molded especially by their particular institutional antecedents, which may be somewhat incongruous with the more general conditions. If you attend a service of the Established Church you become aware of points of view which may seem to you, as a man of today, absurd and incomprehensible, except as you know something of their history. The same may very well be true in the pecuniary

world, though we may not notice it because we are more used to it, because we are ourselves members of this church.

And the method of criticism, in the market as in the church, is to take as large a view of the institution as possible, discover in what respects it is failing to function adequately in the general life, and strive to bring about such changes as seem to be required.

It seems probable that the more we consider, in the light of an organic view of society, the practice of discussing values apart from their institutional antecedents, the more sterile, except for somewhat narrowly technical purposes, this practice will appear. Certainly it should have but a secondary place in inquiries which seek to throw light upon ethics or social policy. It is, for example, but a frail basis for a theory of distribution. The latter I take to be essentially a historical and institutional phenomenon, economic technique being for the most part only a mechanism through which social organization expresses itself. I do not question the technical value of the current treatises on distribution which more or less cut it off from its roots in the social whole, but perhaps the time is coming for a treatment which takes technical economics for granted and elucidates the larger actualities of the question.

The principle that any social institution, and consequently any system of valuation, must be administered by a class, which will largely control its operation, is rather an obvious one. It was long overlooked, however, in political theory, at least in the theory of democracy, and is still overlooked, perhaps, in economic theory. At any rate it is a fact that pecuniary valuation is by no means the work of the whole people acting homogeneously, but is subject, very much like the analogous function in politics, to concentration in a class.

Class control is exercised mainly in two ways: through control or guidance of purchasing power, and so of the demand side of the market, and through the actual administration of the business system, which gives the class in possession command of the large personal (pecuniary) values incident to this function, and the

opportunity to increase these by the use, direct and indirect, of their commanding position.¹

The process of definite pecuniary valuation, the price-making function, is based upon "effective demand" or the offer of money for goods; perhaps we ought to say for consumer's goods, as the value of producers' goods may be regarded as secondary.² It is, therefore, the immediate work of those who have money to spend. Just how far spending is concentrated in a class I cannot pretend to say, but judging from current estimates I suppose it would be no exaggeration to say that one-half of the purchasing power in an industrial community is exercised by one-fifth of the families.³ In this respect pecuniary value is, on the face of it, much more the work of a restricted class than political value, in determining which all voters are nominally equal. In either case, however, it would be most erroneous to suppose that value-making power can be measured in any such numerical way. There is always a psychological process of suggestion and discussion which works underneath the market transactions.

By virtue of this the power of the richer classes over values is far greater than that indicated by their relative expenditure. As people of leisure and presumptive refinement, they have prestige in forming those conventions by which expenditure is ruled. We see how cooks and shop girls dress in imitation of society women, and how clerks mortgage their houses to buy automobiles. It is in fact notorious that the expenditure of the poor follows the fashions of the rich, unless in matters of the most direct and urgent necessity, and in no small degree even in these.

If what has just been said is sound it would be necessary, in order to understand contemporary values, to investigate, his-

¹ By calling these values "personal" I mean merely that they tend to enrich persons; their economic character is multifarious.

² Production has a special institutional development of its own which I shall not attempt to discuss in this connection.

³ This guess is based on English and German statistics indicating that about one-tenth of the families enjoy one-half of the total income; also upon the assumption that the proportion of saving in the richer class is greater and that of expenditure less, so that it might require one-fifth of the families to embrace half of the latter.

torically and psychologically, the ideals, such as they are, now prevalent in the richer classes.¹ It might be found, perhaps, that these are largely of two sorts: ideals proper to commercialism—especially ideals of pecuniary power and of display as an evidence of it—and caste ideals taken over by the commercial aristocracy from an older order of society. Commercialism tends to fix attention rather on the acquisition than the use of wealth, and for ideals regarding the latter the successful class has fallen back upon the traditions, so well-knit and so attractive to the imagination, of a former hereditary aristocracy. We very inadequately realize, I imagine, how much our modes of thought, and hence our valuations, are dominated by English social ideals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We get these not only through the social prestige, continuous to our own day, of the English upper classes, but through history, literature, and art. Speaking roughly, the best European literature, and especially the best English literature, was produced under the dominance of an aristocratic class and is permeated with its ideals. Thus culture, even now, means in no small degree the absorption of these ideals.

They are, of course, in many respects high ideals, embracing conceptions of culture and of personal character and conduct which it would be a calamity to lose; and yet these are interwoven with the postulate of an upper class, enjoying of right an enormous preponderance of wealth and power, and living in an affluence suitable to its appointed station. Thus it happens that as a man acquires wealth he feels that it is becoming that his family should assert its right of membership in the upper class by a style of living that shall proclaim his opulence. He also feels, if he has in any degree assimilated the finer part of the tradition, that a corresponding advance in culture would be becoming to him, but this is a thing by no means so readily purchased as material state; the general conditions are not favorable to it, and his efforts, if he makes any, are apt to be somewhat abortive.

Along with the preceding we have also a hopeful admixture of ideals which reflect the dawn of a truly democratic régime of life—

¹ In this connection the reader will of course recall the work of Professor Veblen along this line.

ideals of the individual as existing for the whole, of power as justified only by public service, compunctions regarding the inequalities of wealth and opportunity, a lowly spirit in high places.

This sort of inquiry into the psychology of the upper class as a social organism—however unimportant these suggestions may be—appears to be indispensable if we are to form even an intelligent guess as to where we stand in the matter of valuation.

Coming now to the control over values incident to the administration of the business system, we note that the class in power, in spite of constant changes in its membership, is for many purposes a real historical organism acting collectively for its own aggrandizement. This collective action is for the most part unconscious, and comes about as the resultant of the striving of many individuals and small groups in the same general direction. We are all, especially in pecuniary matters, ready to join forces with those whose interest is parallel to our own: bankers unite to promote the banking interest, manufacturers form associations, and so on. The whole business world is a network of associations, formal and informal, which aim to further the pecuniary interest of the members. And while these groups, or members of the same group are often in competition with one another, this does not prevent a general parallelism of effort as regards matters which concern the interest of the business class as a whole. The larger the group the less conscious, as a rule, is its co-operation, but it is not necessarily less effective and it can hardly be denied that the capitalist-manager class, or whatever we may call the class ascendent in business, acts powerfully as a body in maintaining and increasing its advantages over other classes. Nothing else can result from the desire of each to get and keep all he can, and to exchange aid with others similarly inclined.¹

When I say that the class is, for this purpose, a historical organism, I mean that its power, prestige, and methods come down from the past in a continuous development like other forms of social life. This would be the case even were individual membership in it quite free to everyone in proportion to his ability, for an open

¹ Perhaps I may be allowed to refer in this connection to the more extended, though inadequate, treatment of classes in my *Social Organization*.

class, as we can see for instance in the case of a priesthood, may yet be full of a spirit and power derived from the past.

In fact, however, membership in the upper economic class is by no means open to all in proportion to natural ability, and the command it enjoys of lucrative opportunities contributes greatly to its ascendancy. It controls the actual administration of the market much as the political party in power used to control the offices, with the influence and patronage pertaining to them—only the ascendancy in the economic world, based largely on inherited wealth and connections, is greater and more secure. The immediate effect of this is to enhance greatly the market value of the persons having access to the opportunities: they are enabled by their advantageous position to draw from the common store salaries, fees, and profits not at all explicable by natural ability alone. This effect is multiplied by the fact that limitation of the number of competitors gives an additional scarcity value to the services of the competent which may raise their price almost incredibly. Thus it is well known that during the period of rapid consolidation of the great industries enormous fees, amounting in some cases to millions, were paid to those who effected the consolidations. It may be that their services were worth the price; but in so far as this is the fact it can be explained only as an exorbitant scarcity value due to limitation of opportunity. No one will contend, I suppose, that the native ability required was of so transcendent a character as to get such a reward under open conditions. Evidently of the thousands who might have been competent to the service only a few were on hand with such training and connections as to make them actual competitors. And the same principle is quite generally required to explain the relatively large incomes of the class in power, including those of the more lucrative professions. They represent the value of good natural ability multiplied by opportunity factors.¹

The fact usually urged in this connection, that these lucrative opportunities often fall to those who were not born in the upper class

¹ For a very strong statement by a conservative economist of the power of class over opportunities and personal values, I may refer to the treatment of the subject by Professor Seager in his *Introduction to Economics*, § 138. I should not estimate the difficulty of passing class lines quite so high as he does.

but have made their way into it by their own energy, is not very much to the point. It is not contended that our upper class is a closed caste, nor does it have to be in order to act as a whole, or to exercise a dominating and somewhat monopolistic influence over values. Though ill defined, not undemocratic in sentiment, and partly free from the hereditary character of European upper classes, it is yet a true historical successor of the latter, and dominates the weaker classes in much the same way as stronger classes have always done. Power is concentrated about the functions of the dominant institutions, and the powerful class use it for their individual and class advantage. Surely one has only to open his eyes to see this. I doubt whether there is a city, village, or township in the country where there is not a group of men who constitute an upper class in this sense. There is, it seems to me, a growing feeling that class, which the prevalent economics has relegated to oblivion under some such category as "imperfect freedom of competition," is in fact at the very heart of our problem.

It seems, then, that pecuniary valuation is a social institution no less than the state or the church, and that its development must be studied not only on the impersonal side but also in the traditions and organization of the class that chiefly administers it.

PREVENTING CRUELTY TO CHILDREN

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

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The state of Massachusetts has one of the most thoroughly organized societies for the prevention of cruelty to children in the United States, and employs a large number of agents. These agents are given a three weeks' vacation, to be taken some time during the summer; and to carry on their work while they are away, the society employs a number of temporary agents. It fell to my lot to take one of these positions, and to spend two months and a half in the employ of the society. I thus had the advantage of viewing the work of the society from the double standpoint of an outsider and an insider. The work proved so novel and fascinating to me, and since leaving it I have found on the part of others such a combination of curiosity and unenlightenment as to the exact nature of the work of such a society, that it has seemed justifiable to attempt to give my experience a degree of publicity.

It is a strange and significant fact that the movement for the prevention of cruelty to children was subsequent to, and a direct outgrowth of, the work for animals, and it was the work of years to rid the newer movement of anomalous ideas and practices which clung to it on account of its origin. The Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was incorporated in 1868, while the charter of the children's society is dated ten years later. The purpose of the newer society, as stated in the charter, is "awakening interest in the abuses to which children are exposed by the intemperance, cruelty, or cupidity of parents and guardians, and to help the enforcement of existing laws on the subject, procure needed legislation, and for kindred work." As might be expected, the first efforts of the society were devoted to remedying and preventing physical abuse and neglect, and it is an evidence, not only of a broadened scope, but of a vast amount of work already accomplished, that the society now expends a large share of its energies

on other less obvious and more insidious forms of neglect—the moral and intellectual.

It is not the purpose of this paper to go into the history of this society, but rather to examine its present organization and methods of work. The headquarters of the society are in a fine old brick residence building which stands at the corner of Mt. Vernon and Joy streets, the highest point in Boston proper, almost within the shadow of the great State House dome. The name of the society appears on a modest sign, nestling among the vines which clothe the front of the building, and the legend, "Do not Ring. Walk In," inscribed on the front door, makes the visitor feel welcome. The whole of the first floor has the appearance of a regular business office. There are private rooms where the general secretary and the organizing secretary have their desks, a second room full of filing-cases and tables where the clerks and stenographers are at work, and then a large room full of desks, given over to the use of the special agents. Everything appears orderly, systematic, and bustling, and in fact the work of the society is administered on a thoroughly up-to-date and businesslike basis. The central office staff consists of a secretary-general-agent, an organizing secretary, fifteen or sixteen agents who do the work of investigating, prosecuting, etc., three clerks, four stenographers, an examining physician, a matron, and an assistant matron. Besides these, there are resident agents in Worcester, New Bedford, and Northampton, and three of the agents spend about half their time in Brockton, Beverly, and Fall River, respectively. In addition to the regular agents of the society there is a large number of voluntary agents and representatives, with the co-operation of whom it is possible to handle a case of cruelty on short notice in almost any part of the state. The society stands ready to send one of its regular agents to any spot in the state where he is needed, and one of them spends all of his time in work on cases in remote sections.

The society has no organic connection with the government of city or state, and its agents have, as such, no official standing, though several of them have been made Massachusetts special district police officers, in order to enable them to serve their own warrants, etc., or to make arrests if absolutely necessary. This

latter power is seldom exercised, however. When the strong arm of the law is needed, appeal is usually made to the regular police officers. And it may be said, in this connection, that in general the police force of Boston is to be commended highly for its attitude toward the society, and its readiness to co-operate in its work. Some stations are more in sympathy than others, but as a rule the officers are ready to lend every possible aid to the agents of the society, and are active and intelligent both in reporting and in handling cases, and seem to have the interests of children thoroughly at heart.

Though the society has no official powers, it does a large share of its work along legal lines, and its agents are frequent visitors to the various courts of Massachusetts, where they have a semi-official standing and are given special recognition. One of the peculiar results of the historical development of the society, and of the laws under which it works, is that up to the year 1909, in all cases of cruelty or neglect which were taken into court, the child was made the defendant; the charge was being a neglected child, and the parents or guardians were summoned as witnesses on the side of the defense. This was made necessary by the reading of the neglect law, which was as follows:

A police, district, or municipal court or a trial justice, upon a complaint made by any person that any child under sixteen years of age within its or his jurisdiction, by reason of orphanage or of the neglect, crime, *cruelty, insanity*, or drunkenness or other vice of its parents, is growing up without education or without salutary control, *or without proper physical care,*¹ or in circumstances exposing him to lead an idle and dissolute life, or is dependent upon public charity, may issue a precept to bring such child before said court or trial justice. . . .

In the year 1909, however, largely through the efforts of the S.P.C.C. (as it is familiarly called), a change was introduced into the law by which it became possible to make the parents the defendants in cases of ill treatment of children. This was accomplished through an amendment to the non-support law. After the clause in that law which specifies the person guilty of non-support, was introduced the clause from the neglect law, specifying the nature of neglect. Thus the neglectful parent was brought

¹ The phrases in italics were added in 1909.

into the same category with non-supporting parent, and subjected to the same penalties. This marks a decided advance in the children's laws of the state.

Changes in legal procedure, however, require a long time, and in spite of the new law, most of the cases are still conducted under the old method with the child as defendant. One of the agents of the S.P.C.C. last summer brought the first case into the Brockton court under the new law, and fortunately won it. The judge was highly pleased with the course of the trial, and stated that hereafter, in that court, they would put the blame where it belonged directly, make the parents the defendants and charge them with neglect or cruelty.

The wording of the law admits of a very broad interpretation, and makes it possible for the society to deal with almost every form of ill treatment to which a child could be subjected, as in fact it does.

Cases of neglect are usually brought up for hearing in the municipal, district, or police court, within the jurisdiction of which the parents reside. There are courts in Charlestown, Chelsea, Everett, Malden, Roxbury, East Boston, etc. All of these courts now have session on a stated day each week, and all juvenile cases are heard privately, either in the judges' room, or in the main courtroom, all persons not directly connected with the case having been excluded from the room. In Boston proper, however, there is a special juvenile court, presided over by Judge Baker (Judges Rubenstein and Leveroni), where all juvenile cases, and only those, are heard. Of course there is a wide variety of juvenile cases, other than those of neglect, which are brought into the juvenile sessions, including the various forms of juvenile delinquency. The Boston juvenile court sets apart Friday of each week as a special day on which the cases of the S.P.C.C. have precedence over all others, and the agents plan to have their cases come up on that day as far as possible.

The principal class of cases which the society brings into the juvenile court are those where it has been decided necessary to remove the children from their parents or guardians. These are very numerous, and are naturally so conspicuous that many people

have conceived the idea that the prize function of the society is taking children away, and it is very commonly thought of as a society for the breaking-up of homes. It is true that the most obvious thing to do in a case of neglect is to remove the child to better surroundings, and the early practice of the society was inclined to follow this idea. If a case could not be made into a court case, it was considered hardly worth bothering with. How far this fails to represent the present work of the society is shown by the fact that out of 7,368 different children dealt with in 1909, only 2,058 were taken into court. It is a basic principle of the society that the removal of children is the final step, to be taken only when conditions are so aggravated that there appears to be no hope of securing proper influences in the existing environment. In such a case, the society acts on the assumption that there is no real home there. It regards a home as something more than a group of parents and children. Certain fundamental virtues of love, unselfishness, morality, and obedience are considered essential to the existence of a true home. Where the rudiments of a real home exist, the society exhausts every expedient to build it up into a proper environment for children before it takes the extreme step of removing the children. In general the society never takes action in cases where there is no blame or culpability attaching to the parents. Cases where the evils are wholly due to misfortune are considered outside of its province, and are referred to some of the charitable agencies. It "invariably refuses to break up a family because of poverty."

The initial step in the treatment of a case of cruelty by the S.P.C.C. is, in almost every instance, the receipt of a complaint from some outside party. The agents of the society never go about looking for trouble. This is for two reasons: first, the society wishes to avoid as far as possible all appearance of being an inquisitorial agency; second, the capacity of the office force is so overtaxed looking after cases that are reported, that they would have no time to search for others if they were so inclined. These complaints come from a hundred different sources, from police officers and every kind of charitable organization, from neighbors, relatives, and friends, from the husband against the wife, and the wife against the husband. Some of them are inspired by spite, and some

by desire for revenge. Another class of complaint is the anonymous. Complaints of this sort are quite numerous, and are the subject of a good deal of discussion among the agents of the society. Many of them feel that the results from them are so meager that the society would do better to ignore them entirely. Instigators of spite cases are very likely to conceal themselves behind the veil of anonymity, while in many cases investigation reveals simply ignorance on the part of the complainant. But for the most part, the complaints are bona fide and refer to conditions which at the very least demand investigation.

As soon as a complaint is received, the data are entered on duplicate sheets of paper. One is the record sheet, which is filed away in the cabinet, and is never allowed to leave the office except under extraordinary circumstances. The other is the so-called "blue-sheet," which is given to the agent for his guidance, and for keeping notes of his investigations. Two index-cards, one by the name of the parent and the other by the address, are made out, and filed in the proper cabinet. Each case is given a number, which is stamped on every document relating to it, and by which it can be immediately identified.

The process of investigation of a new case begins by looking up the family in the index to see whether it has ever been dealt with by the society before. It is more than likely that such will be the case. So frequently do cases come up for treatment over and over again, that the society hardly ever regards a case as definitely settled until all of the children are of age. If a previous record of the family is found, this of course gives the agent a great advantage in carrying out his investigation. Another preliminary step which is invariably taken is the inquiry of a confidential exchange of information, which is used by over one hundred charitable agencies of Massachusetts. This exchange is managed by the Boston Associated Charities, but covers the whole state. With it the co-operating societies register the names and dates of all cases. Accordingly, when the agent of the S.P.C.C. makes inquiry of this exchange, the clerk in charge looks up the case, and if it has previously been dealt with by some other agency (as is quite likely to be the case), the S.P.C.C. is furnished with the name of the other

society, and the record is marked, "known to [for instance] the Children's Aid Society," with the date. Thus the agent of the S.P.C.C. is in a position to get a condensed history of the family, so far as it has figured in the work of any society, and so far as that society wishes to make the facts known. He is thereby enabled to avoid duplicating or interfering with the work of some other agency, or making mistakes which ignorance of the family's previous record might have entailed.

With these facts in hand, the agent starts out on a tour of investigation. One principle of the society is always to go, first of all, to the parents themselves. This is considered the more straightforward, as well as the more practical, way. Agents are allowed to vary from this practice at their discretion, however, and it is frequently done. Occasionally the *amour propre* of the complainant is very much injured because the agent did not come to him first of all. But in most cases, a visit to the family is the first essential step. It gives the agent a first-hand impression of the conditions, brings him into personal touch with the parents and children, and gives him the opportunity to put himself on friendly terms with them if possible. This is of extreme importance. In perhaps the majority of cases, the first step toward the solution of the problem is the breaking-down of a barrier of hostility erected by the parents. If they can be convinced that the agent is really their friend, that he has not come to take away their children or to spy into their private life, but to help them solve some of the difficulties of existence, the task is well on its way to completion. And when this relation is once established, it is amazing how completely all reserve gives way, and how thoroughly the agent is taken into the confidence of his clients. There is probably no other form of social work which brings the agent more closely in touch with the most intimate relations of family life. The people with whom the society deals are, for the most part, simple and childlike at heart, though ignorant, stolid, and unresponsive on the exterior, and when the right relation has been established, they discuss their personal and family affairs with the most complete confidence and lack of reserve. The new agent is sometimes almost appalled to find himself dealing with social forces which are absolutely elemental.

Occasionally the agent has to overcome a prejudice which is due to ignorance of his identity. Experiences like the following are not unusual. One of the agents called at a house where he had been once before. He asked the small boy who answered his knock whether his mother was in, and received an emphatic negative. But when he pressed his question further, and asked the boy whether he was sure she was out, the youngster looked at him again, and turning, called back into the room, "Say! Ma, this ain't the insurance man; it's the other feller."

The visit to the family is, however, only the first step. The proper treatment of the case demands the fullest information that can possibly be gained of the history and character of the family. As someone has said, the best agent is the one who can know a family better in three days than the neighbors do in three years. To accomplish this, the agent should visit a large number of the neighbors, the nearest police station, any doctor, hospitals, or churches with which the family have been associated, all relatives of either parent, etc. The clues which present themselves when such an investigation is contemplated are almost innumerable, and as the agent has a most limited time to spend on any one case, he has to select only those sources of information which seem most important and promising. It is usually possible, however, to get a very satisfactory understanding of the real nature of the case in a comparatively short time.

Having thus gained an idea of the nature of the case, the next step is to formulate a plan. As no two cases are identical, no stereotyped method of procedure will be adequate. The formation of the plan is one of the most important steps in the handling of the case, and in making it the agents keep in close touch with the general agent, whose wide experience is thus brought to bear on all of the important cases. To accomplish this, the agents dictate the progress of each day's investigation (so far as possible within a day after it is made) to stenographers, who enter the data on the permanent records. All records of cases which are in process of investigation pass under the general agent's eye every morning, and those which require special consideration are made the subject of personal consultation between him and the agent in charge.

It not infrequently happens that the conditions of the case are such as to make the first step in the solution perfectly obvious. There is just one thing to be done. Such was a case assigned to me the very first morning I went to work. An officer of the Charlestown police station telephoned over that there was a boy of thirteen running the streets, whose mother was dead, and whose father had that morning been sent to the house of correction for ten days for drunkenness. I at once went over, and found that the boy's mother had died about six months previously of drink. The father had at one time been a hard drinker, but had reformed and up to the time of the mother's death had kept sober for three years. Soon after her death, however, he went wrong again, lost his position, drank up all his savings, even his clothes, and finally was sent to the "Island," as reported. There was an older brother who had a position as stenographer for the government. He had not lived at home for some time, and had sailed two or three days previously for Panama, and so could not be reached. The woman from whom the father rented rooms had been looking after the boy for some time, but could not afford to do it any longer. There was obviously just one thing to do. I got out a warrant and took the boy with me.

In other instances, it takes more investigation to find out the real state of the case, but when this has been definitely determined, the course to be pursued is equally plain. One of the veteran officers of the Charlestown police station reported a case of two children, a boy and girl of nine and seven years respectively, whose father had deserted, and whose mother was found drunk on the floor of their wretched tenement. On my first visit I found nobody at home. Inquiries among the neighbors elicited the information that the father, a hard-working, respectable man, had left home about three weeks before, utterly discouraged with his attempt to make the mother live a decent life, and had not been heard of since. On my next visit, I found the mother and the two children at home. The mother was a rather good-looking woman of about thirty. She informed me that everything was all right, that she knew where the father was, and expected to hear from him very soon. I made several other visits, and learned from neighbors that the

children were frequently found asleep on doorsteps at all times of night, and had been taken in and cared for, for days at a time, by the neighbors. One of them had repeatedly put the children to bed in her own rooms, while she washed their tattered clothes—the only ones they possessed. The police officers told of finding the mother rushing around the streets at midnight, clad in her night clothes, in a demented state. I made up my mind that something must be done at once, and went again to the house, only to find that mother and children had disappeared. This settled the matter. I traced them to East Boston and had the children brought before the court.

But in many cases the solution is by no means so simple. As stated previously, the fundamental principle of the society is to keep the family together if possible. All the resources of church, relatives, moral suasion, and even threats must be made use of before the final step is taken. In the majority of cases these efforts are successful. Sometimes, a single visit of the agent is sufficient to work a cure. I recall one case of the reported abuse of a thirteen-year-old girl by an apparently respectable family. I made one visit to the home, and was told by the mother, between sobs, that the only trouble was that she was too good to the child. The child was most disobedient, unruly, and complaining, and shrieked if her mother so much as combed her hair. I made subsequent inquiries in the neighborhood, and while I could not get any positive evidence against the parents, I was informed that since the time of my visit things had quieted down decidedly, and the case was dropped.

Very frequently, however, the agent has to make repeated and frequent visits to keep things going at all satisfactorily. What the family needs is some moral backing, some bracing-up from an outside source. These are perhaps the most satisfactory of all cases, from the agent's individual point of view—where by the force of his own personality he can get on terms of helpfulness with a family, and gradually bring them back to self-respect and decency. It is the work of months, perhaps of years. Some of the agents have cases which have been on their list ever since they began work with the society.

I was not with the society long enough to have any of my cases

develop in this way. Some of them were apparently started in this direction. One of them was the family of a young typesetter, a very capable fellow, who could earn eighteen to twenty dollars a week. They had had a good home but he had got in with a bad crowd and had taken to drinking heavily. Gradually they sank in the social scale, until when I found them they were living in a four-room tenement, one room of which they did not use. They had lost one set of furniture, and had just secured another poor and meager outfit on the instalment plan. There were no bed clothes, the house was filthy, and there was nothing to cook on, except a small, smoky oil stove. There were five children, ranging from nine years to nine months, the baby a puny, sickly little specimen of humanity. The mother was a rather incapable person, as is shown by the fact that one day when the baby was very sick, she fed him an ice-cream cone, all of which he ate. The father was happy-go-lucky and improvident, fond of good clothes and cigarettes. While the family was in this condition, he bought a twenty-dollar gold watch on the instalment plan. When I first undertook the case, the mother told me that her husband was doing better, working steadily, and they were getting along quite well. I made frequent visits to the home, and found no special improvement. I visited the father's employers, who told me that they had done all in their power to keep the young man straight, even keeping him a half-hour after closing time, and sending the foreman part way home with him, to keep him out of the clutches of a gang of wild fellows who were waiting for him; but all to no purpose. So things went on. It is one of the principles on which the society works that oftentimes things have to get worse before they can get better. Conditions did not seem sufficiently aggravated to warrant me in taking any decided steps, and I waited for them to get worse. They very speedily did.

One day the mother sent for me by telephone. I found that the father had quit his job and gone on a prolonged spree, and the family were at their wit's end. The baby was very sick, and the house was in an awful condition. I urged the mother to send the baby to a hospital and she promised to do so. A day or so later, I went down prepared to take some radical action, probably to

have the father arrested for non-support. I found him at home for the first time—it was, in fact, the first time I had seen him. He was just recovering from his debauch, and was in a most pitiable condition. He was shaking all over with weakness and nervous exhaustion, and threatened suicide and all manner of dire expedients. He was in a most repentant frame of mind, and promised to reform completely, if only I would not take his children away. I told him I had very slight expectation of taking the children away, but that I was of a very strong mind to send him up for non-support. He pleaded with me earnestly, and in spite of his condition, I could not help liking him. Finally, after a long and severe berating, I told him I would give him one more chance. He promised never to touch another drop of liquor as long as he lived, and to search faithfully for another position, and keep it. The next week was a hard one for him. He tramped the streets, looking for work. practically one whole day he spent looking for employment in Cambridge thinking that in a “dry” town there would be less temptation for him to go astray. He appealed for aid to the overseers of the poor, and they put him to work heaving barrels—the hardest two days’ work he ever did in his life, he told me—and paid him for it in provisions. Finally, he saw an advertisement at a printing establishment for a female typesetter. He went in and persuaded the foreman to give him a job, at several dollars less than he had been earning in his last position, but with the prospect of a raise if he did well. The last time I saw him, he had been working in this place about three weeks. He told me that he had not touched a drop, and that he was feeling better than he had for years. What has become of him since, I cannot even guess. It is one of the sad things about going into that sort of work temporarily, that after one has almost lived with a family for a few weeks, sharing their most intimate griefs and burdens, and becoming vitally interested in their welfare, he must cut loose from them, and drop them completely out of his life forever. This case was transferred to one of the women agents, who will do all that possibly could be done for the family, but they are a part of my daily concern no longer.

The society’s analysis recognizes eighteen different types of

cases, specified in the following way: physical cruelty, mother's intemperance, father's intemperance, mother's immorality, father's immorality, feeble-mindedness, physical neglect, moral neglect, non-support, assault, rape, incest, abandonment, child labor, truancy, illegal theater performance, guardianship, adoption. More than one of these conditions may be, and very frequently are, combined in one family. It is easy to see how involved and complicated the problem may be in many cases. The examples which have just been considered were those where it did not appear advisable to remove the children from their home environment. In many cases, however, that seems to be the only course to pursue. To do this, of course, a legal action is necessary. As already explained, the customary course of procedure is to get out a warrant for the child as a neglected child. This warrant is served by a regular police officer, and the child is arraigned before a regular judge, or in Boston before the judge of the juvenile court. The agent of the society appears as the complainant. A date is set for the hearing, and the child is put in the custody of whomever the judge sees fit. In or near Boston, if the child is a Catholic, he is usually put in the Home for Destitute Catholic Children, and if Protestant, left in charge of the S.P.C.C., who keep him in their temporary home. This is located in the office building of the society, occupying the upper floors and roof, and can accommodate about twenty children. It is not a permanent home, and children are kept here only while their cases are pending. A summons is issued to the parent or guardian of the child to appear at the trial, and notice is also sent to the State Board of Charity, whose representative is usually present. In a majority of cases, the parents have no lawyer, and then the judge gives a broad interpretation to the rules of evidence, allowing hearsay to be brought in and taking the agent's word for almost everything. But occasionally the parents bring in a lawyer, and then the trial has to proceed in the regular manner, with sworn witnesses on both sides, and greater formality.

This is the commonest type of court case with which the society deals. It usually rests on physical or moral neglect, or physical abuse of the child. But there is a variety of other sorts of cases

with which the agents of the society are concerned. Sometimes the conditions are such as to make it best to arraign the child as a wayward or stubborn child. I had one case of a boy who was an inveterate runaway, and whose home surroundings were such as to give no hope of correcting this tendency, on the part of his parents. He had to be sent to an industrial school. Again, the father is so neglectful of his family that it becomes a plain case of non-support. Then he is made the defendant, and the case is tried in the regular criminal court. One of the agents spends a large share of his time on non-support cases. The society has succeeded in several instances in getting extradition from other states for non-supporting and deserting husbands. One peculiar type is the "periodical deserter," who habitually abandons his family just before the birth of each new child. The society never takes children away when either of the parents is doing his or her best for their welfare.

Cases arising from the abuse of young girls have occupied a great deal of attention on the part of the society during the last two or three years. The report for 1909 says:

During the past year the society has undertaken an unusually large amount of work in the protection of young girls, and the prosecution of those who have inflicted unmentionable injuries upon them. The two women agents have devoted most of their time to this work. Through their efforts, eighty-six cases involving immoral conduct with young girls were brought to the attention of various courts of the commonwealth. These involved the most flagrant conduct imaginable on the part of a considerable number of men, fifty-three of whom were brought into court. Of this number only five were dismissed from the custody. Two women were also convicted as accessories. . . . The girls in question ranged in age from ten to seventeen, and by far the largest number of them were under fifteen. . . . This is an abuse against which our communities have not yet learned to protect their children adequately. No city or town of any considerable size is free from this corruption.

The problem of the mother with the illegitimate child is a very common one, and one of the most difficult and delicate to deal with. The law is such as to make it difficult to legally compel the actual father to assume a satisfactory responsibility for the child. But the society often succeeds in bringing this about by the force of its authority and influence. There are several solutions of this

problem, marriage, adoption of the child, finding work for the mother where she can have the child with her in a community where she is not known, etc. One of the most difficult points of decision comes when the welfare of the child must be balanced against that of the mother. Often, the child is the one tie which binds the mother to semi-respectability, the one barrier which blocks the easy descent into a life of complete depravity. To take such a child away is a serious step, while to leave it may be still more so.

But when a child has been taken from its parents, for whatever cause, the work is only partly done. The question still remains, What shall be done with it? It has been removed from one environment because it was believed to be unfit to train it for useful manhood or womanhood. Where shall be found a new set of surroundings which shall possess the required elements? With this part of the problem, the S.P.C.C. has but little to do directly. It almost never places out any children, but leaves that to some one of the other agencies. The majority of them are committed to the State Board of Charity, which through their Department of Minor Wards places them out in individual family homes, retaining jurisdiction of them until they are twenty-one. If they are Catholics, particularly in and around Boston, they are often turned over to one or another of the Catholic societies to be placed out, while the placing of Protestant children is occasionally intrusted to the Children's Aid Society, the Children's Mission, or some similar agency. Sometimes, as has been shown, a child has to be sent to an institution. It is rarely that the judge pronounces a final and irrevocable sentence of removal. Usually, a continuance is granted, giving the parents a chance to prove themselves worthy to have the children back. The S.P.C.C. keeps general oversight of all such cases. When not committed to the state board, the society never loses track of a child which has once been placed in its care until it is of age, though it never undertakes a new case when the child is over sixteen. Sometimes the Overseers of the Poor, or, in Boston, the Trustees for Children may be placed in charge.

The placing of a child in the custody of persons other than the parents is made a matter of no little ceremony and solemnity. All parties concerned in the transaction are brought before the judge,

who explains in simple but emphatic terms to the new custodian the responsibility he is assuming, impresses the child with the necessity of good conduct and obedience to the new authority, and makes it very plain to the parents that their only hope of getting the child back lies in establishing a home which shall meet those requirements of helpfulness and decency which the society establishes. The good results of such careful placing out are often striking. I was called on to play a minor part in a late chapter in one of the old cases of the society. The family was one of the most hopeless imaginable, and had utterly failed to respond to the efforts of the society, and the children had been removed. The oldest boy had secured a good position, and at the time I came into the case, he had got the promise of work in the same shop where he was, for his next youngest brother. He wished his brother to be dismissed from the institutional home in which he had been placed by court order, and to be put in his (the elder's) charge as guardian. My part was to investigate the shop in which the elder brother worked, and the home in which he lived, as well as his fitness to take charge of his younger brother. I found him one of the most attractive young men I ever met. It was almost impossible to believe that he had come out of the home surroundings which I knew had been his in early life.

Out of my summer's experiences and observations emerged a few reflections and generalizations, some of which may bear noting down: First, the very tender age at which children, under wrong conditions, become habituated to ways of vice and crime. I was present at the conviction of a charming little eight-year-old boy for larceny. At another time I represented the society at the transfer of a little girl from an institution to a private home. She had been in the former home a year, having been taken from a life of open shame on the streets. She was, at the time I saw her, eleven years of age. Such facts as these emphasize the need in every city of a juvenile court which shall be really a court and really juvenile. Another thing which is most striking is the love of parents for children which exists in the most degraded circumstances, even in conjunction with the most flagrant abuse and neglect. The threat of the removal of the children is the most powerful argument which

the agent can wield, and it seldom fails to elicit some sort of response. The devotion of wives to worthless husbands is a pathetically common thing. A husband may come home drunk every night, and shamefully abuse the wife who toils all day to earn the means for his support, and yet only in extremities will she fail to stand up for him and shield him in the presence of the agent.

I was, personally, impressed with the fortitude with which the majority of those with whom I dealt bore misfortunes and shames which would be absolutely crushing in other stations. It seems as if the poor and unfortunate became so calloused by the daily hardships, deprivation and griefs of life, that any great calamity has power to move them only moderately. Their emotions seem deadened, almost sodden. Perhaps it is a blessing for them that it is so, but it scarcely exonerates society for permitting conditions which breed such a state of mind.

The very limited requirements for a tolerable family relation are also most amazing. In a higher walk of life, if a husband should come home at night drunk and beat his wife, accusing her of the vilest sins in the calendar, and she should have him arrested and sent up for three months for assault and battery, we should not have much hope of the speedy re-establishment of harmonious relations in that particular family. But not so among the other half. After a few days, the wife becomes lonesome and relents. She secures the discharge of her husband, and life together is resumed on as much of a footing of mutual regard as existed before. Of course, this does not always happen, but it is far from uncommon.

One of the cheering things about the work is the spirit of neighborly helpfulness that exists among the submerged classes. It is almost always safe to count on the assistance of neighbors to keep an unfortunate family from acute distress, while the society is determining its course of action, or getting the machinery of relief in motion. One thing that impressed me, perhaps more than anything else, was the tremendous rôle played by drink and sexual immorality in the work of the society. As far as my own experience goes, it is safe to say that behind nine out of every ten cases of neglect and abuse of children lurks one or the other of these

grim specters—or both. As the old janitor of the society said: “If we could just do away with drink and vice, this society might just about as well close its doors.”

It remains finally to speak of the enormous amount of good that the society is doing. The mere existence of such an organization acts as a powerful check on the actions of passionate, reckless, or thoughtless parents. But much more important are the positive results which it accomplishes. I have already spoken of this, but it deserves emphasis. In conversation with the general agent, I spoke of the work as depressing. He admitted that it was at first, but observed that after one had been in the work longer, and could begin to see results, the aspect changed completely, and I could see that it was true. Things are usually just about as bad as they can be when the society takes hold, and any results achieved must be in the way of improvement. The possibilities of good in every child, however unfortunate his early surroundings, are the hope and the inspiration of the society.

REVIEWS

Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt. Von PAUL ROHRBACH. Düsseldorf und Leipzig: Karl Robert Langewiesche Verlag. Pp. 250.

Not to be familiar with the currents of opinion which books of this type represent is to miss one of the most active factors in present German life. What the actual quantity of this influence is, or what its ratio to all the other influences that form German public opinion, is in the nature of the case uncertain. The volume before us bears the legend "Thirty-first to fortieth thousand." As a curiosity it might deserve that sale, but probably its circulation depends chiefly upon people who were either convinced before, or are inclined to lend an ear to its argument. It apparently voices the views of the *Allgemeiner evangelisch-protestantischer Missionsverein*, and it certainly has the pulpit manner of the propagandist.

The book would belong in a museum of pathological exhibits, if there were not thousands of otherwise sane and intelligent Germans whose ideas on the manifest destiny of Germany, and the reason for it, are in a way reflected in its pages.

The substance of the book may be expressed in a few words: first, "the idea of the moral as an absolute quantity, indeed for our intelligence the only absolutely existing quantity, constitutes the aim and the norm of human progress"; second, " 'the German idea' is that we have been placed in the world in order to achieve and to preserve moral excellence not only for ourselves but for all humanity" (p. 6). The author does not explicitly say that the Germans alone are placed in the world for this purpose, nor that their type of moral excellence is superior to all others, but the whole argument of the book would be pointless if this were not the assumption suggested, and if the suggestion were not kept active from cover to cover. The outspoken reason for appeal to Germans to enlist in a campaign for German aggression, moral if that proves sufficient, but forcible if necessary, is that "Anglo-Saxendom has developed such numbers and strength that it bids fair to become the dominating power in civilization" (p. 7). Then the whole argument is a variation of the theme, "Anglo-Saxendom must be put under."

The preposterous character of the argument might not be demonstrable from this pretentiousness alone, but it certainly appears when this factor is seen presently in the light of the confession of national dis-

abilities which the author proceeds to unfold. Rohrbach is aware of no incongruity in repeating his slogan in spite of his testimony that England has developed a higher type of political morality than any other nation! (P. 112.) By judicious expurgation of the refrain "We must beat Anglo-Saxendom, England particularly," we might have left one of the most pitiless exposures of the moral weaknesses of the Germans that has ever been written. The author's state of mind seems to be naïvely childish in claiming moral superiority for the Germans simply because they are Germans, while he denies to them practically every important moral quality as a people, in distinction from moral qualities that are as individualistic as possible. No one can deny that the Germans are conspicuous for such virtues as patience, thrift, thoroughness, truthfulness, etc. On the other hand, everybody knows that the Germans have always been conspicuously lacking in the larger morality; that is in the constructive social virtues which have distinguished Englishmen. The author himself quotes (p. 108) Goethe's exclamation: "The German people, individually so respectable, collectively so miserable!" (Cf. p. 126.) It has taken the strong arm of the tyrant, the benevolent despot, the war lord, to make Germans act together. Rohrbach exhibits this in greater detail than foreigners would care to allege. In fact it would be necessary to change merely a few of the minor passages in the book to make it amount to this: "Behold how superior are the English, and how inferior the Germans in the ranges of social morals that make nations strong, yet we must down them because they are English and **we** are Germans."

For example, the absence of social morals among the Germans is bemoaned in such matters as these: political and religious dismemberment (pp. 10 f.; cf. p. 125), and the author unconsciously furnishes a typical exhibit of German provincialism by a petulant attack on Prussia (p. 15); the failures of German emigrants to spread the German idea (p. 16); the sin of German Catholicism in not being protestant (pp. 21-29); the absence of patriotism in the large and high sense, in contrast with stickling for petty interests (pp. 36 f.); the Social Democrats represent complete negation of "the German idea" (pp. 43 f.); absence of cosmopolitan ambitions (pp. 48 f.); incapacity of Germans to make voluntary sacrifices in the interest of the national idea (p. 56); the unpatriotic character of the wealthy classes in Germany (pp. 59 f.); the German educational system is a weak support for the national idea (pp. 97 f.); the dependence of Germans upon the bureaucracy (pp. 109 f.); increase of use of the law in favoritism toward the upper classes

(pp. 118 f.); Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany are alike in the service of the class idea (pp. 127 f.); the failures of the Germans in colonization (pp. 133 f.), etc.

The notable thing about this book is not its main contention. No one can mix much with the Germans on German soil without hearing the changes rung upon that theme in all possible keys. The diplomatic class alone elaborately disclaims such views, while the academic class expresses them rarely and with careful qualifications. Yet there is a considerable literature in the service of the idea that Germans must force their way to primacy in the world's affairs. The astonishing thing in this instance is the author's own refutation of his premises, with no loss of faith in his foregone conclusion. This is dangerous fanaticism, and particularly when it speaks in the name of religion, or even of ethics. The German army and navy are menaces to the world so long as there are Germans subject to the delusion that morality consists in being German instead of being moral.

ALBION W. SMALL

Sex Education. By IRA S. WILE. New York: Duffield & Co., 1912. Pp. 150. \$1.00.

Starting with the conviction that sexual education should be carried on in the home rather than in the school, Dr. Wile has explicitly the purpose of assisting parents to banish the difficulties and to suggest a program for developing a course of instruction. This explicit purpose is much hampered by the repeated intrusion of mere statements of the necessity of sexual education, and by the resulting paucity of details in regard to the course of instruction.

Childhood is regarded as divided into the age of mythology, the age of chivalry, and the age of civic awakening. By adapting the instruction to the characteristics of these periods, it is possible to build up a progressive system of teachings in regard to the sexual constitution, and of appeals for sexual purity. Dr. Wile gives only a cursory statement of these characteristics and of the items in the program for each period. The result is that the program, even as far as outlined, can be carried out only by parents who have a considerable knowledge of "child-study" and physiology, and for such parents his outline would not be of great value.

There is a final chapter on terminology of reproductive organs and a two-page bibliography of rather non-technical works in regard to sex.

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Religion Worth Having. By THOMAS NIXON CARVER. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. Cambridge: The Riverside Press. Pp. 140. \$1.00.

In view of "the new sectarianism," which says that one religion is as good as another provided its adherents live up to their ideals, the question is raised: "What is the best religion?" and the author answers: "that is the best religion which (1) acts most powerfully as a spur to energy, and (2) directs that energy most productively" (p. 13). He thinks that modern Christianity has lost its primitive motive power, and the problem of religion today is that of restoring its original potency as a motive force in combination with its modern intelligent though feeble endeavors (p. 15). There are two conflicting philosophies of life confronting us in the problem: (1) the *pig-trough* philosophy whose chief aim is enjoyment; and (2) the *workbench* philosophy whose chief aim is productive achievement.

Religion is a means, not an end, and hence that is *the* religion worth having which spurs men to economic achievement rather than enjoyment.

The underlying philosophy of the author with respect to life is that of struggle, and the "let-alone" attitude toward all economic competition (p. 54). He seems to have little sympathy with the "Progressives" in politics (pp. 57-58). He has little sympathy with socialists (p. 61), and he seems to discount to some extent the sociologists, whom he mentions as "certain half-baked moralists, of the sociological type, etc." (p. 78).

He defines the kingdom of God as "a kingdom of productive power at work" (p. 126), and from this idea he develops the notion of a fellowship to come which he describes as "the fellowship of the productive life," and he adds: "If the Christian fellowship becomes a fellowship for the promotion of the productive life, then Christians will become more productive farmers, mechanics, and business and professional men than non-Christians. If that result should be achieved, Christians will eventually own the farms, fill the shops and the offices, and direct the business affairs of the world. If that should happen, this will be a Christian world, otherwise it will not" (p. 127).

It would seem, therefore, that the religion worth having is that religion which embodies the "workbench philosophy" and by so doing inherits the earth—but there are those who will insist that it must be a philosophy in harmony with the workbench philosophy of the Carpenter of Nazareth.

The author insists upon a more rational interpretation of the economic teachings of Jesus and in this regard the book is a real contribution to the newer religious literature well worth having.

EDWIN L. EARP

DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
MADISON, N.J.

Co-operation and Nationality. By GEORGE W. RUSSELL. Dublin: Maunsel & Co. Ltd., 1912. Pp. 104. 1s.

The subtitle of this little booklet is "A Guide for Rural Reformers from This to the Next Generation." Its aim and purpose are to set forth the problem of rural life in Ireland, to show how the conditions of that life have come to be what they are, and to point out the need of two things: first, agricultural co-operation; and second, the establishment of social institutions that shall make life worth while in the rural districts of Ireland, or in his words, "a change in business and technical methods, and a change in social temper." The author sets forth with characteristic Irish enthusiasm the benefits which he believes will follow from these changes. He declares that home rule has little significance as compared with these changes in the rural life of Ireland. The author evidently is actuated by a high and noble patriotism and makes suggestions which, if followed out, would lay the foundations of a more prosperous and happy Ireland.

The suggestions which he makes are not without timeliness for America. We are by no means in as sad a condition in America with respect to the rural economy as they are in Ireland. Nevertheless, there are phases of the American rural life which deserve careful attention. The co-operative movement among the farmers has begun in a small way. Doubtless it will proceed as rapidly as the farmers come to see the economic advantages of it, and as they are able to work out the details of a plan that is satisfactory.

On the other hand, what the author has to say about social life in the rural community applies to the rural communities of America. One of the crying needs of our rural communities is a more active social life. The reading of this little book by every farmer in the country and every rural economist would be very suggestive and helpful.

J. L. GILLIN

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

La réglementation de travail des femmes et des enfants aux États-Unis.

By A. CHABOSEAU. Paris: M. Giard et E. Brière. Pp. 206.

Fr. 2.50.

This volume, one of the series of the Bibliothèque du Musée Social, is somewhat novel in that it shows the progress which has been made in recent years in securing better conditions for women and children rather than describes the evils which exist. In fact, its object, as the author states in the preface, is to show what has been accomplished in the United States to protect the physical and moral health of women and children in order to arouse the admiration of the French people so that they will be led to "imitate." Amid all the discouragements which beset those who are working at these problems in the United States, it cannot but be helpful to find that the impression made on a foreigner in one of rapid achievement.

Legislation which has been passed concerning child labor, school attendance, working-hours, night work, safety, apprenticeship, and similar topics is given both chronologically and by states with remarkable accuracy. While the immediate purpose of the study is to serve the French as an aid to solving their own problems along these lines, it will also aid in giving a general survey of the field to those in this country who sometimes feel the need both of perspective and of encouragement.

MARION TALBOT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Child Labor in City Streets. By EDWARD N. CLOPPER. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. ix+280. \$1.25.

This book canvasses the problem of the street-working child as distinct from that of the child employed in regulated industries. It indicates the extent and injuriousness of street trades in America and Europe, reviews the various forms of street trade, and presents the methods being used for the amelioration of the evil. The treatment is thoroughgoing and, together with the bibliography, appendices, and index, furnishes a handbook of exceptional value. All who work in the field of child protection and welfare will recognize this production as a classic and an invaluable aid.

ALLAN HOBEN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Reconstruction of Economic Theory. By SIMON N. PATTEN. Supplement to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. November, 1912. Pp. 99.

Whenever Professor Patten has anything to say he is sure of a hearing and it is always worth while to listen, although the resultant is often tangent to the apparent direction in which the force is applied. In this case his method of "reconstruction" is the passing of a rhetorical cyclone over certain patches of experience; then having beclouded every landmark in the landscape, he occupies several chapters with pure economic theory which must be judged by itself, and he ends with an epilogue which has no necessary connection with anything that precedes. This is dramatic but inconclusive.

The book would have gained in dignity if it had begun with chap. vii, "The Failure of Theories of Distribution." Five quasi-historical chapters however, are prefixed. In these sections Professor Patten certainly does not appear at his best. They consist, not of careful analyses of the actual thought processes which are disposed of in rapid generalizations, but of a series of sparkling kaleidoscopic radiations from a few fragments of economic history. The major feature of this retrospect is disparagement of German economists. This is much like an oceanography that should begin by maligning the icebergs or the Gulf Stream. Waiving the logic of it, if one is to slander the icebergs or the Gulf Stream or the Germans, it is a pity not to pick one's imputations with reasonable care. On p. 14 Professor Patten implies that German economic theory is what it is from sheer jealousy of England. Even if in our opinion it is merely a case of giving the devil his due, everyone who is acquainted at first hand with the growth of social science theories in Germany knows that at the very least German scholars have on the whole compared rather favorably in candid objectivity with the scholars of any other nation. The eighteenth-century literature of social science in Germany is thick with evidences that the Germans were not only willing but anxious to learn of the English. No modern scholars have made more strenuous efforts to assimilate alien doctrine than the Germans to naturalize English "liberalism" from 1823 to 1870. The reason why the Germans rejected English classicism was, not that it was English, but that it was crude. Even after the Germans had weighed English economic theory for a half-century, and found it wanting, the very scholars who declared that theory impossible were quick to advise their countrymen of superiorities in English industrial practice. Everyone who has studied the publications of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* knows that a large part of

the material for argument in favor of improved labor legislation in Germany was drawn from descriptions of the better ways in which those things had been done in England. To make jealousy of England the explanation of the Germans' refusal to halt their economics with the Cobden Club, is as perverse as it would be to bring a like charge against all modern nations for not stopping their chemistry with Lavoisier or their biology with Lamarck.

I am so far from denying the existence of German chauvinism, that I have no patience with those quietists who think the United States can safely neglect its navy while that type of megalomania persists; but to imply that this disorder has affected German scholars more than others is unworthy of Professor Patten's knowledge and judgment. He seems to have felt, however, that due penance for the confessed (p. 1) indiscretion of excessive appreciation of the Germans in his youth would be correspondingly excessive depreciation of them in his maturity. He returns to the charge on p. 32 with the assertions: "German thought is intensely national and has as its basis the concept of the superiority of the German race. Accepting these two premises, good history is German history. Everything that does not incorporate itself into German thought is bad doctrine. * * * * * Such an attitude it would have been impossible to introduce into England because the English did not have a like concept of their national continuity and superiority." This is the same sort of irresponsible banality which is illustrated by a German book noticed on another page (p. 574). The author is an authentic exhibit of the sort of thing which Professor Patten generalizes as the decisive characteristic of the Germans. At the same time, he and Professor Patten together compose an exhibit of the ease with which one prepossession may contradict another. One of the German writer's most serviceable premises is that the English are notorious for that very national attitude which in the last sentence Professor Patten declares it would have been impossible for them to acquire! In both cases the type of generalization is beneath the level of scientific discussion.

Incidental to his sweeping of German theory out of consideration is Professor Patten's evident opinion that an important prerequisite to economic reconstruction is persistence in that snobbery toward Karl Marx which has been good form for a generation. His justification for this particular smugness is in repeated hints at the same sort of reasoning which has so often satisfied itself that there was no originality in Shakespere. (By the way, one of Professor Patten's poetic licenses would permit him to say that I have now called Marx the Shakespere

of social science.) I have not the slightest desire to make the question, What think ye of Karl Marx? a criterion of economic competence. It is certainly to be regretted, however, that any scholar who forms an appraisal of Marx should do so in an unhistoric spirit. Even the most conservative scholarship in Germany has advanced beyond treatment of Marx as a scientific pariah. That is proved by the expansion of Dr. Plenge's *Antrittsvorlesung* at Leipzig in 1910 (published under the title, *Marx und Hegel*). It is unfortunate that an eminent American scholar feels that he is doing himself justice in maintaining a contemptuous tone toward the Marxian factor in the modern social awakening.

For essentially similar reasons the estimate of Mill is no more adequate than that of Marx. I had to stop more than once for the query whether Professor Patten was not thinking of the father rather than the son. To propose as a historical interpretation of a personality as detached as Kant, for instance, a rendering which made him merely an abstraction among abstractions, instead of one among many co-workers upon the human problems of his time, would hardly have escaped criticism a generation ago. A version of John Stuart Mill in terms no more elementary than the preference of the English public for logical concepts (p. 33), is today too improbable to pass without protest.

In the portion of the essay to which the title properly applies there is much which deserves, and in time must receive, serious consideration. It covers too wide a range to be indicated in a few words. If I correctly understand Professor Patten on p. 30, however, he regards the problem of economic reconstruction as a fight to a finish "between sociological and economic premises." I venture to confess the contrary opinion. The alleged antithesis between economics and sociology is purely factitious. In my judgment the only reconstruction in economic theory which will turn out to be in the line of permanent progress, will be a triumph of economic and sociological co-operation.

As already intimated, the only visible connection between the last two chapters and the earlier parts of the monograph is mechanical. Nevertheless, these chapters contain a flash of Professor Patten's real genius. The following passage (p. 92) contains an important contribution to sociological analysis.

In former descriptions of progress, I divided it into two parts, a pain economy, in which fear and suffering drive man to his daily tasks, and a pleasure economy, in which the motive of action is the pleasure derived from the goods enjoyed. I now regard this division as defective. To love pleasure is a higher manifestation of life than to fear pain; but the pleasure of action is in advance of the pleasure of consumption.

Action creates what pleasure uses up. This would divide progress into three stages: a pain economy, a pleasure economy, and a creative economy. Each stage has its own mode of thought, and its own social institutions. To visualize the elements of these stages, I have put them in the following table:

Stage of Progress	Form of Struggle	Form of Control	Character of the Social Bonds
1. A pain economy	Race struggle	Ancestral control	Blood bonds
2. A pleasure economy	Class struggle	Wealth control	Interest bonds
3. A creative economy	Self direction	Character control	Social beliefs
Type of Thought	Thought Limitations	Kind of Philosophy	Type of Morality
1. Theological	Substance	Anthropomorphic	Traditional
2. Rational	Space	Material	Utilitarian
3. Pragmatic	Time	Ideal	Telic

We may forgive much in a thinker who frequently returns from his wanderings with trophies like this.

ALBION W. SMALL

Financial History of Ohio. By E. L. BOGART. Urbana, Ill. University of Illinois Press, 1912. \$1.80.

In this volume, Professor Bogart has made an important contribution to the literature on public finance in the United States. The work is based largely on Ohio legislative and executive documents and thus presents to the student a very useful array of material from original sources hitherto unused except in a very brief history of taxation of Ohio, by Judge Nelson W. Evans. The work covers the entire period of Ohio's history as a territory and as a state up until the close of 1911. It is unfortunate that the work closes without presenting the results of the recent constitutional convention and the provisions of the new constitution which form a very important part of recent taxation history in Ohio.

The volume is about equally divided into two parts, the first dealing with the history of financial legislation and administration and the second treating the history of taxation in Ohio. Such a division has involved many repetitions which might possibly have been avoided by some other arrangement of material. For example, much of the material on the economic development of Ohio given in the first chapter could have been placed more appropriately in the chapters on railroads and banking.

The most important chapters in the first division are those on the budget and budgetary practice. The tables of receipts and expenditures

on pp. 118-21 covering the entire history of Ohio will be of great value to the student of local taxation. The chapters on the history of taxation of railways and banks are of interest and full of suggestion. Professor Bogart seems to agree with Judge N. W. Evans that "the law for the taxation of banks is as near perfect as can be made."

The student of taxation will find the most important material in the chapter on the general property tax. This chapter is an excellent and suggestive account of the working of the general property tax in Ohio. The evolution of the tax is described in detail and an account given of the attempts during the last twenty or thirty years to enforce such taxation acts as have been passed in conformity to the principle of uniformity. Professor Bogart concludes his study by saying: "Whatever the future may hold in store, the student of taxation in Ohio cannot conclude this general survey of taxation without having his conviction of the inequity of the general property tax deepened." This conclusion presents an interesting contrast to the statements contained in a paper read at the Des Moines conference of the National Tax Association by the chairman of the Ohio Tax Commission, who declared that the general property tax, although not scientific was nevertheless just, had always worked well, and was now satisfactory to the people of Ohio. Professor Bogart further concludes that "the general property tax has begun to disintegrate and we may confidently expect to see developed an improved system." The vote of the people of Ohio two years ago on the question of changing the constitution so as to provide for the classification of property for taxation seems to bear out this statement, for the proposition would have carried if the majority of those voting at the special election had been considered a sufficient majority, but the law required a majority of those voting at the previous gubernatorial election.

Professor Bogart had a great deal of faith in the work of the constitutional convention for he says (p. 250): "When it [the convention] meets, there is little doubt but that the provisions of the constitution relating to taxation and finance will be carefully revised and that the rule of uniformity in taxation will be changed." Unfortunately the constitution was not revised in this particular, and so afraid were the friends of the old order that the people might use the new initiative and referendum to change the rule of uniformity that they placed in the section providing for the initiative and referendum a clause prohibiting the people from initiating any law which would change the present system.

Among the reforms in taxation in Ohio noted by Professor Bogart

are: the use of the general property tax in obtaining revenue for the local jurisdictions alone, thus bringing about the practical separation of state and local revenues; the appointment of a permanent tax commission; the more frequent valuation of real property; and the listing of property at its full value. Another reform alluded to by Professor Bogart has been abolished by the recent vote on the new constitutional amendments, namely, the exemption of state and municipal bonds from taxation. The new constitution once more provides for their listing and taxation.

EDWIN S. TODD

MIAMI UNIVERSITY
OXFORD, OHIO

Social Value. A Study in Economic Theory, Critical and Constructive. By B. M. ANDERSON, JR., PH.D., Instructor in Political Economy in Columbia University. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911. Pp. xviii+204. \$1.00 net.

This is the one indispensable book for those who are teaching courses in both theoretical economics and theoretical sociology. One is indeed tempted to say that it is an indispensable book for both sociologists and economists who wish an outlook upon each other's respective fields, for it bases economic theory squarely upon the intermental life of men in society, that is, upon sociology. From the standpoint of the sociologist, therefore, it is not too much to say that Dr. Anderson's work in economic theory is epoch-making. To be sure, a great number of economic writers have been of recent years gradually coming to the sociological point of view, but, so far as the reviewer knows, this is the first work which avowedly bases economic theory upon the soundest and most recent developments in sociological theory. The author, unlike many writers in economics, shows extensive mastery of the recent literature in sociology and psychology.

The work as a whole is a scholarly piece of psychological and sociological analysis. It would seem to leave but little for the individualistic value theorists in economics to stand upon. The implications of the essay are, however, far wider than the purely economic field, for incidentally the book treats of legal, political, and ethical values as well as of economic value, and it demonstrates quite conclusively that all of these values are products, not simply of individual feeling, as the individualists would have us believe, but of the whole intermental life of men in society. Dr. Anderson's essay, therefore, not only offers a

sound sociological foundation for the science of economics but, by implication, also for ethics, jurisprudence, and politics in so far as those sciences deal with values.

The book is therefore of great use to the sociological theorist as well as to the economic theorist. The sociologist will in addition be particularly interested to see how Dr. Anderson develops, from his own standpoint, the criticisms which advanced sociological thinkers have been making of economics during the past dozen years. There is scarcely a sane criticism of economic theory offered by leading sociological thinkers which Dr. Anderson does not repeat and with telling effect, because the criticism is developed by him as an independent economic thinker in his own search after a sound theory of economic value.

The argument of the book is also based upon the soundest and most recent developments in psychological theory. The point of view is functional throughout. Feeling is recognized only as one element in value and that a purely individualistic one. Value must be understood not so much in terms of feelings as in terms of function and the function of value is to motivate the activities of individuals of society. Values which motivate the activities of masses of individuals or of groups are, therefore, the product of the intermental life of individuals. The motivation of the economic activities of society is something super-individual and that something is social economic value. While there is no such thing as social utility, there is, therefore, such a thing as social values in the economic sphere as well as in the legal and ethical sphere.

In the opinion of the reviewer, it is to be regretted that Dr. Anderson did not dispense entirely with the use of such terms as "social mind" and "social organism." They are not at all necessary to his argument and they are continually misunderstood by workers outside the sociological realm as something mystical. The psychological theory of society is by no means the same as the organic theory and the retention of such terms in psychological interpretations of our social life tends perhaps to confuse some. Since Dr. Anderson's argument is entirely in psychological terms, it would seem to have been unnecessary to have retained any terms which suggest the organic analogy.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Rousseau et socialisme.—There are coexisting in the writings of Rousseau at various moments two opposing tendencies; one is a great confidence in the law of tomorrow, which will be the work of a state in conformity with the general will and rebuilt by the social contract; the other is a great defiance of the law of yesterday, which is the work of an interested minority of privileged characters. These same opposing tendencies are found in the minds of socialists today; it is significant that to explain the application of the Hegelian dialectics to the development of property Engels draws his examples from Rousseau's *Discours*. The chief difference between Rousseau and the socialists is that the main factor in socialistic thinking and action is the member of the industrial group, while Rousseau's thinking is done in terms of the small farmer and peasant. Rousseau hated machinery and the whole industrial revolution, and city life was absolutely distasteful to him.—C. Bouglé, *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, May, 1912. M. S. H.

Les idées politiques de Rousseau.—The political ideas of Rousseau are generally misunderstood and interpreted as a sort of atomism and return to nature. Rousseau very clearly brings out that it is not a return to a primitive state, constructed fictitiously, but a state of society in which the inequalities of conventions and of morals are adapted to the inequalities of nature. It is true that Rousseau admits that man is lost in the world of social values, which he treats as artificial, although genetically necessary. But he attempts also to justify these social values on the ground that in the social obligations of man, and nowhere else, are realized his liberty and equality. This amounts to an Aristotelian conclusion, and was stated clearly by Burlamaqui, one of the disciples of Rousseau, when he said that "the civil state is of all states the most perfect and the truly natural state of man." Rousseau, however, was more concerned with detecting the faults of the civil state in the form in which it presented itself to him in his day and for that reason the critical aspect of his political philosophy has been unduly overstated.—Bernard Bosanquet, *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, May, 1912. M. S. H.

Rudolf von Ihering und die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft.—In view of the controversy concerning penal law, and its influence on legislation, and in view of Ihering's influence on German jurisprudence, a critical analysis of his philosophy is timely. To synthesize Ihering's philosophic system of jurisprudence it is necessary to treat of (1) the jurist's place in the development of jurisprudence, (2) the essence of subjective law, (3) the limits to the efficacy of legal restraint, (4) the methodology of the science, (5) the positivistic character of Ihering's system, (6) its influence on the philosophy of law, (7) an analysis of Ihering's chief works, *Der Geist des römischen Rechts*, and *Der Zweck im Recht*, (8) a criticism of his teleological principle, and (9) his relation to the new sociological school regarding penal jurisprudence. Ihering is a follower of the historical school but transcends that method by the adoption of the historical rationalistic method. His standpoint is the *staatssozialistische*, for he attempts to reconcile and unite individualism and collectivism. His philosophy shows the influence especially of Hegel and Marx.—Dr. E. Hurwicz, *Abhandlungen des kriminalistischen Seminars an der Universität Berlin*, N. F., 6. Band, 4. Heft, 1911. Y. S.

Der Nationalismus und seine Wurzeln.—The roots of a dominant nationalistic consciousness are found in the formation of the modern state with its social and economic organization. Before the nationalistic spirit could arise, it was necessary for political, economic, and social life to assume their modern forms; it was necessary, further, that individuality should be discovered in a man by his fellow-men as the condition of the recognition of individuality in the state. Nationalism is originally

but the dawning consciousness on the part of the citizens of a state that they form a community in every sphere of life. It is a democratic movement, impossible under absolutism. It represents that particular epoch in the history of mankind at which nearly all developmental lines center in the state. It is not the goal of development, but a step, a transition-point in the great process of human evolution. The accomplishment of its particular historic tasks removes it from the stage of history.—Waldemar Mitscherlich, *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung*, XXXVI, No. 3. P. W.

Die phaseologische Methode in der Soziologie.—Since Comte the function of science has been stated to be foresight, but sociology has not yet made definite attempts to foresee, with the exception of Marx's historical materialism. A method by which such foresight might be acquired is the study of the transition of one stage of culture into another, with the object of determining the direction and the laws of evolution, and of projecting the line of evolution into the future. Such a method would systematize historical materials, would make it sociological and would be of value in determining future movements, not in a fatalistic way, but in such a way as to give information about desirable lines of activity.—F. Müller-Lyer, *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*, Heft II, 1912. E. H. S.

Prejudice, Education, and Religion.—Prejudice means the inability or refusal to consider anything from more than one of several possible points of view. There are generic and racial prejudices, geographical, political, and economic ones, and personal prejudices. Each prejudice has at some time served a useful function. Harmful prejudice is located in deficiency or excess, in lack of mental and moral balance. It is the function of religion and education to rid us of our secondary prejudices and so to control the primary and more fundamental ones that no evil consequences will come of them.—Josiah Morse, *Journal of Religious Psychology*, July, 1912. S. A. Q.

La réalité sociale.—The social reality is the social bond, which is psychic in nature and is realized in the consciousness of the individuals, while at the same time it extends beyond that consciousness in content and duration. From the socio-sophic point of view it is the social mind, from the historical point of view it is civilization. Civilization is the sum of the values produced by man, and it is this sum of values which forms the social bonds and consequently the social reality.—W. M. Kozłowski, *Revue philosophique*, June, 1912. E. H. S.

La formation de l'élite dans la société moderne.—Since the industrial revolution societies have become exceeding complex and interdependent, and more real social qualities have been required. This concerted action has presupposed direction by a large, varied, and supple class, educated for the purpose of direction. This class has developed somewhat haphazardly in agriculture, industry, and commerce. It is necessary to know more definitely the functions of this élite, the qualities demanded of them, and the kind of training needed to produce these qualities. Some knowledge of this kind has been secured.—Paul de Rousiers, *La science sociale*, October, 1912, pp. 76. E. H. S.

Erkenntniskritik und Staatswissenschaft.—Historical thinking is subject to the general law of thought that keeps it under the influence of its time. The objectivity of the historical method is an illusion. Social science can never reach the unconditional certainty, the independent position above its object, which the mathematical sciences have. In the social world, however, we can understand causal relationships immediately, for their cause operates as purpose. Political science can attain to a one-to-one relationship with the life it aims to grasp intellectually, because it grows up out of that life; but the consequence and the very condition of its capacity to gain a full truth-content is the perishable character of the science in each of its historic manifestations. The thought that pretends to be the intellectual expression of a law of life must be subject to the same law of evolution which life itself obeys. There can be no generally valid science of state and law, but only historic ideas concerning them. Every attempt to comprehend historic life in a single formula or in a single law of economic development founders on the rocks of a multiform and refractory historic reality.—Georg Jaeger, *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, XXXVI, No. 3. P. W.

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601.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XVIII

MARCH 1913

NUMBER 5

THE NEED OF SOCIAL STATISTICS AS AN AID TO THE COURTS¹

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Of recent years and especially of recent months public opinion and political parties have been aroused, as they have not since the Dred Scot case, over certain judicial decisions and their relation to the public welfare. One outside both of politics and of law might think it prudent to be silent on this subject. But on a matter of such moment every phase of opinion is entitled to a hearing, and we may have faith that "in the multitude of counsellors there is safety." Among that multitude I have heard none claiming to speak for the statistician. Believing as I do that this small but growing group has a point of view which deserves attention, I shall venture this afternoon to present and defend their position, as I conceive it.

What I have to say may be introduced with a quotation from a distinguished jurist who, in part, it may be, because of his work as a student in natural science and later his teaching of law at three great universities, has a broader outlook and more familiarity with related fields of thought than is likely to be the lot of the lawyer or judge immersed in the routine duties of an exacting profession. Professor Pound in closing a recent series of suggestive articles

¹ Presidential address, American Statistical Association, in joint session with the American Sociological Society.

in the *Harvard Law Review* says: "Not a little of the world-wide discontent with our present legal order is due to modes of juristic thought and juridical method which result from want of 'team-work' between jurisprudence and the other social sciences."

The "juridical method" is primarily deductive, deriving conclusions from the principles of the law applicable to the case at bar. Philosophical jurisprudence subjects those principles to a critical analysis, discovers the large empirical element they contain, and by showing how they alter with growing experience and with changes in the implicit political or social presuppositions upon which they are built undermines that almost religious faith in their permanent social value common among lawyers and judges. But even philosophical jurisprudence, like a great part of economics and of sociology as exemplified by my distinguished colleague this afternoon, devotes much time to the definition, elucidation, and criticism of terms and conceptions and to deduction from principles—intellectual processes in which the lawyer and the judge are already trained.

If the lawyer should turn to economic history and statistics, which are perhaps the most inductive branches of social science, he would find a change in method sharply marked. The contrast between the mental characteristics exercised, on the one hand, in stating legal principles neatly and clearly and applying them convincingly to a given or assumed state of facts, and those exercised, on the other hand, in the patient investigation of the facts as they have been and are is of the widest. For this reason an intelligent and sympathetic comprehension of the methods of ascertaining social fact would be of the first value to a judge as supplementing the somewhat excessively deductive training he usually obtains from his profession.

It may be said in reply that the facts are given to the appellate court, that in previous trials they have been admitted or established and that all the judge has to do is to apply his principles. But this statement I am compelled to challenge. The very contrary is often the truth. In the great majority of decisions belonging to the class in dispute the court has by implication, if not by direct statement, passed upon questions of fact so important that if they

had been differently viewed the verdict also would have been other than it was. In other words, my main contention is that many, perhaps most, of the court decisions which have aroused dissatisfaction and criticism have turned on questions of social fact, and fact often imperfectly apprehended or established.

In order to avoid controverted matter at the start, I will draw my first illustration from a decision neither made by a court nor arousing any considerable dissatisfaction, that rendered by the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission of 1902-3.

One claim made before that Commission by the union mine workers, the only one with which I am now concerned, was for an increase of 20 per cent in their wages. For this claim the following reason, among others, was assigned: "The rate of wages in the anthracite coal fields is insufficient to compensate the mine workers in view of the dangerous character of the occupation in relation to accidents, the liability to serious and permanent disease, the high death rate, and the short trade life incident to this employment." The Commission found and reported that anthracite coal mining "should be classed as one of the dangerous industries of the country, ranking with several of the most dangerous."

No evidence was introduced and I believe no important evidence could then or can now be found regarding the comparative liability of American anthracite coal miners "to serious and permanent disease, a high death rate, and a short trade life," and yet these points seem to go to the essence of the miners' claim. In determining the total death rate and the length of trade life accidents are usually a minor factor. In the eyes of the public and probably in those of the miners they bulk much larger than the facts, if known, would warrant.

To show this, let me turn to some foreign statistics, not assuming that they would hold true for Pennsylvania, but believing they point to a line of evidence which we sorely need for this country. Let us suppose a demand for a 20 per cent increase of coal miners' wages had been made in England, supported by similar claims, and examine the evidence there available to aid in its solution. During the years 1900-2 figures were carefully gathered showing the death rates from accidents and other causes among nearly half a

million coal miners. The figures show that fatal accidents were more than twice as common among coal miners as among all occupied and retired males of like age. Thus, if an inference from England to Pennsylvania were allowable, the finding of the Commission that anthracite coal mining is "one of the dangerous industries"—already well supported by Pennsylvania figures—seems confirmed. But looking to the death rate from all causes, a much more significant evidence of the length of trade life, the death rate of English coal miners at ages twenty-five to sixty-four was between 11 and 12 per cent below the average for all working males. Why does coal mining, at least in England, notwithstanding the frequency of fatal accidents, seem to be a healthy occupation? Because the very high mortality from accidents is more than neutralized by the low mortality from certain forms of disease, notably consumption. How far these results would apply to anthracite coal miners in Pennsylvania no one can tell.

The second case of which I wish to speak is the well-known bake-shop case.¹ The New York law under discussion was one of the earliest American statutes restricting the hours of men's labor. The work of bakers was limited to 10 hours a day or 60 a week and the statute, although a part of the labor law, was defended and justified as protecting the health of the consumers of bread, or of the bakers themselves. Nineteen judges passed upon the statute, ten thinking it constitutional and nine unconstitutional; but, as five of the nine were members of the United States Supreme Court, the last and binding decision was adverse.

From the numerous opinions in the case it is possible to derive this general conclusion. If the occupation of a baker as then followed in the bake-shops of cities in New York was so harmful to those engaged in it or through its products was so injurious or menacing to the general health as to invite special legislation, then the statute was an admissible exercise of the police power. But if neither of these conditions was met, the statute was unconstitutional. Thus Judge Parker of the Court of Appeals wrote: "The published medical opinions and vital statistics . . . fully justify the section under review as one to protect the health of the

¹ *People v. Lochner*, 177 N.Y. 145 and 198 U.S. 45.

employees"; and Justice Vann, defending the same conclusion, wrote: "I do not think the regulation in question can be sustained unless we are able to say from common knowledge that working in a bakery is an unhealthy employment." On the other hand, Justice Bartlett of the same court admitted that the state might regulate the hours of labor in any vocation pursued at the risk of health, but expressed his belief "that the occupation of a baker did not fall within that class," and so voted against the validity of the statute; and Justice Peckham of the United States Supreme Court in writing the prevailing opinion said: "There can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker in and of itself is not an unhealthy one to that degree which would authorize the legislature to pass such a statute." Other justices, like Harlan and Holmes, upheld the statute on the ground that whether the occupation was healthy or unhealthy was a question of fact upon which the court should accept the opinion of the legislature implied in the passage of the law. On the whole, a study of the opinions warrants a belief that the law would have been held constitutional by every one of the judges if either of the following conditions had been met: if the judge had accepted the opinion of the legislature affirming the unhealthy character of the baker's occupation as conclusive; or if, on independently reviewing the evidence offered in support of that conclusion, he had found it convincing.

This decision thus turned on a question of fact. Upon that question the evidence cited by the judges consisted in a series of opinions from medical writers and vague references to vital statistics. Mulhall's *Dictionary of Statistics*, that *bête noire* of careful statisticians, was cited four times. I doubt that any member of this Association would hold that the evidence mentioned in the numerous opinions of the judges warranted a confident answer, either affirmative or negative, to the question. Was the occupation of a baker in the cities of New York State a very unhealthy one?

If a similar question had arisen in England the answer to it would have been clear and probably convincing. The death rate of bakers twenty-five to sixty-four years of age in 1891 and in 1901 was to the death rate of all males at the same ages as 92 is to 100;

in other words, the occupation was somewhat healthier than the average. During the decade 1890-1900 the death rate of bakers fell, the improvement being greatest in the case of consumption and diseases of the respiratory system. Whether similarly a low death rate and rapid improvement in the health of bakers in this country or in New York State would appear, if the facts were known, no one can safely assert. The even division of the judges arose largely from the circumstances that most of them felt bound to reach a conclusion of fact when the evidence was inconclusive and about equally balanced.

The third and last case of which I wish to speak is the one in which the New York Court of Appeals last year unanimously held the Workman's Compensation Act of 1910 unconstitutional.¹

The statute was based upon a classification of occupations under which eight especially dangerous kinds of employment were selected for protection by a new system of compensation in case of accident. To this classification no serious objection was raised by the court. The central question decided in this case, as in the bake-shop case, was that the statute was not a legitimate exercise of the police power, that is, "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."² On this point the court said that the statute "does nothing to conserve the health, safety, or morals of the employees," and, elsewhere, that it "contains not a single provision which can be said to make for the safety, health, or morals of the employees." From the context of these passages we may infer that if the court had taken a different view, if it had believed that the statute did make for the safety or health of the employees, it would have decided that the statute was a valid exercise of the police power and constitutional.

Now the striking thing about these positions of the court, like those in the other two cases, is that they are not conclusions of law but statements of fact. As such it requires no special training in the law to examine them.

¹ *Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.*, 201 N.Y. 271.

² Freund, *Police Power*, p. iii.

The United States is believed to have an extremely high accident rate, but our statistics to confirm or correct the opinion are meager, if not inconclusive. One of the main purposes of the law declared unconstitutional was to lower that accident rate in those industries as well as to assure compensation. The court seems to assume without giving its reasons that this purpose would not be realized. The general testimony of students of accident statistics in foreign countries where legislation aiming at the same end has for years been in force is to the effect that the proportion of accidents to one thousand employees has increased, that the proportion of serious accidents to one thousand employees has been stationary or has decreased but that this decrease, if it existed, has been offset or more than offset by the apparent increase of minor accidents. Thus an examination by Dr. H. J. Harris of the accident statistics of Germany, Austria, and Great Britain, published in the proceedings of our Association for last March, concludes that "the progress in the movement for reducing the risk of industry has resulted in distinctly reducing the risk of death or permanent disablement but has not yet diminished the risk of temporary disablement."¹ I quote also the statement of M. A. Fontaine, the French Director of Labor, presented a few weeks ago before the International Congress on Hygiene and Demography at Washington:

If, in order to eliminate the influence of the increase of the number of workmen, one refers the numbers of accidents to one thousand workmen, it is apparent that there has been [sc. in France] no increase in severe accidents, that the actual danger of the industries has not augmented, but that there is a characteristic and important increase of minor accidents. This change is attributed to the increasing care with which accidents are reported and still more to the legal modifications which influence the workmen to prolong short, temporary disabilities in order to get their remuneration.²

The usual and probably the correct explanation of this fact in other countries also is that many minor accidents formerly were not reported at all but now are registered. If this explana-

¹ *Am. Stat. Assn. Pub.*, XIII, 27 (March, 1912).

² *Abstracts of Papers at International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, pp. 284, 285.

tion be accepted, then the tendency in foreign countries has been toward real decrease of serious accidents and perhaps toward a real decrease of all, though not of reported, minor accidents. On the same point the opinion of the commission recommending the law appears in the following sentence of its report signed by 13 of the 14 members. "It is the opinion of a great many of the employers testifying before us on the subject that the compensation system will have the effect of making the employers more careful and with that we agree, nor does it seem in any way probable that the compensation system would have any effect on making workmen careless."¹ This opinion of the Commission was in line with evidence showing that under the present system in three eighths of the cases of fatal accident investigated nothing was paid to the surviving representatives of the deceased, in one eighth only the funeral expenses were paid and in nearly three eighths more the payment was less than \$500. In cases of partial disability, temporary or permanent, the proportion receiving no compensation was even higher. This evidence, carefully considered by the Commission and presented in its report, seems fully to justify its opinion. If the amount to be paid out by employers for accidents were to be increased several times, as the proposed system would do, the motives leading the employer to try to diminish the number of such accidents would be correspondingly strengthened.

The conclusion of the New York Commission has been recently supported by that of the Massachusetts Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents. It recommended an elective compensation law and with the New York decision in hand it unanimously rejected the conclusion of that court regarding the effect of such legislation upon the safety and health of employees and reported the following finding: "No one can study the history of this subject in other countries without being impressed by the fact that the operation of compensation laws in several of them has materially reduced the number of injuries in factories and workshops especially those resulting from machine operative."² On the basis of this experience as well as other evidence, the Massachusetts Commission added: "Under the terms of the new law . . . the

¹ *First Report*, p. 56.

² *Report*, p. 46.

employers will realize that it is of the utmost consequence in a financial as well as a humanitarian way to prevent the injury. It is believed that it will be possible to decrease very largely the number of accidents and this aspect of the law is regarded as its most important part."¹

The New York court seems to believe that an indirect method of decreasing the number of accidents, namely, by increasing the employer's pecuniary interest in preventing them, is unjustified. It hardly realizes that in securing social change indirect methods are often the most effective. The opinion of the legislature, also, that the new law would diminish accidents seems to be clearly indicated by its passage of the bill. We have then upon one side of this issue of fact the conclusion of statisticians regarding the probable effect of similar laws in foreign countries, the conclusion of the New York Commission and the Massachusetts Commission and the statistical evidence upon which they based that conclusion and the opinion of the legislature which passed the law; and upon the other, the unanimous verdict of the Court of Appeals.

Another line of evidence also leads to the belief that the decision in question is entitled to scant consideration except from such courts as are bound to accept it as authority. The evidence is rather psychological than statistical, but still it may be mentioned as supporting the argument that courts are ill adapted to deal with these questions of social fact and that a speedy development of sound statistical work in this field is of capital importance for courts, judges, and legislatures.

If a statute passed in the exercise of the police power is attacked as unconstitutional, the court usually admits the existence of a presumption in favor of its constitutionality. As Justice Harlan put it in his dissenting opinion on the *bake-shop* case: "If there be doubt as to the validity of the statute . . . the courts must keep their hands off, leaving the legislature to meet the responsibility for unwise legislation." A court approaching such a question and feeling bound to review the judgment of the legislature might be expected to describe briefly the existing conditions, the evils which the statute was designed to remove and the changes that

¹ *Ibid.*

had resulted or would result from it, before approaching the discussion of the constitutional objections to the new system. In that discussion an obvious desire to find the law constitutional would be natural.

In the present case the opinion begins with a paragraph reciting the facts and praising "the industry and intelligence of this Commission." The second paragraph begins the argumentative part with a most significant sentence: "The statute, judged by our common-law standards, is plainly revolutionary." On the lips of a lawyer and judge fifty-seven years of age the word "revolutionary," like the word "socialistic," is a term of reproach or opprobrium and not of argument. With his opening sentence as a clue to the writer's frame of mind, the following phrases scattered through the opinion gain new meaning: "the radical character of this legislation," "this departure from our long-established law and usage," "this indictment of the old system," "the new statute is totally at variance with the common-law theory," "the theory is not merely new in our system of jurisprudence but plainly antagonistic to its basic idea." From these passages one not familiar with the law would be almost sure to infer that there is a strong legal presumption against a "revolutionary" statute "totally at variance with the common-law theory." A careful reading of the decision shows that the court at another point of its discussion grudgingly admits what I take to be unquestioned, that the legislature has the right to revolutionize the common law. If so, the common law no more furnishes any standard by which a statute changing it should be judged than the decision of a lower court furnishes a standard by which the reversal of its decision by a higher court should be judged. Then what is the use of this lengthy discussion of the common-law theory? Apparently it reveals a frame of mind somewhat like this, The statute is so totally at variance with the common law that it probably violates also some underlying constitutional provision. And to that conclusion the court comes when it says: "With all due respect to the members of the Commission, we beg to observe that the statute enacted in conformity with their recommendations does not stop at reversing the common law;

it attempts to reverse the very provisions of the Constitution." And the court finds it unconstitutional because it is not a health law, or in its own words: "This statute . . . contains not a single provision which can be said to make for the safety, health, or morals of the employees." The evidence already presented seems to indicate that it was a health law in the sense that its intended effect was and probably its actual effect would have been to diminish or check the increase in the number or proportion of accidents in the industries affected.

These three cases agree among themselves and represent many others in that each tribunal passed upon an important question of fact involved with the questions of law and in so doing decided the case. Each was a question of social fact, or fact about a group average, the average duration of trade life, the average healthfulness of an occupation, the average effect of a given method of compensation upon the frequency of industrial accidents.

Even if the view taken by many judges should finally be accepted by all courts and the decision of these questions of fact made by the legislature in enacting a statute should be left in all but extreme cases without review by the court, still the difficulty of drawing a line between those extreme cases and other cases would be no less serious, though it might arise less often. If the court should refrain, the decision of the legislature would be final.

If an appeal on such questions of fact from the decision of the state court of last resort to the voters were permitted, as has been proposed, the voters would face the same problem.

With whichever of these three, legislature, court, or people, the final decision rests, there is great and growing need of perfecting our agencies for ascertaining social fact and of these in my judgment the main one is social statistics. It is the lack of convincing social statistics upon such problems which has made it impossible to answer with confidence many of the questions judges and legislatures have assumed or felt bound to answer.

It might be said that the need for statistics is not clear, that the brilliant work of Mr. Brandeis in defending the Oregon ten-hour law for women, which illustrates just what is needed, is far from statistical. Such work was probably the best that could be

done under the conditions, but in many fields it could not be duplicated and like any collection of opinion it is open to challenge as mere opinion. Even expert opinion is a poor substitute for an inductive and exhaustive study of the fact.

Our political mechanism for the inductive determination of social fact is immeasurably inferior to our mechanism for the deductive application of legal principles to assumed states of social fact. Many courts, wisely or unwisely, have felt bound to review and decide upon such issues of fact and in doing so have often traversed the judgment of the legislature and sometimes of the public and at the same time have revealed a lack of desire or ability to investigate for themselves or do more than weigh the evidence submitted by the parties in the light of their own convictions or impressions. Such cases are sure to multiply and the criticism of the courts aroused by their decision seems likely to increase.

In such cases a developed system of social statistics should ascertain the facts and present them in a convincing way. It should render upon these multiplying questions of social fact somewhat the service that the jury system does upon questions of individual fact. Our methods of ascertaining social fact are on the whole less developed than in any other great industrial country; more and more our courts are finding it necessary to decide such questions of fact; our national attitude toward the courts is apparently changing from one of perhaps extravagant laudation to one of perhaps excessive criticism. These facts seem to me to be interdependent. The ascertainment and proof of the social facts should not be left to the individual parties to whatever suit may arise. The facts in the case at bar may be anything but typical, and it is by typical, representative or average facts that the court should be guided to a decision. Into this field of exploration our American statistics seem destined to advance and by so doing to supplement a defect in our judicial system.

SOCIAL PHASES OF PSYCHOLOGY¹

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Psychology and sociology have, I think, far more in common than either yet realizes. If, instead of being from the very first social and gregarious, man had been a solitary animal, his psychology would have been a very meager thing. Even individual psychology in the sense of Stern and the Würzburg introspectionists studies personalities as society has shaped them. Again, you are interested, as we are, in philosophical systems like those of Plato, Fichte, and Kant, that were so largely shaped by social and political conditions, which it was their chief end to improve if not to reconstruct. You have a more or less speculative, logical section, as we have, which refines, defines, tabulates, makes schedules, claims everything possible for its own science, and another that gets down as close as possible to hard facts and actual concrete conditions. Both our sciences have passed through a stage of criticism, not to say suspicion, and have only rather lately reached general academic recognition and developed methods and results that are generally recognized as scientific. In the half-hour allotted to me I can do little more than enumerate a few psychological domains in which you also have an interest. The first of these is animal societies, beginning with higher insects which are evolved from the very first denizens of dry land and which are aeons older than man and so have had vastly more time to perfect and consolidate the organization of their institutions. Here we find castes—soldiers, workers, idlers, rulers, slaves—wars, migrations, elaborate and specialized industries, provisions of food, nuptial flights, care of larvae and young, periodic massacres of the useless classes, property, and, in some degree, specialization and marvelous co-operation and sense and feeling of kind. Some ants seem to clear ground, plant, and harvest. Architectural sense is highly developed. They know and fear their enemies and develop many

¹ From proceedings of the American Sociological Society.

strategies to escape or overcome them. Some seem to have almost a moral code that it is death to violate. Each of the forty-five hundred species of wild bees, e.g., seem to have as many types of constitution as they have morphologic differences. In some cases, like the wasp and bumblebee, we can study the phyletic, developmental stages by which the state arose and know something of the way in which the rights and duties of citizenship evolved. Now if on the basis of the many scores of tediously painstaking empirical studies we could have for each species a free and frankly humanistic résumé of what is definitely known, such as, for instance, Maeterlinck has given us of the bee, we should find here a source of wisdom and insight into human social and even political conditions which is only just beginning to appear. In no society is the individual so completely incorporated in the larger group to which he belongs and which his every act from birth to death seems designed to serve. For one, I believe this field might be far more utilized than it has yet been by a sociologist who would put himself abreast of the latest studies here, some of which show not only the fixity of very complex relations but also amazing plasticity in adjusting to new conditions. Here, too, I should like if there were time to say a word in favor of clever biological analogies between far more rudimentary organisms, down to the parasitism, commensalism, and mutualism about which Espinas long ago made illuminating generalizations, and even between individuals in the community and cells, tissues and organs in the human body, which Lilienfeld and others since have stressed. In the social organizations of creatures too, articulates and certain species of fishes, birds, and mammals, we find countless suggestive and illuminating devices of mutual help, which show at least how much wiser as well as older and more varied animal instinct is in some respects than reason itself.

A second interest of genetic psychology which seems to me very illuminating for sociology is the organization of children, especially those which are spontaneous. Every large city has scores of gangs which reproduce most essential features of the savage tribe, in a composite portrait of which, indeed, almost no feature of the latter would be omitted. In a few striking cases boys left to them-

selves have, whether by the blind instinct of recapitulation or by more or less consciously parodied imitation of adult institutions in their plays and games or probably both, developed elaborate social organizations that show many of the traits of primitive society, which not only have great phyletic interest but have stimulated adults' intervention and attempted control or betterment, that has resulted in the scores of more or less controlled juvenile organizations, some of which, like the George Junior Republic and the school city, have embodied the most essential elementary features of the social life of grown-ups. Some believe that by a judicious use of this gregarious instinct it may be found strong enough almost to reconstruct our educational system on a new basis, fantastic and sentimental as some of these adult revisions now seem. In this connection I think should be mentioned, too, the remarkable new interest in childhood, which in many respects in this country had grown colder, more formal and oblivious than in any land or period in the world, but which has lately resulted in the formation of some hundred and eleven (as we classify them) organizations for child welfare and benefit, and in a renaissance of interest in work for children so great that some enthusiasts have even wanted to call this the century of the child. What does this recent awakening to the nature and needs of children, that is now pervading all civilized countries and has resulted in the institution of many academic chairs, laboratories, clinics, journals, and a vast and rapidly growing body of literature, really mean? It certainly marks an extension of our social consciousness, an enlargement of our interests, and a new awakening to our duties to the young.

Third, the anthropological section of psychology has a new interest in savage society. The more we know and understand it, the more we find good in it. Among a number of large tribes in the English dependencies in Africa, British criminal law has been deliberately set aside for a codification of tribal customs, as the latter have been found to be far more adequate and effective. In another African province a school system has been established which insists that for the first four years nothing but native languages and indigenous folklore and custom shall be cultivated, although half a dozen different native languages with small vocabu-

laries have to be given dictionaries and grammar, and learned by teachers, in order to accomplish this end, the idea being to make good Kaffirs instead of pinchbeck imitations of Englishmen. Only in the higher grades of the school and for the brighter students are English language, customs, rudiments of science, and civilization taught. With every race that becomes extinct like the Tasmanians and Boethuks, we are learning that something valuable or at least suggestive in the way of social organization passes out of the world and leaves no trace, perhaps not even an Ossian to record its ideals. It is now almost a commonplace that an administrator of affairs in savage lands should first of all make a careful and sympathetic study, of the kind that Cushing and Miss Fletcher made of the Indian tribes they know so well, of the way in which long and unwritten experience has caused the world to seem to those in their charge and how other ethnic stocks have solved the problems of life and social order rather than to assume that we are the *beati possidentes* and that our ways are always best. Thus they should always strive as far as possible to conserve and fulfil, destroying as little as possible, recognizing that progress is a matter not of years but of centuries, and that it is not impossible that ethnic stocks now obscure may at some time inherit the accumulated resources of the civilization we now represent and wield the resources of the world for good or evil, somewhat according as we now shape their plastic stages, as, indeed, has happened in the world before, as we realize when we think of the Germans in the days of Tacitus, or the Angles and Saxons in the days of the Roman dominion in England.

Fourth, imitation, a decade or more ago when it was most studied, seemed to some psychologists to account for about every psychic process. Beginning with memory and custom, it was by some given such an extent that there seemed hardly any room left in the world for originality or creativeness. We were all constantly setting or following copy. Our thoughts and inflections, as well as our manners and customs, were all borrowed. Conduct, too, if not merely conventional, was essentially initiative, while feelings, sentiments, imagination were most of all contagious. Imitation was conscious and unconscious, automatic and volitional. Even

in science we were imitating Nature or thinking God's thoughts after him. We had studies of school children which showed how scores of fads, like spit-curls, manners of wearing bows and ribbons, bookmarks, and expressions, spread like wild-fire through school communities, how every peculiarity of the teacher, even her lisp or her limp, was unconsciously imitated by pupils who admired her. This kind of psychic contagion was studied with illustrations galore which seemed to show that even children thought, acted, and felt in common to a far larger degree than had been realized, and that individual differences were small by comparison. So panics, crazes, great popular delusions and certain mental distempers are communicated by contagion and the larger the crowd the simpler and more elemental the emotions that they share with each other. One prominent philosopher wrote a very clever treatise explaining how all inventions were really imitations, until this theme itself became almost a fad which is now relegated to a comparatively modest place among psychological topics. Men are certainly prone to follow leaders and it is very hard to stand out from the mass, which is not infrequently prone to persecute those who go too far in declaring their independence. So deep is the instinct for feeling, thinking, and acting with others that it is sometimes simulated, even perhaps against better insight, although the opposite trend in human nature tends to assert itself by forms of originality that lack substance and are little more than poses or whimsies. The saving fact remains that there are those who are unhappy if there are those who agree, act, or feel with them, and who *wish* to be unique, although this instinct may never bear fruit. An old custom is often an iron one, and while an adequate knowledge of history does make havoc with our originalities, it also teaches the impressiveness of numbers and majorities, while individualities that cannot in Max Stirne's sense maximize themselves alone can always find some degree of satisfaction in joining schools, sects, or parties, so that all who portray their sentiments or beliefs still can have the consciousness of kind that goes by finding others who keep step with them. In its largest sense society would have little organic wholeness but would be a mere congeries of units but for imitation, and most of us may count ourselves fortunate

if after a large comparative acquaintance with many kinds of models we select those we wish to follow wisely and well, viz., those that fit and express our own personal *proprium*. Perhaps the great leaders in literature do their best when they are copying the folk-soul which is larger and loftier than they, and perhaps the great reformers are always imitating outwardly the more inward conceptions that they and those in their environment more deeply and inwardly feel. Perhaps science may be characterized as an attempt to make a perfect replica of Nature, and the best society may be an expression of the more intimate fellow-feeling of the people who constitute it. Perhaps in Deity man has only set himself an ideal to be copied, and in morals, standards to live up to. All these have been urged but this view seems to make little room for the *Zeitgeist*, spirit of progress or *nisus* or push-upward, which seems at every moment to be creating at least new variations of old themes which often grow later into specific originalities. Psychology finds an initial tendency indeed to imitate about anything or everything, as indeed is necessary to understand or even know it, as we see in extreme cases of imperative mimicry and even echolalia. But this tendency is prone to be checked, in some earlier and in some later, by an opposing inhibition which arrests and then enlightens, diverts, perhaps sublimates, and in morbid cases may take on the more pronounced aspects of negativism. Thus we have abundant motive power of revolt against almost every consensus concerning almost every human institution.

Fifth, crime is one ostensive instance of this. In its nature it is in a sense not only anti-social but solitary. Those who commit crime against person, property, or even good name thereby declare themselves enemies of the social order which they defy and step outside of, and hence must be restrained or perhaps eliminated in the interests of the community. What constitutes crime is for the law, instructed by sociology, to determine. The psychologist, on the other hand, is more interested in the heredity and the psychic diathesis of the criminal mind and how it is affected by confinement and other forms of punishment. He is not only on the way to find a pure thief, a pure murderer, a pure slanderer type, but is interested in personal psychoses and in all abnormal moral traits, as well as

in all kinds of aberrant traits which are really atypical. Modern criminology can hardly longer be said to hold with Lombroso that criminals are a unique species of man with their own particular physical traits and dimensions, to be determined by anthropological tests and measurements, but the later studies here are suggesting that some of the very greatest crimes have been committed by men in no way peculiar save in their temptation, opportunity, or provocation, with which perhaps any of us might have done as they did. Indeed a great German jurist has declared that every man has in him the possibilities of being a murderer, thief, or anything else, and may thank his stars if he is not, because he has not had sufficient provocation to overcome his various resistances. Psychoanalysis, which has already shown us something of the psychic processes that lead to crime, and which may at some time come to play a great rôle in its detection, has shown that criminals are far less abnormal and unique than was supposed but at worst have only different percentages of the same human ingredients found in the nature of all of us. The criminal insane, too, and even the raving maniac, the victim of delusions, and all the rest are found, when we know them thoroughly, to conform exactly to the laws of psychic action and to act as we should all act if our senses habitually went wrong or our motivations were differently compounded and constellated. In these days of psychic tests some are already dreaming of the time when they will take the place not only of every kind of examination in schools or for vocational guidance but will serve a preventive purpose by detection of morbid processes in a stage so early in their development that they can be rectified.

Sixth, and last, it seems hardly too much to say that justice is the cardinal virtue of social man. It has been called the very muse of legislation. Law has been called the technique of justice, the legislator its physician, called in to cure or prevent its distempers, the judge its high priest, the courts its temples, the prisons its hospitals, the reformatories its orthopedic institutions, the lawyer its clinician. Psychology differs as to whether justice had better be called an instinct, sentiment, or intuition, but it is as universal as the sense of fair play. At the bottom, analysis seems to trace it to the world-wide conviction in the bottom of

every human soul that happiness should go with goodness, that pleasure and duty ought to be one and inseparable, now and forever, and that on the other hand, there is the same association between sin and suffering. What drives society into a frenzy is to realize that this equation is upset, that the bad are happy and prosperous and the good miserable. Righteousness must be profitable and unrighteousness unprofitable. Virtue for its own pure sake, apart from all relations to Hedonism, is a ghastly thing in our pragmatic day, and the masterpieces of pathos, like the crucifixion, are those which attach the greatest pain to the highest goodness. With the ancient Hebrews and the Homeric world, in the Indian doctrine of Karma, we always find that in an ideal state of things no evil can befall a good man, living or dead, and heavens and hells are to balance accounts between good and evil that are left over in this life. One great cause of historic and social unrest, if not the chief, whether in industry, society, politics, or education, is a deep ingrowing sense of injustice, half-unconscious though it may be. If the innocent suffer and the guilty are happy and successful, man revolts at the cosmic order that permits such things on whatever authority, whether God, Nature, or society. Men do desperate deeds when hard up against misfits and vice and pain. They have physical symptoms that have been listed and such incentives are the psychic stuff out of which most of the reforms have been made that have swept away social abuses. Man is never so terrible as when roused to the sense that injustice has been done that must be righted though the heavens fall. To doubt the union of virtue and happiness means despair and pessimism and has meant so from Job to Huxley. Indeed, some psychologists are now teaching that it was the utter impossibility of believing that the cosmos was so made as a whole as to permit any permanent misfits between merit and demerit, and rewards and punishments, that first compelled the soul of man to conceive of a future state of rewards and punishments. Indeed it is the very point of Kant's philosophy that if justice had held perfect sway in this life man would never have wanted or conceived of another, because there would have been no discrepancies to rectify. The world and the inmost life of man demands, like the gallery gods in the theater, that the hero get his reward and the villain his. If this

always occurred in fact as in the art world, what need of heaven and hell? When this belief wanes, however, and man comes to believe that this life is all, then oppressors have to beware. If this comforting hope falls suddenly, the political and social danger is grave.

Again, both Cicero and Aristotle thought the orator and the lawyer should feel personal responsibility that no good deed should be unrecognized, and that both should cultivate the art of praising aright, and even courts of virtue have been suggested, where those who have done the community great service should be tried and given individual rewards, in the form of places in halls of fame or emoluments, that we should detect and reward virtue as certainly as we do vice. Thus indignation, when it becomes a great contagion and sweeps away thrones and privileges, is the minister of justice, for injustice is the chief inciter of anger in the world. Friedrich, the German jurist, declares that no man is so good that he might not kill if his sense of justice were sufficiently outraged, that he would become a minister of vengeance like the Greek furies or run amuck.

Finally comes the question whether we ever have any right to forgive as we often wish to, for we are now often told that to pardon is a violation of our social duty and that we should see that even our friends suffer for their misdeeds. Forgiveness is of course the easy way, especially for them, and it is very hard to inflict a fateful wound to a friend; love shields from punishment. Christianity has sometimes interpreted the *Diety* as longing to forgive and developing a tenderness and sentimentality in regard to crime and criminals which is a product partly of a misunderstood religion and partly of unstable nerves. The best psychotherapy for this moral distemper of the sense of justice is, instead of mitigating the deserts of those who should suffer for their own good and for that of society, to look about and find unrewarded and unrecognized merit, of which there is plenty all about us, and to see that it is brought to light and given its modicum of appreciation. Will and can the pleasure of the world ever be so distributed as to be rightly proportioned to the deserts of individuals? Until this can be done, justice will never have a complete triumph in the world and perhaps this is never to be expected. But of all the various elements of human nature, on which sociology is founded, is there any that is more all-determining than that of justice?

INFLUENCE OF THE GROWING PERCEPTION OF HUMAN INTERRELATIONSHIP ON EDUCATION^{*}

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The term education indicates both a science and an art. As a science, education is dependent upon the established generalizations of other sciences: psychology, physiology, ethics, politics, sociology; and the theory of education possesses scientific validity only in so far as these generalizations are valid. As an art, education is an application of such scientific generalizations, or of related ideas which have been tested empirically only and in a measure. As with logical method or with philosophies of conduct, the art of education was practiced long before any science of it was consciously formulated and long before the contributing sciences had formulated their conclusions. As an art, education has been determined largely by the opinion of the people as a whole, opinions often but vaguely formulated—never very scientifically determined. But it is theory or method in this sense that is the subject of this paper—theory as the working conception of a social art held by the people as a whole.

During the last two or three generations, education as a social art has become an entirely new process; it has become a tool or method of society of a very different character from the education of preceding centuries. This change in the character of education is due to the change in the way of thinking about society and social affairs—social processes, social progress, social aims. It cannot be said that this change is due to sociological thought, if by that is meant scientifically organized and tested ideas about society; it has been due to a growing perception of human relationships. This then is the subject under consideration—the influence of the perception of human interrelationships on the social method of

^{*} From Proceedings of the American Sociological Society.

education. It is the dominating influence of the changing social thought upon education as a social procedure that is my subject, not the specific technical changes in the method of professional practitioners or in the conscious generalization of the few specialists interested in the methodology of the subject. To further delimit the subject, I would add that education is here used to indicate, not the vague general process by which the younger generation is raised to the fully developed adult stage, but the definite, conscious process of transference of a well-organized curriculum, through tried methods, and through a special institution usually called the school.

To realize the significance of the change brought about in education by this perception of human interrelationship, it is necessary to note briefly the general conception of education held previous to the early or middle nineteenth century. Throughout at least the entire modern period education was either considered as the means of perfecting or of disciplining the individual or it was held to be the best means of getting on in the world. If the ideal was that of some imagined perfection, religious or otherwise, the education was termed liberal, even though the institutional type was used quite as directly as any more modern types as a preparation for professions. If it was viewed frankly as a means for bettering one's social position, as it came to be in the earlier stages of popular education, it was termed the practical education; and this by way of reproach by those favored through the liberal education. An excellent definition of the first type is thus given by Sir William Hamilton: "An education in which the individual is cultivated, not as an instrument toward some ulterior end, but an end unto himself alone; in other words, an education in which his absolute perfection as a man, and not merely his relative dexterity as a professional man, is the scope immediately in view." The practical conception of education provides one of the clearest and earliest examples and strongest advocates in Benjamin Franklin.

Into the discussion of these two conceptions of education I will not enter, as it is the still unsurveyed though much-trodden field of discussion of the liberal vs. the practical education. This age-long dispute is now almost wholly an academic question, and one not even of much interest to the "academicians." It is not that educa-

tion has come to be either liberal or practical, but a different sort of thing. In so far as it aims to train even its highest product to use his knowledge and use it directly, it is all practical. In so far as it aims to give its lowliest product a broader view of life, of his relations and obligations to his fellows, and of the social significance of his learning and of his powers, it is all liberal. It is then this very process or influence which is the subject of my discussion which has eliminated the traditional and outstanding conflict in educational thought and practice and is making of education a different thing in kind.

The foundation for this modern conception of education was laid by the political and economic revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in the broader political conception of human relationships, and the closer and more vital economic realities of that relationship. The truth of Aristotle's position that the character of education depends upon the character of the state was clearly realized by some of the political leaders, though it took more than one generation of political experience to reveal to the people the truth of Jefferson's statement that the continuance of the republican form of government hung absolutely upon popular education and the local government. So far as the pre-nineteenth-century conception of education had any conscious social significance it was in the training of leaders. Now, while unfortunately this phase of the social significance of education is undervalued, there are numerous ways in which education has undergone fundamental changes in response to this broadened conception.

1. The first of these is that formal education is now accepted by all advanced peoples as the means by which the normal members of society are prepared to perform their normal function in society. So essentially is this the dominant conception of education that it is necessary for us to recall that there are many nations which yet do not use this method; that it was not used generally in the past; and that our own experience with it has not extended through more than two or three generations. At times in the past, religion and the influence of the church was relied upon as the chief force for preparing the bulk of the people for normal membership in society;

at other times the apprenticeship system either as operated through the gild system or, as in England since the Elizabethan period, through governmental regulation without the gild system. At the present time much more than half of the population of the globe, even more than half of the civilized portion, is prepared for normal adult life by non-reflective participation in ordinary social activities as carried on by the adult population. The eighteenth century was almost universally opposed to schooling or formal education as a means to this end. Mandeville may be somewhat extreme in his expression of these views, but he is typical.

To make the society happy, and people easy under the meanest circumstances, it is requisite that great numbers of them should be ignorant as well as poor. . . . Few children make any progress at school, but at the same time they are capable of being employed in some business or other, so that every hour those of poor people spend at their books is so much time lost to the society. Going to school, in comparison to working, is idleness; and the longer boys continue in this easy sort of life, the more unfit they will be, when grown up, for downright labor, both as to strength and inclination. Men who are to remain and end their days in a laborious, tiresome, and painful station of life, the sooner they are put upon it at first, the more patiently they will submit to it forever after. Hard labor, and the coarsest diet, are a proper punishment to several kinds of malefactors; but to impose either on those that have not been used and brought up to both, is the greatest cruelty, when there is no crime you can charge them with.

It was not until 1870 that the English nation could be brought to accept this estimate of the social importance of education; and there are very many skeptics who yet hold to the traditional views. If the elimination of tuition charges be taken as the indication of the adoption of this social conception of education as opposed to the individualistic views, it has been reached by most European countries within one generation. It is even more difficult for us to realize that this stage was reached, since the Civil War, by a number of our own commonwealths, not only by practically all the southern states, but by such northern ones as New York, New Jersey, Michigan. Twice during the decade preceding the Civil War did New York state record its disapproval of the proposition that public education should be dominated by this conception; and a popular argument against this socialization of education was that

used now against almost every effort for a closer relationship or a broader responsibility in society; namely, that it was socialistic.

Two aspects of present-day education prove conclusively that the modern state has come to accept formal education as a means for preparing all its normal immature members for full adult membership. The first is the tremendous amount of public funds devoted to this subject, now in most states, larger than those for any other single purpose. In our own country it amounts to over \$400,000,000 per annum. The second is its universality: for every advanced nation now attempts to apply uniform standards of schooling. In our own country this means an army of 20,000,000 school children. That our reach is greater than our grasp is indicated by the fact that there are 25,000,000 children of school age (five to eighteen) and an average daily attendance of only 14,000,000. As an illustration of the preparation of the child for normal membership in society through the school system, take the factor of normal physical condition. Medical inspection, dental care, proper selection and preparation of food for lunches, proper exercise, first aid for injured, sex instruction, adjustable desks, individual drinking cups or sanitary fountains, hygienic atmospheric conditions—all these things not only provide for his normal physical development, but give a wealth of instruction, which may be the more significant for after-life, through being indirect and considered simply as a part of a normal child environment.

In a similarly diversified way, the proper social, political, vocational, aesthetic, and moral adjustment of the child for normal participation in society is provided for—not that this is done for all school children as yet, or that it is done altogether successfully with the city child with whom it is tried. The point is that these elements enter, not simply into the ideal, but to a great extent into the reality of the best modern school systems. For one example, more than four hundred cities of the United States have some system of medical inspection embodying many of the above-mentioned features.

The results of this general use of education as the means of attaining full citizenship and full personality have been manifold. One or two of these only can be mentioned. In the earlier stage,

at least for the masses, public education was looked upon as a means of preparing the child for the lot in which he found himself. Now the purpose is to prepare the child for any lot to which he may aspire or may by nature be fitted. The problem of the school thus comes to be the discovery of native ability and its development to the highest capacity. This not only involves the broad general training which now characterizes the work of our schools, but should also involve the high degree of differentiation of schools attained in some European countries, but looked at so hesitantly through our hazy conception of democracy.

In a similar way this conception of education is evidenced by the fact that every extension of the franchise, every broadening movement in the participation of the masses in government and in the juster distribution of the privileges and the wealth of society as well as of the obligations of society has been followed by an expansion of educational privileges and a broadening of the concept of education. The French system of popular education followed the Revolution of the thirties by two or three years. England's first recognition, through financial contributions, of governmental responsibility for popular education was in 1833, the year following the passage of the Reform bill, and was not the least significant of the reform movements of that period. In our own country the first general movement for the democratization of education was in that same decade of the thirties, the period of the Jacksonian democracy.

The reverse of this proposition holds true: for every general reactionary movement in political and social relationship has been followed or accompanied by a similar reaction in education.

The most obvious illustration of the social use of education as the means of the preparation for normal membership in society is that of the education of women. When intelligence, developed through education, is substituted for military prowess as the chief qualification for full membership in politically organized society, the enfranchisement or at least the greater social freedom of women necessarily results. It took centuries with the old methods to raise the male element in society to full participation in social and governmental affairs. Scarcely a half-century of universal education has brought womankind to the threshold if not into full

enjoyment of the political edifice. And it is obvious, even in such conservative centers as Germany, that the education of women, first recognized as of individual concern only, now has the broadest social significance.

2. The second of these fundamental changes is that education is now considered by advanced nations as a means of restoring the abnormal to normal relationship to society. This preparation was reached in general before the broader one of education as a means for preparing the normal. In fact, it was the demonstration of the value of new technique in teaching and of new ideas in education, applied to the deaf and dumb, to the blind, and to the destitute and neglected that in the early part of the nineteenth century aroused the intelligent classes to the realization of the importance of education to the masses of the people and of its significance to the modern state.

But this conception of education relates not only to defectives, who through education may be made self-supporting and contributory members of society; it relates to the delinquent as well. Through the attempt to educate certain types of delinquents, especially juveniles, a reaction upon education itself has been most valuable. The validity of new methods in education, especially those relating to manual activities, was here first demonstrated. And in fact such delinquents have often been provided with a more appropriate education than have normal children. Traditional methods are notoriously inefficient with these abnormally inclined, or traditional methods may be a prominent cause of the delinquency. But because of the opportunity for educational experiment and the fuller control of the child, more admirable results have here been obtained in the attempt to substitute, in the routine of the school curriculum, the actual industrial or social processes of society for the highly generalized intellectual residuum of them. The demonstration of the success of this substitution had led to a much wider use in the public schools of technical processes or activities of society for a too exclusive, highly artificial, reflective consideration of them. It may be that in education as in other respects the prodigal son got the fatted calf; but if so he has been generous to his elder brother.

In general the retributory theory of punishment has been replaced by a view that its purposes should be largely educative. Society is best protected by removing the antisocial habits and beliefs of the criminal. This can be done best by developing a social disposition which operates far more effectively, especially with the criminal type, than fear of retribution. The intermediate sentence is a recognition of the educative character of punishment; but it is only when prison life, for adult as well as for juvenile, has been organized so as to give a definite industrial and vocational training, to give the results of such activities to the prisoner and not to officers or favorite contractors, that adequate results follow. The educative significance of this conception of punishment for delinquents for society as a whole is recognized when it is revealed that punishment on almost any other basis is, to an extent, a lapse into barbarism, as readily seen when a social group takes vengeance into its own hands. In almost all advanced countries, prisons have been differentiated into types—the reformatory, being practically schools, and prisons. But even in the prison type, while not organized as a school, the educative character of punishment is definitely recognized, if not always embodied in its régime.

3. The third application of this new conception of education is its adoption as the means of raising backward nations to full membership in the family of nations.

The early and long-used method by which one nation dominated another was by war. War not only reduced an inferior race, but through further participation in war they might in time be raised to equality or to amalgamation with their earlier conqueror. In the past the process that has been most widely productive of the assimilation of one people by another has been that of slavery. Where the racial contrast has not been too great as with Negro and Caucasian, the amalgamation has usually taken place slowly but effectively. But slavery as a peaceful means has always followed war and not without many of its evils. Certainly if the cost to the individual is considered it is anything but an economic method. We have but the one outstanding case, that “when captive Greece took captive her proud conqueror,” when the process was of marked advantage to the dominating race. Later through commerce and

industry the same results were partially obtained; but as through war, with enormous waste and but partial realization of equality or of attainment to the full status of culture; with trade came the missionary and through the greater part of the nineteenth century as during the early Middle Ages, religion was depended upon as the method by which one people sought to raise a backward one. But until the missionary turned schoolmaster, his work, at least with nations out of barbarism, was seldom more than slum work with the lower elements of the population. But when with the latter part of the nineteenth century the educational element became prominent, the centuries' influence of soldier, trade, and preacher was quickly surpassed by that of the schoolmaster. It was not by chance that King Ferdinand in his recent dispatch to the American people should ascribe to them a large part of the responsibility for the present war and of the regeneration of Bulgaria to Robert College. To this and similar institutions has been due the Young Turk movement which has done the little that could be done to put the government of that country on a sounder basis. The words of a leader of one of these countries where the modern movement has only begun, is to the same effect:

At present, from north to south, and from east to west of Albania, all classes of people—Moslem and Christian alike—have a desire, which amounts to a passion, for national education. All of them understand that just as in the past the sword was the symbol of power, so today education is the goddess of power, and they are going to possess education in spite of persecution. . . . Neither the bastinado, nor the gun, nor the cannon, nor exile, nor imprisonment, nor even death itself, will ever move them.

Whenever in the Orient there has been a striving of the people toward a full realization of their opportunities, there can be traced as the cause the modern ideas as introduced by the schoolmaster. Even in India, with educational traditions centuries old, and with its highly developed intellectual class, the ferment of modern education had been working. And if the ferment is producing the usual results of new wine, may it not be because the conquerors have but attempted to perpetuate the procedure of the old education which, as pointed out by Rousseau a century and a half ago, had the fundamental defect of any exclusively intellectual education

of developing new wants, without developing any adequate means of meeting those wants.

The most brilliant example of the significance of education as a means of raising a nation to full fellowship in the family of nations is Japan. It was fourteen years after Commodore Peary's memorable visit, before the native government seized upon education as the means of social advance. Meanwhile western educational ideas and practices had been introduced through missionaries. But in 1872, the year immediately following the abolition of the feudal system and of the monopolistic power of the military class, universal education was proclaimed, the obligation of compulsory education being placed on parents and elder brothers. American normal-school teachers were employed and the attempt made to transplant bodily a foreign and occidental educational system as a means of regenerating an ancient race. While this complete adoption of a foreign system was not possible, the results of this transfer, when duly naturalized, are self-evident. In forty years a nation has been produced that has as large a percentage of its population and of its children in school as in our own country, and by the arbitrament of the sword, as well as by the more peaceful one of the arts and sciences, has raised itself from an isolated stagnant culture, counted all but barbarism by the rest of the world, to a dignified and respected place among the great powers—in fact the great power, if the test be its substitutions for England by American statesmen as the great political bogey.

If Japan is the most brilliant example of this use of education, the Philippines form the most instructive and the creditable one. Here literally the pen was substituted for the sword, and soldiers in uniform stacked arms and taught the young idea how to shoot. One generation may see an entire people change its language and its culture. In less than twelve years, approximately one million recruits have been added to English-speaking peoples. And in their school, 400,000 are now receiving a practical industrial training, dignifying labor among a people where it has hitherto been despised. This is a far larger percentage than of our own children who have received such training. In many cases, the significance of this work is unique, for the children are literally paid to go to

school, since the product of their instruction is of a distinct commercial value.

But neither of these illustrations can compare in promise with that of the Chinese. Trained for centuries to consider the scholar as the proper leader in society, to look upon education as the proper means for securing stability and the raising of individuals to the highest degree of serviceability to the state, they need only the substitution of the content of western education, a substitution now rapidly going on. Centuries ahead of western nations in their attitude toward education, they are two or three centuries behind in their conception of content and method. And now, seeming to realize their retardation in this respect, they are devoting their energies to a national rejuvenation through education. Here again the missionary educators were pioneers. But a half-century of their endeavor had made it clear even to the old government that a modern education system was their one hope of national salvation. Since 1895 these changes have been going on, and since 1905 there have been definite governmental attempts to build up a modern system. Fifteen years of toleration, and half that of encouragement were sufficient to overthrow a government of several centuries and produce evidence of a new vitality in a culture the oldest in existence. A country that for centuries has looked upon all things foreign as worthy of contempt now borrows, bodily, despised foreign educational system. Even now there are more than 50,000 schools of the new type; they have held an educational exhibit of 34,000 pieces; they have educational associations and conferences, and the book publishers and agents are in the field. A flood of Republican school readers is spreading over the land. The new national minister of education, in this current year, officially states the aim of education as follows: (1) industrial; (2) aesthetic; (3) moral, inculcating the ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity; (4) military, and (5) political, inculcating world-wide views and sympathies. A phonetic script is being introduced and the Central Education Conference, under the leadership of the director of education of one of the provinces, recommends the elimination of Confucian worship from the schools and even stamps with favor the denial of the recognition of Confucius as the patron saint of education. When

the nation can support at one time 15,000 students in a neighboring foreign country, and send almost two thousand to more or less hostile or contemptuous nations half around the globe, what may be expected in the course of a generation? This past summer, despite unfavorable financial conditions, one province sent sixty students abroad; eight to England to study moral affairs, six to Germany to study military affairs, twenty students of mineralogy to Belgium, ten to United States to study industry, eight to France to study law, eight to Italy to study mathematics, and eight to Japan to study politics. We may think the directing officials were ill advised, especially in the last of the selections, but we cannot but see that the recognition of the cosmopolitanism of learning will have tremendous influence in giving to nearly one-half of the human race a more appropriate place in modern culture. It may be, after all, that the white man's burden is to be borne by the humble pedagogue.

As a result of a century's broadening of the scope of human relationships, education is no longer merely the petty concern of the pedagogue; the problems of public-school work are not the trivial details of method or the dreary routine of classroom procedure; the problems of education are the focusing of all the great problems of society for the presentation to the coming generation with the hopes that when thus concentrated and defined they may be better understood and more nearly mastered.

4. A fourth aspect of this social significance of education, and closely related to the previous one of the conquest of one culture by another, is its use in the amalgamation of races as the means of assimilating new factors into the body politic. Here again the value of education stands out in strong contrast to the long-tedious and wasteful methods of former times. War eliminated many of the best and secured amalgamation only by destroying some of the most valuable mental and moral traits of the survivors. Trade and commerce leave the hostilities which have always followed the Jewish race. Religious conversion has seldom been able to work successfully on a large scale without the accompaniment of war. It took ten mediaeval centuries to produce the fusion and transfer of ancient culture, and the amalgamation of hostile races into a

stable society. But in this country we are attempting in a single generation a larger task of race amalgamation, and with certain elements of this new peoples almost as large a task of culture transference. For the decade from 1899-1910 almost 10,000,000 immigrants were absorbed into our social body. Of these 89.5 per cent came from lands where our language was not spoken and a very large part of these from culture surroundings very different from our own. In the last ten years, more than 25 per cent of the 1,000,000 immigrants each year, to use approximate figures, were unable to read or write any language. Remoteness in culture and total illiteracy became increasingly more pronounced each year. We are depending almost wholly upon education as the only formal means of bringing about the assimilation of these alien peoples. The informal education gained through industry does not affect very markedly the more fundamental aspects of approximation to new social, moral, and political standards; and such assimilation as comes through early participation in political affairs is necessarily of no more general character or on no higher plane than that gained through economic relationships. One of the sins of this generation that will return to plague future ones is the general corruption of these more recent additions to our body politic by the dominant political parties. On the other hand, one of the most cheering evidences of the success of public-school education is the results among the immigrants and their children. It is not simply the fact that the percentage of illiteracy among native children of the foreign born was less than the illiteracy of the country as a whole, or even of the native children of the native born, but it is the concrete evidence visible to everyone who comes in contact with school work with foreign children. The difficulties to be overcome are not those of language. The necessity of learning a second language has positive educational advantages. But it is the substitution of new moral ideals and cultural accomplishments for old ones that is crucial. For we are witnessing, especially in our cities, the evil result of this incomplete transition, where the process has been so rapid that the control of the parental culture and ideals, as well as authority, is lost and little but the superficial of the new obtained. But it is clear in this respect, if in no other, that the perpetuity and

improvement of our culture depends almost wholly upon formal educational means.

5. For the fifth phase of these fundamental changes we may turn next to a more inclusive aspect of the subject and consider education as a general means of social reform. This is so obvious that to the school teacher it would not need to be argued. Do we not have Arbor Days, Memorial Days, Boy Scout Days, International Peace Days, with local variants of Big Navy Days? Humane education has its place in the curriculum by law; so does scientific temperance, which too often is neither scientific nor temperate; moral prophylaxis has its numerous advocates. There are Mother's Days, Health Days, Municipal Days, Conservation Days, Flower Days, Fire Prevention Days. We "clean up the town" and fight tuberculosis through school children; they fight the hookworm, swat the flies, and after they have carried on all sorts of altruistic Christmas propagandas for generations they will now be "spugging" for us for a few years to come. The school becomes a savings bank, an insurance company, a self-governing political body, all in the cause of social reforms. Physicians are now proposing that the schools be made permanent centers of municipal health inspection.

Far more significant than these superficial and rather obvious aspects of the argument, is the fact that almost all important and fundamental social reform movements are now considered as educative in their nature and to a large degree use educational methods. Modern charity seeks not only to relieve the recipient but more especially to aid him to an independent position. With the juvenile this is practically always through schools; not the old-time workhouse school, but industrial schools of a far different type. Charity to adults so far as possible takes similar forms. The direction and supervision of philanthropy has become a profession or a business, to be prepared for by a long course of professional training.

It is now generally recognized that the best way to attack poverty, disease, and various forms of delinquency is by preventive measures, and that the chief preventive measure is education. Through adequate industrial training poverty will be avoided, through vocational guidance industrial misfits and blind alleys will

be avoided and a social stability favored. Modern hygiene finds a far wider exposition through the schools than it does through the medical profession. The suffrage movement, at least in most countries, finds its normal method of offense to be educational rather than militant. Socialism works definitely through its educational propaganda.

6. A sixth point can only be mentioned; for, in a somewhat more general way than as the method of social reform, education has come to be recognized as one, if not the prominent, method of stable political and economic advance. The first clear recognition of this function of education came in response to Fichte's addresses to the German nation in 1807-8, when he recommended this remedy as antidote to the Napoleonic subjugation. How successful the remedy was, 1870 demonstrated, and the prominent place of Germany in international politics and in industry yet illustrates. In our own history it has been repeatedly stated by leaders from Washington and Jefferson to the present and quite generally recognized by the people themselves that the stability and development of our political institutions depended on the education of the masses as well as that of leaders. Not only upon their general intelligence, but now more clearly seen upon definite political instruction. In no less degree does the same hold true of economic development. No clearer recognition of this has been given than by the deliberate adoption on the part of the British government of an extensive scheme of industrial education as a means for meeting German industrial competition. And there is no more outstanding illustration of the way in which national handicraft in natural resources can be overcome by industrial, technical, and commercial education. The astonishing advance of Germany during the last century is due in their own estimate as well as in that of others to this more than to any other one factor.

Advance in general economic intelligence as well as in technical skill and commercial ability is also dependent on education. Only by such general instruction can society destroy such doctrines of the wage-earner that there is general advantage in destruction of property or of luxurious waste in making work or as held by the

employer that considerations other than legal ones have no place in competitive business.

7. Concerning the reciprocating influence of this broadening function of education on the technical theory and methodology of education much might be said, as a seventh count in the argument, but this is chiefly of interest to the professional student of education and to the educational administrator. Every expansion in political rights and powers is followed by an expansion of the curriculum by a further inclusion in the curriculum of the political and social sciences. A study of textbooks reveals this clearly. At times, as in the period immediately following the American Revolution, such changes have been very pronounced. In a similar way each increase of power over Nature has resulted in the wider inclusion of the sciences. And especially as the social as well as the intellectual significance of the sciences is realized has this been true. Undoubtedly the growing recognition of the significance of physiological chemistry and synthetic chemistry has been a powerful influence toward the inclusion of the so-called household arts in public schools and colleges and universities all over this land. It is a far deeper thing, and in hopes of a far greater result, that the introduction of some practical training will meet immediate needs of the masses of the people. It bears within it the possibility of fundamental industrial, social, and moral changes.

This reciprocal influence on the theory of education is nowhere more clearly seen than in the various phases of professional education. In so far as the social point of view is substituted for the individual one, any profession becomes liberal in exactly the same sense as the traditional liberal professions. The Hippocratic oath may have called the attention of generations of medical students to the social character of their profession, but more has been accomplished in one generation through the realization that disease to a very large extent is a social phenomena, due to social condition, to transmission through personal contact, and that its cure is quite as largely of social as of individual significance. Preventive medicine, conservation of health, and similar movements are the outcome of this newer point of view in professional education. How much

might be done for our modern business and for economic conditions in general through the organization of a professional training on a similar basis remains to be seen, awaits even yet the men of vision to lead the way. There was a time when more than 70 per cent of college graduates entered the ministry, and college education for them was liberalizing. Now more (30 per cent) enter business than enter any other single line. How much of a definite professional training, of this liberalizing, socializing character, does the prospective business man get in the present college curriculum? In general, this reciprocal influence on the theory of education is forcing not so much a rejection of the old as a restatement of it. The liberality of an education in any time is to be measured not in the old terms of criticism of life, to use Matthew Arnold's words, as in the new terms of contribution to life.

This developing view of human relationships and of contribution to social welfare as the test of formal, especially professional, education is forcing a greater differentiation in institutional education—one of our greatest educational needs, if not the greatest. We are yet under the incubus of the belief that democracy means uniformity. We believe in one public school for all, one high school for all, even one type of college course for all. The mania for standardization and organization leads us to forget, not only that variation is a prerequisite of selection and progress, but that variation is a necessity of stable life. Our greatest need on the side of organization to meet this developing view of society which posits a greater integration is a greater differentiation of schools. Not all children need the same kind of elementary education; in the secondary a greater diversity is needed than even in the higher fields, as it applies to a so much greater proportion of our population; and yet there is scarcely any diversification and that which is developing meets with great hostility.

8. Finally, we are coming to consider education as the means of progress, the method of social evolution. By it the present can determine or at least influence profoundly the future. By it one generation in turn hands on to the coming one that which it received from the past, modified by its own estimates of worth, added to by its own endeavors, passed through the medium of its own experi-

ences. It is through education, as thus considered, that social evolution is raised to a higher plane than that of all pre-social evolution. Progress becomes cumulative in its effect, geometric in its ratio. By education, the achievements or characteristics of one generation are handed on to the next. If it is the nontransmissibility of acquired characteristics that constitutes natural selection the chief method of organic evolution, it is this very feature that constitutes education the method of social evolution. It is because in very recent times this process has become a conscious one that the subject assigned for discussion in this paper has significance. Not but what this conception of education has been held in various times in the past by those with a vision. In the seventeenth century it was revealed to Francis Bacon, who commended to all devotees of science and philosophy the study of the process he termed "tradition," the process by which one generation hands on its inheritance and its achievements to the coming one; and commended the conscious control of this process in the service of progress. It is due to this conception that Aristotle, though with no definite idea of social progress, called education a practical, as opposed to the theoretical sciences, and made it subordinate to politics. It is due to the gradual realization of this conception of education during the last century by society as a whole that education has become the process outlined in this discussion.

Hence in conclusion, if I may speak for the largest group of professional men and women in our society, I would formulate this argument in terms of a plea of public education: a plea to the scientist, that he be interested not only in the new interpretation of phenomena, and in the new control of natural forces; but also in the dissemination of scientific knowledge and scientific methods of thought and procedure among the masses, and thus assist in the control of the greatest of all forces, public opinion and the social will; to the economist, that he be interested not only in the investigation and interpretation of the economic phenomena of society, but also in that institution which touches more lives and those lives more powerfully than any other save possibly the state itself, that it be not one of the most wasteful of institutions in the expenditure of human energy, and relatively one of the most inefficient in the

expenditure of social wealth; to the historian, that he realize that the vital connection in the continuity of history is to be made in the transmission of the achievements and standards of the past to the coming generation; that the really vital thing in history is the *teaching of history* to the end that historic forces and institutions be generally understood and conserved; to the sociologist that he also give attention to the problems of public education, a social process now so influenced by the general principles which are fundamental to his science that it has become the chief means by which society seeks to accomplish a great variety of its purposes—to assist its helpless; to correct its delinquents; to improve its dependents; to equalize its opportunities; to preserve its resources; to lift up the lowly races; to amalgamate alien races; to preserve its hard-won wealth of culture; to perpetuate the results of its age-long struggle with Nature; to render stable the triumphs over the limitations of human nature; the process by which it seeks to realize in coming generations those ideals which are promulgated by the present as an aspiration or as a vision of possible attainment.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND IDEAS UPON THE STUDY AND WRITING OF HISTORY¹

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History is so susceptible to every kind of influence that it is more difficult to define even than sociology. I shall not attempt to define it, further than to say that it is concerned with the life of man in the past. But the life of man in the past is an immense subject, and even with our limited sources of information it is quite impossible to fix the attention upon everything that man has done in the past. The historian has therefore to select, to devote himself to what interests him in the past, to emphasize those aspects of the past which he deems important. Undoubtedly one historian will differ from another in this respect. But in spite of individual differences, the historians of any age are likely to find those aspects of the past interesting or important which are in some way connected with the intellectual or social conditions of the age in which they live; so that the historical work that is most characteristic of any time may be regarded as embodying an interpretation of the past in terms of present social interests.

This manner of defining the function of history finds some support in the current trend of scientific thought. The latest fashion among psychologists and philosophers seems to be to regard the individual intelligence, not as an instrument suited to furnish an absolute test of objective truth, but rather as a tool pragmatically useful in enabling the individual to find his way about in a disordered objective world. In like manner, one may conveniently regard the general intellectual activity of any period—the common ideas and beliefs, the prepossessions and points of view—as having had its origin in practical interests, and as deriving its validity from the service it renders in solving the problems

¹ From Proceedings of the American Sociological Society.

that grow out of community life. Historical thinking is part of this intellectual activity, and like philosophy and science, literature or theology, it is a social instrument, helpful in getting the world's work more effectively done.

And if we turn to the history of history, we find always a pretty close connection between the characteristic historical work of any period and the fundamental prepossessions of the time in which it falls. In the Middle Ages, the study of the past reflected the religious and ecclesiastical interests of that age. Protestant and Catholic historians of the sixteenth century found interesting and important those aspects of the past which threw light on the theological and political quarrels of the Reformation. In the eighteenth century, Monarchy and Church found a certain justification in the *Acta Sanctorum* and the great documentary collections of the benedictines; while the practical value of charters inspired the work of Mabillon, who founded the science of diplomatics. But in the latter part of the century, when social needs ran counter to established authority, the reformers turned again to the past and found there arguments suited to revolution.

It is characteristic of every age to think that "we are the people"; and in our own day historians, with justifiable pride in their achievements, have sometimes supposed that a method of studying history has at last been discovered which owes nothing to time or place; a scientific method, which enables us to study the past definitively, if only it is applied in a thoroughgoing manner. But this attitude is less common today than it was fifteen or twenty years ago; and perhaps it is possible even now to indicate, in a general way, how the study and writing of history during the last half-century has been determined by the pressure of social problems and ideals.

I

The period from 1815 to about 1850 was one of immense activity in the study and writing of history; and the inspiration and determining influence of much of this work was the French Revolution and the problems it left unsettled. To the generation after 1815, it seemed, indeed, that all questions were unsettled; and as the disillusioned found refuge from the present in an ideal Middle Age,

or in the world of dreams, so philosophers and statesmen and politicians and historians, who were often politicians if not statesmen, turned to the past to rediscover the principles of ordered social life.

Of the questions which the Revolution left unsettled, perhaps the most pressing was political in its nature. In France and Germany, if not also in England, the Revolution destroyed all consensus of opinion as to the fundamental principles of government and public law. For two generations party divisions turned on this issue; and we might expect to find, as we do in fact find, that historians and statesmen, when they turned to the past, were primarily interested in its political and legal aspects: they wanted the past to tell them what law really was after all, and what kind of government would prove most stable. It was therefore an age of political historians, and each political party—Absolutist, Doctrinaire-Liberal, Historic-Rights, Whig, Republican, Radical—found support in history for its practical program.

But undoubtedly the strong trend of the period, in practical politics and in educated opinion, at least until about 1840, was toward moderation and compromise. The golden mean was found an excellent substitute for theories pressed to their logical conclusion. Few could deny, after 1815, that institutions are bound to change; and although Joseph De Maistre thought that the Revolution was an evidence of God's wrath which could be appeased only by a return to the Old Régime, even Louis XVIII, who had learned something, however little he had forgotten, knew that this was impossible. On the other hand, few were ready to maintain that the Revolution had ushered in that golden age which the philosophers dreamed of. To find the middle way between reaction and change, to reconcile liberty and authority—to “nationalize royalty and to royalize France,” as Decazes formulated the problem—was therefore a principal motive.

And historians, for the most part, reflect this practical motive; even French historians, balancing the evils of the Revolution against its benefits; hitting upon this or that aspect of the Revolution as *the* Revolution, and regarding all else as a betrayal of it. The favorite method, among French historians, of reconciling liberty

and authority was embodied in the theory of the Frankish conquest, put into classical form by Augustin Thierry, and to be found in nearly every history written in France before 1830; a theory which appealed to the anti-Teutonic sentiment of the time, and yet justified both the Revolution and the Restoration; for the Revolution did well, according to this theory, in abolishing class distinctions which the meddling Germans had established in the fifth century, but it did ill in substituting for the historic monarchy borrowed republican institutions so unsuited to the kindly nature of Jacques Bonhomme.

In Germany, an even more effective "remedy for the eighteenth century and the malady of vain speculation" was discovered. To bind past and present in indissoluble union by grafting new institutions on old custom was the program of the moderate party; and German jurists and historians furnished a complete justification for this policy in the doctrine of historical continuity. Having no faith in the revolutionary doctrine of natural law and abstract rights, they searched for evidence of such law and rights precisely where it could by no means be found, that is to say, in history; and in history they found, providentially, no natural rights, but only historic rights; right, indeed, they identified with fact, and conceived of true progress in terms of race experience; an experience registered in that predestined succession of events which could never be either greatly accelerated or permanently retarded by conscious effort. This idea, applied to law by Savigny, and to politics by Ranke and his disciples, was the strongest bulwark of that generation against the opposite dangers of revolution and reaction. Jurist and historian, employing critical methods of research which could not be questioned, and basing their conclusions upon the most exhaustive investigation, united in announcing that the French Revolution was a necessary mistake—an event which had done a certain amount of good undoubtedly, but which, by virtue of having departed from approved German precedents, had done it in a very bad manner.

This conception of history found support in the prevailing idealism, which furnished just those basic principles that were necessary to a complete philosophy. For although history was

regarded as a necessary and gradual process, it was not, in the main, regarded as a natural process; not conceived as the result of forces inherent in society, but rather as the expression of God's will, or of the beneficent primal force, clearly manifested in some particular form—in the Church, according to De Maistre; in the State, according to the loyal supporters of the Prussian monarchy; in great men, according to Carlyle; in certain transcendent ideas, according to Ranke and Michelet. It was, therefore, quite legitimate to deal with history as St. Augustine and Bossuet had dealt with it, that is to say, representatively; to select, out of all the past, particular activities, such as political activities, or the acts of heroes, as summing up the whole of history's meaning; or, rather, as revealing that meaning progressively; for history was to be understood, also, as the realization of the "one increasing purpose," leading up to certain desired ends—to the Reform bill or the July Monarchy, to the mystical Liberty of Michelet or the Fraternity of Louis Blanc, to the blessings of American federal democracy, to the fostering care of the Hohenzollerns. The quintessence of the historical thinking of the age is in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, in which the whole life of humanity is seen to be but the projection in time of the Absolute Idea, the *Weltgeist*, "whose works are always good and whose latest work is best."

II

Of the influences which contributed, during the third quarter of the century, to enlarged conception of the content of history, the work of the earlier sociologists was one. Toward the middle of the century, von Mohl and von Stein in Germany, Comte in France, and Spencer in England were defining "society" as something distinct from the state, and fundamental to it. The idea was at least as old as Harrington, but the discoveries of natural science gave it a new significance. Spencer, applying the biological analogy, conceived of society as an organism, in its origin and development conditioned by forces that were inherent, and capable of a purely natural explanation; of which the corollary was that great men, ideas, institutions—the state being one, and perhaps not the most important—were only the particular mani-

festations of history and not its substance. It is true that historians were not then, or ever after, carried away with the notion that society is an organism; but they found it increasingly difficult to maintain, in the old manner, that the sum and substance of history is past politics. Treitschke was in fact defending the doctrine against Lorenz von Stein in Germany before it was officially declared in England, and Freeman's famous epigram was already something of an anachronism when it was adopted as the motto of the *Johns Hopkins Studies*.

Practical conditions, however, had probably more to do with enriching the historian's conception of the content of history than speculative thought; and of these practical conditions, perhaps the most important was the growing complexity of social problems for which the older liberalism furnished no solution. Classical economists and liberal statesmen had hoped that if the state guaranteed individual freedom, of which free contract was an essential element, all would be well. "With the ever-greater realization of this principle," said Gavour, "there must follow a greater welfare for all, but especially for the least favored classes." But it was not to be. Even a "calico millennium," upon which Carlyle poured the vials of his wrath, was not ushered in. Free competition meant free exploitation. Chattel slavery might be abolished in the West Indies, but the existence of wage slavery at Manchester made it clear that the state had something more to do at home than to guarantee free contract. In England, indeed, the factory legislation antedated the free-trade budget; and in every country, from the middle of the century, problems of government became increasingly economic and social in their nature. Even the political historian, therefore, seeing with his own eyes how much industrial conditions had to do with present politics, could with difficulty avoid the conclusion that they might have had something to do with past politics as well.

The economists themselves proved to the historian that this was so. John Stuart Mill, the greatest of the classical school, pointed out the weakness of the *laissez-faire* theory. According to some, the remedy for false theory was more theory, and they

labored to found the new science of sociology. Others felt that less theory was the thing. Roscher, borrowing his method from history, founded the school of economic historians, whose fruitful researches made it clear, to them at least, that political history and the fate of governments were mainly determined by the material interests. The theory of the *Economic Interpretation of History* followed in due time. Without committing themselves to the theory, historians admitted, willingly enough, the importance of the results of economic research for the understanding of history.

The economists were not alone in borrowing the historical method. Everyone borrowed it. Disciples inspired by the enthusiasm of Jacob Grimm traced the history of language. Scherer and Sainte-Beuve, renouncing dogmatic canons, interpreted literature as the product of time and place. Baur and the Tübingen school of theology applied the principle of relativity to dogma. The great Hegel himself distilled the acid which dissolved his own absolutism; and philosophers who could not follow Schopenhauer into pessimism turned themselves into historians and wrote histories of philosophy instead of philosophies of history. What, then, was to become of history proper, every part of the past having been appropriated by some special discipline? In those days, many were favorably impressed with the splendid paradox of Seeley, that since everything was history there was no need of historians. But historians themselves, instead of surrendering their subject, enlarged it. Since every aspect of life and thought can be so profitably studied in the light of its past, it must be, they said, that every aspect of a people's past contributes to its history.

And after all, this conclusion was of undoubted orthodoxy. For Savigny had conceived of law as the expression of the whole life of a people, something to be discovered by jurists rather than imposed by statesmen. If so, then it was natural to suppose that the state, which declared the law, must itself be the product of the national life. But the logic of events was needed to prove this corollary. It was characteristic of the earlier liberalism to make a fetish of constitutions, to think of liberty as a recorded

definition rather than as a living fact.¹ The spirit of the generation of 1830 is revealed in Guizot, with solemn confidence battenning down explosive social forces under a revised charter; in Macaulay, resting the edifice of human happiness upon the fragile foundation of a reform bill; in Webster and Calhoun, regarding the Union as the product of the Constitution, a union created by definition, existing, one might suppose, mainly for dialectical purposes. But the events of 1848 and after made it clear that the life of nations could not be run in the rigid mold of written law or formulated custom. Bismarck, Cavour, and Lincoln all held to a higher law than constitutions or resolutions of parliaments. This higher law, which determined states and constitutions, was seen to be the nation itself. The unification of Germany, Italy, and the United States, by triumphantly demonstrating the reality of national sentiment, made it difficult to deny that a state as John Richard Green said, "is accidental, it can be made or unmade; but a nation is something real which can be neither made nor destroyed."²

These conditions, which it has seemed worth while to present in a single view, were doubtless only the more general and obvious influences which have contributed during the last half-century to enlarge the historian's conception of the content of history. In this respect, their effects were not, it need hardly be said, precisely the same everywhere, or everywhere felt at the same time. The earliest marked revival of interest in what may be called culture history was in Germany, during the two decades after 1850—a revival mainly inspired by the social ferment of the revolutionary movement, but partly also by interest in classical studies. German enthusiasm for classical antiquity, especially on its aesthetic side, which dates from Winckelmann, and was so immensely stimulated by Goethe, led naturally to the study of classical and Renaissance

¹ The point of view is well expressed by Lieber, writing in 1853: "Our age is stamped by no characteristic more deeply than by a desire to establish and extend freedom in the political societies of mankind. . . . The first half of our century has produced several hundred political constitutions, some few of substantial and stirring worth, . . . but all of them testifying to the endeavors of our age, and plainly pointing to the high problem that must be solved."—*On Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, p. 2 (ed. 1859).

² Stephens, *Letters of John Richard Green*, p. 391.

history. Grote had his own reasons for being interested in political history; but German historians who came to the subject through art or archaeology could hardly miss the importance of other aspects of Greek or Roman society. Curtius,¹ who was associated with Brandis and Otfried Müller, was the first historian to deal adequately with the aesthetic side of Greek civilization; and it was Friedländer, a classical philologist, archaeologist, and Homeric critic, whose *Sittengeschichte*² made the empire something more than a list of good and bad emperors, and prepared the way for the later work of Marquardt³ in Germany, and the less comprehensive but excellent work of Mr. Dill⁴ and Ward Fowler⁵ in England. Burckhardt was a pupil of Kugler, and came to history through the study of art history. In 1860 he published *Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien*, which Lord Acton pronounces "the most penetrating and subtle treatise on the history of civilization that exists in literature." It was followed, seven years later, by a second work on the same period, the *Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien*. In 1854 a lesser man than Burckhardt, Gregorovius, compounded of Goethe, Hegel, and the social ferment of 1848, was in Italy, already possessed of the idea for his history of the Roman city,⁶ which was to reveal the persistence of classical influences through the Middle Ages.

During the same period the revolutionary movement was having its effects upon the study of national history. After the collapse of the Revolution, Riehl, who had been a member of the German National Assembly, began the publication of his *Naturgeschichte*,⁷ a comprehensive and valuable study of German civiliza-

¹ *Griechische Geschichte* (3 vols.), 1857-67.

² *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms in der Zeit von August bis zum Ausgang der Antonine*, 1862.

³ *Römische Staatsverwaltung* (3 vols.), 1873-78; *Das Privatleben der Römer*, 1879-82.

⁴ *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 1898; *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, 1905.

⁵ *Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero*, 1909.

⁶ *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter*, 1859-72; English Translation in 13 vols., 1894-1900.

⁷ *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Social-Politik*, 1851-69.

tion. Freytag, one of the editors of the liberal journal *Die Grenzboten*, and the author of comedies and novels which celebrate the virtues of the common people, published the brilliant *Ausbilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* between the years 1859 and 1867. At the same time Janssen was preparing for his monumental work on the German Reformation.¹ It was in 1854 that he expressed to Böhmer his intention of studying the history of the German people in a broader way than had been done—"not to give marked preference to so-called leading state events, but to depict the German national life in all its varying conditions."² It need hardly be said that the work itself, supplemented by many others, has shown us how much more there was in the Reformation than is revealed in Banke's *Zeitalter*.

In France, the immediate effect of the failure of the Revolution was to destroy the prestige of the liberal historians: Thiers, "concealing his opinion of Napoleon in twenty volumes" in order to contrast the achievements of the Emperor with the failures of the Citizen King; Michelet, waving the mantle of Danton; Lamartine, alternately preaching Girondin republicanism and defending Robespierre against the Rolands; Louis Blanc, proving that Fraternity was destined to be the last happy state of humanity. During the Empire conservative historians turned to the eighteenth century to see if it was as bad as painted by these writers. But the good side of the Old Régime was to be found only if one left the beaten path of external political history, court intrigue, diplomacy, and wars; and its rehabilitation, begun by De Tocqueville³ and Le Play⁴ and continued later by Taine,⁵ Sorel,⁶ and many lesser men, such as Babeau,⁷ involved, therefore, much attention to social history; to the condition of agriculture and industry,

¹ Not published, however, till many years later; *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters* (8 vols.), 1878-94.

² From the preface to the 15th German edition of the *Geschichte*.

³ *L'ancien régime et la Révolution*, 1856.

⁴ *La reform sociale*, 1864.

⁵ *L'ancien régime*, 1876.

⁶ *L'Europe et la Révolution française: les mœurs politiques et les traditions*, 1885.

⁷ *Le village sous l'ancien régime*, 1878; *La ville sous l'ancien régime*, 1880; *La vie rurale dans l'ancienne France*, 1883; *Les artisans et les domestiques d'autrefois*, 1886; *Les bourgeois d'autrefois*, 1886.

popular education and religious life, the practical as well as the intellectual aspects of the humanitarian movement. The work of De Tocqueville, especially if we include the *Democracy in America*, was perhaps the most important influence, of a literary character, in directing the attention of French historians to those aspects of history which the admirers of the Revolution had neglected. intellect

Religion, more especially, had been regarded by the earlier French historians as a negligible quantity—after the manner of Voltaire. Fustel de Coulanges, who renounced the liberal tradition in so many respects, aimed to show, in his brilliant *Cité Antique*, published in 1864, that religion, so far from being a negligible quantity, furnished the key which alone would unlock the secrets of history, at least so far as the classical world was concerned. The works of Renan,¹ who was less easily seduced by a neat hypothesis, were even more effective in revealing the intimate connection between religious belief and intellectual development, and the influence upon both of social conditions. And Taine's *History of English Literature*, published in 1863, was of similar import. Designed as an application of the author's scientific theories to the study of history, it was nevertheless far more successful in revealing the relation of literature and history than it was in propagating the philosophy which is exposed in the introduction. Indeed, the dogmatic manner in which Taine proclaimed his pseudo-scientific theories has somewhat obscured the wide and very real influence of his works. Historians repudiate his philosophy, and criticize his scholarship; but they have adopted the fundamental idea, which all his works enforce, that history is concerned, not merely with political history, but with the whole social life of nations. social life

And in this respect, his influence was perhaps not less in England than in France. His unblushing hostility to the Revolution, and his frank admiration for English institutions disposed Englishmen to a sympathetic interest in his works, which were in fact immediately translated. They appeared, moreover, at a time when

¹ *Vie de Jesus*, 1863; *Les apôtres*, 1866; *Saint Paul*, 1869; *Les évangiles et les seconde génération chrétienne*, 1877.

social and intellectual conditions in England were directing the attention of English historians to the social and intellectual aspects of the past—the period when public opinion was much occupied with suffrage extension; with social amelioration; with religious reform; with the bearing of scientific rationalism upon conduct and morality: Huxley was warring with bishops, bishops meddling with the higher criticism; Lecky was occupied with the history of rationalism and morals,¹ and Goldwin Smith beginning to be troubled by the riddle of existence in a way not to be suspected by those who had listened, in 1860, to his Oxford lectures; Ruskin, who had settled the question of free will at the age of ten by jumping up and down the nursery stairs, was arraigning English society in *Fors Clavigera*—the period between the publication of *Ecce Homo* and *Robert Elsmere*, when John Richard Green, so susceptible to all the influences of the time, discovered that one could not understand the history of the English bishops without understanding the whole life of the English people.

The influences which produced such works as Riehl's and Burckhardt's in Germany were without much effect upon English scholarship in the two decades after 1850; and in the seventies Green and Lecky were therefore pioneers in exploring the broader field of history. Green's friendly quarrel with Freeman over what he called "pragmatic and external history" may be followed in the correspondence. "The question between us," he says, "is a strictly historical one. It is simply whether history is to deal with only one set of facts and documents relating to a period, or with all the facts and documents it can find."² In the *Short History*, which appeared in 1874, he attempted to deal with all the facts—"to pass lightly over details of foreign wars and diplomacy, the personal adventures of kings and nobles, the pomp of courts, or the intrigue of favorites, and to dwell at length on the incidents of that constitutional, intellectual, and social advance in which we read the history of the nation itself." Three years later Lecky found it necessary, since "the history of a nation may

¹ *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, 1865; *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, 1869.

² *Letters of John Richard Green*, p. 360.

be written in so many ways," to indicate the way in which he proposed to deal with the eighteenth century: "It has been my object to disengage from the great mass of facts those which relate to the permanent forces of the nation, or which indicate some of the more enduring forces of the national life."¹ How much the knowledge of English history has been enriched, since the days of Green and Lecky, by the study of its economic and social aspects, need not be detailed; the works of Seebohm and Maitland, of Gross and Vinogradóff, of Trevelyan, Mr. Rose, and Spencer Walpole, to mention no others, are known to everyone.

Historical scholarship in America, apart from the work of Bancroft, Motley, Prescott, and Hildreth, scarcely begins before 1870; and for a generation the influence of Ranke and Freeman was very considerable, so that the broader conception of the content of history began to make its way here later even than in England. And since the importance of intellectual and religious development has been comparatively slight, apparently at least, historians, in abandoning the purely political point of view, have limited themselves for the most part to exhibiting the influence of economic and social conditions upon political history. For this purpose, American history presented exceptional opportunities, especially in respect to the Colonial period and the period from 1815 to 1860. The result is that in the last twenty years the active study of the economic basis of the Colonial system has radically changed the interpretation of Colonial and Revolutionary history popularized by Bancroft; while the "high aerial route," by which von Holst formerly conveyed us through the middle period, has been abandoned, and innumerable students, inspired by such teachers as Turner and McMaster, are now opening a new way through the wilderness by minute and special investigations into the economic and social basis of national expansion.

After 1870, generally speaking, the main drift and tendency in Germany and France was rather toward special investigation than toward general works of a constructive character. For two decades the *Mark* controversy and the question of feudal origins was of central interest; but attention to every aspect of national

¹ *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (1878-90,) I, Preface.

history has steadily increased, especially in recent years, as religious and social problems have become more prominent. German and French historians, indeed, have abandoned the political point of view rather more completely than English or American historians—a fact which may be illustrated by referring to certain comprehensive works which have appeared during the last twenty years.

Even Treitschke, who denied that society was more than the state, described every aspect of national life when he came, in his old age, to write the history of Germany in the nineteenth century.¹ Other conservative historians, untainted by Prussian chauvinism, have naturally departed much farther from the earlier ideal. Of these, the ablest is Alfred Stern, whose monumental *Geschichte Europas*² is now appearing, six volumes, covering the period from 1815 to 1848, having been published. Based upon the most exact investigation of a wide range of sources, it deals with literature and religion, the industrial revolution, and the rise of social theories, as well as with problems of government and diplomacy; and it deals with them in no perfunctory spirit, but as altogether necessary to an understanding of the history of Europe in the nineteenth century.

At the same time the subject of *Kulturgeschichte*, so successfully studied in the earlier period by Burckhardt and Riehl, has become the predominant interest in Germany. This has been due partly to the reconstruction of early Greek history, which has been made possible by the discovery of new archaeological material and the study of anthropology and comparative religion.³ But it is due principally no doubt to the remarkable work of Lamprecht, whose *Deutsche Geschichte*⁴ led to a pamphlet war,⁵ unprecedented perhaps even in Germany. The work of Lamprecht is important from the point of view of method, as well as from the point of view of the

¹ *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 1879-89.

² *Geschichte Europas seit den Verträgen von 1815 bis zum Frankfurter Frieden von 1871* (6 vols.), 1894-1911.

³ The most important work in this respect is Eduard Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums* (5 vols.), 1894-1902.

⁴ *Deutsche Geschichte*, 1891-1909.

⁵ Pirenne, "Une polémique historique en Allemagne," *Revue historique*, LXIV, 50; Dow, "Features of the New History," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, III, 431.

content of history. Of Lamprecht's method, something will be said presently. Here it is only necessary to say that the *Deutsche Geschichte* assumes in the most thoroughgoing way that history has to do with every aspect of the social life of man in the past. The new school, without occupying the commanding position which the Berlin school held in the days of Droysen and Sybel, is no longer on the defensive in Germany,¹ where the publication of culture histories is now the order of the day.

In France, the establishment of the Third Republic was followed by a renewed study of the Revolution, which now receives more attention than any other phase of national history. To the Revolution, indeed, the French bring all their difficulties, hoping to find in it their original cause or their final solution. Recent religious and ecclesiastical problems have accordingly inspired, or have at least been accompanied by, many studies of the religious aspects of the Revolution, notably those of Bere,² Sicard,³ Champion,⁴ Gorce,⁵ and, more especially, Mathiez.⁶ But as the chief problems in France, as in other countries, are now economic and social, the economic and social side of the Revolution is the one which receives most attention. The comprehensive *Histoire socialiste*,⁷ written mainly by Jaurès, and written for the working men of France, but for all that one of the best histories of the Revolution yet written, is significant of the main drift and tendency. It was Jaurès indeed who suggested the appointment of the commission, appointed in fact by the minister of public instruction with Jaurès at its head, which now has in hand the publication of what will eventually be one of the most valuable collections of

¹ At present, the controversy rather centers in certain differences between different representatives of the new school. Meyer, for example, maintains against Lamprecht that the great man may be an original force in history.

² *Le clergé de France pendant la Révolution*, 1901.

³ *L'ancien clergé de France* (2 vols.).

⁴ *La séparation de l'Eglise et de l'état en 1794*, 1903.

⁵ *Histoire religieuse de la Révolution française*, 1909.

⁶ *Les origines des cults révolutionnaire*, 1904; *La Theophilanthrope et le culte décadaire*, 1904; *Rome et le clergé français sous la Constituante*, 1911; *Les conséquences religieuses de la journée du 10 août, 1792*, 1911.

⁷ No date. First volume appeared in 1901.

documents for French history; a collection, that is to say, which is designed to furnish the completest understanding possible of the economic and social conditions of France at the opening of the Revolution, and of the changes that were effected between 1789 and 1800. Happily, the commission is not composed of politicians, or the editing intrusted to the "Chef du bureau des proces-verbaux" and the "Bibliothécaire-adjoint de la Chambre des Députés." That the commission is composed of some of the ablest and most prominent French historians is an indication of their interest in social and economic history.¹

But the attitude which French historians are coming to take toward the content of history may be best indicated perhaps by referring to certain general histories published during the last twenty years. To this task they have not, indeed, brought the method of Lamprecht; they have not written culture histories, but they have written histories of civilization; the latter being, nevertheless, very much like the former with the theory omitted. One of the works I have in mind is the *Historie générale*, of which the first volume appeared in 1893. In the preface to this volume, the editors, Lavissee and Rambaud, acknowledge their obligation to Duruy, who, as early as 1863, asserted that "l'histoire-bataille n'est pas tout," and announce their intention to place "au premier rang les faits qui intéressent, comme disait Voltaire, 'les mœurs et l'esprit des nations.'" This ideal was undoubtedly more difficult to attain in a history of Europe than in a history of some particular country, such as France; and has in fact been attained much better in M. Rambaud's brief *Histoire de la civilisation française*, and in the more comprehensive *Histoire de France*,² recently completed under the editorship of M. Lavissee. In these works the whole history of France is divided into certain distinct periods, each possessing a certain unity in itself; at least each period is treated on that assumption; treated, therefore, descriptively,

¹ *Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire économique de la Révolution française, publié par le Ministère de l'Instruction publique.* The commission, which was appointed in 1903, includes such well-known historians as Aulard, Lavissee, Levasseur, Sagnac, Bloch, and Esmein. The publication of the *cahiers*, and of documents having to do with the acquisition and sale of the national lands, is being actively prosecuted.

² 9 vols., 1905-10.

from the point of view of its political, intellectual, religious, aesthetic, economic, and social characteristics. The aim has been, "not to relate how the battle of Bouvines was won or that of Poitiers lost, but to sketch the history of the nation itself, in all its elements: to show how our ancestors lived, and by what activities [*labeurs*] they prepared the happier life which we enjoy"—to write, that is to say, "the history of French civilization."¹

To exhibit the growth of civilization, to trace the evolution of society—most historians today would probably agree that the ultimate aim of history is to do something of that sort. But it is doubtless true that historians, for the most part, have not defined very precisely the meaning of the term "society," or of the term "evolution" as applied to society. Certainly many difficulties lie hidden in this harmless looking phrase "evolution of society," difficulties which recent attempts to write comprehensive histories, such as those just mentioned, are beginning to reveal. What some of these difficulties are may be suggested by pointing out the influences which, since the middle of the last century, have transformed the earlier conception of history in respect to synthesis and interpretation.

III

That history became "scientific" in the third quarter of the nineteenth century was probably due as much to the influence of Ranke as to the influence of natural science. Ranke set forth his method of dealing with the sources in 1824.² His merit was straightway recognized by the Prussian government, but for some years his influence was confined mainly to his pupils, of whom Giesebrecht and Waitz were the most famous. Even in Germany his works were severely handled on all sides; he was too conservative to satisfy the liberals, while Droysen classed him with the romantics. Nevertheless, his history of the popes³ gave him an international reputation, and the *Zeitalter der Reformation*⁴ became

¹ Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation française*, I, Preface.

² *Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtschreiber*, 1824.

³ *Die römischen Päpste, ihre Kirche und ihr Staat im 16ten und 17ten Jahrhundert*.

⁴ *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation* (6 vols.), 1839-49.

a German classic. Whatever might be thought of his interpretation, the value of his critical methods could not be denied, and before the middle of the century they became the basis of the exact and laborious scholarship of the most famous school of German historians.

The influence of German scholarship was felt in England from the time of Coleridge and Carlyle, who revealed to Englishmen the value of a language, the existence of which Dr. Johnson might have denied, and which Gibbon could not use and did not need to. In 1830 Niebuhr was enthroned at Oxford, where he remained till replaced by Mommsen twenty years later.¹ Ranke's *Popes* was translated into English and given the prestige of a review by Macaulay.² The admiration of mid-century Germans for English institutions found its complement in English appreciation for German scholarship and in loyalty to the German *Mark*. In the fifties, Lord Acton was laying the foundation, at Munich and Berlin, for his immense learning; Bishop Stubbs was preparing to apply the methods of Waitz to the study of the English constitution; and in 1860 Freeman retired to Somerleaze, there to instruct his countrymen in the great dogmas of unity and continuity, and to assure them, at some length, that in Germany Froude would scarcely be considered a historian, or Kingsley have been made a professor. About the same time, the first American pilgrims were coming home to establish seminars in the spirit of the master.

In France, the influence of German historical methods was slight until the collapse of the Revolution of 1848 drove the radicals to cover and exposed the vain prophesies of the liberal historians. Of those who had pinned their faith to the Revolution, many turned from it in fear or disgust, because, like Quinet, they felt that it had betrayed their hopes, or because, like Lamartine, they had seen the shade of Robespierre in the streets of Paris. The lyric note had already ceased in France when the siege of Paris proved past dispute that exact and critical scholarship, even when employed in the chauvinistic spirit of the later Berlin school, had

¹ Cf. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, 2d series, p. 318.

² *The Ecclesiastical and Political History of the Popes of Rome during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Translated by Sarah Austin. 3 vols. 1840. Macaulay's review appeared in October of the same year, *Edinburgh Review*, LXXII, 227.

surprised more of history's secret than the genius of Michelet. And already French scholars were crossing the Rhine to learn German methods. It was in 1867, when Duruy was reorganizing the schools of France, that the young Gabriel Monod, returning from Göttingen and Berlin, set himself to inspire two generations of French students with the ideals which Ranke had bequeathed to Giesebrecht and Waitz.

But undoubtedly the critical methods of Ranke would have less easily conquered the world of historians, had it not been for the rising influence of natural science. The work of Malthus, which acquired peculiar significance toward the middle of the century, the work of Comte, Quetelet, Buckle, and Marx, the work of Spencer and Darwin, all seemed to point to a positive and materialistic explanation of man and society. The possibility of a "science of history" was accordingly a much-mooted question about 1860; and historians found themselves between the devil and the sea: must they acknowledge themselves mere literary people, hoping for nothing better than to elevate history to the dignity of romance; or, renouncing their former ways, become sociologists in good earnest and set themselves, after the manner of Buckle, the task of reducing history to the rank of a science? They chose to do neither. Droysen¹ and Lord Acton,² Goldwin Smith,³ even Charles Kingsley⁴ in his way, undertook to refute the "science" of Comte and Buckle; and the first two were generally thought, by historians at least, to have succeeded. In this controversy it was Ranke, a most acceptable alternative to Buckle, who taught historians how to be scientific without ceasing to be historical.

Nevertheless, "scientific history," which became the watchword of historians from this time on, implied something more than the adoption of Ranke's critical methods of research; it implied

¹ Droysen's criticism of Buckle appeared originally in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1862. Translated by E. B. Andrews, and included with his translation of the *Grundriss der Historik* in *Outline of the Principles of History*, 1893.

² Two articles published in *The Rambler*, 1858; reprinted in *Historical Essays and Studies*, 1907.

³ One of his Oxford lectures delivered in 1859-61, *On the Study of History*, p. 45.

⁴ *The Limits of Exact Science as Applied to History*, 1864.

a particular point of view in respect to interpretation as well, a point of view which was not precisely that of Ranke. To be scientific was to assume, in respect to historical events, the objective and detached attitude of mind with which the scientist regarded natural phenomena. "The historian," said Taine, "may be permitted the privilege of the naturalist: I have observed my subject as one might observe the metamorphosis of an insect."¹ Doubtless many historians, like Taine himself, were more thoroughgoing in theory than in practice; but all agreed that the first duty was to avoid the warping effects of religious or party bias, the insidious influence of temperamental prepossessions, the alluring temptation to read into the facts any meaning suggested by a preconceived theory.

Undoubtedly Ranke's ideal of impartiality was a high one, and his freedom from religious and political bias sufficiently complete; but the "scientific historian" could no longer adhere, in the interpretation of history, to his favorite doctrine of ideas. Apart from any scientific theories about man, it was difficult, indeed, considering the marked success of Machiavellian politics in this period, not to think that Providence favored big battalions rather than ideas. An interpretation of history, on the biological analogy, as a conflict of forces in which the strongest prevailed, was therefore well suited to explain the fall of Louis Napoleon, or to justify the success of Bismarck and Cavour. Perhaps industrial exploitation and Machiavellian politics were after all only the natural and necessary results of the struggle for existence, leading to the survival of the fittest, the policy of "blood and iron" as beneficent in the end as the methods of Nature "red in tooth and claw."

It was not indeed difficult for historians to adapt themselves to this point of view. The earlier conception was sufficiently fatalistic, and it needed only to put Nature in the place of God, to transform ideas into force, and the change was complete. Doubtless the germ of the later theory is in Savigny; and we are told that Droysen learned from Hegel how to justify success, and that Marx founded his materialistic interpretation upon a dialectic borrowed from the same high authority. Giesebrecht's attitude

¹ *L'ancien régime* (1876), Preface.

of aloofness implied that whatever got itself well established was doubtless right as long as it prevailed; and if you conceive of Carlyle's great man as the product of Nature instead of the agent of God, his philosophy is, what it was so often said to be, the assertion that might makes right, for it justifies equally Cromwell and Charles II, Henry IV in proclaiming the Edict of Nantes and Louis XIV in revoking it.

However that may be, scientific history, renouncing philosophy altogether, aimed to free itself from the taint of teleological explanation, and set about studying the past "as something worth knowing for itself and the truth's sake."¹ And to do this it was above all necessary to eliminate the present, its needs and desires, its passions, its hopes and fears—"Histories should be prepared with as much supreme indifference as if they were written in another planet," according to Renan.² Previous historians had not done this. They had studied the past from the point of view of the present, and on that rock they had split—"The way in which Macaulay and Forster regarded the past—that is to say, the constant avowed or unavowed comparison of it with the present—is altogether destructive of real historical knowledge," according to Samuel Rawson Gardiner.³

But after all, why study the dead past for its own sake? Precisely for the sake of the present! And this paradox concealed an initial prepossession and a philosophy. To study the past for its own sake, without prepossessions, was itself a prepossession. A splendid hypothesis, "avowed or unavowed," inspired confidence in the value of the fact for the truth's sake. This hypothesis was implicit in the doctrine of continuity. The doctrine of continuity was not new; but it had formerly been conceived mainly as the progressive realization of certain ideas; whereas scientific history, banishing ideas as a motive force, and concerning itself with the "fact," sought for the continuity of history in external action, and conceived of the present as the product of the past in the sense of being the last event in a connected series of events. History, thought of as a kind of objective reality, seemed a wonder-

¹ Stubbs, *Lectures on Mediaeval and Modern History*, p. 26.

² *The Apostles* (Trans. 1880), p. 44.

³ *History of England* (1884), Preface.

fully solid, almost material, thing; something needing only to be "reconstructed" to stand visible: much as if the facts of history were a number of blocks which had fallen down; which might be set up again; and which, once set them up in the order, precisely, in which they had originally stood, would spell out an intelligible word. Let the historian set up the blocks! Strictly speaking, it was not for him to interpret, but to reveal. "It is not I who speak, but history which speaks through me," was Fustel's reproof to applauding students. And again: "Il se peut sans doute qu'une certaine philosophie se dégage de cette histoire scientifique, mais il faut qu'elle dégage naturellement, d'elle même, presque en dehors de la volonté de l'historien"¹—a splendid theory, doubtless naïve in the extreme, and impossible to be applied by any one, certainly not by Fustel de Coulanges; but amounting, in practice, to this, that everything which got itself established was judged to be necessary where it existed and so long as it lasted; so that the importance of a fact would be measured, speaking from the point of view of an ideal reconstruction, in terms of its extension in time and space. If, for example, certain facts, which for convenience we call the Catholic church, persisted throughout western Europe for several centuries, exerting an influence in some proportion to their extension and persistence, it must have been because they were adapted to the conditions there and during that period; they must have been fittest to survive; the reason for supposing that they were fittest to survive, and adapted to the conditions, being precisely the fact that they did persist throughout western Europe for several centuries. The presumption would of course be "in favor of the church against the sects because the sects came to unspeakable grief, and in favor of the Reformation against Rome because the reformers were successful." "I consider," said Albert Sorel, "that my work will not have been useless if I can achieve this result: to show that the French Revolution, which appeared to many as the subversion, and to others as the regeneration of the old European world, was the natural and necessary result of the history of Europe."²

¹ Quoted in *English Historical Review*, V, 1.

² *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 8.

This attitude of objectivity—the thoroughgoing renunciation of the present, the disposition to reconstruct the past as a whole, to know it for itself alone, to “justify that which is just by the judgment of experience”—undoubtedly this attitude was well suited to the spirit of the two decades after 1870. The resplendent vision of Perfectibility, vouchsafed to the generous minds of the eighteenth century, was much dimmed after 1815, and again after 1848. In the sixties, the evolutionary philosophy fell like a cold douche upon the belief in progress through conscious effort. The theory that man is one with Nature was an old one, but the work of Darwin seemed to furnish a positive demonstration of theories which had hitherto rested on a purely speculative foundation. The biological law of evolution, especially as applied to society by Spencer, indicated that progress, if there was such a thing, could come only through the operation of mechanical forces. Man himself, at best hardly more than a speck of sentient dust, a chance deposit on the surface of the world, might observe the laws of development, but could neither modify nor control them. Materialism had its day in science, pessimism in philosophy, naturalism in literature; religion seemed a spent force. When all the old foundations were crumbling, historians held firmly to the belief that facts at least could not be denied; and in these days of acrid controversy, the past, studied for itself, as a record of facts which undoubtedly happened, was a kind of neutral ground, an excellent refuge for those who wished to sit tight and let the event decide.

But the mood of those years is definitely passing. During the last two decades there has been a revival of faith in the possibility of social regeneration, a revival, one might almost say, of the optimistic spirit of the eighteenth century. Out of the wreck of old creeds, there is arising a new faith, born of science and democracy, almost the only vital conviction left to us—the profound belief, namely, in progress; the belief that society can, by taking thought, modify the conditions of life, and thereby indefinitely improve the happiness and welfare of all men. As this faith strengthens, it finds expression in the imperative command that

knowledge shall serve purpose, and learning be applied to the solution of the "problem of human life." And so there comes, ever more insistently, this question: What light does the past throw on the present and the future? The answer to this question is what our age demands of the social sciences.

And to this question the social sciences are giving heed. Long ago Ihering broke with the Savigny tradition, and conceived of jurisprudence as a science of rights as well as a knowledge of law. Sociologists have emancipated themselves from Spencerian fatalism. Economics, having turned from theory to history, is returning, in some measure, to theory; but to a theory immensely enriched, flavored with ethics. In a recent book, I find the "new economics" defined as the science of human welfare rather than as the science of wealth. Philosophy, which natural science, in the heyday and flush of its tawdry intolerance, so carefully interred forty years ago, has come to life again; and its first conscious act has been to announce, in metaphysical and poetical form, a definition of time which frees the will from deterministic shackles, and a conception of history which liberates the present from slavish dependence on the past.

The study of history is bound to be, and has been already, influenced by this new faith in progress and the possibility of social regeneration. It is becoming clear that the past, regarded as an objective reality, is an abstraction; that the facts, simply restored to their original position, convey no intelligible meaning; that it profits us little to know that the present is what it is because the past was what it was. And so historians are coming, very slowly indeed, but certainly, to regard the past in a new way, or perhaps in an old way. It cannot indeed be said that they are growing either metaphysical or poetical in their conception of the past; but in the statement of Professor Robinson that the time has come when the present should "turn on the past and exploit it in the interest of advance," I see only a more militant assertion of Maeterlinck's idea that "past events do not control us except in so far as we have renounced our right to control them." Perhaps not many historians would subscribe to Professor Robinson's confession of faith; but many are ready to welcome new methods of

interpretation which promise to bring our knowledge of the past to bear more directly and more effectively on the present than the prevailing method has been able to do.

Now, if purpose is to direct knowledge, we must be aware of purpose. If we are to control events and not be controlled by them, it is first of all necessary to know to what end we would control them. If we are to exploit the past in the interest of advance, we need to know what is advance. And this means that the importance of the fact can no longer be measured by the fact itself; it must, on the contrary, be judged by some standard of value derived from a conception of what it is that constitutes social progress—some tentative hypothesis, or conception of moral quality, or present practical purpose. Let us see, then, if it is possible to find, in recent historical works, or in the expression of opinion by historians, any disposition to set up such standards for purposes of interpretation.

"History, in the higher sense of the word," says Mr. Chamberlain, "means only that past which still lives actively in the consciousness of man and helps to mold him." And in his *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* he has attempted to give, "not a history of the past, but merely of that past which is still living,"¹ Whatever historians may think of Mr. Chamberlain's performance, it cannot be denied that many are disposed to sympathize with his ideal; a disposition which finds practical expression in the tendency to emphasize only or principally those aspects of the past which have an obvious connection with the present, to deal more fully with the recent past than with the remote past, or to seek in the remote past situations analogous to those of the present. The latter method of interpretation, which is only a kind of recrudescence of the old theory of cycles, has been made much of by Ferrero.²

¹ *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 1899; English translation by John Lees, 1911.

² "I hope that my book has enabled me to demonstrate that the Roman world conquest, . . . was in reality the effect, remarkable, indeed, for its special conditions of time and place, of an internal transformation which is continually being re-enacted in the history of societies on a larger or a smaller scale, promoted by the same causes and with the same resultant confusion and suffering—the growth of a nationalist and industrial democracy on the ruins of a federation of agricultural aristocracies."—*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, I, Preface.

A more direct method of bringing our knowledge of the past to bear on the present is represented by the recent work of Mr. Firth on *The House of Lords during the Civil War*, which appeared two years ago when the conflict between the Commons and the Lords was at its height. The bearing of the work on that controversy is obvious; but the author did not press the analogy, and it was only in its timeliness that the book departed from accepted principles of interpretation.

The case is somewhat different with many recent textbooks in mediaeval and modern history which consciously devote far more space to the recent past than to earlier periods, and in their treatment of the earlier periods neglect those movements which seem to us dead issues, however important they may have seemed to the people who were engaged in them. "In preparing the volume in hand," it is stated in the preface to Robinson and Beard's *Development of Modern Europe*, "the writers have consistently subordinated the past to the present. It has been their ever-conscious aim to enable the reader to catch up with his own times; to read intelligently the foreign news in the morning paper; to know what was the attitude of Leo XIII toward the Social Democrats even if he has forgotten that of Innocent III toward the Albigenses." It is true, as the authors maintain, that this does not involve any "distortion of the facts in order to bring them into relation to any particular conception of the present or its tendencies." Yet it quite clearly implies that the standard for judging the importance of historical facts is the present and its tendencies. Consistently applied, it is a method of interpretation which renounces the attempt to "reconstruct" the past as a whole for its own sake. Conceiving that the past is to be studied, not for itself, but for the present, it assumes that certain events, such, for example, as the Russian campaign, may have had immense importance for understanding the time in which they occurred but are dead for us and for the present, while other events, such as the invention of the steam engine, may have had little importance for understanding the time when they occurred, but have immense importance for us; and assuming this, it asserts that the historian, in telling the story of the past, may legitimately emphasize the

facts according to their importance for our time instead of their own—may legitimately, that is to say, interpret the past in terms of the present.

Two years ago, in an address before the American Historical Association, Professor Turner formulated this conception of the purpose of historical study much better than I can do. He said:

In the observation of present conditions, we may find assistance in our study of the past. By the revelation of the present, what seemed to be side eddies have not seldom proven to be the concealed entrances to the main current; and the course which seemed the central one has led to blind channels and stagnant waters, important in their day, but cut off like ox-bow lakes from the mighty river of historical progress. . . . [And therefore] it is important to study the present and the recent past . . . as the source of new hypotheses, new criteria of the perspective of the remoter past. A just public opinion and a statesmanlike treatment of present problems demand that they be seen in their historical relations in order that history may hold the lamp for conservative reform.¹

How remote is all this from the attitude of Gardiner—"The avowed or unavowed comparison of the past with the present is altogether destructive of real historical knowledge."

A quite different method of estimating the importance of historical facts is to bring them to the test of some conception of moral quality. The historian who claims the privilege of the naturalist cannot be concerned, strictly speaking, with the quality of actions or events. He may find of course that an action acquires special importance because those whom it concerned attributed to it a certain quality, and were influenced by it accordingly. But for the historian who observes his subject only "as one might observe the metamorphosis of an insect," the circumstance that the men whom he studies judged actions by their quality is itself only another fact to be observed and recorded; he judges none of these facts by their quality, as good or bad, harmful or beneficial, as contributing to progress or making for retrogression. So far as he is concerned, the facts of history have no ethical significance, no qualitative value.

Precisely the opposite of this was maintained by David J. Hill four years ago, before the Congress of Historical Sciences at Berlin,

¹ "Social Forces in American History," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XVI, 217.

in an address entitled "The Ethical Function of the Historian."¹ "The substance with which the history of man is concerned," he said, "is personal conduct, and the reaction of personal conduct upon human development." The function of the historian is, therefore, an "ethical function." Not, to be sure, that the historian should set himself up "as a moral judge"; but "the interest of history does not lie in the fact that so many painters and sculptors lived in a certain period of time and produced so many works, but in the quality of the pictures and statues they created; not in the fact that so many soldiers fought in so many battles and succeeded in killing so many of their number, but in the social purpose for which they fought and the effect of their victory upon human happiness." According to this view of the matter, the historian judges the importance of the fact, not by its extension, but by its quality; and not by the contemporary estimate of its quality, but by his own estimate; he "*explains* the action of a man," as Lord Acton says, "by the standards of the age in which he lived but *judges* it by those of his own." And this, obviously, implies a standard of value not furnished by the facts themselves. The historian must rouse up a brave philosophy of life before venturing to say what was the effect of the battle of Waterloo upon human happiness; he must provide himself with aesthetic canons if he is to estimate the quality of *Mona Lisa* or the *Sistine Madonna*—a difficult business, certainly, for Renan's supremely indifferent man, sitting calmly in Mars, or in the moon.

Perhaps Mr. Hill is not a representative historian. But let me quote, as an illustration of the disposition to interpret history according to the quality of its facts, the following from the preface of a recent book on the Middle Ages.² The historian's sympathy, says Mr. Taylor,

cannot but reach out to those who lived up to their best understanding of life; for who can do more? Yet woe unto that man whose mind is closed, whose standards are material and base. Not only [thus saith the historian to those who make history] shalt thou do what seems well to thee; but thou shalt do right with wisdom. Thou shalt not only be sincere, but thou shalt

¹ *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XIV, 9.

² *The Mediaeval Mind* (1911), Preface.

be righteous, and not iniquitous; beneficent and not malignant; loving and lovable, and not hating and hateful. Thou shalt be a promoter of light and not of darkness; an illuminator and not an obscurer. Not only shalt thou seek to choose aright, but at thy peril thou shalt so choose. . . . And so at *his* peril likewise, must the historian judge. He cannot state the facts and sit aloof, impartial between good and ill, between success and failure, progress and retrogression, the soul's health and loveliness, and spiritual foulness and disease. He must love and hate, and at his peril love aright and hate what is truly hateful.

This is clearly a new note. It might have pleased Lord Acton; but it would assuredly have sounded like sweet bells jangled, out of tune, and harsh, to Ranke, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, or Henry C. Lea. Yet it is the quite deliberate opinion of a professed historian, trained in all the excellent technique of his trade, and the author of books which few historians would deny to be scholarly in every sense of the term.

These are direct and practical methods of bringing our knowledge of the past to bear on the solution of present problems; they are not, however, altogether new methods; and certainly they are somewhat empirical methods, useful rather for dealing with particular aspects of history than with the whole of it. The uncompromisingly philosophic mind, resolutely seeking a complete historical synthesis, requires a more scientific method, and a more inclusive one. Such a method has been discovered in Germany—the method of Lamprecht; a method which I understand to aim at a complete synthesis, omitting nothing; and one which seeks to explain in a new manner, and in a severely scientific manner, exactly how the present is the product of the past. Of Lamprecht's method, I confess to speak with the greatest misgiving, for I am not at all sure that I understand it. But at least it is an attempt to solve the difficult problem of synthesis. One may therefore approach it from that point of view.

The growing interest, among historians, in synthetic problems is, indeed, a notable characteristic of the last two decades. During that period many constructive works, either by individuals or by associated scholars, have been begun or brought to completion. The *Revue de synthèse historique* was established in France in 1900.

Rickert,¹ Xenopol,² Berr,³ and many others have concerned themselves with the theory and the logic of historical synthesis.⁴ And it is significant that most of the historians who spoke before the Congress of Arts and Science at St. Louis took occasion to urge the necessity of giving more attention to constructive work, and to interpretation. They seemed also to agree, although differing in many other respects, that the ultimate purpose of the historical synthesis is to exhibit the development of society, or of national life, as a whole, to the end that the present organization of society may be better understood.

Now, one result of recent attempts at constructive work has been to reveal the difficulty of doing just what historians profess to be their ultimate task—the task, that is to say, of exhibiting the evolution of national life, or of society, as a whole. Such works, for example, as the *Histoire générale*,⁵ the *American Nation*,⁶ and Professor Channing's *History of the United States*⁷ aim to deal with all aspects of the national life. But the truth is that these works, excellent as they undoubtedly are, are after all mainly political histories, with a good deal of attention throughout to the influence of economic conditions, and with chapters sandwiched in here and there dealing with literature and other odd ends. Except for the prefaces, one could not easily distinguish them

¹ *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, 1896–1902.

² *Les principes fondamentaux de l'histoire*, 1899.

³ *La synthèse en histoire: essai critique et théorique*, 1911. This is rather a review of recent discussion than a contribution to theory.

⁴ For an excellent brief summary of Rickert, with mention of many other works, see Fling, "Historical Synthesis," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, IX (October, 1903), 1.

⁵ "Nous nous garderons de faire entrer uniquement ou principalement ce que notre respecté maître, M. Duruy, appelait l'histoire-bataille: litanies de souverains, séries de combats ou de traités. Nous entendons mettre au premier rang les faits qui intéressent, comme disait Voltaire, 'les mœurs et l'esprit des nations'."—*Histoire Générale*, I, Preface.

⁶ "Not intended to be simply a political or constitutional history: it must include the social life of the people, their religion, their literature, and their schools. It must include their economic life, occupations, labor systems, and organization of Capital."—*American Nation*, I, editor's introduction to the series.

⁷ "The growth of the nation will be treated as one continuous development from the political, military, institutional, industrial, and social points of view."—*History of the United States*, I, Preface.

from histories which frankly profess to be political histories, such as Hunt and Poole's *Political History of England*,¹ or those which have taken to themselves unique titles, such as the *Cambridge Modern History*.

Nor is the difficulty due altogether to predilection for political history, or to ignorance of other things. For the problem is not solved by works which give as much space to social and intellectual conditions as they do to political conditions, such as Rambaud's *Histoire de la civilisation française*, or the *Histoire de France* of M. Lavissee. The problem is to exhibit at once the interaction of all the complex forces which make the nation what it is at any given time, and the process of change by which these forces, acting together, are transforming the nation. But the interaction of political, economic, religious, and intellectual conditions at any given time is not necessarily revealed by simply describing them in turn; and if, as in these works, the whole subject is divided into certain distinct periods, and each period is treated statistically, as it were, the process of growth or evolution is largely lost sight of. These works do not, therefore, trace the evolution of the French civilization or of the French nation. At best, they give us excellent descriptions of various aspects of national life in successive periods.

There is a most suggestive phrase in a letter to Freeman from Green, who was fully aware of this difficulty. He insists that he must deal with the "moral and intellectual facts" as well as with political facts. "And I must deal with them," he says, "much as I have dealt with them in Little Book; that is, I can't muddle them up in corners always."² To deal with moral and intellectual facts as well as with political facts was easy enough if one "muddled them up in corners"; but how to fuse them all together in one continuous narrative, revealing at every stage the unity and the

¹ "As the title imports, this history will deal primarily with politics, . . . but as the history of a nation is complex, and its condition at any given time cannot be understood without taking into account the various forces acting upon it, notices of religious matters, and of intellectual, social, and economic progress will also find place in these volumes."—*Political History of England*, I, Preface.

² *Letters of John Richard Green*, p. 304. "Little Book" was Green's phrase for designating the Short History.

continuity of national life—that was Green's problem. With a wide knowledge of details, possessed of a constructive imagination denied to most men, employing a literary style which even in description always conveys a sense of movement, he solved the problem as well perhaps as it is likely to be solved by anyone who attempts to synthesize the facts of history in terms of their concrete relations.

For in truth this problem raises the question whether a synthesis of facts according to their concrete relations is altogether adequate if the business of the historian is to trace the evolution of society as a whole, or of distinct social groups, such as nations. If society, or a nation, is something more than its external manifestations, an adequate description of it must seek to relate those manifestations which, in their concrete setting, seem to have no connection with each other. It is possible, for example, that there is some underlying connection between the painting by Whistler of Carlyle's portrait and the introduction into Parliament of Gladstone's second Home Rule bill. But the connection, whatever it may be, is not external, and probably no amount of investigation, however accurate, of what actually happened, or any juxtaposition, however ingenious, of concrete descriptions of those events, will reveal it. The connection, if there be one, is not found in the documents. It may, however, be found, hypothetically at least, in the subjective basis of these events; and so the attempt to deal with all the complex activities of men in society, to exhibit at once their interaction and their evolution, leads naturally enough to the search for some ideal connection of the facts—to a method of synthesis which, without necessarily ignoring altogether their actual position in time and space, groups them fundamentally according to common qualities.

And this, to return to the method of Lamprecht, is what I suppose to be the significance of the *Deutsche Geschichte*, which has created such a stir in Germany. Lamprecht took his cue, I believe, from Burckhardt, and I understand that, like Burckhardt, he has attempted to disengage the soul of society, the *social-psyche* from the concrete events, the particular activities of men, in any given period; and this he does by discussing the concrete events,

the particular activities, as results of the psychological forces which are generated by social life: thus he finds, in the *social-psyche*, the underlying connection between the crude delineation of an eagle, the construction of a heroic song, and the Donation of Charlemagne. But Lamprecht goes farther than Burckhardt, for while Burckhardt limited himself to a single period, and was concerned, therefore, only with one problem, the problem of correlating the facts of a single period, Lamprecht surveys the whole of German history and is confronted with the further problem of explaining how the *mass-psyche* of one period is transformed into the *mass-psyche* of the next one: he seeks, that is to say, to exhibit the evolution of the social soul by discovering the "fundamental underlying psychic mechanism" which conditions it.

Those who are interested in guarding frontiers may determine whether Lamprecht is historian or sociologist. It is worth while noting, however, that he did not, like Ferrero, come to the study of history as a psychologist, but that, starting as a historian, it was the purely historical problem of synthesis and interpretation that led him to apply the principles of psychology to history. The success of the method obviously depends very largely upon psychology; it is for psychology to say whether there is a soul of society, to define the concept with as much precision as possible, to determine the process by which it operates, and to formulate methods for detecting and measuring its influence. Assuming that this can be done, it is clear that the method of Lamprecht furnishes at least one solution of the problem I have mentioned—the problem of dealing with society as a whole, of exhibiting at once the unity and the evolution of its varied manifestations.

But in doing this, it does something more; it erects a standard for determining the importance of past events which enables us to bring the past to bear on the present in a new way altogether. By interpreting the series of objective events in terms of psychic development, the present ceases to be the product of the past in the sense of being the last event in a time series of events, and becomes the product of the past in the sense that the actions of men now living are the results of past social experience psychologically transformed. The English Parliament, to take an

example, is, we say, the product of the past; and we try to show this by tracing its continuity in successive external acts from the thirteenth century down. But after all, Lamprecht might say, the English Parliament is an abstraction, and the continuity of the institution, in any external sense, a mere figure of speech. In what sense, then, is it the product of the past? Why, only in the sense that the social experience of the English people, gathered up, as it were, though the course of their history, and cumulatively transmitted from generation to generation, is now effectively producing those psychic reactions which impel Englishmen to act as they do act, at Westminster or elsewhere—impelling Gladstone to introduce a second Home Rule bill, and Whistler to paint the portrait of Carlyle. The continuity of history is thus subjective. Its real substance is social experience deposited in nerve centers. Civilization is understood not as action but as motive to action, and progress is measured by the growing intensity of psychic responses.

In connection with the method of Lamprecht, it is interesting to recall the earlier ideas of Fustel de Coulanges, and notably certain sentences in the preface of the *Cité antique*. "Happily, the past never dies completely for men. Man may forget it, but he keeps it with him always. For, such as he himself is in each epoch, he is the product and *résumé* of all anterior epochs. If he descends into his own soul, he can rediscover there these different epochs, and distinguish them according to the impress which each has made on him." Fustel seems here to have anticipated the fundamental idea of Lamprecht—an idea, however, which he afterward repudiated absolutely.

IV

These are, as it seems to me, some of the ways in which social problems and ideas are influencing the study and writing of history. I am not concerned to pronounce upon the legitimacy of any of the new methods, or to estimate the measure of success with which they have been applied. It is worth noting, however, that they are likely to be much used in the future. Differing in many respects, they seem all inspired by a common motive, the desire,

namely, to appropriate out of the past something which may serve that ideal of social progress which is the sum and substance of our modern faith; and in this respect they are part of the central intellectual movement of the age, of which the most striking feature, perhaps, is the reaction against scientific materialism. It is the philosophers, indeed, rather than the historians, who have popularized the new conception of the past. The past, according to Rudolph Eucken, is not a burden on the present but a power within it—which I understand to mean that knowledge of history is useless except in so far as we can transmute it into motives for effective social service. Maeterlinck has expressed the same idea much better:¹ "Our chief concern with the past is not what we have done or the adventures we have met with, but the moral reactions bygone events are producing within us at this very moment." The *Deutsche Geschichte* might be considered as an exposition of this thesis.

Perhaps it is the *social-psyche* that induces historians, against their will doubtless, to approach within hailing-distance of philosophers. At all events, if it be true that the boundaries which have hitherto set history off from philosophy and the social sciences are being effaced, I think we may regard it as a fortunate circumstance, an indication that historical studies are not destined to run into a barren scholasticism, a most happy augury, therefore, of their future usefulness.

¹ *The Buried Temple*, p. 245.

Climate
1 year
the day
a day
in progress

OUTLOOK FOR SOCIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES¹

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The term "social politics" is but little employed in this country. Other phrases, however, such as "welfare legislation," "social legislation," "labor legislation," "social reform," "legislation for social and industrial justice," have been employed to express this idea. Social politics, as I understand it, involves the conscious systematic control exercised by the government over the economic and social life of the given society or group. It is contrasted with a "police" system in which the government contents itself with merely preventing violence and fraud. No government has ever practically confined itself to this course, but some governments have come much nearer to it than others, and some have given the idea theoretical assent.

In our own country progress in the direction of a comprehensive social policy has been particularly slow for a variety of reasons which an analysis of the subject discloses.

In the first place, the eighteenth-century political philosophy, under the influence of which federal and state governments were formed, was favorable to a minimum of governmental organization and action. Thomas Paine, for example, regarded society as a blessing, government as an evil. "Society," he said, "is a patron and government a punisher." The structure and powers of government were organized at this time with a view of giving as little power as possible to those in positions of authority. This mechanism was primarily intended to prevent a possible lapse into hereditary aristocracy or monarchy. But the theorists of the time did not distinguish clearly between this specific purpose and the general limitation of the powers of government for all purposes, and in later times the doctrine and the machinery intended to prevent

¹ From Proceedings of the American Sociological Society.

monarchy were applied against all forms of governmental action or interference even in the interest of the community.

Further, the prevailing economic theory of the last hundred years has been unfavorable to the development of policies of social legislation. It would be superfluous to show that economic theory has been until recently of the distinctly *laissez-faire* type. Our political economists have set their faces against interference with the "natural laws" of trade on the ground that such intervention is more likely to hinder than to help social progress. They have magnified the difficulties of governmental action and minimized the advantages of action on the part of the state. It is only within the last few years that the attitude of leading economists in the United States has shifted. In our own day Mr. Walker referred to "those of us who discerned the coming of a storm and removed ourselves and our effects from the lower ground of an uncompromising individualism to positions somewhat more elevated and seemingly secure." Professor James also declared:

We do not regard [the state] as a merely negative factor, the influence of which is most happy when it is smallest: but we recognize that some of the most necessary functions of a civilized society can be performed only by the state and some others most efficiently by the state, that the state in a word is a permanent category of economic life and not merely a temporary crutch which may be cast away when society becomes more perfect.¹

Little by little the attitude of many of our leading economists, although by no means all of them, has materially changed.

The development of a system of social politics has further been made difficult in our country because of the strict constitutional limitations imposed upon state activities; and because of the narrow interpretation of these limitations by unfriendly courts. It is not necessary to cite at length the array of cases in which the judiciary has wrecked plans for social legislation. Opposition to laws limiting the hours of labor and to workmen's compensation are conspicuous illustrations familiar to everyone. Much the same attitude has been taken in regard to other cases involving conscious and systematic control over the economic and social life of the community by its organized government. The

¹ *Publications of American Economic Association*, I, 26.

political philosophy of the eighteenth century, the economics of the same period, together with narrow legal training and frequent ignorance of, or indifference to, social and industrial questions, has made the courts cold or even hostile to any broad policy which we might characterize by the term "social politics."

The organized system of political corruption has stood in the way of schemes for social betterment and improvement. The greatest loss inflicted upon the community by the genus grafter is not the millions he has stolen. We could almost afford to pension off our grafters and give them what they steal if they would leave us alone to work out plans of social and industrial improvement. The greatest damage they have inflicted upon the community has been their opposition, sometimes open and sometimes covert, to any program of social politics. Through their control of state legislatures, administrators, and sometimes, courts, they have been able to delay, obstruct, cripple, and hamper policies designed to promote the general welfare of the community. Social politics has been in the jackpot of more than one legislature. In this way, even where public sentiment has been aroused to such an extent that historic prejudice against governmental action has been overcome, its waves have been beaten back or driven into other channels. We may properly say that one of the largest single losses inflicted by our organized corruptionists has been the prevention of social and economic progress.

These combined influences of economic theory, political philosophy, constitutional limitation, judicial interpretation, and political corruption have made the practical advance of any policy or policies of social legislation extremely slow. Together they have been able to force the United States far in the rear of the procession of the great industrial states of the world. The remarkable progress made by Germany under Bismarck thirty years ago was almost unnoticed in this country for a quarter of a century, while measures adopted by other European states were ignored by our practical statesmen. English advance in the same direction also passed to a large extent unnoticed, although the recent experiments made under the Lloyd-George régime have attracted far more attention than the Continental undertakings. So it has happened

that our country blazed the trail of political liberty a century and a half ago but now lags far behind the other great industrial states of the world. Germany and England, our keenest competitors in the business world, have far outstripped us in practical measures for the protection of the community and for the promotion of the general welfare in the broad sense of the term. The so-called Manchester school of economics never had much vogue in Germany where the state has for many years been recognized as an agency for the promotion of community welfare. England, the home of the "let alone" policy, has long since abandoned it in theory and in practice.

Notwithstanding the many obstacles interposed and the long delay occasioned, substantial progress has been made in the United States in the direction of a comprehensive social policy during the last ten years. This is evident in city, in state, and in nation alike.

In our city government one of the most striking evidences of a community policy has been the development of city-planning schemes. In New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, and in practically all the large centers of the country, city plans so-called, have been outlined either by private societies or by public act. These plans involve a careful and comprehensive study of the needs of each local community, with respect to arrangement of streets, parks and public places, transportation, housing and recreation needs, and in short they constitute an attempt on the part of the city to regulate and control its own growth and development. While most of these plans have thus far been only imperfectly executed, yet they show a tendency toward conscious social control through governmental agencies. They have compelled the community to think of itself and of the possibility of regulating by common action at least the physical outlines of the city. In cases like the Pittsburgh Survey, under private auspices, the analysis has gone down more deeply and the remedies prescribed have been correspondingly more fundamental, for in this case we have a description and analysis of social, industrial, and living conditions of men and women.

Many other aspects of city government indicate the development of the social-political idea; as for example, the growth of

parks, playgrounds, opportunities for public recreation, the so-called neighborhood or social center, the educational system now developing, the activities of the health and building department for the protection of the community from unsafe and unsanitary conditions, all indicate the presence of the same general tendency to treat broadly the vital problems of a community. Kansas City has even established a "general welfare board." "Necessity" has been, from time immemorial, "the mother of invention," and the dire necessity of our cities has driven them to many constructive efforts. These, it is true, are not comparable either in breadth of design or in completeness of execution to the plans of Germany or even of English cities, but compared with our situation of twenty-five years ago they indicate a rapid advance in the conception of what the community should and may do for the welfare of its citizens. The treatment of the school problem, the park problem, the sanitary problem, the juvenile court, the city-plan question would all have been impossible under conditions as they existed twenty-five years back. It must be admitted that many of these advances have been made, not by straight frontal attack, but by flanking movements. Nevertheless they have been made step by step and the lines have been pushed forward year by year.

In our state governments the advance in the direction of a distinct system of social-political policy has been made in the field of labor legislation. The last bulletin of the American Association for the Advancement of Labor Legislation contains a summary of the legislation for the year 1912 which is extremely significant to any student of American politics or of American society.

This bulletin gives a review of laws covering the subjects of industrial accidents and diseases, child labor, employers' liability and workmen's compensation, detailed factory and workshop regulations, legislation regarding the hours of labor, old-age pensions, unemployment, and many regulations in regard to hours and conditions of labor for women, and in the case of Massachusetts includes the establishment of a minimum-wage commission. While these laws are in no sense and in no place complete and are not to be compared in completeness of scope or in vigor and efficiency of administration with much European legislation, yet they

constitute a striking advance. They are the forerunners of a general and comprehensive plan of social legislation. They are of significance, not only because of what they actually embody, but for what they foreshadow in the way of future accomplishment. This is particularly true of such acts as the Massachusetts law establishing minimum-wage commissions for women's work and authorizing the payment of old-age pensions for laborers employed by cities and towns; the investigation of the subject of unemployment and the adoption of employers' liability, workmen's compensation, and insurance acts.

In the federal field much less has been accomplished, although legislative activity in this direction is not wholly lacking. The policy of the federal government in regard to a protective tariff, in respect to internal improvements, in the wholesale distribution of land may all be classified under the broad term of "social politics." The avowed purpose of fostering manufacturing by governmental action, of settling a vast territory by practically free grants of government land, and of stimulating and developing industry and agriculture by governmental grant and bonus are all evidences of national welfare work on a gigantic scale. Curiously enough, however, the opposition to these movements, particularly in the case of tariff and internal improvements, has been based, not on theoretical grounds, but largely on the constitutional principle of state's rights. At the same time those who have been most active in promoting these policies have often been the theoretical opponents of the economic doctrine of *laissez faire*. The manufacturer who demanded at Washington governmental action to protect his industry was often found at the state capital denouncing state interference with the conditions of his employees. We have often seen men bitterly opposing social politics in the abstract while encouraging and practicing it in the concrete.

The conservation policy of the United States government stands upon a somewhat different basis. In this case we have a consciously designed policy of preserving the natural resources of the country. This was based partly upon the desire to avoid evident waste of assets and partly upon a desire to prevent control by special as opposed to general interest. The broad policy of pre-

serving and protecting of water-power, timber, minerals, and other similar resources of the country has been an illustration on a huge scale of what is properly known as social politics.

In other directions also the federal government has advanced. A conspicuous illustration of this has been the limitation of the hours of labor in public work or public contracts, and the regulations in regard to hours of labor on railroads; laws compelling the adoption of certain safety appliances on railroads, together with the employers' liability and workmen's compensation acts. The last Congress provided for the establishment of a children's bureau, and created a commission on industrial relations with broad powers of investigation, including an inquiry into the general condition of labor in the principal industries of the United States, into existing relations between employers and employees, into the effects of industrial conditions on public welfare and the rights and powers of the community to deal therewith, into conditions of sanitation and safety, into associations of employers and wage-earners, methods of collective bargaining, methods for maintaining satisfactory relations between employers and employees, bureaus of labor, and finally: "The commission shall seek to discover the underlying causes of dissatisfaction in the industrial situation and report its conclusions thereon." This inquiry may prove to be the beginning of a comprehensive social policy on the part of the United States, or of course it is possible that it will bear no fruit at all. It is significant in this connection that in his recent volume on *Social Reform and the Constitution* Professor Goodnow has stated that in general there is less constitutional difficulty in the way of a national policy of social reform than is found in the various states. For example, he has indicated that there are no constitutional objections, so far as the federal government is concerned, to the establishment of far-reaching plans of social insurance, while in the separate commonwealths these same measures might encounter fatal constitutional objections. Professor Goodnow says:

Who, in view of the history of the public domain, will venture to say that the constitution limits the power of Congress to dispose of the public funds as it sees fit in order to promote what it considers to be the "public welfare of the United States," to provide for which the constitution specifically says the taxing power may be used.

When we consider, therefore, the development in our urban communities, the results obtained in the several states of the Union, and the legislation completed and in prospect in our federal government, it seems likely that we may expect a régime of social politics in the United States within our day and generation. It is a striking fact that in the year 1912 a political party was organized on a platform strongly emphasizing social and industrial justice. Some of these measures have been championed for many years by the Socialist party, which, however, because of its weakness in America, was unable to make a deep impression. The Progressive party, polling at the last election over four million votes, adopted a sweeping program of social legislation. They declared in terms, both in state and in national platforms, for effective legislation looking to the prevention of industrial accidents, occupational diseases, overwork, and involuntary unemployment, for the fixing of minimum safety and health standards for various occupations, for the prohibition of child labor, for minimum-wage standards for working women, for the establishment of an eight-hour day for women and young persons, for one day's rest in seven for all wage-earners, for an eight-hour day in continuous (twenty-four) industries, for publicity as to wages, hours, and conditions of labor, for standards of compensation for death by industrial accident and injury and trade disease, for "the protection of home life against the hazards of sickness, irregular employment and old age through the adoption of a system of social insurance adapted to American use." And in order to carry out this program the Progressive party pledged itself to use all powers of federal and state government, not only up to the limit of the Constitution, but later by amendment of the Constitution if found necessary.

The causes of this recent and rapid development in American political thought and in American political policy are numerous. Among them a few may be mentioned. The rapid growth of great cities has forced many of these problems to the attention of the community in a striking manner. In congested cities like New York and Chicago the "let alone" policy of government becomes untenable and impossible. The state or the city must regulate individual conduct for the protection of safety, health, and life.

When the fathers founded the Republic the United States was a rural nation. At that time only 3 per cent of the population lived in cities, while the census for 1910 showed 46.3 per cent of our people living in urban communities. In a number of states like Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois more than 50 per cent of the population is urban. This fact has operated powerfully to bring about the development of social policy within the city and to force the recognition of it in state and in nation.

Again, the rapid growth of great industries in the United States has tended to precipitate this problem. Large-scale industry has made it almost impossible for an individual workingman to protect himself in respect to wages, hours, or other conditions of labor. He has therefore been driven into some form of organization, and to organized demand for state intervention to protect him. Organized labor has been an important factor throughout the land in the formulation of, and the agitation for, social legislation. Labor has never taken any effective form as an organized political party in this country but has carried on a vigorous propaganda for labor legislation.

The development of the doctrine of conservation during the last ten years, applied as it has been to forests, mines, and water-power, has strongly affected the general conception of the scope and purpose of government. The idea of conservation by the government of interests belonging to the whole society has been extended to the conservation of human resources as well. Having familiarized the public with the idea of conserving timber as a matter of national economy, it was an easy step to the idea of conserving human beings and human energy as a matter of practical economy as well as humanity.

Almost at the same time the so-called efficiency doctrine appeared and was widely heralded in industry. The accountants, the teachers of shop management like Taylor and Emerson, the industrial engineers and doctors have begun a study of the conservation and effective application of human energy which has had a pronounced effect upon social thinking. They have extended the study of organization and machinery to the human machine

itself and endeavored to find out what possibilities lie in the human being in the way of accomplishment and achievement. This has doubtless been a minor element in the general process, but approaching the subject from the side of private business, it has unquestionably been an influence which cannot be ignored.

Another reason for the development of these policies is the advance of science, whether in the form of public sanitation or of social science. Much of the advance made in the field of labor legislation has been made possible by a study of industrial hygiene. The effects of modern industrial methods and processes upon life, safety and health have been studied and made plain during the last ten years and in response to this there has come a flood of legislation. Detailed investigations like those of Miss Josephine Goldmark have contributed materially to the development of social policy. The argument presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois in defense of the ten-hour labor law for women was much more like a treatise on industrial hygiene than a legal argument. It dealt more with a discussion of medical facts than with precedents gleaned from the law books. Concrete studies of the effect of child labor upon later development, of the effects of bad working conditions for women upon the future of the race, of overstrain and overwork in all occupations have made much easier the pathway of social legislation. The clearer these studies have been and the more graphically the results have been presented, the more quickly and decisively have results been secured.

On the other hand, the study of the anatomy and physiology of society has helped to give not only detailed information but a point of view necessary to the formulation of a comprehensive policy. The scriptural phrase "We are all members of one body" has been translated into the language of social science by the studies of hundreds of observers and the analyses of trained minds. We now begin to know in a scientific sense how and why we are all members of one body.

Whatever may be our opinion as to the present status of the science of society or the possibilities of future development of that science, no impartial observer can fail to perceive that study of

the structure and laws of society has been and will continue to be of great value in helping the public to treat more broadly the great questions of social policy.

The chief objection to these policies of social legislation comes from two diametrically opposite groups. On the one hand, there are the "standpatters," and on the other, the extreme socialists and the group known as the syndicalists, industrial trade unionists, in our country best represented by the Industrial Workers of the World. The standpatter, so-called, opposes these measures because he does not consider that any material change in the industrial or political order of things is urgently necessary. He believes that on the whole satisfactory progress is being made in the increase of the social product and in its distribution. He invokes once more the economic theory of *laissez faire* and the political philosophy of the eighteenth century. In our country, unfortunately, honest conservatism is not unfrequently linked with crooked privilege and criminal politics. The alliance of conservatism with graft and privilege has made its position strong from one point of view and vulnerable from another. In so far as corrupt methods may be successfully employed, this alliance has strengthened conservatism, but in so far as the moral sense of the community has revolted against corrupt practices in the public service, and has tended to associate conservatism and corruption, its general position has been greatly weakened.

Certain socialistic writers have attacked the present plan of social reform in Germany, England, and the United States on the ground that they are not fundamental but superficial. They have declared, as Mr. Walling does in his volume on *Socialism as It Is*, that the purpose and effect of these measures will be to preserve capitalism as it is, to maintain the system in a better and more human form, but nevertheless to continue the so-called capitalistic scheme fundamentally undisturbed. They have argued that these plans as thus far worked out involve nothing more than a highly intelligent efficiency system on the patriarchal basis, and while they have not directly opposed these measures, they have not regarded them as fundamental or as final. Mr. Walling has been particularly bitter in his attacks upon this whole policy. He

denounces what he calls the "capitalistic reform program" and the activities of the so-called revisionists, reformers, and German Social Democrats of the Berger type. "The new reform programs," says he, "however radical, are aimed at regenerating capitalism, and the net result will be to establish another form of economic feudalism, patriarchy, or paternalism." Quoting another writer, he says: "The new feudalism will care for and conserve the powers of the human industrial tool as the lord of the manor looked after the human agricultural implement."

The so-called syndicalists, on the other hand, prefer "direct" methods to political methods. They repudiate parliamentary and political action and prefer such methods as the general strike and *sabotage*.¹

Certain of their leaders denounce not only reform but state socialism and democracy itself. They regard as one of their chief objects the abolition of the state. The syndicalist distrusts the state and believes that political forms and institutions have outlived their usefulness and cannot be adapted to new social relations.

No one can of course predict what the final form or effect of these various measures of social policy will be. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out the enormous development of rational social legislation in the United States in recent times. It is adequate for this immediate purpose to show the pronounced change in economic and political theory and the altered attitude of the public mind as evidenced in party platform and in practical legislation as well. It is sufficient to show that during the last fifty years these great changes have been wrought. It is safe to assume that during the next generation the conscious rational treatment of social and industrial problems by society acting through its organized governmental agencies will continue in increasing measure. This is likely to develop most rapidly in cities, but will characterize both state and national activity, and it is not at all impossible that under our constitutional system the national government may lead the way in policies of this nature. The cramped consti-

¹ See W. E. Walling, *Socialism as It Is*, chap. v; Louis Levine, "The Standpoint of Syndicalism," *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, XLIV, 114.

tutional situation of the state compared with the powerful situation of the nation may prove decisive. The practical question is whether these changes shall be made scientifically, wisely, and with sufficient deliberation to insure the maintenance of the social equilibrium, or whether they will be made ignorantly, rashly, and with the blind fury that characterizes revolutionary movements. The mutterings and rumblings of discontent are a warning that changes must come and that the real choice lies, not between change and no change, but between rational and gradual change on the one hand, and sudden and revolutionary change on the other.

THE BACKGROUND OF ECONOMIC THEORIES¹

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It is a weakness of economics that the social ideas upon which its theories rest have been neglected. Economic theories have been put forward as though they depended solely upon physical or objective conditions. This view obscures the relation between economic theory and the epochs in which it originated; it makes what really is of class origin appear as though it were a necessary element of human nature. To understand its development the history of economic thought must be divided into three epochs, which may be designated as the epoch of 1776, that of 1848, and that of 1912. The social thought of the first epoch brought out the elements in human nature and in objective conditions that contributed to the harmony of interest. The early economists thus emphasized general laws, and were optimistic in tone. This epoch ends in 1848 with the revolution by which it became well known.

To understand the new group of writers which now appears, the political and social development of the time must be reviewed. The group to which Adam Smith belonged had influenced public opinion in England and on the Continent; by it a radical, or at least a liberal, viewpoint had been created. As a result, however, of the Napoleonic wars, a definite reaction began in all Europe which has its basis in the thought that social progress had been too rapid, and that either a reaction was necessary or at least a considerable halt should be made before new progress was undertaken. This made the thought of 1848 either revolutionary or reactionary. One group of thinkers contended that progress had been too slow and hence should be accelerated by a revolution, while the other group regarded the forward movement as too rapid and hence thought that in some way it should be checked. A representative of this English reaction is Carlisle. In Germany the movement associated

¹ From Proceedings of the American Sociological Society.

with Bismarck had the same ideal and end. The best representative of the revolutionary movement is Karl Marx, since from his writings the revolutionary socialism of recent years has taken its origin.

It is not my purpose to discuss in full the views of either group of thinkers. The contrast, however, is definite and has constituted the basis for discussion during the last sixty years. The most influential representative of this epoch is John Stuart Mill, whose position therefore needs attention. Mill was as revolutionary in his ideas as was Karl Marx, and one of his essays of this epoch is a *Defense of the Revolution of 1848*. Mill, however, was not consistent in his position. When he wrote his *Political Economy* he was reactionary in production and revolutionary in distribution. To make this clear, the attitude of Adam Smith must be contrasted with that of Mill. Smith regarded production as varying with quantities of labor, and thought that improvements in production were connected with the improvements in the condition of the laboring class. Mill's emphasis in production is not on labor but on capital. Hence he views the progress of society, not in connection with the changes in the laboring class, but rather with the accumulation of wealth. From standards of labor to standards of capital there is an evident reaction, because capital appeals to many fewer motives than do the incentives to labor. It is also a class appeal. Relatively few are aroused by the motives for saving; the great mass of people contribute to production only through their labor.

It is equally clear that Mill expected a revolution to take place in the distribution of wealth. At the present time, most economists neglect the first ten chapters of Mill's *Theory of Distribution* and spend their time analyzing the next five. There is, however, a reason why Mill discussed the distribution of property and emphasized it more than he did the distribution of income. Whenever he speaks of the distribution of property, he always speaks of it with some limitation, as "under the present time conditions," or "for the time being." He anticipated that at no distant date radical legislation would alter materially the property distribution then prevailing in England. The theory of the distribution of income stated in his later chapters is presented not with the thought that

these laws would elevate the laboring population to a higher position, but rather with the view to showing that this transformation is so difficult that it is not likely to take place. His position, therefore, is as radical as that of Marx; Marx, however, relies more on the revolutionary methods as applied to the distribution of income, while Mill would effect the same end by a distribution of property. In either case, a radical reconstruction of society would take place. Both Mill and Marx were plainly of the opinion that this transformation was inevitable and desirable. The compromise which Mill effected between reactionary production and revolutionary distribution was accepted by the economists of the next generation, not as a compromise, but rather as a solution. Only after long, serious study did the inherent opposition in Mill's position become apparent. It was then recognized that between Mill's theories of production and distribution an irreconcilable gulf intervened.

In the epoch following the publication of Mill's *Political Economy* the economists were divided into two groups: one attempted to make economic theory consistent by making distribution reactionary; the other group attempted to acquire consistency by creating a revolutionary theory of production. Of the latter attempts, the work of Karl Marx is prominent. His book on *Capital* is an endeavor to give a revolutionary basis to theories of production. I shall not describe his efforts in this connection, but it is plain that they have failed. No revolutionary theory of production has been worked out in a way that would gain for it general recognition. The law of increasing misery, the iron law of wages, and similar doctrines have been either abandoned or discredited. The movement, therefore, to gain consistency in economic theory through revolutionary concepts in production must be regarded as a failure. In a like way, although it is not so generally recognized, the endeavors to create a reactionary theory of distribution have also failed. Writers with reactionary tendencies have not experienced many difficulties in restating production, but in the attempt to put the theory of distribution on a plane similar to that occupied by the theory of production the shortcomings of their theories are apparent. So many writers have attempted the task of creating a consistent

economic theory that it can now be regarded as something impossible to do. If consistency and harmony are to be attained, economists must find some new way of handling economic problems.

This brings us into the present epoch; 1912, at least for America, seems clearly the year in which the break from the old to the new has become apparent. The essential thing in the new epoch is the increased power of evolutionary ideas. Today, instead of having a sharp contrast between reaction and revolution, a third alternative is possible—progress through evolution. I shall therefore put the three groups in conscious contrast, so that the elements upon which each depends may be made clear. In order to do this, I shall give a table in which the elements for reactionary, revolutionary, and evolutionary reasoning are contrasted.

Reactionary	Revolutionary	Evolutionary
Retrospective	Large	Incremental
Hypothetical	Sudden	Persistent
Dogmatic	Militant	Voluntary
Undemocratic	Heroic	Material
Class-conscious	Epoch-making	Planless

Reactionary thought begins with a retrospective, or perhaps it is better to say a historical, attitude, since there is an emphasis on old conditions and old ideas, rather than on those of the present. With this basis, the reasoning becomes hypothetical, and as the class feeling that results develops, reactionary thought becomes dogmatic. It also changes into undemocratic forms, which end in the emphasis of the superiority of the capitalistic class over those who are engaged in manual labor. The reactionary thinker is also class-conscious, because he views the world from the standpoint of his particular group rather than the nation as a whole. In contrast with this, revolutionary thinkers expect large results to come suddenly by transformations that are epoch-making in their consequences. There is also a decided emphasis on militant action ending in or at least transforming itself into heroic action. All revolutionary thinkers look to some hero to make the transformations they hope for rather than to the small steady changes that lead to regular progress. A much-quoted statement from Mill represents this

view: "When the object is to raise the permanent condition of a people, small means do not merely produce small effects, they produce no effects at all." If this is true, then social progress depends upon those epoch-making changes that revolutions inaugurate, and must be brought about by the revolutionary measures that disturb the normal growth of society.

In contrast with this, evolution proceeds by small changes that are persistent in their action, and therefore create cumulative effects. There are also those which can be measured objectively. The changes that follow can usually be represented by some statistical curves. This gives to evolutionary concepts a material form and emphasizes the slow changes that progress is making. Such changes give but little place for heroic action. The man who makes small improvements is usually a commonplace individual, and yet it is the accumulation of these small changes that reorganizes society, and in the end improves its tone and character. The hero is out of place, except where militant action can create epoch-making changes.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF RELIGION

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The social idealism of the present age has deeply affected many sciences and professions, and its influence has been instructively traced during these meetings in its relation to the study of history, politics, and economics, and to the movements of legislation and philanthropy. All these indications of the new social conscience are of importance, but the region of human interest in which its profoundest effect may be observed is unquestionably that occupied by religion. When one contrasts the note of teaching and preaching, the activities of organizations and churches, and the very theory of redemption, which have prevailed for centuries in all communions, with the spirit of worship and work which is characteristic of religion at the present time, the change appears to be practically a revolution. In Protestant Christianity especially, where the philosophy of individualism has had almost complete control, this change in the center of gravity has created a new type of religious life. For many generations the conditions of personal salvation have been the burden of theological teaching, and the attainment of that salvation the sufficient end of religious aspiration.

The same extraordinary transition which has of late transformed modern politics and modern economics has also revolutionized the current conception of religion. Governmental non-interference and *laissez-faire* industrialism had their counterpart and parallel in self-centered theology and self-satisfied piety. The renaissance of the social conscience has brought with it a socialization of religion. It is a transition like that from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican conception of the world. It transfers one from the thought of oneself as the fixed point round which the universe revolves to the recognition of an orbit in which one moves round an infinitely larger center. The religion of the individual remains not less real, but is taken up into the larger unity

of social redemption. Round the problem of personal salvation sweeps the problem of a world to be saved. Organizations created for worship find themselves irresistibly summoned to become organizations for work. The world, as the title of Canon Fremantle's epoch-making book announced, has become the "subject of redemption." Communion of Christians publish their social programs. "By their fruits ye shall know them"; "I will show thee my faith by my works" might be the text of modern religion. Instead of an individual rescued from a perishing world, like a sailor from a sinking ship, the socialization of religion sets the sailor to the more heroic task of joining with his fellows to bring the world, like a battered but still seaworthy vessel, safe to its port.

What are the influences which have brought about this revolutionary transition? It must be at once confessed that they are not to be discovered in theological instruction or philosophical insight. On the contrary, theology has clung to its traditional formulae long after they lost reality, and philosophy has been content to repeat the teachings of the nineteenth century to the careless ears of the twentieth. The same confession which religion makes of tardy discernment of the signs of the times must, however, be made by economics and politics. There, also, the doctrines which interpreted a simple and provincial world have been stretched to cover a new complexity of civilization; and there, also, the sudden and tremendous expansion of social unity has compelled a corresponding expansion of economic theory and political action. Precisely as economics and politics, in the troubled years at the middle of the nineteenth century, were confronted by new circumstances of agitation and revolution, of industrial distress and national peril, and a new conception of social responsibility and organic unity was demanded to interpret a new world, so the same sense of strain and collision has been felt by religious teachers, and the same transition has become inevitable. Phrases, now familiar, but a generation ago novel and undefined—such as "The social organism," "The co-operative commonwealth," "Social legislation," "Social justice"—are taken up into the worship and work of the churches. A new significance is discovered in John

Wesley's famous saying: "There is no such thing as a solitary Christian." Religion is accepted as a social fact. No man, under the new conception of the social order, can live or die to himself. The Pauline doctrine of membership one of another becomes expanded from the limits of the church to the cosmopolitanism of a world. The isolated soul discovers its own place as it finds its part in the social whole.

It is interesting to recall how simultaneous has been this momentous transition in all the sciences which interpret human life. It is often said that religious teachers are apt to lag behind in the movement of thought as conservatives and reactionaries; and it is true that the habitual temper of other worldliness may induce indifference to the condition of the world that now is. Yet it is reassuring to observe that the sense of a new social era was felt quite as promptly and acutely by Christian teachers as by economists or industrialists. The modern era in economics may be said to begin with Mill's *Principles of Political Economy*, which appeared in the year 1848, and bore the very suggestive subtitle: "With some of their applications to social philosophy." It was in precisely the same year that Archbishop von Ketteler, accepting from Lassalle the scheme of co-operative workingmen's associations, substituted the Church for the State as the source of capital, and announced the doctrine that "The aphorism 'Property is robbery' is not a mere lie, but contains, with a great fallacy, a fruitful truth." "May God," he said in a sermon at Mayence, "in his goodness bring all good Catholics to adopt the idea of co-operative association on the basis of Christianity." Almost at the same moment, in 1849, Wichern, a Protestant pastor, established himself with his little family of homeless boys in the "Rauhe Haus" near Hamburg, and began the work of the "Innere Mission," which has reached such vast expansion. In the same year, 1849, Maurice and his friends adopted the title of Christian Socialists, and in 1850 Maurice wrote: "That is the only title which will define our object, and will commit us at once to the conflict we must engage in sooner or later with the un-social Christians and the un-Christian socialists." It was after conference with Maurice, and after studying the social movement thus begin-

ning in Great Britain, that the learned and devout German scholar Victor Huber established his "Associations for Christian order and liberty." Meantime the co-operative societies of Great Britain had begun their extraordinary history in 1844, when 28 poor weavers of Rochdale opened their modest shop in Toad Lane; the anti-corn law agitation had ended in the abolition of the tax on bread in 1846, and the Chartists, who had introduced their first petition in 1839 witnessed the pathetic end of their agitation in 1848. Thus, from many sides, Catholics and Protestants, academic teachers and uninstructed handworkers, social reformers and radical legislators, within a period of a half-dozen years, with an extraordinary convergence of thought and feeling, found themselves led to a social application of Christian ideals, unprecedented since the time when the first preaching of the gospel of Christ brought with it an efflorescence of philanthropy, and substituted for the *Prodigalitas* of Rome the *Caritas* of a new faith.

Orthodox economics and orthodox Christianity were, it is true, alike in being tardy to recognize that a new world had arrived. Protestantism as a whole persisted in the hopeless task of perpetuating its individualism; and Catholicism, with its great tradition of immovability, seemed preoccupied by its ecclesiasticism. But by degrees the sense of a new era, of which Maurice and von Ketteler were prophets, swept like a cleansing wind through all communions. The attitude of Protestantism may be defined by the resolution proposed in 1906 as a part of the basis of union for three American communions, comprising over a million members. "We believe that, according to Christ's law, men of the Christian faith exist for the service of man, not only in holding forth the word of life, but in the support of works and institutions of pity and charity, in the maintenance of human freedom, in the deliverance of all those that are oppressed, in the enforcement of civic justice, and in the rebuke of all unrighteousness." The position of the Catholic church is sufficiently indicated by the Encyclical of Leo XIII in 1891, a document which marked a new era in ecclesiastical responsibility, and stamped its author as one of the most discerning and broadminded of modern men. Never was an ecclesiastical deliverance more unexpected and unprecedented

than these weighty words: "The momentous seriousness of the present state of things fills every mind with painful apprehension; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes; popular meetings, legislators, and sovereign princes, all are occupied with it Therefore, Venerable Brethren, We have thought it useful to speak on the Condition of Labor." Thus the era of combination, association, and organization, which has witnessed the transformation of industrial action and more than half effaced the boundary between economics and social ethics, has seen a contemporaneous and not less dramatic change in religious action and theological thought, and has given to organized religion an expansion and enrichment which recognizes the world as the subject of redemption.

At this point, however, a further question opens, which is of grave importance to those who are concerned with the administration of religion. What is to be the effect of this socialization of religion on the organization of worship? Is worship to be crowded out by work? Is sociology to supplant theology? Are the churches to become social laboratories, and sermons to be indistinguishable from talks on current events, or tracts on socialism? These possibilities are greeted by different types of observers with very different emotions—on the one hand with grave apprehension, and on the other hand with confident expectancy. On the one hand are the timid defenders of religion, who see the landmarks of tradition and confession swept away, and who fear an approaching deluge. They distrust this tendency to the socialization of religion, and counsel a retreat to the ancient ways of personal piety and consolation. In the admirable book which Professor Rauschenbusch has just issued, and which is marked by even deeper insight than his earlier volume, he cites a Lutheran synod of Missouri as so uncompromisingly hostile to the new social spirit as to be almost cynical in its repudiation. "The real business of the church," announces this communion, "is to preach the gospel. It is not the mission of the church to abolish physical misery, or to help men to earthly happiness. Jesus says: 'If any man will follow me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily.'" On the other hand are the defiant revolutionists,

who find in religion one characteristic product of the capitalistic system and anticipate that a world with no master will be a world with no God. "Religion," Bebel has said, "will not be abolished or God be dethroned without attack or force. Religion will naturally perish. It is a transcendent reflection of the existing social order." The language of less philosophical revolutionists is more embittered and undisguised. "Speaking for the proletariat," a correspondent of Professor Rauschenbusch writes, "I shall say that we all, who have gone far enough in the study of socialism to become revolutionary, regard the so-called Christian churches as our bitterest enemies. It is a maxim among us that any man who comes into our body must drop his religion. . . . The hardest person to wake up is the workingman who has been chloroformed by the church in the interest of the master-class."

Is it, however, probable that a relation so intimate as obviously exists between social service and religion can be either avoided or outgrown? Is either the hesitancy of religionists or the bitterness of revolutionists likely to determine the effect of the socialization of religion? On the contrary, the probable adjustment of the two forces must be estimated, not by the temporary emotions of revolutionists or reactionaries, but by observation of the great tidal movement of modern life on the surface of which these waves of feeling rise and fall. What, one must ask himself, is the nature of the religious life which is thus undergoing the process of socialization; and what, on the other hand, is the nature of the social movement which, in its turn, is so profoundly modifying the religious life? What, in other words, have the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of the social movement to teach concerning their mutual relations and effects?

When one turns, in the first place, to the philosophy of religion, he is at once confronted by the world-old controversy between the rationalists and the mystics. Either, as with Hegel, the reason is regarded as the path to the Eternal; or, as with Schleiermacher, the emotions seem to open the way along which the reason may later go. Between these two alternatives the religious life, it has seemed, must choose. Is there not, however, a third factor of spiritual experience, of which neither the rationalists nor the

mystics have taken serious account, but which it is the special task of this generation to restore to its place in the philosophy of religion? Does not the will open a way of communion with the Eternal? Is there not a path which leads from morality to faith, and which is accessible to that great multitude who are neither sages nor visionaries, but whose religion must begin in the simple pledge to do their duty? Such was the way to reality which was first clearly explored by Kant, then followed by Fichte, and has now become familiar to the feet of modern men. "With surprising clearness," said Fichte, "does this thought which was hitherto veiled in obscurity now reveal itself to my soul—the thought that my will merely as such and through itself shall have results. It has results because it is immediately and infallibly perceived by another Will to which it is related, which is its own accomplishment and the only living principle of the spiritual world. . . . The voice of conscience in my soul which teaches me in every situation of life what I have there to do, is the channel through which again His influence descends upon me."

The same teaching reappears in the most impressive spiritual philosophy of England during the nineteenth century. "If," says Martineau, "the moral consciousness be in every truth a communion between the Divine and the human mind . . . a great redemption comes, . . . and converts the life of duty into the life of love. . . . The rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet: they are known among the stars." To the same effect is the conclusion of Paulsen: "The vocation and dignity of man is not ultimately rooted in knowledge, but in the volitional side of his nature. . . . One's view of the world receives its most powerful and decided impetus from the understanding, but from the volitional side, from the practical reason." One of the greatest of English preachers, whose sermons indicate the profound influence of Fichte, translates these academic phrases into the language of homiletics. "Obedience," Robertson says, "is the organ of spiritual knowledge. In every department of knowledge there is an appropriate organ by which we gain a knowledge of that which cannot be seen or felt. . . . By doing God's will we recognize what he is."

When one turns with these teachings of the philosophy of religion to the gospel of Jesus Christ he finds them strikingly anticipated and confirmed. Great disclosures of truth were indeed made by Jesus to the reason and high emotions stirred in those who heard him, but when we trace the way in which Jesus habitually drew men to himself nothing is more obvious than the fact that he appealed, first of all, not to their intellects or their feelings, but to their wills. What he first demanded was not theological accuracy or mystic ecstasy, but practical obedience and moral decision. "Follow me," he says, "take up thy cross and follow. He that willeth to do the will shall know the doctrine." The dedication of the will is the first step toward the religious life. It is not the whole of religion; it is perhaps not the best of religion; but it is the beginning of religion. Disclosures of truth and high moods of rapture or peace lie beyond this decision of the will; but the way to these heights lies up the steep path which obedience has to climb. The way of conscience and the vision of faith, ethics and religion, idealism and theism, are in the teachings of Jesus one continuous process which has its beginning in the appeal to the will.

Our wills are ours we know not how,
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.

From this conclusion concerning the nature of religion we turn to the other inquiry concerning the nature of the social movement, and with a certain sense of surprise discover an intimate, though often unsuspected, kinship of character and aim. By one of the most unfortunate of historical accidents the world-wide agitation for the transformation of industry has become associated with the philosophical materialism of a century ago. Both Marx and Lassalle were disciples of left-wing Hegelianism, and accepted its logical corollary of economic determinism. "The mode of production," said Marx in one of his most famous aphorisms, "determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life." "Here," Engels said, "is the fundamental proposition which belongs to Marx." "Every man," in Bebel's words, "is the product of his time and the instrument of circumstance." "Christianity, the prevailing spiritual expression of the

present social order, must pass away as a better social order arrives." To this economic fatalism the will of man can be little more than helpless in the cosmic movement of events, and the individual becomes a puppet in the hands of economic destiny. The great external process unfolds itself under an absolute law from thesis to antithesis until the final synthesis of collectivism arrives and the people come to their own.

Whether a movement which began in such an antipodal relation to religious initiative can free itself from this historical tradition is as yet by no means clear. "The socialist movement," Mr. Spargo hopefully writes, "has outgrown the influence of the early Utopians, which touched even Marx and Engels. . . . It is obvious that we are in the presence of a new socialism, of a quality and temper undreamed of by Marx and Engels," and to the same effect Miss Scudder insists: "It is my steady contention that those of us who read history otherwise than the Marxians have an equal right in the socialist movement." Difficult as it may be to abandon the Marxian economics and at the same time to maintain the Marxian infallibilism, it is evident that these interpreters of the spirit of socialism estimate its real character more justly than Marx himself. Nothing could be more improbable than that a great popular movement of enthusiasm, fraternity, and sacrifice could flow from no richer source of inspiration than a mechanical, automatic, or in the favorite language of the movement, "scientific" view of life. The source of momentum must obviously be sought, not so much in an interpretation of history, as in an appeal to the will. It is not a movement of fate, but a movement of feeling, not an expression of economic determinism but an expression of human determination. In short, there met in Marx two great historical influences, that of the French Revolution and that of the classic philosophy of Germany; and while Fichte and Hegel reappear in Marx's doctrine of a solidaric state, Rousseau and Fourier touch his program with vitality, humanity, and passion.

The Marxian philosophy of history might in fact be in very large part abandoned without any serious retardation of the cause which still claims his authority. The social movement, of which social democracy is one illustration, has much deeper

and firmer foundations than the subtle materialism of two generations ago. It is the expression on the largest scale of the will to serve, the dedication of the individual to the social whole, the emergence of social morality. Nothing could be more obstructive to its progress than to identify it with a single philosophy of society, or a restricted definition of science, or an exclusive claim to orthodoxy. Precisely as the Christian church has suffered from these arbitrary definitions, so the social movement is passing through the same phase of extravagant claims to inspiration and arrogant demands for excommunication. The new social responsibility, like Christianity itself, is a much larger thing than any orthodoxy has been able to cover. It is not an economic or political phenomenon, but an ethical awakening. The characteristic feature of the present age is the emergence and quickening of a social conscience.

Here, then, meet these two expressions of the will in action—the conforming of the will to the universal order, and the transforming by the will of the social order. Must it be inferred that such operations of the will, varied as they are in their field of opportunity, are essentially hostile or even neutral to each other? Can their relation be regarded as either accidental or controversial? On the contrary, it becomes obvious that two enterprises so similar both in origin and form must be contributory, co-operative, and in certain aspects even identical, in intention and direction. Both are alike, at least, in their attitude toward the problem of life. Both propose a readjustment of the individual to the organic world of which he is a part, and both summon the will to this task of reconciliation and harmony. Both follow a path which leads from duty to insight. Both begin with the stirring of the will. One finds a new religion in the social movement; the other finds a new field for piety in the socialization of religion. Slowly perhaps, but surely, as the social movement comes to understand itself, it will perceive its essentially religious dynamic; and on the other hand, with equal susceptibility the work of religion will accept its appropriate socialization. The path which the social movement must follow if it would fulfil its own ideal is a path which naturally opens into the broader highway of a revival of faith.

If this conclusion, derived from a consideration of the nature

of religion and the nature of the social movement, is in any degree justified, it brings with it much reassurance, both for those who are concerned with religion, and for those who are advancing the cause of social regeneration. The theologians of the early church found in the condition of the world into which the new religion came, a way of divine leading, a *praeparatio evangelica*, for the Christian dispensation. May it not be that the social movement of the present age will open a way to the renaissance of rational religion, and may be a *praeparatio evangelica* of the twentieth century? The path thus followed may not be the straightest path to faith; it is certainly not the only path, but for many persons, under the conditions of the present time, it happens to be the path most clearly open; and it is not so important what way one takes, as it is that he shall start from the point where he happens to be and not stop till the end is reached. The spiritual desire of the present age takes the form of social service; and teachers of religion should be quick to recognize that this unfamiliar way may be the natural path for the religion of the time to take, and should welcome the doing of the will as the first step toward the knowing of the doctrine.

These suggestions may throw some light on a problem much considered of late by religious teachers—the supposed decline in the numbers of candidates for the ministry. It is commonly said that the call to this profession has grown unpersuasive, and that the future of religion is imperiled from lack of recruits to serve her cause; and the statistics of theological schools seem, in the main, to confirm this despondency. If, however, it be true that social science is stirred by the same motives which have been hitherto the peculiar property of the ministry, then the profession finds itself not depleted in numbers, but recruited by many new allies. When a young man, as now frequently happens, deliberates whether he shall enter the ministry or enlist in the calling of social service, he is in fact choosing, not between two vocations, but between two departments of one calling. Social service should be recognized as a religious work, precisely as religious service is recognized as a social work; and to draw a line between the two is to rob religion of its reality and social service of its sacredness.

If, then, this common origin and common tendency are recognized, the future, both of the social movement and of religion may be viewed with confidence and hope. What the social movement has most to fear is a controlling materialism, the anticipation that a change in economic method will automatically produce a change of the human heart. And, on the other hand, what religion has most to fear is a reversion to separatism, the isolation of consecration, the desocialization of piety, the satisfaction with emotional elevation or dogmatic formalism, instead of the dedication of the will to do the will of the Eternal. What the social movement, therefore, most imperatively needs is spiritualization, and what religion most needs is socialization. If the social movement be essentially a spiritual fact, then the way is open upward toward religious faith; and if religion be essentially a social fact, then the same way is open downward into human service. The socialization of religion meets the spiritualization of the social movement. The traveler by one road finds himself, as he proceeds, on the other. The Mount of Transfiguration and the healing of the boy on the plain below made, in the life of Jesus, not two conflicting incidents, but a normal and continuous experience. The vision led down to the task; the task was made possible by the vision. When, again, the same teacher cites the ancient law to describe his purpose: "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with all thy heart and mind and soul, and thy neighbor as thyself," he announced, not two commandments, but one. A rational love of God utters itself in the effective service of one's afflicted neighbor. "If any man love not his neighbor whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen." An effective love of one's neighbor is the product of a rational and idealizing faith. "We walk by faith, not by sight." The spiritualization of social service is the secret of fidelity and hope. The socialization of religion is the emancipation from faithlessness and fear. The call of God to the heart is a summons to social duty; and the turning of the will to social duty is not only a call to man, but not less surely a call from God.

REVIEWS

Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects. By CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, PH.D. New York and London: D. Appleton & Co., 1912. Pp. xiv + 417.

This book presents an extremely well-conceived and wisely executed survey of the chief theoretical positions of psychological sociology. It is admirable for its many lucid and illuminating formulations. It affords a telescopic view of human society from the vantage-ground of functional psychology—telescopic rather than microscopic in character, since the author conceives the various parts of his subject in almost uniformly abstract rather than concrete terms. His abstract and elliptical style, due to the high degree of generalization involved, will make the book difficult reading to those unacquainted with social facts as organized by the science of sociology, but to the student or reader somewhat familiar with that field, following the author's clean-wrought, coherent argument will prove an intellectual treat.

The value of the book is augmented by the fact that the author is not a system-maker but an eclectic who looks impartially at every aspect of social theory and seeks to mediate between conflicting or confused positions.

"The position of the writer is . . . that sociology is a study of the biological and psychological factors in the social life . . ." (p. vii). Leaving the biological problems on one side the author addresses himself to the other half of the field, the psychological. Thus the scope of social psychology, which by most writers is limited to a fraction of the field of general sociology in this view is enlarged to include all of sociology except the biological elements. Obviously the term social psychology must be supplanted by one which defines this larger scope more adequately.

The first five chapters, comprising nearly a fourth of the book, are taken up with what the author calls "preliminary methodological problems." These excellent chapters might well be compressed in order to afford space for a fuller treatment of such topics, for example, as public opinion, which is allotted but five pages in chap. xv.

Chap. vi is entitled "The Psychological Basis of Sociology." It presents, with numerous references to well-chosen authorities, the main

positions of modern psychology relative to individual human nature. It is a handbook of sociology for the student of sociology, condensed into thirty well-packed pages.

Other chapters deal with the origin of society, social co-ordination, social self-control, instinct, feeling, intellect, imitation, sympathy, the theory of social order, and of social progress, and other topics.

Social co-ordination is the central idea of the book; by this term the writer means the process of social habit-formation by which "folk-ways," customs, and institutions grow up as channels of social activity. Revolutions are cited as cases where a group has been unable gradually to readjust its habits to changing circumstances; at last the habits become fatally inadequate to the group needs and a convulsive breakdown takes place. Enlarging upon this idea, the author regards the general social process as fundamentally a co-ordination of individual activities which are continually undergoing readjustment in response to changed conditions.

Professor Ellwood agrees with McDougall in according a large place to the instincts: "they may well be characterized, therefore, as the real propelling forces of society" (p. 246). Space does not permit an account of the relations which the other psychological factors mentioned above—feeling, intellect, imitation, etc.—bear to the main process of social co-ordination. In general it may be said that each is recognized as a more or less important element in a synthetic account of social facts. "There can be no single key either to social evolution or to social progress" (p. 379).

In conclusion, attention should be called to the author's conception of the meaning of social life and the goal of social effort: "The great fundamental need of our civilization, therefore, is an ethics of service, a humanitarian ethics which will teach the individual to find his self-development and his happiness in the unselfish service of others, and which will forbid any individual, class, nation, or even race from regarding itself as an end in itself apart from the rest of humanity" (p. 394).

ERVILLE B. WOODS

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

My Life. By AUGUST BEBEL. Pp. 343. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1913. Pp. 344. \$2.14 postpaid.

By what combination of circumstances the University of Chicago Press was induced to publish the autobiography of the most prominent socialist in Germany during the last thirty years, others must explain.

Not that it is out of character, but it certainly contradicts reputation. One might as soon look for a life of Karl Marx, from the Oxford University Press.

I have not seen the original of this book, and do not know whether it explains its title as a half-truth. It does not give an account of Bebel's life, but only of the first thirty-eight years of his life. As the longer and more important portion of his public life falls after the year 1878, with which the volume closes, it will be a flat disappointment unless a sequel is forthcoming. The index which this volume contains does not encourage the assumption that the account is to be continued.

Even this fragment, however, is a fascinating story, but it is rather a contribution to the general social history of Germany than to the history of socialism. It adds touches of local and temporal color which at once require readjustment of impressions about the origins of the German labor movement. For instance, it will surprise most Americans who have given attention to German socialism to read: "I don't remember anyone at that time [1861] in Leipzig who was acquainted with the Communist Manifesto, or with Marx and Engels' part in the revolutionary movement" (p. 45). The kind and degree of bitterness which the book discloses in the rivalry between the *Lassalleaner* and the *Eisenacher* will be a revelation to most American readers, even to those who thought they knew the essentials of the controversy. On the other hand, an inveterate enemy of socialism could hardly follow Bebel's account of the sacrifices which men of his sort have made for the cause, without some feeling of admiration for their spirit if not for their theories. Still more, not merely the injustice, but the impolicy and absurdity of the Bismarckian attempts at repression appear with a vividness that makes intolerance as despicable as it is futile.

Upon his own showing, neither Bebel nor his group was always a model of good judgment, their own interests being the criterion. They were of course less able than men of more education to co-ordinate their "class-consciousness" with the views of other elements. They did not judge such phenomena as the Paris Commune, for instance, by the same standards which the ruling classes applied. At the same time, after looking at these things through Engels' eyes it would have to be a very injudicial man who could deny that the interests which he represented deserved very different treatment from that which they received.

If Bebel leaves a continuation of his life-story that covers his maturer years as graphically as he pictures his early manhood, the whole will make up a human document of rare value.

ALBION W. SMALL

The New Immigration. A Study of the Industrial and Social Life of Southeastern Europeans in America. By PETER ROBERTS, PH.D. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xxi+386. \$1.60.

This comprehensive yet compact study of the problems arising from the influx into this country of millions of southeastern Europeans in the last twenty years is valuable because the author writes from the fulness of his own personal experience.

The book is divided into six parts: Part I, "Inducements and Impressions," 48 pp.; Part II, "Industrial Life," with four chapters: (iv) "Industries They Enter," (v) "Conditions of Work," (vi) "Accidents," (vii) "Efficiency and Progress," pp. 49-108; Part III, "Community Conditions," with four chapters: (viii) "Camp and Town Life," (ix) "Housing Conditions," (x) "Home Life," (xi) "Cities Where They Gather," pp. 109-72; Part IV, "Social Relations," with eight chapters: (xii) "Leaders," (xiii) "Societies," (xiv) "Churches," (xv) "Banks and Savings," (xvi) "Crime and the Courts," (xvii) "Politics," (xviii) "Recreation," (xix) "Culture," pp. 173-291; Part V, "Assimilation and Hindrances," with three chapters: (xx) "Relations to Americans," (xxi) "Reaching the Newcomer," (xxii) "The Child of the Foreigner," pp. 291-340; Part VI, with a single chapter: "The Immigrant Problem," and addenda of statistical tables, pp. 341-73. Index, pp. 375-86.

The discussions are straightforward, concise, and filled with concrete illustrations from the lives of the immigrants. The spirit is much like that of E. A. Steiner's volumes. The key offered for the solution of the problems is personal contact giving rise to sympathetic study and understanding, thus enabling the natives to help the newcomers to become, as they can and will, good American citizens. Mr. Roberts sets the example, in his own life, of how to go to work.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

An Introduction to the Study of Adolescent Education. By CYRIL BRUYN ANDREWS. New York: The Rebman Co., 1912. Pp. 10+185. Bibliography.

Mr. Andrews' *Introduction to the Study of Adolescent Education* is a discussion of the problems of adolescence, and particularly, as they appear in the public and preparatory schools of England. For this reason and for the further reason that it is an introductory study, compared with the masterful books on adolescence, by G. Stanley Hall,

and others, it will find no large place in American libraries or American education.

Mr. Andrews believes the time is ripe for a close study of adolescence by scientists instead of scandalmongers. In the English preparatory schools, he says, there is greater need for such study than in the state schools, since much in private school life naturally escapes public notice.

Adolescents should receive instruction in regard to sex in the schools. Parents will take not more than a languid interest in such instruction until a generation grows up which has been taught, when young, the science of human development.

There are six classes of perversion: (1) moral perversion, due to youth or ignorance; (2) victims of slightly pathological tendencies, inherited; (3) mentally deranged; (4) perverts, due to herding together one sex; (5) perverts, due to late meals, beer-drinking, overheated dormitories, etc.; (6) "mutual hypnotists," or, instances of abnormal love between two of the same sex similar to love later between two of opposite sex.

Three remedies are proposed: (1) the conservative method, i.e., supervision, religious instruction, and athleticism; (2) the rational method, development of self-reliance, instruction in sex matters and in civic and social life; (3) coeducation.

Whatever the method, the principle that should be followed is "self-assertion" as opposed to "discipline." The last-four chapters are given to an appeal for the reconstruction and administration of the curriculum in harmony with this principle—the essential trait in the adolescent makeup.

EDGAR F. RILEY

KANSAS STATE NORMAL SCHOOL

An Introduction to the Study of Adolescent Education. By CYRIL BRUYN ANDREWS. New York: The Rebman Co., 1912.

Pp. 10+185. \$1.50, net.

This book is an arraignment of education as it is found in schools of the type of the English "public and preparatory schools," the schools to which the members of the well-to-do and aristocratic classes send their sons. These schools, according to the author, violate the cardinal principles which should govern the education of the adolescent, and which are deduced from a study of the adolescent psychology, particularly as concerns his sexual impulses. The fundamental difficulty is that whereas the adolescent craves above all else an opportunity to

express his individuality by engaging in activity which is in line with his own impulses, and doing so in his own way, his every act is prescribed for him and must be performed under supervision. He then finds an outlet for his energy in perversions. This evil is increased by the segregation of youth of the same sex and by cutting them off from the live interests of the outside world. The remedy by which the masters attempt vainly to combat the evils which are tacitly acknowledged to exist, consists in the encouragement of athletics, in a rigid program of supervised work, and in religion. None of these are successful. The author rather advocates giving the adolescent freedom to guide his own conduct trusting to his reason to guide him, instructing him in the facts of sex, training him in civic duties, and educating both sexes together. This is the gist of the argument. It is trenchant and in the main convincing. The book is controversial in tone throughout, but will appeal to the American educator as sound in its general trend.

FRANK N. FREEMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Spiritual Culture and Social Service. By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND, Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. New York: Revell, 1912. Pp. 222. \$1.00.

In the first section, "The Pattern in the Mount," the author's purpose as stated in the foreword is "simply to portray the Master as the living historic example for human life and service and of the noble spirit in which that service should be rendered."

The second section, comprising chaps. ii-vii, is entitled, "Social Redemption." In this his point of view seems to be as follows: "We can have no kingdom of heaven on earth until our economic programs are fashioned in the light of spiritual ideals and with spiritual ends in view."

In the third section, "The culture of self," chaps. viii-xvi, the author's claim is for spiritual culture before a man can truly serve society; quoting himself from a former work he declares: "The sole hope of the world is to make men disciples of Jesus." The book is sermonic in style and seems to place more emphasis upon *spiritual culture* than *social service*.

The spirit of the entire work is admirable and should attract a wide circle of readers.

EDWIN L. EARP

DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
MADISON, N.J.

Great Educators of Three Centuries. By FRANK PIERREPONT GRAVES, PH.D., Professor of the History of Education in the Ohio State University. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. ix+289. \$1.25 net.

Peter Ramus and the Educational Reformation of the Sixteenth Century. By FRANK PIERREPONT GRAVES. New York: Macmillan. Pp. xi+226. \$1.25 net.

In these two books Professor Graves continues his studies in the history of education, which he began a few years ago with his volume on *A History of Education before the Middle Ages*. The first volume mentioned above is a series of sketches of great educators from Milton to Herbert Spencer. The studies are extremely important as bearing on the culture history of the period covered. The second work, on *Peter Ramus*, is a most suggestive study of a philosopher and educational reformer of the Renaissance, whose significance in the history of thought has often been overlooked. Professor Graves's monograph performs a real service in bringing to notice again the work of this neglected scholar.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

The Control of Trusts. By JOHN BATES CLARK and JOHN MAURICE CLARK. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xi+202. \$1.00 net.

This is a revision and enlargement of an earlier book upon the same subject, by John Bates Clark. Most of the new material, we are informed, is contributed by John Maurice Clark, and serves to bring the discussion down to date, including the recent dissolutions of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco companies. According to the authors:

The purpose of the work is entirely constructive, since it advocates a positive policy for controlling trusts. It aims to show that certain measures having this end in view are in harmony with modern tendencies and are well within the power of the legislator and executive official and that they give promise of insuring what the public needs, namely, protection against abnormal prices, continued increase in production, and improvement in the conditions of labor [p. v].

The book is timely and interesting but disappointingly brief. One cannot refrain from wishing that the authors had gone more fully into such questions as the advantages of large-scale production in recent

years, the methods actually employed by the "trusts" to stifle competition, the extent to which such methods are used, and the results of attempts to enforce the Sherman law. In short, one wishes for the presentation of more facts concerning trust operations upon which to base theories of trust control.

The authors favor the retention of competition, potential or active, wherever possible, as a price-fixing agency, and as a necessary means of promoting progress in methods of production. They propose to preserve competition by preventing all railroad discrimination, the factor's agreement, local price-cutting, etc. To accomplish this, they recommend the abolition of the holding company, greater corporate publicity, the issuing of stocks without par value, patent reform, the limiting of the size of corporations, the enforcement of a uniform price at point of shipment for similar goods of the same company, and the appointment of an "Interstate Trade Commission, or similar body" to whom the enforcement of the law shall be intrusted.

The book is rather popularly written and, in spite of short-comings, should prove serviceable to anyone desiring a brief elementary treatise on the subject.

ELMER A. RILEY

JAMES MILLIKIN UNIVERSITY

Divorce. By EARL RUSSELL. London: William Heinemann, 1912.
Pp. x+218.

In this book Earl Russell, the well-known English radical, discusses the present English divorce laws and their reform. The discussion is almost wholly from a legal standpoint. The historical origin of the English law on divorce is traced, the present law is set forth, and the procedure of the English divorce courts is described in detail. Then follow several chapters in criticism of the present law and its administration, with specific proposals for a new divorce code. Little or no use of statistics is made in the book, and what few statistics there are, are for the most part used inaccurately. Earl Russell contents himself with citing specific cases to show the hardship of the present English divorce law.

The whole discussion of the book illustrates forcibly the difficulty of embodying ethical and religious ideals in legislation, in our present stage of social and moral development, without doing serious injustice to somebody. There can be scarcely any doubt that the present English law on divorce deserves much of the criticism which Earl Russell levels

at it. He could doubtless have made his criticism even more effective if he had developed the idea that law can do little to give a nation a pure and stable family life. Earl Russell is concerned, however, chiefly with the happiness and liberty of the individuals rather than with the conservation of a great social institution. Consequently, the law which he proposes would make divorce very free, not only by mutual consent of the parties, but even without mutual consent after separation or desertion lasting for three years. It is perhaps fortunate that the Royal Commission on Divorce, to whom this book is more or less addressed, has not accepted the very lax proposals of Earl Russell, but instead has recommended a divorce law which would be a model, compared with some of the lax laws of our American states, admitting as the grounds for divorce, adultery, desertion for three years, incurable insanity after five years' confinement, and habitual drunkenness found to be incurable after three years. This law would place the sexes on an equality and prohibit the publication of divorce proceedings in the public press. If it is enacted by Parliament, it will certainly remedy most of the injustice which Earl Russell complains of in the present law.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Heredity and Society. By WILLIAM DAMPIER WHETHAM and CATHERINE DURNING WHETHAM. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. viii+190.

This volume consists of a series of essays by the well-known physicist of Trinity College and his wife—essays which no reader of their *The Family and the Nation* will fail to get at once and read through. For Mr. and Mrs. Whetham have already established for themselves an enviable reputation for clear thinking and delightful reading which the present volume will do much to increase.

A few sentences from the preface indicate the point of view from which the book has been written.

Both this book and its predecessor are written avowedly to draw attention to the problem of heredity, a conception which has hardly yet penetrated consciously into modern sociology, where the subject of environment has held hitherto almost limitless sway. We find it necessary continually to point out that improved conditions of life will not by themselves alone secure certain and corresponding improvement in the inborn qualities of the race. Selection also is needed. We have deliberately concentrated our attention chiefly on one side of a very complex and involved problem. But it is not necessary in actual

life to disregard the effects of a better environment in order to realize the importance of the workings of heredity; and to point out that the present trend of modern civilization produces certain dangers, is not to discourage further attempts to improve the surroundings of mankind, whatever may be felt on the subject by impulsive philanthropists or unresting politicians.

At the outset, attention is directed to human variation and the method of inheritance of discontinuous qualities is illustrated by eye-color. But the authors seem not fully to be cognizant of the new ideas that "man" is not a single kind but consists of a number of elementary species or biotypes, which we fail to recognize because extensive hybridization has so largely confused them, but which are more nearly realized in long-settled countries. Thus Scandinavia shows a nearly pure blue-eyed biotype; southern Italy a brown-eyed biotype; among the Nigritians we find a woolly-haired biotype; among the Negrilloes a dwarf biotype, and so on. There are biotypes in America with mechanical ability, others with artistic, or musical or literary, or mathematical or military ability. This recognition of biotypes simplifies the whole subject of heredity. The authors have at hand the facts on which the theory of the biotype is based. They show the existence of blood lines with special ability and they recognize that the cases of sporadic ability are to be explained on the ground of the kind of matings their parents made and the unfortunate marriages that they have themselves made. An eminent man may arise from a fortunate combination of mediocre traits and through a dissociation again of these traits mediocrity will return in the family. One of America's greatest inventors has a son whose mind is quite as "suggestible" as that of his great father but he will probably never attain eminence because of a lack of persistence and self-control in a social way.

In the chapter on natural selection the authors illustrate the danger of increasing the proportion of persons who belong to weak strains by improved methods of rearing them to the reproductive period. In the chapter on "The Biological Influence of Religion" the physical vigor and intellectual keenness of the Jew are ascribed to the extensive elimination that the race has suffered from its enemies. In the Christian religion the great advantage that the Roman Catholic sect enjoys by virtue of its insistence on a high birth-rate over the Protestant sects which do not lay stress on this ideal is indicated. The birth-rate is discussed and, properly enough, the point is made that it is quality rather than quantity merely that counts. The rôle that growing luxury with its distaste for parentage has played in the decline of fecundity is considered. The

relation of the woman question, education, and politics to eugenics are in turn passed in review. In general, one finds the authors' position logical because biological.

There are a few defects in the book. One could wish that there were more bibliographical citations; one may doubt if the intermingling of races *per se* involves danger; one may regret that the laws of heredity are not more fully set forth, but after all one finishes the book with a feeling that the authors have made a forceful presentation of the importance of heredity for society.

CHARLES B. DAVENPORT

COLD SPRING HARBOR, N.Y.

Socialism and Individualism. Fabian Socialist Series, No. 3.

Reprinted from Fabian Tracts, revised. By SIDNEY WEBB and OTHERS. New York: John Lane Co., 1911. Pp. 102.

This small volume is a collection of four short essays issued by the Fabian Society of England as propagandist material. The titles and authors are: "The Difficulties of Individualism," by Sidney Webb; "The Impossibilities of Anarchism," by Bernard Shaw; "The Moral Aspects of Socialism," by Sidney Ball; "Public Service versus Private Expenditure," by Sir Oliver Lodge.

In "The Difficulties of Individualism" Sidney Webb makes use of the usual socialist arguments in favor of collective ownership of capital. Socialism is defined as "not a faith in an artificial utopia but a rapidly spreading conviction . . . that social health and consequently human happiness is something apart from and above the separate interests of individuals."

"The main difficulties of the existing social order are those immediately connected with the administration of industry and the distribution of wealth." Specifically these difficulties are: inequality of income, with consequent degradation of character and loss of real freedom by the wage-earning class. The approach to socialism is to be by opportunist methods. The economic argument of the essay rests on the theory that wages are determined by the worker upon marginal land and with marginal capital; and that consequently all advantage of land above the marginal, and of capital employed at better than marginal conditions, goes to the capitalist owner under the present order. Economists will not all agree with this theory of wages.

"The Impossibilities of Anarchism" is reprinted from a paper read in 1891 before the Fabian Society and since circulated as a socialist

tract. On the assumption that many middle-class persons are today using anarchist arguments in behalf of the present social order, Mr. Shaw proceeds to meet the practical tenets of anarchism by a *reductio ad absurdum* argument. His goal is not the demolition of anarchistic tenets but the showing that compulsory collectivism is the only possible road to freedom and democracy.

In "The Moral Aspects of Socialism" Sidney Ball defends socialism against the charge of placing undue emphasis on machinery. The ground taken is that socialism is "an endeavor to readjust the machinery of industry in such a way that it can at once depend upon and issue in a higher kind of character and social type." It does this by putting competition on a higher plane than individualism, and thereby results in the social selection of a higher type of character. This higher standard of life is the goal of socialism.

In the address upon "Public Service versus Private Expenditure," Sir Oliver Lodge presents in popular language the advantages to a community of corporate ownership of property and compares this with individual expenditure to the disadvantage of the latter. The development of a higher degree of public spirit is held as not the least result of this corporate ownership and expenditure.

There is little that is new in the volume and the argument is adapted to popular propaganda rather than to scientific purposes.

CECIL C. NORTH

DE PAUW UNIVERSITY

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Die Entwicklungsrichtungen der deutschen Volkswirtschaft nach den Ergebnissen der neuesten Deutschen Statistik.—The basis of German economic development has been the increase in the population. The task of providing for the growing population has involved the industrializing of Germany and the development of a foreign commerce. The proportion of the population of working age and in industrial occupations has increased. Increasing numbers have been drawn together into cities. Big business has developed. The laboring classes have increased much more rapidly than the population as a whole, while the absolute number of persons economically independent has increased very little, and has actually decreased in proportion to the entire population. Finally the number of women in gainful occupations has greatly increased.—Dr. M. Mendelson, *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, Nos. 3-11, 1912. S. A. Q.

Zur Geschichte der Anfänge des englischen Trade Unionismus.—Three struggles are to be distinguished in the early part of the nineteenth century. The small home producers were fighting the factories, sometimes giving vent to their passions in the destruction of property. The guilds were struggling against the large contractors. The factory workers were carrying on the real class conflict between laborers and capitalists. The first two groups were entrepreneurs, the third alone was the proletariat. The small producers and guilds sought a solution of their difficulties in co-operative production. The factory workers demanded improvement of their situation by legislation.—L. Pumpiansky, *Ergänzungshefte zur Neuen Zeit*, August 9, 1912. S. A. Q.

Essai de critique sociologique du Darwinisme.—Neo-Darwinians have injected into the insufficiently analysed terms "fittest" and "best adapted" an evaluational significance from which they deduct the fatalistic doctrine of a necessary straight-line human perfectibility. But facts show that progress toward higher types is only one of the possible consequences of selection, which is in itself a blind force. Underlying Darwin's theory of natural selection was the notion of reproduction suggested by Malthus. But again, facts show that reproduction is simply a phenomenon of adaptation. Were the above doctrines valid, sociology would be useless. Its value is based on the fact that there are other factors in adaptation which can be controlled.—S. Jankélévitch, *Revue philosophique*, May, 1912. S. A. Q.

Sur le caractère international de l'économie politique contemporaine.—Not a single civilised country produces all that it consumes, nor consumes all that it produces. Not only are all interdependent for finished products, but also for half-products and for raw material. Capital and labor, through international credit and migration, are also important for the integration of all national economies into a world economy. This international division of labor and integration have already gone so far that changes in the economic condition of every country affect every other country.—L. Brentano, *La vie internationale*, No. 5, 1912. S. A. Q.

Krupp'sche Arbeiter-Familien. Entwicklung und Entwicklungsfaktoren von drei Generationen Deutscher Arbeiter.—The following conclusions are drawn from an intensive study of 682 families in the Krupp steel mills in Essen; monograph studies have been made of 196 of these families for three generations. The descendants of business men and under officials have in the third generation become officials in the mills; the descendants of iron-workers have become in the third generation masters; the descendants of original peasants have made the least progress. It is possible for

manual laborers to advance, retrograde, or remain in the same relative position. Most of those who had failed to advance were physically weak. The most important factors in advancement were found to be personal characteristics, the success of the enterprise, steadiness of work relations, character of family. Length of service, age of entering the occupation, economic condition of the family were not found to be definitely correlated with advancement of workers. Richard Ehrenberg and Hugo Racine, *Archiv für exakte Wirtschaftsforschung, Sechstes Ergänzungsheft*, 1912, pp. 1-398. S. A. Q.

Hard Work, Long Hours, and Human Limitation.—The age at which work shall begin has by degrees been raised to 16 and an effort is being made to raise it still higher. Hours of work have been shortened, but, at the same time, there has been a corresponding increase in the intensity and strain of the work. Arduous work likely to entail future physical disabilities upon young persons should not be allowed and the age at which young persons undertake hard work should be raised. Where twelve-hour shifts have been reduced to eight hours, all employers are agreed that the men have become more temperate, more regular in their attendance, with fewer days of sickness, and have had more opportunities of qualifying themselves for citizenship. In some cases there has been a reduction in the number of accidents. It would be well if means could be devised whereby Sunday's rest could be obtained for all workmen.—Sir Thomas Oliver, *Journal of the Royal Sanitary Institute*, November, 1912.

R. F. C.

Medical Inspection of Schools.—This is the latest move in the direction of co-operation between health boards and educational authorities. The primary object is the prevention of contagious diseases. But the field has widened to include also a study of all the children from the point of view of health and physical perfection. Though concerning himself first with communicable diseases, the medical inspector will also search out remediable defects. This work should be supplemented by the services of oculists, aurists, and dentists. The inspector will note the irremediable physical and mental defects and will know how the child can be made most fully self-supporting. He will conserve the health of the children whom he finds well, by attention to all the items that influence their mental and physical life. The school nurse is a real aid, both in the school and in the home, and as a social worker.—Robert W. Hastings, *American Journal of Public Health*, December, 1912.

R. F. C.

The Problem of Drunkenness.—The present system of caring for cases of drunkenness is inefficient. Punitive measures are futile. State control of treatment is desirable. Two facts must be kept in mind: (1) A comparatively small percentage of users of alcohol are confirmed drunkards or inebriates; (2) the appropriate care of the alcoholic implies both curative treatment and custodial care—the latter for the recidivist. The study of inebriety begins with the inebriate and requires individualization in treatment. Inebriety is an expression of nervous weakness and should be treated as a disease. There is no known drug which can permanently eradicate the desire for drink. Experience favors the educational system, relying largely for treatment upon the effects of pure air, good food, abstinence from alcohol and drugs, regular hours and out-of-door, skilled labor. It seeks to develop self-control in the patient and secure his co-operation in his own recovery. Medical after-care treatment is highly desirable. Colonization offers peculiar advantages.—Irwin H. Neff, *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, December 26, 1912.

R. F. C.

The New Science of Geography.—Geography like every other science includes three phases or stages. (1) The empirical stage which is concerned merely with the gathering of facts. (2) The systematic stage in which these facts are classified. (3) The explanatory stage which is devoted to the determination of laws. The geographers' work has been done scientifically and is of great value but it still belongs to the empirical stage of the science. The majority have failed to apprehend that a mere collection of facts is not science. Only a handful have given their lives to the work of systematic classification. Because the facts in themselves are so entertaining they have failed to realize the necessity of co-ordinating them. Still fewer have devoted themselves to the final stage. Because of the vast number of highly interesting

phenomena they have not given enough energy to the patient sifting in order to discover laws. But the laws, although intricate and as yet only beginning to be known, are distinct and clear. This explanatory phase demands a close and careful reasoning which is in the highest degree disciplinary. Thus as a New Science which has comprehended all the phases, Geography stands between the science of geology, which deals with the past and the interior of the earth, and the great group of sciences, biology, ethnology, economics and history, which deal with life as it now exists.—Ellisworth Huntington, *Yale Review*, October, 1912.

J. H. K.

Some Laws of Racial and Intellectual Development.—There has always been a tendency to confuse the phenomena of intellectual development with those of racial development. One explanation for the confusion and the contradictory theories of sociologists and anthropologists is found in the fact of the perpetual migration which has been going on ever since man evolved from the prehuman stage. Migration is one of the methods of survival for as soon as a species becomes adjusted to its environment, it produces more individuals than can survive. The most fit remain at home. The migration results in extermination, change of type in the new environment or survival unchanged if the new environment is like the old. In early times when migration was slow and culture was primitive there was remarkable uniformity of type in a restricted area. Ability to migrate advanced with culture. In modern times when every nation is composed of many types and races, society is so organized that a few exceptionally able men uphold and advance its civilization and at the same time preserve and control the lower types of that vast majority which have never had an original idea in their lives. At the present time almost every advance in culture is the conception of some man in the northwestern corner of Europe, or one whose ancestors came from that place more or less recently.—Charles E. Woodruff, *Journal of Racial Development*, October, 1912.

J. H. K.

Minimum-Wage Laws.—Minimum-wage laws are no longer a subject of merely academic discussion. Massachusetts has a permanent commission with the initial duty "to inquire into the wages paid female employees in any occupation in the commonwealth." If it is discovered that the wages paid in a given occupation are inadequate, it becomes the duty of the commission to establish a wage board for this occupation. This board is to endeavor to determine a suitable wage rate. There is nothing permanent or final in the conclusion since upon petition of either employer or employees the entire action must be reviewed or even a new wage board established. Ohio has given constitutional sanction to the principle. The amendment applies to men as well as women. It expressly connects the establishment of a minimum-wage with concepts of health and working hours. Wisconsin and Minnesota considered bills in 1910 which will be reintroduced in 1913. Critics object that prices must rise with wages and that the worker will gain nothing. Evidence, however, goes to show that improved standards of hours, wages, and conditions tend not to increase retail prices of the product but to enhance the efficiency of the management.—Florence Kelly, *Journal of Political Economy*, December, 1912.

J. H. K.

The American System of Industry.—The progress and development of the American republic has been proportional to the development of machine power in industry. The American system of industry today is segregated into twenty or more crafts or commercial states. The Federal Congress has not as yet provided any legality for these now monopolistic entities. They are extra legal and are termed unlawful. Their operations are wrongly considered criminal performances. This system of business has no representatives in the Federal Congress. The representatives of the political states cannot properly interpret and legislate for these commercial states and for the rightful production and distribution of wealth. The American people should, therefore, recognize these great craft factors of business, remove their anti-trust limitations, incorporate them under government control and admit their representatives into congress. Here they would be able to express and to maintain their rights co-ordinate with representatives of the political states. The creation of such commercial states is possible under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.—C. A. Bowsher, *Moody Magazine*, August and December, 1912.

J. H. K.

A Negative Ideal.—The Manchester school sought to secure to every man the enjoyment of such wealth as he might inherit or justly acquire, but public conscience now demands that the government shall at least mitigate the inequalities of wealth. This demand is due to the sentiment that suffering must be relieved at any cost and that so far as suffering is due to poverty, poverty must be abolished. There is real danger lest the abolition of poverty and distress, rather than the positive work of diffusion of plenty, shall become the popular ideal. There is evidence that we are drifting into this negative ideal. If the State becomes responsible for relief of all distress, State regulation of the increase of population and State control of domestic life are prerequisites.—Edward Latham, *Economic Review*, October 15, 1912.

J. H. K.

The Sociological Significance of the Myth.—Narratives may be classified into historical traditions, myths, and tales. A myth gives an account of the coming into being of man himself or of any feature of his environment, natural or social. A myth may deal with social topics in three ways: it may seek to account for the origin of a social institution; it may have a social setting; and it may include incidental reference to specific social events. The historical value of the latter two aspects being accepted, the inquiry concerns the first. Mythical narratives of the first sort are rare and sometimes difficult to distinguish from historical tradition. The principle suggested to evaluate the worth of myths as evidences of the history of institutions is that it is not the especially familiar and uniform that becomes the subject of myth. Applied to Australia as an example it provides clear evidence of the complex nature of Australian culture.—W. H. R. Rivers, *Folklore*, September 30, 1912. A. H. W.

Bureaus of Public Efficiency.—There are problems of municipal government that cannot be met by the present machinery and can best be handled by some bureau. The question of the purpose, scope, and power of such a bureau should be determined by the local conditions plus the experience of the cities where the work has started. Experience shows that there should be a permanent organization having power to carry out recommendations within its sphere. The bureau may be a part of the controller's office; a separate department; or its work merged with the civil service commission. A department of efficiency including under it the civil service is preferable. There must be an authoritative director and a staff of trained men. Power to enforce recommendations should be limited to accounting methods and business procedure. Co-operation with other departments should be provided for. The bureau must be financed independently. It should act as a clearing house and interpreter of results.—Myrte Cerf, *National Municipal Review*, January, 1913. A. H. W.

The Reign of Science in the History of a Race.—The reign of science is the third in the progressive story of the Humani's "line of succession." In this phase there was an alliance of candor with utility. Double living was the rule. Men had come to know themselves and the world. They displayed a bewildering versatility and developed a maturely mechanical skill. A strong new zest of life was manifested. There was a practical cosmopolitanism and also a more pronounced centralization. Natural science arose, formally conservative but materially radical or negative, and the world was conceived as mechanical. But rationalism did not impair interest in life or humankind. On the practical side commerce absorbed attention. Like science it was rationalistic, indirect, and keen in exploitation. Coexistent with the theoretical and practical rationalism was an assertive religious mysticism. Like those of law and art the reign of science was transitional; the Humani became speculative, philosophical, openhanded, in act and thought spenders of civilization.—Alfred H. Lloyd, *Mind*, October, 1912. A. H. W.

An Ethical Aspect of the New Industrialism.—Colbert's policy of making art and industry flourish together was right. Moral and aesthetic values are essentials to the evolution of future industry. Uncommercialized industry was governed by values arising from the artisan's reflection upon the user's need and worth, and from the standards created by society. Industry today is largely dominated by the trader's ideal involving production of the most profitable. The trader's ideal of maximum gain has also supplanted the industrial ideal of a fair price and a just wage. Imperial-

istic trade and the seizure and exploitation of newly discovered economic resources are chiefly responsible for the change. The industrial progress of the future will depend upon a restoration of the old feeling of responsibility to the user. The service of society will have dignity and meaning according to our concept of society's worth. Accordingly we must remove conditions that destroy our faith in society. The ultimate need of the new industrialism is for poets and artists who shall translate society and social man into terms of values worth serving.—Alvin Saunders Johnson, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, January, 1913. A. H. W.

The Higher Criticism of Karl Marx.—The progressive movement within the Socialist party struggles to break away from blind adherence to Marx. The dominating personality of Marx and his sympathetic assimilation of the conflict situation account for the dominance which he acquired. His high priesthood was valuable as a force for unity, but it also tended to dogmatism and ultra-orthodoxy. The revolt against the Marxian system has resulted in the adoption of an opportunistic program for reform, in a large accretion from the middle class, and in increased growth. The change has been brought about largely by a method of higher criticism of the master, involving reinterpretation and reconstruction. But in some cases there has been a revision of economic theory and a modification of sociological and political principles.—L. L. Bernard, *Forum*, February, 1913. A. H. W.

The Element of Fear in Religion.—The unusual and unfamiliar is interesting and claims attention. For primitive peoples the strange is allied with the magical and sacred. Similar awe and reverence are displayed by the higher animals. The attitude taken toward these phenomena is almost invariably one of fear. Fear, then, is an element common to every religion. Hence it follows that religion is rooted in individual as well as in social psychology, since no social complex presents any one common feature, unless it be such fundamental underlying features as find their ultimate support in individual psychic needs.—W. D. Wallis, *Journal of Religious Psychology*, July, 1912. S. A. Q.

Dynamism, the Primitive Nature Philosophy, and its Relation to Religion and Magic.—(1) The belief in non-personal powers is neither a derivative of animism nor a first step leading up to it, but the two beliefs have had independent origins; and (2) animism appeared second in order of time.—J. H. Leuba, *Journal of Religious Psychology*, July, 1912. S. A. Q.

Die Zukunft des deutschen Volkwachstums—eine nationale Lebensfrage.—The percentage of increase in Germany's population since 1900 has decreased. This decrease is largely due to the lower birth-rate, coincident with the concentration of population in large cities and with the depopulation of the country districts. The rate of mortality and especially of infant mortality has been lowered the last ten years and can be lowered still more. For the future, however, the lowering of the death-rate will not be as important a means of maintaining the increase of population as the resettlement of the country districts will be. To protect national industry and the German laborer, Germany must promote a national internal colonization movement rather than attempt to restrict foreign immigration and migration from the country to the cities by means of tolls. Internal colonization, started by Frederick the Great, is again being renewed and the landowners, the laborers, and the captains of industry are all taking interest in it.—Arthur Dix, *Annalen des deutschen Reichs*, No. 8, 1912. V. W. B.

Actual Operations of Woman's Suffrage in the Pacific Coast Cities.—Suffrage in California has had both objective and subjective results. It has increased man's respect for woman, boy's respect for women teachers, girl's interest in school, and woman's self-esteem, and women are doing more than formerly to become informed. Women vote up to their registration strength fully as well as men, especially in the uninteresting elections where no personal element is involved. It appears that women are more interested in municipal and civic affairs than in political partisanship or national politics and that women favor progressivism.—Mrs. Charles Farwell Edson, *National Municipal Review*, October, 1912. V. W. B.

Industrial Employment of Women.—By an analysis of the statistics for the 635 registration areas into which England and Wales are divided, it may be inferred with confidence that the rate of infantile mortality is to a certain extent dependent upon birth-rate. By an examination of the tables prepared to demonstrate the influence of industrial employment of women on rate of infantile mortality, birth-rates, and the sex ratio at birth, the following conclusions can be drawn: (1) that the employment of married women in industrial occupations tends to diminish the birth-rate; (2) that such employment tends to the birth of a larger proportion of girl infants; (3) that low birth-rates tend to the birth of a larger proportion of girl infants; (4) that the rate of infantile mortality is higher as the proportion of employed married women rises.—H. R. Jones, *Lancet*, August 10, 1912. J. H. K.

Society and Liberalism in England and Germany.—The word "liberalism" in this lecture is used with the special meaning of *Kultur-Liberalism*, the liberalism of civilization. It is the liberalism which represents in general the character of the English mind and nature. It is that which divides the old times of feudal institutions from the modern development of economic history. One of the most important elements of this kind of liberalism is shown in the valuation of the social position of men. The position which any man occupies in society does not in England affect his position in public life. In Germany the place a man has in society largely determines his official position. Titles, honors, and class are of enormous importance in public life and influence. England gained this state of liberty early because of the achievements of the civil wars in the seventeenth century. These revolutions had a strong ethical foundation which made the results permanent. In Germany there has never been such an outburst of revolution. The Puritan Calvinism of the seventeenth century which held that every individual was to exert himself in labor and business was also a strong element in this early liberalism of England. This religious aspect of wealth is very different from the Catholic and Lutheran doctrine.—Hermann Levy, *Sociological Review*, July, 1912. J. H. K.

Gerechtigkeit und Kommunismus in der heutigen Volkswirtschaft.—In the endeavor to effect social equalization, a rational distribution of financial burdens must be made. The theoretical economist knows that the structure of our economic order is itself in process of development. Free competition, for several generations the norm of the economic process, if viewed in historic perspective, is but a transition phenomenon and must presently be replaced by another norm. But free competition is at the same time the bearer of that retributive social justice which is built on an absolute economic individualism. For these individualistic motives our new economic order will need to substitute forces of a psychologically different character. In the interest of a peaceful transition it is advisable to experiment early with a communistic organization of industry. The possibilities of this are given in the principle of taxation within the framework of our present-day economic order.—Karl Oldenberg, *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, XXXVI, No. 3. P. W.

Unionist Land Policy.—The opponents of the unionist land policy assert that British agriculture has flourished under the present land system, and that experience has taught the superiority of tenancy as a basis of agriculture. The experience of France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark has proved that ownership of the land is the best basis of agriculture. England's loss of citizens through emigration is due to the overcrowded conditions of the cities. The country remains depopulated. A large amount of the labor dissatisfaction in England can be traced to the lack of a proprietor class. Property makes people happy and contented. Those who advocate government ownership of railways and mines oppose the financing of a land-purchase policy for settlement purposes. This policy is one of the nation's safest investments. The liberal policy has proven inefficient and destructive to the immediate solution of England's land problem.—"Politicus," *Fortnightly Review*, October, 1912. R. E. S.

A Further Study of the Problem of Race Betterment.—The state has the right to enact laws which will prevent the perpetuation of criminality and of degeneracy by inhibiting procreation in the confirmed criminal and in the defective subject. These may be rightfully regarded as in a state of disease and therefore the legitimate subjects

for medical and surgical treatment. Neither education nor punitive measures are effective in restoring the criminal and defective subject to normal conditions. Surgical procedures instituted for the prevention of procreation of the confirmed criminal, pervert, degenerate, idiot, imbecile, epileptic, and vicious insane should not be regarded as a method of punishment, but as a remedial measure, the sole objects of which are the betterment of the human race, through the arrest of the continually flowing stream of degeneracy and the mental, moral, and physical improvement of the defective subject.—J. Ewing Mears, M.D., *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, October 3, 1912.
R. F. C.

The Break-up of Landed Estates.—A departmental committee which was appointed to inquire into the position of tenant farmers in England and Wales found that there was an abnormal number of sales and of dispossession of tenants because of such sales. Two remedies were proposed: (1) the extension of principle of the Small Holding Act, 1892 (now Act of 1908), enabling loans to be made on easy terms to purchasing occupiers; (2) the acquisition of landed estates by the state. Since it was found that the tenant farmers did not, except as a last resort, desire to acquire their farms, that the inevitable tendency of subdivision of land is to raise rents, and that the state can acquire and maintain land cheaper in large areas, the committee declared itself in a recommendation for state purchase.—E. W. Davies, *Contemporary Review*, July, 1912.
J. H. K.

La sexualité dans les naissances françaises.—The principal theories in regard to the moment at which sex is determined may be classified as epigamic, progamic, and syngamic; each of these is supported by experiments in the botanical and lower animal world. The two latter join in opposition to the first in the conclusion that it is not possible to modify the sex after conception has taken place. From the mass of evidence it is safe to adopt the conclusion that the determination of sex, at whatever moment it may occur, is greatly influenced by nutritive conditions, and that favorable conditions result in femaleness. This principle may be applied in the human field. The birth-rate for males is higher than for females in France, yet in the population at large the females predominate. This demonstrates an excess mortality of males, and this in turn demonstrates an excess of unfavorable pre-natal conditions.—René Worms, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, June, 1912.
E. E. E.

Motherliness.—The old illusion was that motherliness was inexhaustible and infallible. That it is an attribute belonging to the lower phases of development, and that motherhood is not a worthy vocation is the new illusion. Accordingly, every effort to make motherliness a determining factor for woman's calling is now considered as antiquated superstition. Since uneducated mothers may make homes into hells for children, many women maintain that day nurseries, kindergartens, and schools should replace the too devoted and confined motherliness of the home. These women forget what hells institutions can be. Woman's liberation should allow motherliness to penetrate all spheres of life, but not at the cost of the dissolution of the home. Motherliness must demand all the rights and cultivation necessary for women to be at the same time child-bearing, child-rearing, and self-supporting.—Ellen Key, *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1912.
V. W. B.

Dispensaries for the Prevention and Treatment of Consumption.—The Interim Report of the Departmental Committee on Tuberculosis recommends the establishment of one dispensary for every 150,000 to 200,000 of the population. The chief functions of the tuberculosis dispensary are: to act as a receiving-house and center of diagnosis and clearing-house and center of observation, with physicians, and a center for curative treatment; to co-operate with every existing agency dealing with tuberculosis; to deal with and endeavor to improve home conditions of patients; to serve as an information bureau and educational center. Open-air shelters to be loaned to patients to be erected at their own homes are of great value. Expenses will include salaries of a chief tuberculosis officer with one or more assistant medical officers, nurses, clerks, porters, etc. Services of voluntary workers are of inestimable value.—D. J. Williamson, *Journal of the Royal Sanitary Institute*, October, 1912. R. F. C.

The House Fly in Its Relation to City Garbage.—In a Boston tenement district, larvae were collected from the contents of various pails of garbage as they were emptied into the carrier's wagon. Rearings showed 22.4 per cent of house flies. Considering the great numbers of muscids issuing from the garbage every day during the warm summer months, this percentage means that this place of breeding ranks among the first to be considered in a campaign against the insect.—John Howard Paine, *Psyche*, October, 1912. R. F. C.

Quantitative Study of Bacteria in City Dust.—Evidence of infection by air or dust is practically nil. Contact is the great danger to be guarded against. Bacteriological evidence indicates, however, the possibility of a given disease germ being present in dust and that which shows actual germ content of dust as it exists under natural conditions. Experiments show that the spread in dust of cholera and the plague is an impossibility; the spread of diphtheria and typhoid fever is possible, though not probable; while it is very possible to spread tubercle bacilli and pus cocci in this way. Dust from the neighborhood of consumptive patients appears to give positive results in 20–50 per cent of the animals infected, while in dust from places not specially exposed to pollution, the positive results were nearly always under 10, and in two-thirds of the cases, were under 5 per cent. Street dusts were found to be more prolific in bacteria than indoor dusts. The ratio of acid-forming streptococci to total bacteria found in street dust was 1 to 1,157, and 1 to 215 for indoor dust. If dust contains mouth-streptococci and tubercle bacillus at the same time, inhaling and ingesting large quantities of this dust may have a real sanitary significance.—Winslow and Kligler, *American Journal of Public Health*, September, 1912. R. E. S.

Is Typhoid Fever a "Rural" Disease?—Owing to different and changing conditions investigated, and to the lack of unified understanding of the terms "urban" and "rural," there is much confusion of opinion on the subject. The most recent scientific investigations seem to indicate that the disease is becoming less prevalent in both rural and urban communities, that immigration and urbanization have greatly affected the problem, and that since 1890, at least, it has been an "urban" rather than a "rural" disease.—William T. Sedgwick, George Rodney Taylor, J. Scott MacNutt, *Journal of Infectious Diseases*, September, 1912. M. T. J.

The Passing of the Farmer.—Unprecedented industrial and social changes taking place in urban life necessitate quite as great changes in rural life. The farming of tomorrow will of necessity become a specialized department of urban life. The reasons for this are (1) great increase in land values, (2) a decrease in supply of helpers on farms, (3) increased burdens on the farmer's wife, (4) the need for intensified and specialized farming, and (5) the economic, educational, and social advantages offered by the city.—Roy Hinman Holmes, *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1912. G. J. T.

Der schwedische Kinematographengesetz vom 22. Juni 1911 nebst Ausführungsverordnung in ihrer Bedeutung für die Reform der Filmzensur in den deutschen Bundesstaaten.—The significant features of this law are centralized censorship, special regulation with reference to children, and opportunity for the censor to exercise a large measure of personal judgment. Imperial censors pass on all films except pictures of actual events within ten days of their occurrence. No films may be shown to children which will cause overexcitement or disturb normal development of the imagination. Children under eight are not admitted to other shows unless accompanied by legal guardian. All productions must be in conformity with common law and morality.—Dr. Albert Hellwig, *Annalen des deutschen Reichs*, No. 7, 1912. S. A. Q.

Federal Aid to Education and the Necessary Step in Solution of the Child Labor Problem.—Larger responsibility must rest upon the public school as child labor is eliminated from industry. New resources for financing the public schools must be found. Prior to the present time support has come from within the state: from state tax, local tax, tuition, etc. The older states have learned from experience that they cannot afford to meet the demand for more efficient industrial education with these limited resources. National aid in equalizing the burden of cost of public

education is urgent. A national board of education representing the best educational life of each state in the nation should be organized under the United States commissioner of education and should distribute among the various states an annual appropriation from Congress. The presentation to Congress by the National Child Labor Committee of a plan to establish such a commission is urgent.—S. Lindsay, *Child Labor Bulletin*, June, 1912. R. E. S.

Rural Child Labor.—A special census bulletin of 1907 reported about 1,050,000 rural child laborers, four-fifths of whom were assisting their parents. The apparent evils are (1) physical development impaired, (2) arrested educational development. There are no reliable data on the subject. It offers a problem in scientific investigation and study for some scientific foundation or for the Childrens' Bureau.—John M. Gillette, *Child Labor Bulletin*, June, 1912. G. T. J.

Wages in Massachusetts and New Jersey.—The average wage is socially misleading and merely dehumanizes wage statistics. New Jersey and Massachusetts have adopted an effective method whereby age, sex, industry, exact wage and proportion of same are clearly shown. A study of the statistics gathered by these two states shows: (1) the average earnings in the two commonwealths is about \$500; (2) this amount is apparently increased in those industries dominated by men and decreased in those dominated by women; (3) larger industries pay less than \$600, while the small industries pay more than \$600. In both states, wages of adult males have risen more generally than those of adult females. Unemployment is a modifying force in wage statistics. Nine-tenths of the adult males earn less than \$800 per year. Nine-tenths of the adult females earn less than \$500 per year.—Scott Nearing, *American Statistical Association*, June, 1912. R. E. S.

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Library p. 737.

Lester Frank Ward

The Nestor of American Sociologists

Died

April 18, 1913

137

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XVIII

MAY 1913

NUMBER 6

EUGENICS, EUTHENICS, AND EUDEMICS¹

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EUGENICS

ARTIFICIAL SELECTION

When Charles Darwin, in his great work on *Variations of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, published in 1868, taught the whole world the marvelous efficiency of artificial selection, it was no wonder that the idea of applying it to the human race should have occurred to many. His talented cousin, Francis Galton, was the first publicly to suggest such an application. He had used the word "stirp"² for the primary bearers of heredity, and he perceived that in the improvement of cereals and fruit trees, and the breeding of domestic animals, man had been engaged practically in the culture of hereditary stirps.

STIRPICULTURE

In an article on "Hereditary Improvement," published in *Fraser's Magazine* for January, 1873, he had used the word "viriculture" (p. 119) for what he now renamed "stirpiculture," and

¹ A lecture delivered before the Federation for Child Study in New York, on January 30, 1913.

² In a paper entitled, "A Theory of Heredity," read before the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain, November 9, 1875, and published earliest in the *Contemporary Review* for December, 1875, where the word is used and explained on p. 81, and soon after in the *Journal of the Institute*, V, No. 3 (January, 1876), where the same passage occurs on p. 330.

his claim that mankind might be made the beneficiary of this potent principle seemed altogether reasonable. But such a captivating idea could not fail to be seized upon by charlatans and carried to unwarrantable lengths, and very soon the term "stirpi-culture" had degenerated and become objectionable to all refined natures. Galton was therefore compelled to abandon it and to adopt another which could not be so easily prostituted to coarse sensual ends, and in 1883 he introduced the word "eugenics"¹ for practically the same idea. This term has been kept fairly within the pale of science, but it has almost set the world on fire, and now seems to engross the attention of all classes. Many see in eugenics the regeneration of mankind. Is there a rational basis for this, or is it only a temporary popular "craze," doomed to collapse after a short period?

NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE EUGENICS

Dr. C. W. Saleeby² has clearly pointed out that eugenics embraces two quite different fields, which he very appropriately calls negative eugenics and positive eugenics, respectively. Negative eugenics relates to the problem of preventing the mental and physical defectives of society from perpetuating their defects through propagation. Positive eugenics relates to the problem of improving the mass of mankind by the selection of the superior in the process of reproduction.

It is clear that these are two entirely distinct problems. As the defectives are the wards of society, society has somewhat the same control over them as intelligent men have over the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and there is no good reason why it should not act in the same way with regard to them, and eliminate as completely and as rapidly as possible the worthless elements in the population. Nothing but an inexcusable indifference, due to

¹ In his book entitled, *Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development*, London, 1883, p. 44. He here says: "The investigation of human eugenics—that is, of the conditions under which men of a high type are produced—is at present extremely hampered by the want of full family histories, both medical and general, extending over three or four generations." He does not even italicize the word here, and it is evident that in thus incidentally using it he had no idea of the rôle that it was soon destined to play.

² *Sociological Review* (London), II (July, 1909), 228.

general ignorance and the half-unconscious state of society, prevents this being done. This problem has been adequately treated by the two lecturers who have preceded me on this platform, and I will therefore make no attempt to treat it myself.

POSITIVE EUGENICS

The great problem remains, the problem of positive eugenics. The principle underlying it is beyond question. The power of an intelligent being to modify to almost any extent the qualities of organisms over which such a being has complete control has been demonstrated beyond a peradventure. Why, then, may not human nature be thus modified, and the human race be lifted up in the same way and to the same degree that the vegetable and animal races have been lifted up? In 1891 I myself said:¹

Artificial selection has given to man the most that he possesses of value in the organic products of the earth. May not men and women be selected as well as sheep and horses? From the great stirp of humanity with all its multiplied ancestral plasms—some very poor, some mediocre, some merely indifferent, a goodly number ranging from middling to fair, only a comparatively few very good, with an occasional crystal of the first water—from all this, why may we not learn to select on some broad and comprehensive plan with a view to a general building-up and rounding-out of the race of human beings? At least we should by a rigid selection stamp out of the future all the wholly unworthy elements. Public sentiment should be created in this direction, and when the day comes that society shall be as profoundly shocked at the crime of perpetuating the least taint of hereditary disease, insanity, or other serious defect as it now is at the comparatively harmless crime of incest, the way to practical and successful stirpiculture² will have already been found.

¹ "Neo-Darwinism and Neo-Lamarckism," annual address of the president of the Biological Society of Washington, delivered January 24, 1891, *Proceedings*, VI, 71.

² I had not at this date heard the word "eugenics," but the word "stirpiculture" was quite common in America. In fact, even in England, it was supposed to be an American word. Thus, Mr. H. G. Wells, in discussing Galton's paper on "Eugenics," read before the Sociological Society of London on May 16, 1904, said: "Eugenics," which is really only a new word for the popular American term 'stirpiculture,' seems to me to be a term that is not without its misleading implications." See the report of that meeting published in the *American Journal of Sociology* for July, 1904, X, 11. To this remark of Mr. Wells, Mr. Galton replied (*ibid.*, pp. 24-25): "Mr. Wells spoke of 'stirpiculture' as a term preferable to 'eugenics.' I myself invented it, and deliberately changed it for 'eugenics.'"

Indeed it seemed at first very simple, but the moment a practical application of it is contemplated an insuperable difficulty arises. The control of heredity is possible only to a master-creature. Man is the master-creature of the animal world. Society is the master of its defectives. But normal people are their own masters. History tells of sumptuary laws by which kings controlled the food and clothing of their subjects. This has all been long since done away. But the most extreme sumptuary law would be liberty itself compared with any attempt on the part of society to control the choice of partners in their marital relations. This would be a tyranny by the side of which all other tyrannies would fade into insignificance.

So clear had this become to Galton himself that he had long confined the practical teaching of positive eugenics to the idea of making the laws of heredity so widely and thoroughly known that people would practice them for themselves, and thus automatically, as it were, perfect the human race. That this is possible no one will question, but there are reasons why its success must remain comparatively small even in the most enlightened communities.

In the first place, eugenists are not usually willing to admit the enormous force of personal preference. When two persons are attracted to each other by those subtle laws of their emotional natures, they are not likely to inquire whether they are fitted to maintain the standard or improve the quality of the race. However deeply grounded in the laws of heredity they may be, their passion completely blinds them to all lack of harmony with such laws. Even if they attend to it, they are sure to believe that no such deficiencies exist. We cannot imagine them abandoning their intentions on that account. The number of cases in which this would occur would be so extremely small as to produce no appreciable effect upon society or the race.

In the second place, Galton was not willing to accept the popular view that Nature herself tends to bring about race improvement through the selection of opposites. He even attempted to prove from a few statistical facts, taken from the highest classes where exceptions would be most likely to occur, that the reverse was the case, and that the sexes preferred similar, and not different, qualities.

The biological imperative.—There are many ways in which Nature strives to maintain a perfect race, and even to improve it. I have grouped all these tendencies together under the phrase “biological imperative,”¹ and it constitutes one of the most salutary principles of sociology. Moreover, it is not recognized or understood by eugenists, which is a serious defect in their doctrine. It is the *vis medicatrix naturae* of society. A large part of the degeneracy of the higher classes is due to the neglect of this principle, and to the attempt, often successful, to defeat its normal operation. There has been too much interference with Nature’s ways. Man assumes to know better than Nature how to guide the forces of heredity. He sets up artificial imperatives—the social imperative, the categorical imperative—and he thereby thwarts Nature in her wholesome tendencies, which all look to the vigor of the race. It is these manifold social and artificial restraints that are bringing about race degeneracy and social decadence. There is serious danger that the teachers of eugenics may take a false road, and, in so far as they can influence human selection, may work deterioration rather than amelioration.

In the first place, eugenics tends to emphasize unduly the intellectual qualities. Galton’s whole interest was centered on hereditary genius. The only kind of superiority generally recognized is intellectual superiority. The only organ that it is sought to improve is the brain. If the eugenists could carry out their plans the human head would be enormously enlarged at the expense of the rest of the body. This would soon make it impossible for men to be born, for obstetricians know that the head is now so unnaturally large that birth is a great hardship for woman.

In the second place, eugenists manifest more or less contempt for the affective faculties. The emotional side of man’s nature becomes for them mere sentimentality. Brains, intellect, genius, alone have worth. Like the breeders of cattle, they would “breed for points,” and the head is the only organ that they seek to develop. But Nature is far wiser, and seeks to develop all the faculties and to prevent all extremes. The normal becomes the ideal. A perfect race is one that is developed in all its qualities, physical, moral, and

¹ See *Pure Sociology*, p. 302.

intellectual. It is this that the biological imperative aims at, and if not interfered with by the doctrinaires of heredity, this will be the result.

THE WELL BORN

It is strange that in the science of the well born all emphasis is laid on the ill born. To read the eugenic literature one would infer that the majority of mankind are defectives. The United States Census shows that the number of mentally defective (insane and feeble-minded) is about 333 per 100,000, or one-third of 1 per cent. While of course allowance must be made for errors in the statistics, and while there are many weak-minded persons who fail to be classed among defectives, still, after all corrections are made, the number of defectives cannot exceed one-half of 1 per cent of the population, leaving 99.5 per cent for the normal classes.




FIG. 1

Galton talked as though it were possible to arrange all the members of society in a series extending from idiocy to genius, and he supposed that the resultant figure would show a regular gradation, such as Quetelet found in measuring the stature of Belgian soldiers, by which he arrived at his well-known *homme moyen*, which some facetiously translate, the "mean man." With Galton the defectives on the one hand and the geniuses on the other represent mere "deviations from a mean." That "mean" is the great mass, or mediocrity. In his *Hereditary Genius* (p. 24) he gives a figure of Quetelet's results, indicating the deviations by lighter shading. He does not give any figure for mental deviations, but they

might be represented by two triangles with a common base and with the apices opposite each other, as in Fig. 1.

This view is shared by Ribot and many others, and may be

regarded as the eugenic doctrine. Ammon¹ showed that it is not true for mental phenomena, and that the normal condition includes the bulk of the population. On p. 53 of the first edition, and p. 173 of the second, of his work on the *Social Order*, he gives a figure illustrating this, which, with the omission of some details, I have reproduced (Fig. 2).




FIG. 2

This is much nearer to the real state of things, but still greatly exaggerates the mentally defective. The geniuses are probably also exaggerated, because the existing state of society does not enable the mental powers to show themselves.² There is scarcely any gradation from the insane and feeble-minded to the normal condition, and the transition should be represented as abrupt. Much, too, that is called genius is pathologic, and belongs rather at the bottom along with the insane. A figure like that on p. 744 (Fig. 3) would come much nearer the truth.

* ¹ Otto Ammon, *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen*, Jena, 1895; zweite verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage, 1896.

² See *Applied Sociology*, chap. ix.

But it is scarcely worth while to try to indicate the amount of genius. We really know nothing about it. All the estimates are based on the actual number who have accomplished something in the world, but this, as I have abundantly shown, is no criterion of the amount of real genius, because the greater part of it lies latent in the great mass, and has never had an opportunity to manifest itself. The amount of visible genius has never exceeded one-tenth of 1 per cent, but it is proved that at least two hundred times as




FIG. 3

much exists and might be brought out. This would raise it to 20 per cent. But when we recognize the many forms that genius takes we cannot escape the conclusion that some measure of genius exists in nearly everyone. All this genius is scattered somewhat uniformly through the whole mass of the population.

Negative eugenics aims at the elimination of the defective element. Positive eugenics seeks to increase the number of geniuses. This can be done only from the ranks of the normal, i.e., of mediocrity. These, and also the superior, and even the geniuses, are supposed to be capable of almost indefinite intellectual improve-

ment through hereditary selection. This is at least a recognition of the existence of potential genius.

THE LIFE-IMPULSE

The greatest problem before the world today is that of a universal upward tendency in nature. One aspect of it has been called "vitalism," or "neo-vitalism." But it is not less chemism and psychism. The biologists are alarmed at it. They see in it the specter of the old metaphysical life-entity. They are frightened at the bugbear of a life-god. But the discussions show that they fail to understand the principle. Properly conceived, it is entirely scientific, and has nothing to do with Reinke's "dominants" or Driesch's "entelechy" or "psychoid." Bergson talks of an *élan vital*, leaving it doubtful, however, as to what he really means. But the principle is not new. It has been dimly seen by many truly great philosophers. It has also been perceived by men of science. The eminent botanist Nägeli¹ clearly saw it in the plant world, and set it forth as the basis of his system. The great American botanist, Dr. Asa Gray, who was also a leading expounder of Darwin's entire system, accepted this view, and says that it was shared by another great European botanist, Alexander Braun. Criticizing the view that variation has no definite course, but takes place in all directions alike, he says: "What we observe in the seed-bed does not suggest this view. Nägeli, Braun, and myself incline to the opinion that each plant has an inherent tendency to variation in certain general directions."² The fact is that it is always in an upward direction, toward higher structural perfection.

What, then, is this principle? At bottom it is the universal energy at work in all nature. We have only to recognize that this universal energy is constructive and creative, as I have so fully shown.³ It builds, and to it are due all the manifold forms of existence—worlds, atoms, organisms, man, society. Evolution is

¹ Carl Nägeli, *Entstehung und Begriff der naturhistorischen Art*, zweite Auflage, München, 1865; *Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre*, Leipzig, 1884.

² *Structural Botany*, New York and Chicago, 1879, p. 319.

³ *Pure Sociology*, pp. 79, 171.

a series, and it is also an ascending series. The "nisus of nature"¹ is constantly pushing higher and higher structures into existence. The history of our earth is the history of a series of ascending steps in organic evolution. Each geologic age reveals the presence of higher types of both plants and animals than the preceding age. The present flora and fauna of the globe represent the last stage thus far attained in this ascending series. Toward the end of the animal line man emerged as the crown of the organic process. But man himself also constitutes an ascending series, and his history, unaided by the efforts of the eugenists, is one of progress from the lowest nature—men to the highest culture—races. This prolonged spontaneous upward movement of the entire organic world is the result of that form of the universal energy which inheres in the life-principle, and which makes life a progressive agent, mounting "through all the spires of form."

The present eugenic movement is one of distrust of nature, of lack of faith in great principles, of feverish haste to improve the world, of egotism in the assumption of a wisdom superior to that of nature. If it could have its way it would thwart and distort the spontaneous upward movement, and create an artificial race of hydrocephalous pigmies. Fortunately its power is limited, and can produce only a ripple on the surface of society.

EUTHENICS²

Is there, then, nothing to do? Are we to accept that modern scientific fatalism known as *laissez faire*, which enjoins the folding of the arms? Are we to preach a gospel of inaction? I for one certainly am not content to do so, and I believe that nothing I have thus far said is inconsistent with the most vigorous action, and that in the direction of the betterment of the human race. The end and aim of the eugenists cannot be reproached. The race is far

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 93, 178; *Pure Sociology*, pp. 22, 136.

² *Euthenics. The Science of Controllable Environment. A Plea for Better Living Conditions as a First Step Toward Higher Human Efficiency.* By Ellen H. Richards, Boston, 1910.

Mrs. Richards gives (p. vii) the etymology of the word and its classic uses. The central thought seems to be that of material prosperity. I shall use it as embracing practically all that Galton meant by "nurture."

from perfect. Its condition is deplorable. Its improvement is entirely feasible, and in the highest degree desirable. Nor do I refer merely to economic conditions, to the poverty and misery of the disinherited classes. The intellectual state of the world is deplorable, and its improvement is clearly within the reach of society itself. It is therefore a question of method rather than of principle that concerns us.

THE HUMAN BRAIN

The brain of primitive man was so large and so highly developed that he reasoned himself into all sorts of errors, which he has handed down to us, and which have constituted the most serious impediment to the progress of the world. Cephalization, natural selection, and especially sexual selection, co-operated during a long prehuman period to give to man a head and a brain much too large for his good, and which has been for the most part a biologically disadvantageous character. It is only coming to serve a useful purpose in the most advanced stages of civilization. Brain increase is therefore not at all the needed thing for the improvement of the race. The chief evils of the world have been due to error, which is a product of reason. Error is in turn the result of the ignorance of man of his environment, and his consequent false reasoning about it. The progress of the world has been due to scientific investigation, by which the true nature of the environment has been made known and the error removed. The thing needed for the improvement of the race is therefore more knowledge and not more brains.

COMPETITION

Everywhere in nature there is a tendency for the avenues of progress to become choked and the normally upward movement checked or arrested. The rising tide of world-progress, of which I have spoken, has therefore always been rhythmic. A dynamic state is converted into a static one, and kinetic activity into stagnation. The world has its resting stages, waiting for some new influence to enter in and produce a difference of potential. In the organic world competition tends constantly to keep the organism

far below its possibilities of development. In the struggle for existence every organism that survives is arrested on a comparatively low plane. The survival of the fittest is only the survival of low types adapted to a hostile environment. They are all striving to rise to higher stages under the spur of that inherent force, or life-urge, which is everywhere and always pushing upward toward higher and better things. Nature is literally "bound fast in fate" by the competitive forces everywhere at work. Every plant and every animal possesses potential qualities far higher than its environment will allow it to manifest.¹

The signal success of artificial selection is due entirely to this principle. The truth, however, is ignored by those who avail themselves of the principle. It is ignored by eugenists, who imagine they are adding something to the native powers of men, when all they can do at most is to loose the fetters with which nature has bound them. All that the agriculturist or the horticulturist can do, all that he needs to do, is to remove the hostile influences that restrain the native energies of the vegetable kingdom, and permit those energies to lift them to higher levels of existence. All that the stock-breeder can do is to liberate certain selected parts of the animal organism, and permit those parts to expand by their inherent powers. All that the eugenist could do, if he had full power to transform human beings in conformity with his capricious notions of what constitutes improvement, would be to set free the particular elements of human nature that he should select, and watch the workings of those potential agencies that had been hitherto cramped into quiescence.

But all this is *nurture*, pure and simple. Nature is unchanged. The hereditary tendencies remain the same. These are beyond the reach of human art. It is the environment that holds the hereditary impulse down. Man has no power over heredity. The only thing he can affect is the environment. It is true that man can utilize the laws of heredity. But the utilization of any law of nature consists simply in so adjusting the environment that the law shall operate in his interest. It is merely directing the forces

¹ I set forth this principle and established it by numerous examples as long ago as 1876. See my article on "The Local Distribution of Plants and the Theory of Adaptation" in the *Popular Science Monthly* for October, 1876, IX, 676-84.

of nature into channels of human advantage. But those channels belong to the environment.

SPONTANEOUS VARIATION

Darwin recognized the existence of spontaneous variation. In fact, he admitted that it must be called in to explain the first step in natural selection. Without it there would be nothing for natural selection to lay hold of. Enamored of the great principle of natural selection, biologists have fallen under the illusion that it explains everything. But spontaneous variation is a more fundamental principle. It is prior in order, and it is universal in nature. It goes on along with natural selection and in perfect harmony with it. It explains great numbers of facts that natural selection is powerless to explain. This latter can explain the biologically advantageous only, while those changes which are devoid of utility can be explained by spontaneous variation only. I long ago emphasized this fact and illustrated it by striking examples from my own special field.¹ I called it "fortuitous variation," but the phrase was due to the impression under which I then labored that Darwin himself had used it. But it is the same as his "spontaneous variation," simply emphasizing the fact, which so strongly appealed to me, that such variations take place, as it were, by chance, and not because they are useful. In point of fact, as I have repeatedly shown, they are due to that inherent impulse of the whole organic world, which is perpetually pressing in all directions, and striving to lift all life to higher levels, and which really brings about organic evolution.

THE ENVIRONMENT

It turns out, then, that after all the discussion of heredity, and the hopes hung upon the idea of utilizing it in the interest of race improvement, it is a fixed quantity which no human power can change, while the environment, which Galton affected to despise,

¹ See a brief abstract, all that was ever published, of my paper on "Fortuitous Variation in the Genus *Eupatorium*," in *Nature*, London, for July 25, 1889, XI, 310. On account of the importance of the idea, even for sociology, and the completely buried condition of this note, I reproduced the essential part of it in *Pure Sociology*. See pp. 241-42.

is not only easily modified, but is in reality the only thing that is modified in the process of artificial selection, which is the essential principle of eugenics itself. All the improvement that can be brought about through any of the applications of that art must be the result of nurture, and cannot be due to any change in nature, since nature is incapable of change.

There is a sense in which the environment may be regarded as representing opposition.¹ It is the environment in the widest sense that resists the upward pressure of the life-force, and holds all nature down. That force is like an elastic spring coiled up beneath a mass of environmental débris, and needing only to be freed in order to unfold spontaneously and lift the organic world to higher and ever-higher planes. In the human field the mind-force is added to the life-force, and both vital and psychic powers press forward together toward some exalted goal. The environment lies across the path of both and obstructs their rise. The problem everywhere is how to unlock these prison doors and set free the innate forces of nature.

THE ORGANIC ENVIRONMENT

Darwin has taught us that the chief barrier to the advance of any species of plants or animals is its competition with other plants and animals that contest the same ground. And therefore the fiercest opponents of any species are the members of the same species which demand the same elements of subsistence. Hence the chief form of relief in the organic world consists in the thinning-out of competitors. Any species of animals or plants left free to propagate at its normal rate would overrun the earth in a short time and leave no room for any other species. Any species that is sufficiently vigorous to resist its organic environment will crowd out all others and monopolize the earth. If nature permitted this there could be no variety, but only one monotonous aspect devoid of interest or beauty. Whatever we may think of the harsh method by which this is prevented, we cannot regret that it is prevented, and that we have a world of variety, interest, and aesthetic attractiveness.

¹ See *Applied Sociology*, pp. 123-28, 233-34.

THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

It is not generally realized that in this respect the social environment does not essentially differ from the organic environment. It is true that Malthus taught us this more than a century ago, but we go on deploring the action of this law in the human race, and striving to nullify it by all manner of artificial devices. That rational man has the power through his intelligence to rob this law of its harsh, painful features is beyond question, but whenever this is attempted there is a general outcry against it, and those who attempt it are accused of an unpardonable sin against nature, and usually of a sin against God.

RACE SUICIDE

On April 12, 1901, Dr. Edward A. Ross, in his annual address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia, speaking of the displacement of the American by the foreign population in this country, uttered these words:

For a case like this I can find no words so apt as "race suicide."¹ There is no bloodshed, no violence, no assault of the race that waxes upon the race that wanes. The higher race quietly and unobtrusively eliminates itself rather than endure individually the bitter competition it has failed to ward off by collective action.²

The phrase "race suicide" was immediately taken up and echoed throughout the civilized world. "Race suicide" was loudly and widely condemned, and branded as a mark of decadence. Chief among those to make a public use of it and indulge in its wholesale condemnation was Theodore Roosevelt, who lost no opportunity to weave it into his speeches and warn his audiences against its insidious dangers to mankind. He was credited with the authorship of the phrase, and the press took it up and scattered it broadcast over the world. Books with it as their title have been written, and the literature of foreign countries is now replete with translations of it into all languages.

¹ The use of quotation marks here was probably not intended by Dr. Ross, as the words were not quoted, and were here used for the first time.

² *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Philadelphia, XVIII (July, 1901), 88.

THE FALLING BIRTH-RATE

All this is simply the latest aspect of the general alarm that has come into the world at the manifest decline in the birth-rate of civilized countries. Many see in it the approach of the end of the human race itself, and are filled with all manner of sinister forebodings. In France, where it is most extreme, and where a stationary condition of the population has almost been reached, thorough scientific inquiries into the causes have been instituted by the government, with the general result of establishing the fact that the limitation of families is in the main voluntary and purposeful. There are many elements that must be considered in the complete understanding of the problem, but the great truth stands clearly forth that people are no longer willing to contribute to the population at the rate prescribed by nature.

THE LAW OF POPULATION

Further investigations in all countries have shown that the movement is general, and although the problem is complicated by a large number of special influences, there comes forth from amid it all a great law, which may be called *the law of population*. It is very distinct from Malthus' "principle of population," and may be stated in this simple form: *population is inversely proportional to intelligence*.

What is the meaning of this law? It means that man, in proportion to his intelligence, is learning to mitigate the cruel law of the organic environment, which consists, as already stated, in reproducing greatly in excess of the possibility of existence, and then killing off the surplus. By whatever name we may call it, this law has in fact applied to mankind in all the ages past. It still applies to the uncivilized races, and it no less applies to the lower classes of civilized society. These still remain prolific. They furnish the *proles*, and constitute the proletariat. But nature knows how to keep down population, and they are still the victims of the organic law. And in so far as the population of civilized countries is permitted to increase, it must be from the proletariat. The enlightened classes refuse longer to furnish soldiers to gratify the ambition of military chieftains. They seek comfort and happiness, and have learned how to obtain them. They prefer quality

to quantity, and demand *multum non multa*. They are accomplishing the same end as nature, viz., numerical uniformity, but they are doing it without destruction and without pain. Their remedial agent is a prophylactic. They have solved the Malthusian problem by the discovery of restraints to population of which Malthus never dreamed.

EUDEMICS¹

There are many who look with alarm at the fact that population is being to so great an extent recruited from the base, i.e., from the lower classes. Such apprehensions are due to the almost universal error that those classes are inferior to the middle and higher classes. This is not the place to refute this error, and I have done it elsewhere,² but could it be removed, all grounds for alarm would be dispelled. If there are signs of decadence anywhere they are not in the proletariat. They are to be found among the pampered rich and not among the hampered poor. These, though ill bred, are well born; their infusion into the population imparts to it a healthy tone. It constitutes the hope of society.

On a former occasion³ I emphasized this fact in language which I could not now improve, and which, therefore, as a concluding word, I will ask permission to repeat:

The paper of this morning treats the problem to which Galton, Karl Pearson, Ribot, Lombroso, Ferri, and many others have devoted so much

¹ This word, so far as I am aware, has thus far appeared only three times in print, viz., first, in the paper of Professor J. Q. Dealey on "The Teaching of Sociology," read before the American Sociological Society, on December 31, 1909, and published in the *American Journal of Sociology* for March, 1910, XV, 662, and in the *Publications of the society*, IV, 182; second, in a review of Professor C. B. Davenport's *Eugenics*, by Mr. Carol Aronovici, in the *American Journal of Sociology* for July, 1910, XVI, 122; and, third, in Professor Dealey's recent work, *The Family in Its Sociological Aspect*, Boston, 1912, p. 128; each time in a footnote only, but also each time credited to Professor H. L. Koopman, Librarian of Brown University. Professor Koopman informs me that he suggested the word to Professor Dealey in conversation; and Professor Dealey admits this to be the origin of it. But the word seems to be needed, derived as it is from the Greek *δημος*, "the people at large," and signifying a science or doctrine of the welfare of the masses. It alliterates well with the other two words, "eugenics" and "euthenics," and yet it has a distinct meaning of its own, greatly expanding the whole field of discussion.

² See *Applied Sociology*, pp. 95-110, 129-81.

³ Remarks on a paper by Professor D. Collin Wells on "Social Darwinism," read before the American Sociological Society on December 29, 1906. See the *American Journal of Sociology* for March, 1907, XII, 709-10, and the *Publications of the society*, I, 131-32.

attention—namely, the physiological improvement of the race of men. One aspect of that problem was thoroughly discussed yesterday, and it is remarkable that neither the able paper of Professor Ross nor any of the discussions of that paper once alluded to the most important and best-established law of demography—that population is inversely proportional to intelligence. Of course there are other things of which the same general principle is true. Suicide, insanity, crime, and vice increase as we rise in the scale of intelligence. You do not find them among animals, and you find them less among savages and lower classes than in the upper strata of society. It is lowest in the scale of organic life that we find the highest fecundity, and the law goes back through the entire animal kingdom until we have those Protozoans in which one individual may be the parent of millions of offspring. This law also extends upward to the very topmost layers of society and finds its maximum expression in the very few who have attained to that lofty realm of wisdom where they not only understand the teachings of eugenics, but are capable of applying them to family life.

The doctrine defended by Professor Wells is the most complete example of the oligocentric world-view¹ which is coming to prevail in the higher classes of society, and would center the entire attention of the world upon an almost infinitesimal fraction of the human race and ignore all the rest. It is trying to polish up the gilded pinnacles of the social temple so as to make them shine a little more brightly, while entirely neglecting the great, coarse foundation-stones upon which it rests. The education and preservation of the select few, of the higher classes, of the emerged hundredth, to the neglect of the submerged tenth and the rest of the ninety-nine hundredths of society, covers too small a field. I cannot bring myself to work contentedly in a field so narrow, however fascinating in itself. Perhaps mine is a "vaulting ambition," but I want a field that shall be broad enough to embrace the whole human race.

For an indefinite period yet to come society will continue to be recruited from the base. The swarming and spawning millions of the lower ranks will continue in the future as in the past to swamp all the fruits of intelligence and compel society to assimilate this mass of crude material as best it can.

This is commonly looked upon as the deplorable consequence of the demographic law referred to, and it is said that society is doomed to hopeless degeneracy. Is it possible to take any other view? I think it is, and the only consolation, the only hope, lies in the truth that, so far as the native capacity, the potential quality, the "promise and potency" of a higher life are concerned, those swarming, spawning millions, the bottom layer of society, the proletariat, the working classes, the "hewers of wood and drawers of water," nay, even the denizens of the slums—that all these are by nature the peers of the boasted "aristocracy of brains" that now dominates society and looks down upon them, and the equals in all but privilege of the most enlightened teachers of eugenics.

¹ *Applied Sociology*, p. 23.

LEGISLATION AS A SOCIAL FUNCTION¹

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Of the two agencies of law-making in our legal system, one is thoroughly conscious that it is making rules and imposing standards, while the other purports to be wholly unconscious of power to do anything of the sort. The legislator, holding that law is a conscious product of the human will, takes it for unquestioned that he has but to ascertain the will of the sovereign with respect to the civic conduct of individuals and put such will in the form of chapter and section of the written law. In his view the prefatory "be it enacted," so far as anything beyond political responsibility is concerned, justifies what follows. On the other hand, the judge, holding that law is something found, not made, that it is reason, not will, and believing that in the long run conscious law-making can achieve little beyond authoritative declaration of what has been discovered in the determination of controversies, proceeds haltingly. He persuades himself to overlook the law-making function which everyone who administers justice must necessarily wield. Hence the one is prone to attempt far too much and to be careless how he carries out the details of what he attempts. *Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem* may be the theory of popular as well as of imperial sovereignty. In either case, the feeling that a declaration of the sovereign will suffices to make law gives rise to a mass of arbitrary detail that cannot obtain the force of law in practice. The other agency of law-making, on the other hand, attempts much too little and carries out what is attempted too cautiously and too doubtingly. For the judge is hampered at every turn by the theory that he can only discover, that the principles of the unwritten law are invariable, and that application of a rule which has at least a potential logical pre-existence in the received system is his sole function. What he does attempt is of necessity limited

¹ From the Proceedings of the American Sociological Society.

by the honest endeavor to make it appear that he is bringing in nothing new.

Theories of law are not theories of law-making. If they are to be so taken, certainly it is not expedient that judges, wielding the common-law power of making binding precedents, have before them consciously a theory that they make law rather than find and declare it. The judge in the Year Books who announced from the bench that law was the will of the justices did not give us a satisfactory theory of judicial law-making. Yet the analytical jurists have done a good service in insisting upon their imperative theory of the form of the law and in demonstrating that law is made and must be made by tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers works mischief here in confirming the traditional notion that the law is always discovered, that decisions are only declaratory, and that when a precedent is overruled the law is not changed but instead a misinterpretation thereof is corrected. The theory which confines the judicial function to mere application of a rule formulated in advance by an extra-judicial agency proceeds upon an eighteenth-century conception of law and of law-making which we cannot accept today. Our first step in the endeavor to compel law-making to take more account and more intelligent account of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied must be to make all the agencies of law-making completely conscious of what they are doing. The next step is to make plain the end and purpose of what they are doing.

Subject to the qualification which attaches to all such classifications, namely, that they are divisions of the historian's discourse rather than of the subject itself, we may recognize four stages of legal development. I shall call these stages (1) primitive law, or the beginning of law, (2) the strict law, (3) equity or natural law, and (4) the maturity of law. To these, I conceive, we shall have presently to add a fifth stage, one upon which the law is now definitely entering, which may be called the socialization of law. Ideas of the nature of law and of the end of law, and hence ideas of law-making, are relative to the circumstances of these several stages, and, in consequence, an understanding of the four first named and of their respective contributions to the law of the

present necessary to any thoroughgoing consideration of modern law-making.

In the beginnings of law the idea is simply to keep the peace. Self-help or the help of the gods through their ministers is resorted to in the majority of cases. The help of the politically organized community is invoked exceptionally. Hence public administration of justice is not an agency for remedying wrongs. Much less is the law an agency for delimiting interests so as to adjust the relations of individuals with each other. It is simply a body of rules by which controversies are adjusted peaceably. At first, therefore, it attempts nothing more affirmatively than to furnish the injured a substitute for revenge. Where the law today thinks of compensation for an injury, primitive law thinks of composition for the desire to be avenged. Where modern law seeks a rational mode of trial that will bring forth the exact truth, primitive law seeks an acceptable mechanical mode of trial which will yield a certain unambiguous result without opportunity for controversy. Accordingly, in its beginnings law is a means toward the peaceable ordering of society. Along with religion and morality it is a regulative agency by means of which men are restrained and the social interest in general security is protected. Indeed, it is the least of the three, since its chief function is to restrain and regulate self-help and self-redress. Law retains this character of a regulative agency and of a means the end whereof is a peaceable ordering, although other ends become manifest as it develops. The contribution of this first period of legal development to the idea of the end of law is the conception of a peaceable ordering of society through the peaceable adjustment of controversies.

In the second stage of legal development, the stage of the strict law, law has definitely prevailed as the regulative agency of society and the state has prevailed as the organ of social control. Self-help and self-redress have been superseded for all but exceptional causes. Normally men appeal only to the state to redress wrongs. Hence the rules which determine the cases where men may appeal to the state for help define indirectly the substance of rights and thus indirectly point out and limit the interests recognized and secured. But rights and interests as such are quite unknown.

The period is one of remedies, not of rights, for while the logical sequence is interest, right, remedy, the historical sequence is the reverse. And when remedies are known, but not rights, arbitrary and formal limitations must do what in modern times is done by a detailed logical system of rights and the conception that remedies are a means of giving them effect. Accordingly in this stage two causes operate to produce a system of strict law, namely, fear of arbitrary exercise of the power of state assistance to individual victims of wrong and a survival of ideas from the beginning of law, when legal interposition in controversies was not the regular course. Five characteristics of this stage of legal development result: (1) the law is formal in a high degree; (2) it is rigid and immutable; (3) it is extremely individualistic; (4) it is wholly indifferent to the moral aspects of conduct or of transactions which satisfy the letter of its rules, and (5) it restricts capacity to invoke the law and capacity for acts which may lead to legal consequences in ways that now appear utterly arbitrary. These characteristics of the strict law affect the whole course of development of legal justice. The permanent contributions of this stage are the ideas of certainty and uniformity and of rule and form as means thereto.

The next stage, which I have called the stage of equity or natural law, is one of liberalization. The watchword of the period of strict law was certainty, the watchword of this period is some word or phrase of ethical import—in the Roman law, *aequum et bonum*, with us, equity and good conscience, in the law of Continental Europe, natural law. In consequence the period of strict law relies upon rules and forms; this period relies upon moral ideas and reason. Four ideas of the first magnitude come into the law in this period. The first is that legal personality should extend to all human beings and that incapacities to produce legal consequences should be rejected except where a natural as distinguished from a historical reason can be found for them. The second is that the law should look to the substance and not the form, the spirit and not the letter. This is the most revolutionary change in legal history, for Jhering says truly that every history of a legal system might take for its motto "in the beginning was the word." Only the systems that went through this change and came to measure things by reason

rather than by arbitrary rule or arbitrary formula have become laws of the world.

The third idea is good faith, the idea that justice demands one should not disappoint well-founded expectations which he has created; in other words, that it is not so much that rules should be certain as that men's conduct should be certain.

The fourth idea is that one person should not be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. Insistence upon these ideas, as moral ideas, leads to a further development of the means by which the legal system secures its ends. In the period of strict law, the means are remedies; in this period they are duties, and remedies are thought of as given to make these duties effective.

But the attempt in this stage to make law coincide with morals leads to two difficulties. One is an attempt to enforce over-high ethical standards and to make legal duties out of moral duties—such as the duty of gratitude—which are not sufficiently tangible to be made effective by legal means. This gradually remedies itself. The other is that it gives too wide a scope for discretion, since, whereas legal rules are of general and absolute application, moral principles must be applied with reference to circumstances and individuals. Hence at first in this stage the administration of justice is too personal and therefore too uncertain. In time this fault is corrected by a gradual fixing of rules and a consequent stiffening of the legal system which leads to a fourth stage. The permanent contributions of the third stage are the conception of promoting and enforcing good faith and moral conduct through the law and reliance upon reason rather than upon rule and form.

In the fourth stage, which I have called the maturity of law, the watchwords are equality and security. The former involves equality in operation of legal rules and equality of opportunity to exercise one's faculties and employ one's substance. The latter involves the idea that everyone is to be secured in his interests against aggression by others and that others are to be permitted to acquire from him or to exact from him only through his will that they do so or because of his infringement of rules devised to secure others in like interests. To this end, the idea of individual rights is worked out thoroughly and is put as the basis of the legal system,

so that duties are regarded as correlative thereto and remedies as vindications thereof. Accordingly the all-important legal institutions of this period are property and contract. But the interest of the promisee in the contract is itself treated as property. Hence Mr. Choate had much justification for asserting as he did in his argument in the income tax cases, that "preservation of the rights of private property" was the fundamental object of the law.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century signs of the beginnings of a new stage of legal development begin to be manifest throughout the world. In the maturity of law, the legal system seeks to secure individuals in the advantages given them by nature or their station in the world and to enable them to use these advantages as freely as is compatible with a like free exercise of their faculties and use of their advantages by others. To accomplish these ends it reverts in some measure to the ideas of the strict law. In consequence a certain opposition between law and morals develops once more, and just as the neglect of the moral aspects of conduct in the stage of strict law required the legal revolution through infusion of lay moral ideas into the law, which in different legal systems we call equity or natural law, so the neglect of the moral worth of the individual and of his claim to a complete moral and social life involved in the insistence upon property and contract in the maturity of law are requiring a similar legal revolution through the absorption into the law of ideas developed in the social sciences. Juristically, this is beginning in the recognition of interests as the ultimate idea behind rights, duties, and remedies. It is seen that the so-called natural rights are something quite distinct in character from legal rights; that they are claims which human beings may reasonably make, whereas legal rights are means which the state employs in order to give effect to such claims. But when natural rights are put in this form it becomes evident that these individual interests are on no higher plane than social interests, and, indeed, for the most part get their significance from a social interest in giving effect to them. In consequence the emphasis comes to be transferred gradually from individual interests to social interests. Such a movement is taking

place palpably in the law of all countries today. Its watchword is satisfaction of human wants, and it seems to put as the end of law the satisfaction of as many human demands as we can with the least sacrifice of other demands. This new stage has been called the socialization of law.

Legislation, in the sense of a deliberate framing and establishing in advance of rules of decision or of rules and standards of conduct by which, therefore, decision is to be governed, is chiefly a phenomenon of the maturity of law. In the first stage of legal development, law-making is wholly subconscious. Historically the judge precedes the law and the court precedes the legislature. What we call legislation in the beginnings of law is wholly declaratory. It is not an authoritative making of new law, it is an authoritative publication of law already existing in the form of traditional modes of applying for judicial action, traditional rules of decision, and traditional limitations upon self-help. The first conscious making of law takes place when choice has to be made between conflicting traditions or where conflicting traditions must be harmonized through amendment. This necessity arises whenever an attempt is made to declare the common custom of a political unit formed by the union of heretofore distinct tribes or peoples with customs of their own. Alfred's laws are the classical example. He tells us in his prologue that he found it necessary to pick and choose and even amend, but, he adds, "I durst not set down much of my own." The first step in the direction of conscious constructive law-making comes when men perceive that by changing the written record of the law they can change the law. Usually when this is discovered a legislative ferment sets in, as in the case of the early republican legislation at Rome, the Frankish capitularies on the Roman imperial model, and perhaps the legislation of Edward I. But the idea of deliberate change in the law is uncongenial to the stage of the strict law. The law is a system of remedies. The idea of rights has not developed. There is no body of principles of substantive law. Hence there are no principles to govern change, and arbitrary change appears to be at war with the very idea of law. Accordingly this brief outburst of legislation is quickly superseded by a purely judicial or juristic development of the law, under the

theory that law is to be found rather than made. This is true even when the law is wholly made over in the stage of equity or natural law. Even then the idea is that principles of superior validity have been discovered and that these principles, which have an independent and intrinsic validity, are simply applied. It is not until the maturity of a legal system that we enter upon a real stage of legislation.

Legislative law-making first becomes conscious of what it is. As soon as conscious constructive law-making begins there comes to be in the legal system an imperative element, an element resting on the expressed will of the sovereign and deriving its authority from the power of the state. This leads one type of thinker to look upon all law as an emanation of the sovereign will. But the main body of the law continues to be traditional in form and continues to be developed along traditional lines by judges or jurists. Resting at first upon the usage and practice of tribunals or the usage and customary modes of advising litigants on the part of those upon whom tribunals rely for guidance, the basis of its authority comes to be reason and conformity to ideals of right. The latter commonly are conceived of as immutable and eternal. Hence the function of judge or jurist in developing the law is taken to be one of discovering in the traditional materials of the legal system the principles which accord with reason and conform to ideals of right and of drawing them out to their logical consequences. This view of judicial law-making accords with the demand of the maturity of law for certainty and uniformity and is furthered by the insistence in this stage upon the security of property and contract. What it may lead to is well illustrated by the jurisprudence of conceptions of which Continental jurists have been complaining so bitterly.

First, then, judicial law-making must know itself; it must know what it is. Next, both judicial law-making and legislative law-making must know the ends to which they are employed. For our trust is in the efficacy of intelligent effort; so far as we make law consciously, we are to make it intelligently. This was hardly possible until we had arrived at the conception of interests. Our hope of achieving it is in definition of the interests that may claim

to be secured and determination of the principles according to which they are to be selected and delimited for legal recognition.

A legal system attains its end by recognizing certain interests, individual, public, and social; by defining the limits within which these interests shall be recognized legally and be given effect through rules of law, and by endeavoring to secure the interests so recognized within the defined limits. It does not create these interests. There is so much truth in the old theories of a law of nature and of natural rights. These interests arise, apart from law, through the competition of individuals with each other, the competition of groups or societies with each other, and of individuals with such groups or societies. What the law-maker has to consider, therefore, is (1) the interests which the law may be called upon to recognize and secure, (2) the principles upon which such interests should be defined and limited for purposes of legal recognition, or, to put it in another way, the principles by which conflicting interests should be weighed or balanced in order to determine which are to be recognized and to what extent, (3) the means by which the law may secure the interests which it recognizes, and (4) the limitations upon effective legal action which may preclude a complete recognition or complete securing of all these interests to the full extent which ethical considerations may demand.

Strictly the concern of the law is with social interests, since it is the social interest in securing the individual interest that must determine the law to secure it. But using interest to mean a claim which a human being or a group of human beings may make, it is convenient to speak of individual interests, public interests, that is interests of the state as a juristic person, and social interests, that is interests of the community at large. This is the order in which they have been recognized in the development of juristic thought.

Although certain great social interests have determined the growth of law from the beginning, individual interests were the first to be worked out critically. For nearly two centuries now philosophical jurisprudence has devoted itself chiefly to this task. The more important of them have become well known to us under the name of natural rights, because of the old theory that the pres-

sure of these interests in a state of nature produced the state and hence that the state existed solely to secure them. Usually they have been deduced from the qualities of man in the abstract or from some formula of right or justice. But the practice of jurists has often been sounder than their theories have been. So far as individual interests go, the sociological jurist will find little to do beyond essaying to supply a better theoretical foundation.

With respect to public interests, the situation is very different. These were first thought of as individual interests of the personal sovereign and hence were worked out originally in jurisprudence on the analogy of individual interests. Moreover, since the sovereign is, as it were, the guardian of social interests, these also were at first treated as individual interests of the sovereign and were worked out on the same analogy of private rights. Hence there is much confused thinking in jurisprudence at this point. General social interests and interests of the state as a juristic person are not differentiated, and both are spoken of as "rights" of the state. By public interests, then, I mean here the interests of the state as a juristic person; interests of personality, i.e., the integrity, freedom of action and honor of the state personality, and interests of substance. The persistence in American public law of the royal prerogative of dishonesty and the resistance of lawyers to attempts to introduce ideas on this subject which are familiar to the rest of the world afford but another instance of the practical effect of theoretical confusion in retarding the growth of the law.

Turning to social interests, the sociological jurist has in a sense a clear field. As such, we have only begun to recognize them. Yet the social interest in general security was the first interest protected by the law. Primitive law arose and existed to maintain this interest. Unhappily in the nineteenth century legal history was written from an individualist standpoint and was interpreted as a development of restrictions on individual aggression in the interest of individual freedom of action. When we recognize that this was a mistake and that the social interest in general security dictated the very beginnings of law, so that individual rights were only a means gradually worked out for furthering this social interest, and rewrite our legal histories accordingly, we shall be

able to make historical jurisprudence more effective. In the same way much that has been written as to individual natural rights, when recast from the standpoint of a social interest in security of acquisitions and a social interest in the security of transactions, may be made useful. But the jurist cannot work alone here. In order to construct a scheme of social interests that will serve the jurisprudence of tomorrow as the thoroughly elaborated schemes of natural rights served the jurisprudence of yesterday, the social sciences must co-operate. This does not mean that any jurist shall take all the social sciences for his province. It does mean, however, that he shall know that they all have materials for him and shall be willing and able to go to them therefor.

With respect to the next step in a theory of law-making the principles seem to be clear. Having determined what the interests are which the law may be called upon to secure, as they cannot all be secured and as many of them are in positive conflict, questions arise which are fundamental for the law-maker. How are these interests to be balanced? What principle is to determine their relative weight? Which shall give way in case of conflict? Philosophical jurists have labored to reduce some method of getting at the intrinsic importance of various interests. They have sought for some absolute formula whereby we may be assured that the weightier interest intrinsically should prevail. I do not believe in such attempts for a moment. Yet perhaps I shall be accused of following in their footsteps when I venture to lay down two principles for the theory of law-making in this connection. The first is that individual interests are to be secured by law only because and to the extent that they are social interests. There is a social interest in securing individual interests so far as securing them conduces to general security, the security of social institutions, and the individual moral and social life. Hence while individual interests are one thing and social interests are another, the law, as I have said, secures individual interests because of a social interest in so doing. No individual, therefore, may claim to be secured in an interest that conflicts with any social interest unless he can show some countervailing social interest in so securing him—some social interest to outweigh that with which his individual

interest conflicts. The second principle is, secure at all times the greatest number of interests possible, with the least possible sacrifice of other interests. Interests change in their incidents, in their intensity, and even in their very nature. Hence such a principle recognizes that there can be no final word on any point of the law. The legal system must be kept flexible and law-making must accommodate itself perennially to shiftings in the quantity and quality of the interests it has to meet.

Next in a theory of law-making come the means of securing interests. Here jurisprudence is at its best. The conceptions of rights, duties, powers, and privileges, the notions of punishment, redress, specific and substitutional, and prevention and their respective provinces, require relatively little from the sociological jurist. The chief task will be to discover how far each has been used to secure the interests which the law has recognized, how far each has been effective for such purpose, and thus how each may be developed or curtailed in the future. Probably the most important task is the development of the idea of preventive justice.

A side where more is to be done is in ascertaining the limits of effective legal action. We must remember that law, as a practical matter, must deal largely with the outside and not the inside of men and things, and must keep in mind that the legal system is obliged to rely upon external agencies to put its machinery in motion. Even the best of laws do not enforce themselves. Hence it is of the first importance to study the social-psychological limitations upon enforcement of legal rules. It needs very little comparison of the law in the books with the law in action to demonstrate that both judge-made and statutory rules fail continually because they lack what has been called the social-psychological guaranty. A rule may run counter to the individual interests of a majority or of a militant minority or of a powerful class; or it may run counter to the moral ideas of individuals, as in the case of the Fugitive Slave law; or it may be that no immediate interests of individuals are involved and hence they are indifferent. In Anglo-American law, where individual initiative is the main reliance and the individual wields a sort of dispensing power through the power of the jury to render general verdicts, the latter is a

frequent situation. No work that can be done in jurisprudence is of more importance than this study of the application and enforcement of law. But here again the social sciences must co-operate. Judicial statistics—and we have yet to gather them—must be looked at from more than one point of view before the sociological jurist may lay down much beyond a few obvious principles which Bentham on one side and the historical jurists on another have already perceived.

So far I have barely sketched the progress of juristic thought as to law-making and the main heads of a theory of law-making as a social function. But this is less than half of the field. Before we can have sound theories here we need facts on which to build them. Even after we get sound theories, we shall need facts to enable us to apply them. Hard as it is for legislators to ascertain social facts, it is even more difficult for courts with the machinery which our judicial organization affords. As a general proposition, courts have no adequate machinery for getting at the facts required for the exercise of their necessary law-making function. As things are, our courts must decide on the basis of matters of general knowledge and on supposed accepted principles of uniform application. Except as counsel furnish material in their printed arguments, the court has no facilities for obtaining knowledge of social facts comparable to hearings before committees, testimony of specialists who have conducted detailed investigations, and other means of the sort available to the legislature. Yet judges must make law as well as apply it, and judicial reference bureaus not remotely unlike Dr. McCarthy's epoch-making contribution to practical legislative law-making are not unlikely to develop. The laboratories and staffs of experts which are coming to be attached to some Continental tribunals strongly suggest this. But before we can do anything in this direction, we must provide a more flexible judicial organization. We must give our courts power to organize such administrative agencies as the business before them may require. The present system, in which in many of our jurisdictions the judges are at the mercy of elective administrative officers over whom they have no control, is incompatible with effective handling of social facts in our tribunals. A judge

to whom I showed recently the last report of the Municipal Court of Chicago, when he saw that the court had a general superintendent, that it kept statistics, and devoted much attention to proper gathering of them, study of them, and embodying the lessons they had to teach in rules, objected that this was not a court at all but a sort of imperial ministry of justice. The excellent work done by the Municipal Court of Chicago shows us that we must abandon the hard-and-fast line between the judicial and the administrative involved in our legal tradition, must recognize that a great deal of the administrative is involved in and necessary to the effective working of the judicial, and must make each court within its proper scope a bureau of justice rather than as has been our theory in the past a sort of slot machine into which the facts of a controversy are put above and from which the decision is taken out below. After some seven centuries our legal system has not completely evolved a rational mode of trial which will ascertain the facts of particular controversies. There may be an analogy here. Starting with purely mechanical modes of ascertaining facts, the law has gradually developed rational methods. In the immediate past the social facts required for the exercise of the judicial function of law-making have been arrived at by means which may fairly be called mechanical. It is not one of the least problems of the sociological jurist to discover a rational mode of advising the court of facts of which it is supposed to take judicial notice.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF REMEDIAL AND PRE- VENTIVE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES¹

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It has been said by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, with reference to English legislation, that

the intervention of the legislature in the domain of private law, though sparing and unsystematic, has been continuous. When the development of common law rules has failed to keep pace with changes in social and economical conditions, when a too servile adherence to precedents has forced those rules into a wrong groove, the legislature has never shrunk from stepping in and bringing the rules into conformity with the national will and national requirements.²

It can also be said that the legislatures in the United States, unsystematically but none too sparingly, have not hesitated, particularly within the last twenty-five or thirty years, to attempt to make law conform to social desires and, to a degree, to meet social ends.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate, briefly and in general terms, some of the principal matters with which legislative activity has been busy, in order to find out, if we may, what principles, if there be any, are guiding social legislation in the United States. It cannot be contended that social legislation in this country has been enacted in conscious pursuance of any fundamental theory. The legislator has, as a rule, no fundamental conceptions, a priori, from which he deliberately proceeds. His legislation is more likely to be empirical, and none the less sound for that, and his desire, not always effectively or wisely carried out, is to meet practical conditions and not to develop a theoretically perfect body of law founded upon assumed fundamental conceptions or theories.

¹ From the Proceedings of the American Sociological Society.

² *Legislative Methods and Forms*, p. 6.

I shall not concern myself with constitutional difficulties, nor with criticism of the wisdom or unwisdom of particular methods of accomplishing results, for my object is not so much to determine the validity of particular enactments as it is to indicate the lines along which legislatures are thinking and the matters to which they are directing their attention.

I

By far the largest part of the publications containing the legislation of the United States, revised statutes, session laws, and what not is taken up with political and governmental affairs and only a comparatively small portion is necessary to contain those statutes which relate to or affect the private law. There is, however, a great deal more of legislation relating to matters of private law than there used to be, though it is still relatively small in bulk.

Modern legislation, as it affects social reforms, is much more likely today to have more care and thought put upon it than was the case only a few years ago. The legislator is more inclined to make use of sociological investigations in the preparation of laws than he formerly was, when a great deal of legislation was based upon his general impressions as to social facts rather than upon the facts themselves, which were, and in many cases still are, impossible to obtain or inaccessible to the legislature. The modern statute is likely to show better draftsmanship than used to be the case, though there is still room for improvement. There is still a great deal to be done along this line and the official legislative draftsman, long an institution in England, is very little in evidence in America.

The success of the Legislative Reference Library in Wisconsin, both in the matter of assembling such information as there may be relating to projects of legislation and in the actual drafting of statutes by experts, indicates the probable introduction of this institution in many of the American states.¹ Something of this sort is necessary if we are to have social legislation that will adequately meet the conditions desired to be affected.

¹ McCarthy, *The Wisconsin Idea*, chaps. viii, ix.

Not only is there need of accurate knowledge of social conditions and proper drafting of legislation, if our statutes are to be adequate for the purpose desired by legislators, but there ought to be what there are not now, studies of the operation of new enactments and their effect upon the conditions they are intended to modify. There is material for such studies in existence in the reports of administrative boards and commissions and elsewhere, but it is scattered and not readily available for legislative use.

If we are to have social legislation, therefore, that is to be effective, the legislator must be provided with these three things; the facts as to the conditions to be changed and affected by the proposed legislation, proper draftsmanship, and a comprehensive and adequate study of the operation of the new law after its passage, in order that its effectiveness and adequacy may be determined.

II

Social legislation is a vague term, for the law itself, in its traditional as well as in its imperative element, is a social mechanism, and all legislation therefore, in one aspect at least, is social. But there are departments or branches of legislation which more intimately relate to and affect the individual in his social contacts than is the case in others, and I shall endeavor to consider some of these topics in this paper. I cannot hope to cover the whole field of legislative activity but shall endeavor to confine myself to those topics which have been, and are now, aside from political and governmental matters, occupying the attention of legislators and social thinkers, to the end that certain changes in social conditions, affecting intimately the lives of men, may be brought about.

A very cursory glance through the records of legislation will show that legislation of the kind referred to, judging simply from quantity, relates largely to matters concerning labor, protection of health and safety, and the regulation of certain callings and professions. Then in smaller quantity comes legislation relating to dependent classes, family relations, the prevention of fraud, the prevention of monopolies and discriminations, and the conservation of natural resources and the regulation of their use.

This is not all of the legislation which has for its object a definite

social purpose, but these are matters about which the present-day legislator seems to be most busy. Exemption and homestead laws have been upon American statute books from a very early day and their principle has become so imbedded in American legal thought and the operation of the older statutes apparently so satisfactory that very little of the new legislation relates to this subject. The same may also be said of the law relating to mechanics' liens.

The formulation of a satisfactory and scientific classification which will put each topic into its proper category is difficult and I shall not attempt it in this paper, but shall speak briefly of some of the topics, which I have mentioned without regard to any classification that might be called scientific, and shall endeavor simply to group together the laws which seem to be, from their subject-matter, more or less closely related.

1. *Labor*.—Labor legislation is nothing new in the history of Anglo-American law. The English parliaments have from early times legislated upon this subject and much of this early legislation has many resemblances to some of the projects which have been made the subject of present-day legislative activity; for example, the regulation of wages was attempted in England as early as 1349.¹

In America labor legislation may be divided roughly into four classes; enactments relating to: employers' liability, factory conditions, terms of employment, strikes and lockouts and unemployment.

Employers' liability is one of the subjects which the common law has dealt with unsatisfactorily. Indeed, it may be said that the common law has broken down at this point and it was not long after the first announcement of the fellow-servant doctrine in *Priestly v. Fowler*² in England in 1837 and in *Murray v. South Carolina R.R. Co.*³ in South Carolina in 1841 and the adoption of the doctrine of these two cases in *Farwell v. The Boston & Worcester R.R. Corporation*⁴ in Massachusetts in 1842, that American legislatures and courts began to busy themselves with the limitation and restriction of its operation, so as to increase the number of cases of

¹ Stimson, *Popular Law-making*, p. 64.

³ 1 McMullan's Law, 385.

² 3 Meeson and Welsby, 1.

⁴ 4 Metcalf, 49.

employers' liability. The related questions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk have also been greatly affected by legislation. The tendency today is to abolish the common-law doctrine of assumption of risk and to modify that of contributory negligence and to put upon the employer, or a fund to which he is a contributor, the burden of all injuries to workmen except where there is the most culpable negligence. Workmen's compensation acts have apparently come into American law to stay and we may expect their adoption in some form or other in most, if not all, of the states. It is not possible within the limits of this paper to describe them at length or to do more than mention the principle, to a degree novel in Anglo-American law, upon which they are based, of liability for damage without fault.

Factory conditions have provided a fertile field for legislative activity and almost everywhere there is at least a minimum provision for the health, safety, and comfort of employees, particularly of women and minors. Sweatshops, wherever the conditions prevail which cause them, are the objects of legislative reprobation.

Factory inspection under the direction of a state officer is the means provided generally for the enforcement of such legislation and furnishes an example of the pronounced tendency to put matters of social welfare into the hands of administrative officials and boards and to take them as far as possible out of the hands of the courts.

Building laws, which influence factory conditions very greatly, are generally enforced by the municipality and sometimes by state officials as well, and so in some states a very unfortunate condition of conflict between city ordinances and state laws results which has handicapped materially the enforcement of either. The building inspector and the factory inspector and their respective chiefs and boards are usually supreme and from their decisions there is no appeal, a condition of affairs that shows how far we have traveled from *laissez faire*.

Many of the terms of employment, which, under common-law doctrines, employer and employee were left to settle for themselves, are now regulated by the state, and contracts contrary to the terms of the statutes are declared to be void. Wages must be paid in

money in many states, sometimes at least once a week. No employee can release his employer from liability. Membership in labor organizations may not be forbidden by employers. Hours of labor are regulated, though so far the tendency is, as to adult male employees, to provide nothing more than that a work day shall not exceed a certain number of hours. But as to women and minors, labor for more than a certain number of hours is prohibited and they are also prevented from engaging in certain employments which are taken to be detrimental to their physical and moral well-being.

Wages have also been made the subject of legislation and minimum-wage laws are being advocated in many states. The Massachusetts law applies only to women and minor employees, but in the projects advanced in other states no such limitation is made, and it is proposed to make the statute apply to employees of both sexes, raising interesting constitutional complications. The statutes applying to the wages of employees of the state and its subdivisions are numerous, and, of course, apply to men.

If Sir Henry Maine's interpretation of legal and political history is sound, from "status to contract,"¹ all of this means we are traveling backward, for legislation is putting disabilities upon employers and employees, as well as upon common carriers and others engaged in public employments, which are not imposed upon the rest of the community. But, even assuming that Maine's dictum is sound, status in former periods of legal history had the effect of creating disabilities with a very different end in view than that of the legislation just mentioned, and such legislation is probably not so much reversing the course of history as it is creating, or at least is intended to create, conditions of self-realization, more consonant with Maine's interpretation than would be likely to exist otherwise in our industrial age.

Compulsory arbitration is a principle which the American legislator has not adopted and the statutes generally provide merely a means for conciliation unless both sides consent to arbitrate. But the recent pronouncement of the board of arbitrators in the controversy between the eastern railroads and their engineers,

¹ *Ancient Law*, Pollock's ed., p. 165.

in favor of this doctrine, may give vigor to the otherwise rather feeble movement for such laws.

Black lists on the one hand, and intimidation on the other, have both been legislated against.

Aside from the authorization of temporary employment upon public work in times of critical unemployment, the legislative attempts to cope with this great problem have been confined largely to the establishment of free employment offices and to the provision of means for circulating information as to the condition of the labor market.

Bureaus of labor have been established and the collection of labor statistics and the reporting of accidents provided for.

2. *Public health and safety.*—The inadequacy of the classification adopted in this paper is shown more clearly, perhaps, in considering legislation affecting public health and safety than almost anywhere else, for a very great deal of the legislation considered under other heads in this paper might be included under that of public health and safety. Therefore, I shall consider at this point and under this head only a few of the laws which directly affect these matters and which cannot conveniently be made to fit into the other classes of legislation named at the beginning.

A characteristic of the legislation relating to matters of public health and safety is the wide discretionary power given to public boards and officers charged with the duty of enforcing these laws. Their authority is almost arbitrary, and they may cut off access to dwellings, condemn and destroy food, prohibit the carrying-on of offensive trades, protect the purity of the water supply, condemn buildings, and in general exercise the widest and most unquestioned authority for the protection of the health and safety of the community.

The sale of adulterated and impure foods, or of foods, such as milk, and of drugs which do not conform to established standards, is prohibited. Vaccination in many places is compulsory as a condition of admission of children to the public schools. Sewage systems are provided for and hospitals, generally for the treatment of the insane, are almost universal. The details of health and safety regulations are generally left to local authorities, upon whom is

also usually placed the burden of maintaining hospitals for the treatment of diseases other than insanity, and they may have this burden also.

Legislation against the smoke nuisance is becoming not uncommon, though this matter is also generally left to be dealt with by local authorities.

The inspection of buildings and of such things as elevators and steam boilers is general.

No individualistic theories are permitted to stand in the way of the protection of public health and safety and the benevolent despotism of the health officer and the building inspector is accepted as an ordinary fact of American existence.

3. *Regulation of callings and professions.*—There are very few businesses and professions which are not made to feel the regulating hand of the legislature. The laws on this subject may conveniently be grouped into three classes: (a) laws which require some qualification or special evidence of skill as a condition precedent to engaging in certain professions or callings; (b) laws which regulate certain public or quasi-public callings; (c) laws which are designed to secure public health, public morals, or public safety, or to protect the public from fraud or imposition.

In the first class we find examinations required in order to enter upon the practice of law, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, and veterinary surgery, and the same is true as to barbers, plumbers, and stationary engineers. The tendency seems to be to subject more callings to this requirement than the contrary, and the legislator would seem to be skeptical of the existence of a natural right to enter upon the practice of a profession or of a calling, the qualifications of whose practitioners the public has no practicable means of determining, and evidently does not agree with the Supreme Court of Indiana, that "there is a law higher in this country, and one better suited to the rights and liberties of the American people—that law which accords to every citizen the natural right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, the sciences, the professions, or other vocations."¹

¹ *In re Leach*, 134 Ind. 665.

In the second class we find not only those businesses regulated which the common law regards as public callings—railroads, hotels, warehouses, express companies, gas and electric companies—but also such private businesses as may be regarded in their actual relation to everyday affairs as practically public or quasi-public—banks, insurance companies, and auctioneers.

Here again we meet the phenomenon to which reference has already been made in the discussion of labor legislation, the imposition of an incapacity to enter into certain contracts contrary to the terms of the statutes. Particularly in the cases of common carriers and insurance companies, we find the very terms of the contracts prescribed for the parties by the statute, and it does not matter what the wills of the parties may be, their respective rights and obligations are fixed by the statute and their particular intentions overruled.

The purpose of much of the legislation regulating businesses and callings seems to be to secure the public health, morals, or safety or to prevent fraud or imposition. Many of the laws just referred to are directed to this end, but this seems particularly to be the case with laws affecting public exhibitions and amusements, dealing in rags and junk, the selling of intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, dealing in certain essential commodities such as coal, the manufacture of explosives, intelligence offices, and lending money on the collateral security of personal property or the assignment of wages.

4. *Prevention of fraud.*—The determination by legislation of standard weights and measures is general and in some states special officers are charged with the duty of seizing and destroying all false measures and weighing devices. Articles must be correctly described in the labels which they bear, so that the public may not be deceived and defrauded. Gambling and bucketing are prohibited, and gambling devices may be seized and destroyed. In some states "blue sky" legislation has been adopted to prevent the issuing of fraudulent securities.

5. *Dependent classes.*—There are indications in American legislation that the idea of providing state pensions for certain dependent classes has found a firm lodgment and we may expect

the enactment of many varieties of pension legislation. Old-age pensions have made a start, though so far they have been confined only to superannuated public employees. Pensions to the blind are granted in many states and in some states soldiers and their dependent relatives are the recipients of state bounty. The maintenance of paupers by public agencies has existed for centuries, and new legislation only confirms and extends the practice. In many states the widow and children have a right to recover damages because of the death of the husband and father resulting from the sale to him of intoxicating liquor. There is also a vigorous movement to secure to the dependent family of a prisoner some share in his earnings while in prison, which has resulted in legislation in several states. Pensions to mothers with dependent children are upon the legislative program of some of the states, and it is not unlikely that statutes granting such pensions will be enacted.

6. *Family relations*.—Uniform marriage and divorce legislation has been adopted in some states and an effort is being made to provide by law that individuals defective mentally or physically may not marry, though I am not aware that such projects have been enacted into law in any state.

In at least one state, the common-law doctrine that a parent has no legal right to be supported by his children has been reversed and the duty of support made mutual.

Only a mention can be made of the existence of laws prohibiting monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade, and of the numerous laws for the conservation of natural resources and the regulation of their use.

Nor is it possible to do more than call attention to the tendencies in American penal legislation, which seem to modify very greatly the primitive theory of retribution. Separate courts with a procedure very different from that which prevails in the ordinary criminal courts have been established for juvenile offenders and some individualization of punishment by means of the indeterminate sentence and a probation system has in several states been provided for adults as well as minors.

In this hasty survey of legislation, which it would take at least a volume to consider adequately, it has not been possible to do

more than mention many things of the greatest importance, and, of necessity, many subjects of legislation have been passed over entirely, but perhaps enough has been said to indicate the general results of American legislation and to disclose whatever underlying tendencies there may be.

III

Perhaps the first thing that strikes one in considering the results of legislation in America is the very evident fact that there is present no evidence of a belief in that "juristic pessimism" which denies the "efficacy of effort," notwithstanding the objections of historical jurists which have been accepted as sound by some American lawyers of standing and influence.¹

Nor is there much evidence that the American legislator is still clinging to the individualistic theories of the older schools of economics or jurisprudence. To him, apparently, law, at least so far as law consists of legislation, is a means to the accomplishment of social ends and not an instrumentality to promote the Spencerian dogma of "equal freedom,"² with all its individualistic implications. Nor does he believe, if we may determine what he believes from what he has done, that, "to leave each man to work out in freedom his own happiness or misery, to stand or fall by the consequences of his own conduct, is the true method of human discipline,"³ at least so far as legislation is a method of discipline. The American legislator does not adopt the theory which has so profoundly influenced American judges, that there exist natural rights of the individual which derive their force from sources external to the law.⁴ He puts restrictions upon the ownership of property, provides for its seizure and destruction, denies to those not qualified the exercise of professions and callings, limits the freedom of contract, interferes in multitudes of ways with the management of private businesses, all in supreme disregard of

¹ Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harvard Law Rev.*, XXIV, 598-604.

² Spencer, *Justice*, Sec. 27.

³ Carter, *Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function*, p. 337.

⁴ Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harvard Law Rev.*, XXIV, 609, note 62.

natural rights, whenever he conceives that social demands require it. He ventures to lay his impious hands upon the common law itself and changes it and makes it over to promote what he believes to be the course of social and economic progress. Something of what he has attempted to do has failed of its purpose. Many of his projects are unsound from every viewpoint. Sometimes the mark has been overshot, sometimes undershot, but the significant thing is that sometimes the mark has been hit very close to the center. The conception that legislation may be made a powerful agency in the promotion of social and economic development has been thoroughly grasped and the development of the law, through legislation, to meet the social and industrial problems of the present, will continue. There are inherent limitations upon the power of the legislature, growing out of the nature of law itself, which will frustrate many fondly cherished legislative schemes, but well within such limits is an immense field for sound, constructive legislation, which will be taken possession of, sooner or later, whenever it is demanded by a sufficiently developed public opinion by which the legislator, in the end, is always controlled and guided.

The older jurisprudence of the various schools of juristic thought, with its ultimate emphasis, no matter from what premises it starts, upon extreme individualism and *laissez faire*, is not adequate to provide a theory which will explain and qualify the legislative output of the past twenty-five or thirty years. Professor Pound, in his paper "The Need for a Sociological Jurisprudence,"¹ has declared the necessity for the development of a new school of juristic thinking, and this necessity is, indeed, evident to everyone who considers the trend and scope of the legislation referred to in this paper. The increasing dominance of social ideals in all departments of American thought is convincing evidence that there is to be no let-up in the demand for social legislation and the need for a new statement of juristic theories and for a new philosophy of law and legislation will become more and more urgent.

In speaking of the ideals back of the social legislation in England in the nineteenth century, Dr. Brown makes the remark:² "In

¹ *Green Bag*, XIX, 607.

² *The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation*, p. 42.

the first place, the ideal is unconscious, rather than conscious. It is something whose nature is being slowly realized, something that finds expression in action long before it has been formulated in speech." The social ideals back of American legislation are easier to translate into legislative action than they are to express in deliberate speech, but that the realization of these ideals will ultimately find expression in a juristic philosophy very different from that of the old schools cannot be doubted. When this new philosophy does come, it must avoid the pitfall of the eighteenth-century postulate of the existence of fundamental a-priori principles, capable of being made the bases for the construction, by processes of pure deduction, of a complete code of law, valid for all time and in all places. It must not, in its desire to express the social ends of law, disregard what is valid in individualism and *laissez faire* nor reject that which is sound in the older philosophies. Nor must it ever lose touch with the facts of life and of the developing and ever-unfolding social process or forget that law is not an end but a means, and a means to the accomplishment of social justice.

No matter from what point of view we regard the legislation referred to in this paper, we see the most convincing proof possible of the development among the American people of a social conscience, which compels at least an attempt at the reconstruction of economic conditions, so that each may secure "a standard of living, and such a share in the values of civilization as shall make possible a full moral life."¹ As in all idealistic movements, this conception of the function of legislation has its dangers. Like new wine it has gone and will continue to go to the heads of some who have grasped it, but as the conception itself is sound, we may expect that, as it is no longer a new thing, the realization of practical difficulties and of the value of the experience of the past, together with a clarified vision of the problems of the present, will direct its application to the concrete condition so that the requirements of a social justice will be met and social justice itself firmly established.

When it is said that the underlying tendency of American legislation is the accomplishment of social justice, so far as that may be done through law, it is desirable to give some definiteness to this

¹ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 496.

rather vague phrase. What is its meaning, as this meaning may be found in the legislation referred to?

"Justice," says Willoughby,¹ "consists in granting, so far as possible, to each individual the opportunity for a realization of his highest ethical self, and . . . this involves, or rather is founded upon, the general duty of all, in the pursuit of their own ends, to recognize others as individuals who are striving for, and have a right to strive for, the realization of their own ends."

It cannot be said, for it would not be true, that all of the social legislation to which reference has been made satisfies to the fullest extent the requirements of this description, but taking it by and large, looking at it as a whole, its spirit and its purpose is to accomplish the greatest possible self-realization of the individual consistent with an opportunity on the part of others to strive for a like realization. Take the labor legislation, for instance, the abolition of the fellow-servant rule, the provision for workmen's compensation, the requirements as to factory conditions, the regulation of hours of labor, the protection of women and children—what are these but attempts to achieve by legislation the establishment of the principle that the laborer is an end in himself and not a means to the ends of another? What are they but endeavors to provide working men, women, and children with an opportunity for their highest and fullest self-realization?

Labor legislation does not stand apart from the rest of social legislation, and what is true of its purpose is, in a measure, true of the purpose of all the rest.

The moral criterion by which to try social institutions and political measures may be summed up as follows: The test is whether a given custom or law sets free individual capacities in such a way as to make them available for the development of the general happiness or the common good. The formula states the test with the emphasis falling upon the side of the individual. It may be stated from the side of associated life, as follows: The test is whether the general, the public organization and order are promoted in such a way as to equalize opportunity for all.²

Does not American legislation react positively when these tests are applied? Does it not to a degree satisfy these moral criteria? I submit that it does.

¹ *Social Justice*, p. 24.

² Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 482.

The balancing of individual demands with social demands and with other individual demands, so as to promote the general order by the equalization of opportunity, and to provide for the greatest possible self-realization consistent with the common good; at once to satisfy and reconcile the justifiable claims of the individual and of society as well, is no easy task, but it is the task to which American legislatures have set themselves. In a manner, halting and feeble it may be, by enactments in many instances unwisely conceived, legislation is proceeding to accomplish this purpose. It never will be completely achieved, for a body of legislation made in the present never can satisfy the demands even of the time in which it is framed, much less those of the unforeseeable future. American legislatures have not and never will accomplish the impossible, but the fact remains that they are attempting, and with a considerable degree of success, to express in the imperative mood something of "that which has been demonstrated by the logic of association to be true" and to realize what Professor Small has said, that "law is a force of occupation whose business it is to see that the flag of the conqueror is never lowered upon territory once annexed by social conviction."¹

¹ *General Sociology*, p. 359.

SOCIAL IDEALS IMPLIED IN PRESENT AMERICAN PROGRAMS OF VOLUNTARY PHILANTHROPY¹

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Programs of voluntary philanthropy deal with no exclusive or distinctive problems to which religion and statesmanship are strangers. If it has a distinct field, it is rather in the stage at which the problems are attacked than in their essential character. Speaking very generally it may be said that in America initiative and experiment and educational propaganda belong to voluntary philanthropy, while control, and the enforcement of standards, and the meeting of large elementary recognized social needs fall to the state. Even when the state inaugurates frankly experimental schemes, these have usually been devised and tried out to some extent as voluntary enterprises; and governmental bureaus of research and publicity are most easily developed in fields which are not experimental, controversial, or doubtful but rather obvious, fundamental, and thoroughly understood.

Programs of voluntary philanthropy are as numerous, diverse, and complex as are the minds of philanthropists and the needs of suffering humanity. Socialism itself might be claimed as such a program. Large sums of money are voluntarily contributed every year and an enormous amount of human energy expended for no other purpose than to propagate its ideas; to rescue the exploited from what are represented to be the hardships of the capitalistic régime. It is a strange commentary upon the materialistic interpretation of history that socialists conceive it to be necessary to make such sacrifices and to put forth such herculean efforts to achieve an end which the economic forces alone have any potency to achieve, an end which no conscious human planning can either insure or avert. By the policies which they pursue, socialists avow themselves not to be really fatalists, or materialists, or determinists,

¹ From the Proceedings of the American Sociological Society.

but nothing else in effect than philanthropists, working according to their light, and certainly according to their strength, for changes which they conceive to be beneficial to mankind.

However, I presume that neither the socialists nor the sociologists who planned this program will thank me to give any such extension to the definition of philanthropy as to include revolutionary propaganda. What you have had in mind is rather the relief of the oppressed and suffering and the improvement of conditions within the existing industrial and social order. We encounter first, then, those programs which have to do with making governmental action more effective, or extending its sphere. Bureaus of municipal research, state charities, aid associations, associations for labor legislation, tenement house committees, child labor committees, public education associations, public health associations, and numerous other similar agencies are founded mainly for the purpose of influencing governmental action, either directly, or through the development of public opinion. Workers in enterprises of this kind are sometimes almost as keen as revolutionists themselves to dissociate their activities from philanthropy, or at least to discriminate sharply between their kind of philanthropy which aims to deal with 100 per cent of the problem, that is to say, with all citizens as such, and ordinary philanthropy, which is content to deal with a modest fraction of the problem, helping particular individuals, or modifying for the better particular local conditions. Undoubtedly these numerous national, state, and municipal associations which have governmental action in view are characteristic of modern American philanthropy and they do disclose a common social ideal, an ideal of the state and of human relations. We should not be warranted in describing that ideal as either socialistic or anti-socialistic, as Christian or pagan, as Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian. The distinguishing feature of modern American philanthropy is that it keeps clear of controversial theories of the state and reaches down to a substratum of social concepts, to a foundation of common instincts, traditions, and motives upon which sociological, theological, and political controversies become indifferent, to a provisional and evasive realm, if you like to call it so, where there is a truce to superficial differences, and a recognition of kinship and common purpose.

Perhaps when radical and conservative, Jew, and infidel, and Christian, work together to protect children, or to stamp out contagious disease, or to raise wages, or to secure the introduction of a modern accounting system, or to humanize the administration of the criminal law, they write themselves down as guilty of intellectual inconsistency, or as lacking in a clear perception of the theory of the state on which they should proceed. I prefer to think that they are exhibiting a higher kind of consistency and perception, that they are obeying a true social instinct, that they are helping to shape for themselves and for their, perhaps, more pugnacious contemporaries a more adequate ideal of the state, one more consonant with the social ideal which our conditions require.

What is implied in regard to the state in all these programs which look toward better government as a prime means of securing social welfare reform is not paternalism, but the deliberate intention to use the governmental machinery for the doing of those things for which experience shows it to be more efficient and more economical than any other means yet devised. Neither to be alarmed by the growth of state action, nor obsessed by the desire to increase it for its own sake, is the frame of mind of workers in modern philanthropy. The state is looked upon as a social institution, not as a friendly or as a hostile power with independent personality, but as a very vital part of ourselves, as an extension of our will, our conscience, and our strong right arm, as a tool to work with, but none the less as a subtle, delicate, and somewhat mysterious inheritance, stronger because no man can fully understand it and no small group of men long bend it to selfish or sinister purposes, less strong than it might be if we had more respect for it and understood better the laws of its operations. The ideal of the state implied in these programs to which I refer is that of adults and not of children; of equals and not of tyrants or slaves; of physically able-bodied men, sound of mind—not of neurasthenics; of educated men rather than of instructed men; of optimistic, good-humored, patient men, not of fatalists or blasé, disillusioned, end-of-the-nineteenth-century philosophers; of economists with a Golden Age ahead, and a present surplus at their disposal; of men with a historical point of view, appreciative of the high services of their

constitution-making, law-creating ancestors, and shrewdly suspecting that among the things which they have inherited is some capacity for taking part on their own account in that same kind of fundamental law-making when the occasion arises.

The ideal of the state implied in these programs involves what we may call the investment theory of taxation. The state is urged to spend money in preventing contagious disease, in strengthening and developing the educational system, in providing factory inspection on the ground that such expenditures will eventually save money now spent for the care of the sick, and for waste social products which would be saved by education for efficiency and by adequate inspection. This is of course not the only argument. Even if it cost more to keep people well, to prevent accidents, and to educate than to care for the sick, the injured, and the inefficient, the former would still be worth while in the economics of philanthropy. But in that case the amount of money available for the purpose might be limited by the financial ability of the taxpayer. In so far as the things to be done represent saving expense instead of increasing it, there is no such outside arbitrary limit. All that is done but opens the way to do more, for it increases resources at each step instead of depleting them. This corresponds, of course, to the genetic conception of capital, as resulting not from saving in the sense of deprivation, but as an incident of serial or capitalistic methods of industry.

These programs for the encouragement and support of state activity imply also a new sense of the close interdependence of the interests of all social classes. They take into account the social effects of the growth of cities, of the increase in congregate dwellings, of the new facilities for educational propaganda, of the advances of science and mechanical invention. They assume the public-school system and boards of health, and factory inspection systems, and the daily press. That all the world is one great neighborhood, and especially that America's hundred million people may learn at the same moment and may fairly well understand what a president is recommending to Congress, what a supreme court is deciding to be the law, what a scientist has discovered, what lives are lost in a factory fire and by what means the bereaved families

are relieved, if at all, from the financial loss attendant upon the disaster, or by some dramatic educational device, such as a great exhibit, or the Christmas seals, what graver losses there are from tuberculosis and how preventable such losses are, if the cost of prevention can be met—all such revolutionary facts have been incorporated into the philosophy of modern philanthropy in such a way as profoundly to modify its programs. Of course, for the sake of brevity, I somewhat exaggerate. There are many things which have not actually been incorporated but the tendency is, I think, clearly to be seen. The ideal is that of a society which is by no means entirely dependent upon the government for meeting its corporate needs, which uses the state increasingly, as I have already said, but uses increasingly also other instruments for executing the social will, which looks upon a voluntary association, a chamber of commerce, a political party, or a newspaper as equally appropriate, within its limits, sometimes very wide limits, for accomplishing any beneficent purpose. Modern voluntary philanthropy as a whole is free from prejudice for or against state action, for or against voluntary action. Herein lies its greatest strength and its unique character. Its social ideal transcends that of political socialism on the one hand and that of the old individualism on the other. The same agencies, the same active workers, and the same financial contributors are to be found at one moment eagerly working for a restrictive law, or for more efficient administration because state action promises good results, and at the next moment for a relief fund, or a voluntary educational propaganda, because that promises good results. They are pragmatists, asking not what is inherently and abstractly the right way of social reform, but what way will cash in. They are positivists, measuring social needs and social remedies on the same scale and refusing to be embarrassed by the thought that one appropriate remedy is unavailable because, requiring state action, it leads toward socialism; or another because, requiring voluntary co-operation, it does not deal at one stroke with 100 per cent of the problem. They examine historical precedents but decline to be discouraged because of historical failures. The social ideal implied in such programs as we have thus far considered is, then, comprehensive, free from that artificial simplicity which

is gained by ignoring some of the elements of the situation, but nevertheless definite in that it takes affirmatively into account all kinds of social resources. Religion, business, and government are all tributary to its campaigns. The appeal of social work is a religious appeal. Philanthropic investment, or, rather, ordinary business investment controlled by a social spirit, is one of its most constant resources for dealing with certain kinds of exploitation and hardship. Legislation and administration are in the forefront of its programs though they do not fill the whole horizon. Its watchwords are five: (1) *social responsibility*, (2) *the utilization of social surplus* to the common advantage, (3) *the removal of obstacles* to individual efficiency and prosperity, (4) *the free and willing assumption by society* of the whole financial burden heretofore imposed by progress upon the *weaker members of society*, and (5) reasonable social control of those who for either biological or economic reasons have to be eliminated from ordinary industrial competition and social relations.

A second phenomenon characteristic of modern American philanthropy is the establishment of foundations for the study and improvement of social conditions. These may be separately incorporated and endowed, as in the case of the Russell Sage Foundation and the General Education Board; or grouped under a single financial corporate management, as in the case of the various Carnegie endowments; or associated with some educational or religious or philanthropic institution, as in the case of the Croker bequest to Columbia University for research into the causes and cure of cancer. The task of the social psychologist who would undertake to say just what social ideals are implied in these foundations is a delicate and difficult one for the reason that in the comparatively small group of founders there is naturally a relatively large personal factor which it would perhaps be safer to analyze in the manner of the more conservative national biographies, after the heroes have passed from the stage of action.

Still the programs of these foundations do disclose some elements in common of a social ideal which we can perhaps keep distinct from questions of individual characteristics. They are, on the whole, not unnaturally, more conservative than the groups of associations,

committees, and bureaus of which we have been speaking. Both donors and trustees of such foundations have an average age considerably above that of the whole population, and even above that of the directors and active workers in the first group of agencies. Except, perhaps, as to the public schools, and with other occasional exceptions, these foundations concern themselves less with state activities, and affiliate more naturally with the established voluntary institutions, such as colleges and universities, hospitals and orphan asylums, churches and relief societies. They are sometimes experimental, explanatory, and occasionally strikingly original; but, as a rule, they support accepted ideas and traditional methods rather than untried theories and bold innovations. This is not said in any spirit of hostile criticism. It is very desirable that tried and accepted ideas should have support from those who believe in them. That great foundations which can come only from great wealth should represent the ideals of the previous generation rather than of the next generation is what must be expected; and that they should represent the ideals of mature age and of vested interests is equally inevitable. What this means at the present time in this country is that their natural attitude toward state action for the social welfare is one of distrust, or at least of hesitation about greatly enlarging its functions. The disposition would be and is to examine the constitution and court decisions and to consult our conservative political traditions in determining whether a particular result should be sought through state or voluntary action, rather than to decide the question exclusively upon its merits; and these tendencies are clearly enough reflected in the actual programs of the foundations. Scientific research, popular education in hygiene, in agricultural methods, etc., pensions to college teachers, endowments for approved colleges, the standardizing of the work of charity organization societies are typical and most praiseworthy features of the programs of foundations inspired by such ideals. There is implied in such programs a high sense of personal responsibility, a deep concern as to the stewardship which great wealth involves, sometimes even an obvious embarrassment in finding some way of using the accumulated wealth so as to be certain: o help and not injure. Perhaps there may be some failure

to recognize the full value of democratic co-operation, some reluctance to trust the future to the extent to which on the whole the future has generally shown itself, when it becomes the present, and still more when it becomes the past, to have been worthy to be trusted. Perhaps there is some failure to realize the extent to which chaotic industry itself and social neglect are responsible for the evils with which the foundations would deal. Perhaps the foundations on the whole, as compared with the more informal, more spontaneous, and more precariously supported voluntary agencies, are open to the danger of seeking to exercise control beyond the legitimate boundaries implied in their benefactions, as when a foundation for pensioning college teachers seeks to eradicate sectarian control of colleges. Nevertheless the social ideal which they represent is one that we could ill afford to spare. They do represent the socialization of wealth in process. They are not intended to be merely, I am almost inclined to say not at all, a form of insurance against more radical social reforms. Founders and the trustees of foundations may have their views on current issues of "social and industrial justice," but there is no evidence which I can discover of an expectation that their gifts will greatly retard or deflect the onward movement for the destruction of privilege and exploitation. They do what they are doing, so far as I can see, from what Mrs. Harriman calls the spirit of charity and philanthropy, "loving one's neighbor as oneself," "doing one's utmost to insure equal opportunity for all to become efficient." True, Mrs. Harriman has not herself as yet endowed any such great foundation as those of which I have been speaking; but, as she has sanctioned the publication of a book on modern philanthropy, in which "valuable lessons and suggestions" are drawn by Dr. Allen with her approval and commendation, in the preface of which she asserts roundly that man's individual gifts must be used systematically as well as sympathetically to be successful in their mission of benefiting himself, his country, and his race, we may confidently count her among the prospective founders of benefactions proportionate to her "gifts material," and we may assume that the social ideal which she expresses is in some measure representative. In one respect, however, the brief preface from which I have quoted is

sharply differentiated from the tendencies which I have attributed to foundations in general, as it puts forth the distinct proposition that "united individual efforts should be concentrated upon making efficient government everywhere." We may therefore expect that any institutions which Mrs. Harriman may create or support will belong primarily to the Bureau of Municipal Research type of philanthropy, rather than, say, to the type of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

We have third to consider these philanthropic agencies which our generation has inherited, such as hospitals, relief societies, orphan asylums, and the like. It might naturally be expected that these institutions, having come to us from Colonial times, from Europe, or even from the far-off cradle of the Aryan race, corresponding to some of the most fundamental and universal instincts of humanity, would exhibit comparatively little influence of modern social ideals. This, however, is not the case. No less than the foundations, and scarcely less than the committees for the prevention of tuberculosis or for the promotion of sex hygiene, these venerable philanthropic institutions are responding to the new influences, and expressing in brick and mortar, in location and management, in technique and in results, the prevailing social ideas.

We see first an extraordinary broadening of their program to include the social causes of poverty, sickness, and crime, in addition to their traditional task of caring for individuals. The charity organization society has its department for the improvement of social conditions. The hospital has its social service department. Even the prison has its parole system; and the voluntary agencies which deal with the criminal extend their interest to the school system, even to prenatal influences and the control of heredity, to the administration of the criminal law, to the sanitary conditions in prison, to the occupations of prisoners, and eventually to the whole industrial and social complex.

These established voluntary agencies, in the next place, have come largely into the hands of experts who have had more or less direct professional training for their several functions. The merit system of appointments and promotion in the public service has its analogy in the preference now given in voluntary agencies to those

who besides ordinary physical and moral qualifications can give some evidence of having studied the specific problems involved, of having had training for the work to be done. This extension of scope to include social aspects of the problem, this trained service, and a new and refreshing spirit of co-operation have together transformed the programs of voluntary philanthropy, even as embodied in the oldest agencies, almost beyond recognition. These newer programs of the old institutions imply social ideals similar to those already attributed to the newer associations which are more directly concerned with state activities. Not that they co-operate to any great extent necessarily directly with the state, although in fact many of them do. Their aim, however, at their best, is everywhere prevention rather than cure, or at least equally with cure; rehabilitation of the individual, and the co-ordination of social service. Their ideal is constantly more social; more democratic; more inclusive, freer from racial sectarian limitations; more scientific in that it conceives even the waste places of human society to be subject to moral order, even the philanthropic obligations of individuals to be capable of formulation.

If we look upon charity organization as the most familiar, the most highly developed, and most clearly formulated concept of voluntary philanthropy, we may profitably inquire, finally, what the ideal of organized charity precisely is—whether it is destructive, capable of differentiation from other current and perhaps more popular ideals. What charity organization stands for specifically is intensive, discriminating, thorough, and sympathetic consideration of the individual man, woman, or child, of the particular family which for any reason fails to be self-supporting and self-sufficient. Organized charity instinctively distrusts large general relief schemes, whether public or voluntary. Public outdoor relief, emergency relief funds, widows' pensions, minimum-wage boards, social insurance, old-age pensions, the feeding of school children at public expense, and all such wholesale handling of relief problems are foreign to its spirit. Organized charity may have to deal with such relief schemes as *de facto* resources for the relief of individuals in whom it is interested, as existing portions of the social environment which, not being able to eliminate, it must seek to modify so far as

possible in the direction of its own ideal; but this task is not undertaken *con amore*, and, left to itself, organized charity would depend, even in the complex conditions of modern urban society, as Thomas Chalmers depended in Glasgow upon the invisible relief fund, upon the natural and spontaneous resources which lie in ordinary family and neighborhood relationships, rather than upon artificially created devices. Like Chalmers, organized charity of today, when unadulterated, fears the gift-bearing types of social legislation, fears the pauperizing effects of precollected relief funds, and prefers to work on what is known as the case-by-case system, discovering first of all what is needed, and then getting the money, or the job, or the advice, or the discipline, or whatever it may be that will meet the need.

Organized charity has scarcely as yet formulated a comprehensive social program based upon this notion of concentrating attention upon the individual and the individual family, and bringing to bear all the resources of the community co-operating freely but intelligently on the basis of ascertained facts for the specific purpose of removing the handicaps, increasing efficiency, or as a last resource supplying adequate relief if there is found to be a permanent deficiency of earning power. Such a program will imply a survey of physical, educational, and ultimately of all social needs. It will require far larger resources than organized charity has ever had or possibly ever will have at its disposal—resources, financial and personal, resources of imagination, of constructive statesmanship, of persuasion, and of that persistence which Professor Patten named yesterday as the predominant characteristic of the evolutionary point of view.

And yet the charity organization idea does have extraordinary staying power. Not being dependent upon the outcome of a political campaign, or upon an endowed foundation, it defies unpopularity and misrepresentation, it makes its way by sheer force of its reasonableness, by its scientific quality. What it will mean when, with braver apostles and with ampler resources, organized charity makes bold to formulate its social program is that all who lag behind will be helped according to their needs by all according to their powers. No dependent classes will be compulsorily

created or officially recognized, whether pensioned classes, or insured classes, or relieved classes; but each man will stand on his own feet, a man made efficient by the application of rational, individualized remedies, a man in whom relatives and neighbors, employer and fellow-workman, inspector and teacher, and if necessary physician, and probation officer, and judge are interested—personally and professionally interested—to render such specific appropriate service as his needs may require. It is not true, in America at any rate, that the ideal of an independent citizen of an industrial democracy, earning his own living, providing for his own emergencies, and relying for support even in old age on the accumulated savings of his productive period, has wholly disappeared, as it is said to have disappeared in England. If the day comes when the farmer and the skilled mechanic lose this conception, organized charity will represent it still as the inspiration of its small, unheroic and commonplace, but persistent, evolutionary task.

Whether these varying ideals of the diverse programs of modern philanthropy can be reconciled, whether this ideal of organized charity can be superimposed upon an ideal of minimum compulsory standards—that is another problem, which even the most liberal interpretation of our present topic does not warrant one attempting at this time to solve.

RELIGION AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

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Primitive religion concerned itself with the dynamic forces of nature and life, birth, death, marriage, first fruits, rain, and the growth of crops. Through sympathetic magic the powers of nature were brought into harmony with human needs. The point of view was pre-eminently social because reflection and self-consciousness and the sense of individuality were a late product; religion was not differentiated from the institutions of industry, the family, and the state.

That ancient religion was predominantly social is everywhere apparent in the Old Testament. Abraham meant to the Hebrews something more than an individual name; he represented early Israel. Joseph and Jacob frequently mean Israel. Israel is referred to as a "flock" in the wilderness; Israel is a "vine" planted in Canaan. Nothing could be more explicit regarding the social solidarity of Israel as a people, as a nation. The more conservative Israelites in Saul's day did not want a king, because Yahweh was himself the head of his people. Yahweh was a God of war, having a distinctly social and political function; he gave his people corn and wine and oil—when they became an agricultural people. Yahweh, not individual Israelites, owned the land, for he, not they, had conquered Canaan (Ps. 44:1-3). Such a central place did Zion, as the nation's capital, hold in the thought of the Israelite that he could say of it: "All my springs are in thee" (Ps. 87). And if the "servant" of Yahweh ever meant an individual, it was only such a one as could represent or typify the ideal Israel (Isa., chap. 53). Such was the ancient religion of Israel. The family did not rest on the will of contracting individuals; it was a religious institution and had as its object the preservation of Israel as the people of Yahweh. The same was true of the state; religion was not an "inner" life or experience in con-

trast to the state as an "external" means. The family and the tribe and later the state were vital organic forms through which the Hebrew religious life expressed itself. David was as directly the servant of Yahweh as any Hebrew priest. Moses' work was no more religious than political; Isaiah was equally prophet and statesman.

The ancient Greek religion had the same social character that we have just seen in the Hebrew. This needs emphasis only because the elements in the Christian tradition, which are still dominant, were fixed in the western consciousness in the early Christian and mediaeval centuries when the theory of religion was individualistic or, at least, presupposed the separation of church and state. But individualism and the separation of church and state are comparatively modern notions. These ideas would have been as unacceptable to Homer and Hesiod and Lycurgus as to Moses and Isaiah and David. Comparing the Hellenic and the Christian ideal, Farnell tells us that "while the latter looked mainly to the individual soul and its main concern was the gospel of purity, the social religion of Greece looked to the state and to the family as a unit of the state. Thus the state-religion and the state-law could enjoin marriage as a duty." The spirit of Greek religion demanded "that a man in his choice of a wife must be guided by the interests of the state, not by his own pleasure. . . . In fact, to the ethical and religious theory of the ancient classical communities romantic sentiment would appear merely egoism, and the religious and philosophic ideal of marriage was wholly altruistic."¹

Elements of oriental asceticism and the doctrine that the body is wholly sinful are common in later classical writers. They occur in Plato and came from him into the writings of the Church Fathers. But this is absolutely foreign to the true Hellenic consciousness.

A political religion like the Hellenic could only commend the virtues of chastity from the point of view of social utility, looking to the purity of the family, the birth of lawful and healthy children, the maintenance of family-cults. It was wholly alien to its spirit to exalt virginity as an abstract ideal desirable for the individual soul above all other goods.²

¹ *The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

When the city-state was evolved the old religion of the family was transformed; the citizens of the city-state were members of a larger family. The military camp became a stronghold and this in turn became a fortified city; but it was not a civic organization in the modern secular sense, for there was the temple and the perpetual sacrificial fire which represented the unbroken life of the city-soul. Zeus became the city-god and it may have been, as Farnell indicates,¹ that the eating of the common sacrificial flesh was a condition of citizenship. The old clans and tribes were associated together in a new city-organization or family through the fiction that they were all of one blood. The soul of any one of their number who was slain demanded vengeance by the whole city-group!² It was only later that a homicide could regain his social position through a civil process; in the early period reinstatement after a crime was possible only through a religious ceremonial.

Early Roman religion did not differ in regard to its social character from the religion of the Hebrews and Greeks; it was connected with agricultural life and centered about the seasons of the year most critical for the agricultural interests. Such names as Flora, Ceres, Mars suggest their function. Jupiter in the early days had not become the god of the city-state; he was the god of the sky, of the lightning, sending sunshine and rain.

Later there was added to the old agricultural interests those of the city and state, so that new deities were necessary. With the development of the manual arts and handicraft there arose the goddess Minerva whose temple was the business and religious headquarters of all the artisans in Rome. Greater than the agricultural god, Jupiter Feretrius, the thunderer, was Jupiter Optimus Maximus, the political deity of the city-state. In the building of the city-state the Romans fixed a spiritual boundary, the *pomerium*, within which no god foreign to the state was allowed. The Roman religion was characterized by its strong ritual. It was not formal in the modern sense, however, for ritual to the old Roman was but the instinctive social expression of a religious spirit undisturbed by skepticism.

¹ *The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, p. 65.

² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

But the time came when Hebrew and Greek and Roman religion ceased to be institutional; a new point of view developed and spread through them all. According to this newer point of view religion did not concern the individual soul in its relation to the family, the state, the creative forces of nature. Religion came to deal with the inner life of the individual himself, especially in its new search for immortality. We will take up this new development first in the Greek, and then in the Roman, and finally in the Hebrew, religion.

From the sixth century Orphism and Pythagoreanism introduced an entirely new set of values into the old Greek religion. Orphism was essentially non-Hellenic in origin. It taught that man's origin was partly evil, and this idea is common in Plato, who holds that the body is the prison of the soul. Here is in part the origin of the Christian doctrine of the depravity of human nature. Hellenism is humanism; it is aesthetic; it is healthy, wholesome, and delights in nature. It deifies nature. Sin as an "all-pervading element of man's inner life," to quote Farnell's words, was absolutely foreign to the old Hellenic consciousness. The newer doctrine is seen in the Pythagorean emphasis on mathematics, which is repeated in Plato. War is waged against the senses. Pure form, because it is changeless, is exalted; it lifts man into the eternal. The chief function of religion is no longer to render sacred the whole world of social institutions. Now its function seems to be the conferring of immortality on certain special types of experience. This type of experience is generally characterized as mystical; indeed the leading religious sects—for religion was now not an affair of the family and the state but a sectarian matter—were known as the Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries. Dionysus, the god of emotional ecstasy, had taken the place of the old family and state gods. The function of religion was no longer to guarantee social institutions but to intensify the individual consciousness. Religious initiation no longer meant as formerly the sharing of a common institutional life through the eating of sacrificial flesh; it had come to mean the dying to the old world of family, state, and nature, and the putting-on of immortality through new and mysterious rites. These new mystery religions were directly in opposi-

tion to the social institutions for which the old Greek religion stood. In the time of Alexander the old city-states passed out of existence and this situation served to intensify the craving for a religion of the mystical, rather than the old social, type.

The change from a social or institutional to an individual or mystical type of religion which we have just observed in Greece took place likewise in the Roman religion. About the year 200 B.C. the spiritual boundary of the *pomerium* which had preserved intact the religion of the Roman state was broken down. From Asia Minor, Egypt, Syria, and Persia, mystery cults came into the eternal city; new ideas as to asceticism, sin, individual, and future salvation, the exaltation of the individual consciousness, now gained a foothold, in opposition to the established religion of the old Roman family and state. The senate in the second century B.C. passed an edict excluding all philosophers from the city. These philosophers included not only Stoics who were in sympathy with the state but Pythagoreans who conceived of the state as a mystical cult and skeptics whose individualism was openly contrary to the state and even the family.

Such was the change in the Roman religion! To save the state there was evolved the philosophic doctrine of the double truth: the state religion was dead so far as the philosopher was concerned but it was essential for the masses for the preservation of the state. This doctrine put forth to save the state was essentially disintegrating. Religion as an instrument in the control of the masses was indeed a new sort of thing! It meant that politicians began to use religion for purely secular purposes; the old priesthoods became political¹ clubs. Augustus attempted to restore the old state religion; the new emperor-worship was but an outgrowth of the old idea of the worship of the spirit of the master of the house. But the old state religion was dead. The Romans were turning to Pythagoreanism and Stoicism and to the oriental mystery cults. The mystery religions and Greek philosophy had brought the individual to a consciousness of himself; there was a craving for intense individual experience; the religion of the family and the state was dead.

¹ Carter, *The Religion of Numa*, pp. 129-30.

The death of the old state religion and the growth of a cosmopolitan philosophy in its place is nowhere more clearly seen than in the famous letter which Sulpicius, the governor of Greece, wrote to his friend Cicero to console him on the death of his daughter. He says:

I must tell you a reflection that has consoled me; perhaps it will succeed in diminishing your affliction. On my return from Asia, as I was sailing from Aegina toward Megara, I began to look at the country surrounding me. Megara was in front of me, Aegina behind, the Piraeus on the right, Corinth on the left. Formerly these were very flourishing cities, now they are but scattered ruins. At this sight I said to myself: How dare we, poor mortals that we are, complain of the death of our friends, whose life nature has made so short, when we see at one glance the mere corpses of so many great cities lying around.¹

The change from the social to the inner type of religion was universal in the West in the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era. The fact which perhaps had most to do with this transition in the Hebrew religious development was the destruction of the Hebrew nation in the Babylonian exile. It has been said that Israel went to Babylon a nation and returned a church. To Jeremiah, the great Hebrew contemporary interpreter of the exile, the great religious lesson of the national catastrophe was that religion was a matter of the heart and not an affair of law codes and temples and sacrifices. But Jeremiah was too much of an idealist to reach the masses. The situation demanded a priest and it found its man in Ezekiel, who began the movement which culminated in the Priestly Code about 400 B.C. Here is the origin of scribism and pharisaism; religion ceased to be social and political—it became a sectarian matter. The Essenes, for example, were purists opposed to marriage and all secular interests.

Besides the priestly development there was the type of religious experience shown in the Wisdom literature. The tendency here was toward a cosmopolitan, rather than a social, type of thinking; it was individualistic rather than institutional. Ecclesiastes is speculative rather than ethical; the Book of Proverbs belongs to no special type of society; it belongs to man as a reflective, contemplative spirit, and not to man as a member of the family

¹ Quoted from Boissier, *Cicero and His Friends*, p. 102.

and the family-state. Already in the Deuteronomic code of 621 the individual had been declared responsible only for his own sins. This was repeated in Jeremiah and Ezekiel. The Book of Job goes still farther with this problem and appeals from the public social conscience to Jehovah as the absolute source of right (chap. xxiii). The individual is clearly differentiated from the social conscience.

There was a third type of post-exilic Hebrew religious thought which was distinctly social and held to the old prophetic ideal of institutional religion. This was the messianic type of literature of which the Book of Daniel is a conspicuous example. But because of the absence of a regular governmental machinery and because of the theological determinism of the Jewish mind, this messianic ideal remained a sort of external hope rather than a working method of social progress.¹

The teaching of Jesus set forth the old social ideal of the great Hebrew prophets. To a study of this teaching we shall turn later. But the social character of the new message was obscured by many contemporary tendencies with which we are already familiar in Greek and Roman thought. The death of Jesus caused even the Jewish school of Christians to lose sight of the social ideal of the Old Testament. Pauline Christianity, according to Paul's own clear statement, was a religion of the "inner," mystical type, with its chief emphasis on the future life. And the Greek type of Christianity, of which the Fourth Gospel is the clearest expression, was a metaphysical, rather than a social, gospel. Its kingdom of heaven was conceived as a form of spiritual knowledge which was not democratic and social in the same sense as the Sermon on the Mount.

One great result, however, of the mystery religions and of Greek philosophy was that religion came to be concerned with the heart, the motive, the will, and with outward ritual processes only in so far as they expressed certain states of mind. Here lies the tragedy of Socrates' death. This humanistic point of view is clearly expressed by Orestes in the speech regarding Auturgus in Euripides' *Electra*:

¹ In this theological determinism the unscientific character of the Hebrew mind is seen in strong contrast to the scientific character of the Greek mind.

Nature hath given no outward mark to note
The generous mind.

I oft have seen

One of no worth a noble father shame,
And from vile parents worthy children spring,
Meanness oft grov'ling in the rich man's mind,
And oft exalted spirits in the poor.

.

Will you not learn by manners and by deeds
To judge the noble?

How difficult it was to correlate this new view with the older type of religion is attested by the tragic life of many prophets and teachers. Jeremiah and Socrates and Euripides were all regarded as unpatriotic and dangerous to the state; they were thought of as destructive individualists. The whole new Orphic, mystical type of religion, with its ecstasy and intensity of individual experience, was in violent opposition to the social character of the old religion. Much of the new philosophy was of the same sort. Public opinion could not distinguish the religion of Socrates from the irreligion of the Sophists. We can feel and act as members of a group but we can think only as individuals. The new mystery religions and the new Greek philosophy and the New Testament religion appealed to the individual conscience rather than to the social group as a mass. Furthermore any individualistic development is in itself disorganizing in its influence on society. Just as the social, institutional, ethnic type of religion tends to become mechanized into a set ritual, so the "inner," individual type tends to become mystical, exclusive, and sectarian. The religions of the Roman Empire at the beginning of the Christian era were universal, cosmopolitan, humanitarian, but as compared with the old ethnic religion, which they were supplanting, they were one and all private, exclusive sects. Certainly they were not social, institutional. *They appealed to individuals as individuals and not as members of families, communities, and states.* The coming of the new therefore was a *loss*—at least a temporary loss—as well as a *gain*. It was a gain in intensity of individual experience and in cosmopolitan and humanitarian breadth; it was a loss because in this new discovery of the individual there was a temporary failure to

correlate the new point of view with social institutions so dear to the old but dying religion. The result was that the old narrow civic type of religion was broken down and there grew up in its place an inner, mystical, individual, "universal" type which *deprived the world of social institutions of its old moral and spiritual meaning*. There were two separate worlds, the inner, "universal" kingdom of the "spirit," what St. Augustine later called the City of God, and the kingdom of this world, the Roman Empire.

Greek philosophy, the mystery religions, and the larger moral thought of the world, had outgrown the old boundaries of the religion of the family and the state. But the only power to carry out these or any other ideas into public practice was in the hands of the Roman Empire. The Greek city-states and the Hebrew state were things of the past; only Rome remained. But Rome at its best under Augustus was attempting to remain true to the old régime of a state religion. And Rome as a state was built on physical courage, subordination of the individual, intellectual aristocracy, and supremacy through war. Hence the new moral and religious ideals incarnated in Stoicism, neo-Platonism, Mithraism, and Christianity were compelled to grow as private religious sects independent of the Roman government. This means that deprived of political support these new ideals were forced to become mystical, individualistic. There were created *newer* institutions, religious sects, and monasteries, independent of, and antagonistic to, the normal social institutions such as the family and the state. In short, the "spiritual" world was separated from the social and political world and became a church. On the other hand, because this new non-political organization was made up of the very best, morally and religiously, *the world of social institutions*, the family, industry, the state, *was deprived of that moral and spiritual interpretation* it would otherwise have received. In this way, there arose as correlative to the "inner," "spiritual," mystical organization, the church, an "outer," secular, political organization, the state. Into the former went Greek philosophy, and the newer religions, with their new sense of the value of the individual; into the latter went the *old* social and institutional *conscience*—centering in the family, the community, industry, and the state—but *secularized* and therefore deprived of its old moral and religious significance.

Now we must regard this emphasis on the "inner," individual phase of experience as indicative of a genuine moral and spiritual growth in the experience of the race. It means that the old racial level of "status," custom, tradition, has been outgrown, that the individual has become conscious of his own voluntary and rational life. Socrates and Euripides and Jeremiah and the Song of Solomon brought forth their discovery of the inner life of the individual in contradistinction to the group consciousness of Lycurgus and Moses. But these "inner" elements and processes of experience are not to be regarded as the ultimate achievement of religious truth; this development of the inner life is not to run riot in its own idealization and enjoyment, as happened in the mystery religions of Greece. Much of early Christianity took the same course. Religious experience exhausted itself in the achievement and enjoyment of ecstatic and mystical states of mind. Since this newer sense of self is but the coming to consciousness of the elements and processes of the reason and the will, functional psychology points to a larger interpretation of this "inner," individual experience brought to light by Greek philosophy and the newer mystery religions. It is not to spend itself in its own "internalization," to use Nietzsche's charming term, but to serve the purpose of giving a newer interpretation of the older social ideals. The older social ideals centering in the family, industry, education, government, are to be kept, but they must receive, if the mind of the race is to progress, an interpretation in terms of the will and reason, in other words in terms of the "inner" experience. To retreat from the world of social institutions, as a certain type of religious thinking has done, on the one hand, renders mystical and unbalanced and ineffective the religious and moral life, and, on the other hand, makes unspiritual, unethical, unidealistic the old world of social institutions which religion should interpret and spiritualize. Well may Farnell exclaim:¹

The vitality of this religion of the family [and may we add of all social institutions?], assailed as it was by the later ethics and philosophy of individualism, remained till the extinction of paganism; and its moral tradition survived that extinction both in the Greek and Roman world, and has become a heritage for modern civilization which will be maintained or discarded according to our destiny.

¹ *The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, pp. 57-58.

Nowhere is the inwardness of religion more apparent than in the teaching of Jesus. Instead of a body of laws against this and that form of wrongdoing, Jesus gives two attitudes as covering all special cases, love of God and love of our fellows as ourselves. The ceremonial, ritualistic type of purity incarnated in the Pharisees, Jesus severely condemns. Their ritual, priestly observances obscure the old prophetic elements of mercy and kindness and love. But this "inner" phase of religion in the teaching of Jesus is never opposed to an "outer" world; this emphasis on the individual is never a retreat from the social. The newer individual, internal point of view, which we historically associate particularly with the mystery religions and with later Greek philosophy, is clearly set forth on its moral and religious side in the teaching of Jesus. But Jesus does not emphasize reason as did Socrates, which tends toward exclusiveness and sectarianism. He emphasizes love, which is an emotion, and is social rather than individualistic in its tendency. Religion in the evolution of society must always in periods of race struggle emphasize the social or altruistic, and restrain the individual, instincts. Jesus was no purist, no separatist, no sectarian. His emphasis on the heart and will in no way separated him from the old Hebrew ideal of a righteous social kingdom as the greatest thing in the consciousness of his race.

The teaching of Jesus brought a new discovery of the individual. It brought a sword; it made a man the enemy of his own household. It made the hundredth individual who is needy more important than the ninety and nine. It brought a new spirit into the world absolutely in opposition to the social organization of the Roman Empire. This is true but it is a half-truth, and this half-truth has for many centuries done injury to the whole truth of the religion of the Nazarene. This other half of the truth is that this emphasis on the heart, on love, on the individual attitude, is the basis of a new type of society which Jesus called the kingdom of God. The love he preached is not a mystical emotion, not an exclusive attitude; it is essentially social, being nothing less than the attitude which one individual naturally assumes toward others who are brothers because children of one divine parent. Jesus, therefore, combines in his teaching the new religion which had been growing for cen-

turies in the Greco-Roman world—the religion of the inner, individual life—with the priceless ideal of the Old Testament prophets which interpreted religion in terms of social institutions. He gives a new philosophy of education in his declaration that the little child is the greatest of all in this new kingdom. He gives a moral basis of industry in his doctrine of wealth. And to government there comes a new meaning in his contrast between the Greco-Roman kingdoms built on aristocratic privilege and his own kingdom wherein the greatest is he who best serves. In this way the social institutions, for which the old Greek and Roman and Hebrew religions stood, are preserved; but they rest upon new foundations. They are interpreted in a new spirit, the spirit of Greek philosophy, the mystery religions, the reason, the heart, the will, the spirit of the Hebrew prophets. *The new doctrine of the inner life and the older religion of social institutions are united in a more complete religious life.* In biblical terms we may say that the Old Testament social consciousness gives way to the consciousness of the New Testament with its sense of inner individual experience. This, however, is but half the meaning of the New Testament. This inner experience is not the final religious goal of racial development; it gives a new spirit through which the old institutional, social religion of the Old Testament is to be reinterpreted. The old institutional religion is not to pass away but to be fulfilled in a new spirit—the spirit of love.

REVIEWS

Socialism from the Christian Standpoint. Ten conferences by FATHER BERNARD VAUGHAN, S. J. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. 389.

Christianizing the Social Order. By WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. 493.¹

To the severely objective sociologist there is little to choose between the futilities of socialism and the fatuities of anti-socialism. Neither is convincing. Father Vaughan's destructive argument is of the form: It is capable of proof that tide-mills could not be depended on to run the world's machinery, therefore there is nothing in oceanography; or, science has succeeded neither in creating life nor in abolishing death, therefore biology is an impostor. However valid the major premise in either case, it does not establish the conclusion. Father Vaughan has no trouble in assembling quantities of evidence that, among the doctrinaires and agitators of socialism, intellectual and moral perversities have been liberally represented. No more difficulty has he in specifying incredibilities in socialism itself, whatever the type. On the other hand, he says much well and truly, but more subtly and sophistically, about the resources of the Catholic church for healing all the real ills in human society. But after all he does not understand, or if he understands he artfully conceals, the gist of the whole matter. Whatever the merits or demerits of socialism, the fight which the Catholic church is making against it is merely the latest action in the immemorial struggle between dogma and life. The antithesis that began to appear between the popes and the reformers, that has become generalized now in the contradiction between authority and experience, between traditionalism and modernism, is merely manifesting itself with peculiar details in the present conflict between church and social discontent.

Father Vaughan's constructive argument is merely: the church knows it all; the church has the rights and wrongs of society all appraised and tabulated; the church has the only remedy for everything in society

¹ This review was written for the *American Journal of Theology*, and appeared in the issue of that journal for April, 1913.

that is abnormal; therefore, it is wicked to look elsewhere than to the church for social programs. It would be as profitless for Protestants to argue with this position as it would be to thresh out the old straw of theological differences. The Catholic and Protestant premises are as irreconcilable in the realm of sociology as in theology. Given a deep ground swell of human dissatisfaction, and a fierce demand for knowledge of what is the matter and what the remedy, yet Father Vaughan is unable to conceive the possibility that human conditions may not have been interpreted and programmed once for all by the Catholic church. Whatever their disabilities for other reasons, Protestants, unless they are merely self-deceived authoritarians, are not handicapped by any similar *a priori*. We may be as sure as Father Vaughan is that socialism as a program is chimerical, and that socialism as a diagnosis errs, but we may at the same time be as sure as the socialists are that capitalism rests on a social fallacy, and that no convincing formula for the correction of the fallacy is at present in sight.

The essential difference between the Jesuit propagandist and the Protestant professor of church history appears first in the fact that the latter is not obliged to beg the question at the outset, by assuming that the cardinal human institutions, family, state, private property, and the church, are essentially impeccable and unalterable; second, that he thinks he finds the remedy for social ills in Christianity, not as a finished creed but as a vital spirit. Professor Rauschenbusch does not fall into the banality of denying that there is something fundamentally wrong in our social order. Such a passage as the following may indicate the substance of his indictment:

In all the operations of capitalistic industry and commerce, the aim that controls and directs is not the purpose to supply human needs, but to make a profit for those who direct industry. This in itself is an irrational and un-Christian adjustment of the social order, for it sets money up as the prime aim and human life as something secondary, or as a means to secure money. The supremacy of Profit in Capitalism stamps it as a mammonistic organization with which Christianity can never be content. "Profit" commonly contains considerable elements of just reward for able work; it may contain nothing but that; but where it is large and dissociated from hard work, it is traceable to some kind of monopoly, privilege and power—either the power to withhold part of the earnings of the workers by the control of the means of production, or the ability to throw part of the expenses of business on the community or the power to overcharge the public. In so far as profit is derived from these sources, it is tribute collected by power from the helpless, a form of legalized graft, and a contradiction of Christian relations (p. 312).

The author's program is summed up in this paragraph:

Christianizing the social order means bringing it into harmony with the ethical convictions which we identify with Christ. A fairly definite body of moral convictions has taken shape in modern humanity. They express for collective consciences, our working religion. The present social order denies and flouts many of these principles of our ethical life and compels us in practice to outrage our better self. We demand therefore that the moral sense of humanity shall be put in control and shall be allowed to reshape the institutions of social life (p. 125).

There is no more stirring plea in our literature for renovation of our social system than Professor Rauschenbusch's appeal in this book. It is unequivocal, but after all it is not radical. Its indictment of capitalism proves to be an arraignment of workings, not a demonstration of false principles which foreordain the workings. While the Catholic and the Protestant set out from opposite directions, they virtually fail at the same point. Each reaches his limit in the conclusion, which in the one case was also the assumption, that the source of all existing social ills is not anything essentially defective in our social principles, but defiance of a competent moral guide in applying the principles. The one assumes that Christianity as represented by the Catholic church is a sufficient moral authority. The other assumes that Christianity as represented by a widely diffused moral consensus is a sufficient moral index. The one supposition is as unauthorized as the other. Neither the church nor christianized conscience can say anything conclusive about Panama tolls, for instance, until knowledge not now possessed by either has illuminated all the relations of cause and effect that would be affected by the possible alternatives. What is true of a casual incident in our social order is incalculably more true of relations fundamental to the order. Neither the church nor christianized conscience can say anything conclusive about capitalism as a peculiar social régime, until capitalism in all its moral connotations has been analyzed beyond our present insights, and until all its implications have been more completely exposed. There is much more potential mitigation of social ills in christianized conscience than has yet been realized, but there is not enough to catch up with the accelerated mischief-making of the false principles which are chiefly chargeable with the ills. Practically all modern consciences, no matter to what degree they are christianized (and by no means all who call themselves socialists are exceptions to the rule), are mortgaged to certain preposterous capitalistic presumptions. These underlying economic presuppositions remaining unrevolutionized,

the goodly fellowship of the apostles could not operate our industrial system and make its workings just.

Capitalism is rooted in the superstition that wealth produces wealth, and in the derived illusion that ownership confers upon the owner a just claim to more wealth. Capitalism is accordingly a system in which the title to dividends of some men who do not work is regarded as equally sacred with the title to wages of other men who do work. We have institutionalized these immoral assumptions in artificial persons—corporations—and we have thus given ungovernable cumulative force to the injustice which they sanction. This central injustice of capitalism would be comparatively harmless if it were confined to application through natural persons. Incorporating the injustice has not only multiplied its power, but it has so diffused its stultifying effects that most of the thrifty members of society have unwittingly accepted retainers as supporters of the injustice. The illusion and the superstition that are the capitalistic breath of life are often more tenacious in the man with a hundred dollars in the savings bank than in the millionaire. That being the case, a task of economic enlightenment is first in order. Otherwise appeal to christianized conscience is merely recourse to charity vitiated by ignorance.

For different reasons, both the books referred to should be read by every serious student of the social situation. By contrast they interpret each other. The Catholic writer is zealous for the glory of the church first, and incidentally for the well-being of men. The Protestant author is ardent for the well-being of men first, and secondarily for the church as a means to that end. The contrast will be most impressive if readers invert the order in which the books were named.

ALBION W. SMALL

Les opinions et les croyances. Par GUSTAVE LE BON. Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 26 Rue Racine, 1911. Pp. 340. Fr. 3.50.

Though Le Bon repeats himself a great deal, this book on opinions and beliefs summarizes the fundamental principles of social psychology found in his other books, *The Crowd*, *The Psychology of Socialism*, and *The Psychology of Peoples*. The following extracts are designed to give his method and general conclusions.

Belief is an act of faith of unconscious origin which forces us to admit *in toto* an idea, opinion, explanation, or doctrine (p. 5). . . . Knowledge is a conscious acquisition built up exclusively by rational methods, experience, and observation (p. 5). . . . Knowledge constitutes an essential element of

civilization, the great factor in its material development. Belief determines the thoughts, opinions, and as a consequence the conduct. . . . Opinions generally represent small beliefs more or less transitory (p. 7).

After discussing his various psychological methods—introspection, psycho-physical, cerebral localization, questionnaire, pathological, and comparative psychology—he pronounces them insufficient for the study of the genesis and evolution of beliefs and opinions. His own method: “After studying the receptive grounds of beliefs—intelligence, sentiments, subconscious, etc.—we will analyze the diverse beliefs—religious, political, moral, etc.—and examine the rôle of each of their determining factors. History for the past, the facts of everyday life for the present will furnish the elements for this study” (p. 14).

Pleasure and pain are the springs of action in all living beings, psychic as well as vital. “The pleasure of Newton discovering the laws of gravitation was without doubt greater than if he had inherited the numerous wives of King Solomon” (p. 21). He answers William James’ argument that we do not breathe for the pleasure of breathing: “the pain accompanying the cessation of breathing rigorously obliges us to that function” (p. 21).

Organic, affective, and intellectual life are three spheres of activity. While very distinct from one another they are always interdependent. “Character consists of affective elements, emotions, sentiments, and passions superimposed upon one another and little mixed with intellectual elements” (p. 55). “Each people possesses a certain collective character common to most of its members, making of different nations different psychological species” (p. 57). “Character and not intelligence differentiates peoples” (p. 58).

The spheres of activity are further subdivided into biological, affective, collective, mystical, and rational. Each sphere is ruled by its own logic, which is defined as the

art of reasoning and demonstration (p. 70). . . . The biological rules over the preservation of beings and the creation of their forms without any influence of the will being the product of adaptations to forces unknown to us (p. 71). . . . The affective is sharply distinguished from the rational, being unconscious and determining most of our acts, while the latter is conscious (p. 72). . . . The collective must not be confounded with the affective since man in a crowd conducts himself differently than when isolated (p. 72).

The mystical does not consider the causal connections of things but depends on superior beings or forces.

The rational is the art of voluntary association of ideas and images to discover their casual connections (p. 73). . . . These different forms of logic coexist. They may be superimposed, fused, or in conflict with one another (p. 73). . . . In daily life the conflict of different forms of logic resolves itself into an equilibrium which is a superposition and not a fusion (p. 106). . . . This is seen also in superior persons trained rigorously in scientific methods. It is because in their scientific work they are ruled by the rational logic, and in their beliefs they are ruled by the mystical and affective logics. In the conflict the rational logic is rarely victorious (p. 107). . . . While sentiments affect ideas greatly, ideas affect sentiments very little (p. 108). . . . The true rôle of the intellect upon the sentiments is to isolate some of them by supporting mental representation thereby giving them more attention (p. 109). . . . Optimistic or pessimistic doctrines are the results of character more than of intellect (p. 131).

He agrees with William James that the history of philosophy is to a great extent a conflict of human temperaments.

In his social philosophy Le Bon, very much like Spencer, is an individualist.

The need of explanations accompanies man from the cradle to the grave. This need, however, is easily satisfied and becomes the source of many erroneous opinions and beliefs (p. 144). . . . The discord between the prescriptions of blind legislators and the necessities which govern things becomes daily accentuated. French society actually lives in spite of the laws and not by the laws (p. 148). . . . The two methods by which opinions are corrected are reason and experience (p. 152). . . . The rôle of reason is preponderant in all the scientific and technical opinions. The mistake which psychologists and philosophers make is that the same is true in the domain of ordinary opinions (p. 153). . . . The ideas capable of influencing the multitude are not rational but merely sentiments expressed in the form of rational ideas. The opinions of crowds today dictate to the legislators the laws for which they are to vote, and since these laws correspond to the ephemeral phantasies and not to the necessities, their final result is the disorganization of industrial, social, and economic life (p. 180). . . .

Opinions and beliefs are influenced by race, environment, custom, and social groups (p. 168).

There are no pure races in the anthropological sense.

There are historical races resulting from ages of association under the influence of the same beliefs, institutions, laws, languages, morals, and religion (p. 169). . . . Without prestige opinions and beliefs would not be born, without affirmation they would not be imposed, and without example and repetition they would not subsist (p. 202).

Mental contagion results from the involuntary and unconscious acceptance of opinions and beliefs.

Opinions propagated by contagion destroy themselves only by contrary opinion propagated in the same way (p. 210).

One of the most constant characteristics of beliefs is their intolerance. Men dominated by a certainty cannot tolerate those who do not accept it (p. 235). . . . Sorel justly predicts that the first measure of triumphant socialism would be to massacre without pity all their adversaries (p. 236). . . . Arguments invoked by believers often resemble infantile reason (p. 244). . . . Destructive sometimes, creative often, irresistible always, beliefs constitute the most formidable power in history, the true support of civilization (p. 241). . . . The irreducible point of conflict between science and belief is that they are ruled by different forms of logic (p. 247).

The last of the nine books is devoted to researches which substantiate the conclusions contained in the foregoing extracts.

The book contains a great many suggestions of value to the student of social psychology. The distinction between the rational and affective is emphasized at the expense of their interdependence. This logic together with the author's assumption of the lack of rational powers on the part of the mass of the people supplies a psychological basis for his social philosophy of individualism.

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TWO BOOKS ON SOCIAL MECHANICS

Mécanique sociale. Par SP. C. HARET. Paris: Gauthier-Villars; Bucarest: Ch. Göbl, 1910.

Apuntes sobre Mecánica Social. Por ANTONIO PORTUONDO Y BARCELÓ. Madrid: Establecimiento Topográfico y Editorial, 1912.

Probably because the present reviewer once made a contribution to social mechanics¹ these works have come into his hands, although the one first named was not received until two years after it appeared. As both these works treat the subject from the standpoint of mathematics, no pretension is here made to reviewing them from that point of view, and all that will be attempted is a general appreciation of them

¹ *Annales de l'Institut International de Sociologie*, Tome VII, Paris, 1901, pp. 163-203; *Report of the U. S. Commissioner of Education for 1899-1900*, Washington, 1901, pp. 1579-93.

as contributions to sociology. Of the first one not even this would have been undertaken had not Mr. Carol Aronovici, a countryman of the author, whom he knows, and former student at the same university, offered to furnish a few notes on that work, which he prefers to have inserted here, rather than submit them as an independent review.

These notes are as follows:

There is no class of men called upon daily to solve intricate and far-reaching problems who feel more keenly the lack of exactness and expediency of method in their field of endeavor than statesmen. Dr. Spiru C. Haret is one of these men. He has been for years one of the leading figures in the political life of Roumania, while at the same time he has held a high place among mathematical students and teachers of the country. His scholarship and sincere interest in public affairs, added to his duties as professor in two universities, have gained for him the honor of membership in the National Academy of Science and in the prime ministry of his country.

Mécanique sociale, the book we are to consider, may be characterized as the result of a keenly felt need for exact methods in the solution of social problems. The mathematical genius of the writer has made it possible for him to conceive of certain quantitative elements in social life as standing in exact relationships to each other, which may be traced to social processes determined by well-defined and mathematically measurable forces. Dr. Haret, in justifying his book, rather than the principles set forth, says: "There is not a single statesman worthy of the name who is not impressed by the insufficient means available for the solution of the difficult problems which present themselves in the life of the people. This difficulty comes about because of the complexity of these problems, because of the large number of elements which create them, and because of our complete ignorance of the laws which undoubtedly govern social phenomena as they do all other natural phenomena."

While it would be difficult to trace the chain of reasoning that characterizes social mechanics, without going into a discussion of somewhat complicated mathematical principles, the conclusions reached by the author are as interesting as they are significant. In formulating the fundamental principles to be used in his calculations Dr. Haret assumes that "society, or the social body, is a union of individuals subjected on the one hand to reciprocal influences among themselves, and on the other to external influences." In other words, he accepts without modification the theory set forth by De Greef that the basis of all society is "territory and population."

Having accepted the principle that territory and population are the determining factors in all social phenomena, he classifies all such phenomena into economic, intellectual, and moral. The perfect society is to be attained by a mathematical equalization of the degree of economic, intellectual, and moral development of society. This equalization is to take place, not in specific social strata, but on a democratic basis, comprising, as far as possible, all

members of the community, by distributing equal opportunities and privileges for economic, intellectual, and moral development, rather than by an over-development of either the economic, intellectual, or moral qualities distributed among special social classes or groups.

To emphasize the importance of democratic distribution of attainment, the author cites Greece and Rome as illustrations of stratified and unsuccessful distribution of social attainment. Against these he places the progress of Sweden and Norway, where equalization has taken place, and where progress is normal and rapid.

The concluding chapter, while sounding a note of pessimism as to the present equipment for the solution of the many perplexing social problems, places confidence in the efforts made in that direction by saying: "But what makes the glory of our civilization, and what distinguishes it from the civilizations which preceded it, is the fact that the economic, intellectual, and moral well-being of the weak and disinherited takes the first place among its endeavors."

The task of demonstrating mathematically that democracy is an essential condition of civilization, has been well met by Dr. Haret. This work shows that a great field of research is open in the line of quantitative social dynamics, that may compare favorably with the achievement in quantitative social statics, or social statistics.

The concluding portion of the work is non-mathematical, and constitutes an important contribution to sociology. Some idea of it may be gained from the following passage, which sounds a sort of keynote to the whole treatise:

The study of social forces and of their mode of action constitutes the most considerable part of social science. . . . What we have said has had for its chief object to give an idea of the aspect under which this study should be presented, considered from the point of view at which we are placed.

In his final chapter, on civilization, Haret treats the general characteristics of the civilized state, past civilizations, causes that oppose the development of civilization, and the conditions to a high civilization. Mr. Aronovici has given an idea of the general conclusions arrived at.

The work of Señor Portuondo y Barceló is of a quite different character from that of Dr. Haret. He was unacquainted with the latter when he began it, but while writing it a copy came into his hands, and he introduces a note in the middle of his book, in which he says:

I see that this work is entirely distinct from mine, although in both the principles and theorems of rational mechanics are applied to individuals and social groups. But the application is made from different points of view, and with a very different purpose, as anyone will perceive who reads both works.

My study is predominantly psychological (as a basis for the social study), and moreover purely abstract and theoretical, while M. Haret aspires in his to make an applied social mechanics (at least as a first approximation), the motive which impelled him to write his work having been its application to politics.

He sent six copies of the work to Dr. Small, to distribute to American sociologists, whom he named, and he took special pains to inclose in each copy a hectographed French translation of the Contents and Introduction.

The fundamental principle that underlies the entire work is that of the existence of true social forces, identical with the forces that control the physical world. Social mechanics is for him simply the laws of mechanics operating in society. But the social forces are psychic, and become social in their collective action. The subdivision of social mechanics is therefore necessarily into social statics and social dynamics, and these are systematically treated in that order. He uses the regular postulates, elements, or units of the science of mechanics—mass, space, time, and their combinations—only that he employs different symbols for some of them from those used by Clerk Maxwell and other English writers (see *Pure Sociology*, p. 165), and the several combinations of these—velocity, momentum, force, energy, power, etc.—are formulated as in other works. He makes much use of the principle of acceleration, which is the velocity divided by the time. He thus shows the fallacy of regarding either force or energy as an ultimate, irreducible postulate, since they both involve mass, space, and time in different relations. It is remarkable how closely he clings to these postulates and formulas throughout, and it would seem that almost the entire science of mechanics may be worked out in all fields by the aid of these alone.

But our author does not conceive that these general mechanical principles can be applied to all social phenomena at once. They can be used in only one particular field, department, or institution (*asunto*) at a time, as in religion, ethics, jurisprudence, politics, economics, art, science. In all discussions of social mechanics, whether static or dynamic, the treatment must be confined to whichever one of these fields may be chosen. These institutions seem to correspond in sociology to the unit *space* in rational mechanics.

The social forces consist of desires, which of course are psychic, and under their universal operation in society all social phenomena are brought about. The laws of mind are as exact as those of matter, and the social forces are as uniform and reliable, when they are understood,

as are the physical forces. He thus arrives at a physics of mind, psychic physics, or psychics, the same as defined by Edgeworth, and the law of parsimony, or greatest gain for least effort, is worked out mathematically, and referred to the principle of least action of Maupertuis, and that of minimum force of Gauss. Potential energy in social structures is insisted upon, and the equilibrium of social forces in such structures constitutes the essence of them, but the disturbing of that equilibrium, or creating a difference of potential, is necessary to progress, and inaugurates the dynamic stage.

Portuondo has no patience with any metaphysical attempts to explain the phenomena of mind. The "empirical" character of Kant is the only one he recognizes, and of his "intelligible" character he significantly says: "to me unintelligible" (*para mî ininteligible*).

The social forces are feelings, and ideas are not forces in any direct sense. "The forces which come from ideas do not produce dynamic impulses in a direct way, because these impulses come directly from desires, that is, feelings. But ideas exert their influence only through the medium of the feelings which accompany them, and therefore we consider them as forces when they work effectively." This is virtually Fouillée's doctrine of idea-forces, and is the only scientific meaning there is in that phrase.

The author's views on the universal energy are highly enlightening, and he is not afraid to declare that vital and psychic energy exist as simply higher forms into which physical and chemical energy have been transformed under the great law of the conservation and transmutation of energy, and he says: "All physical, chemical, physiological, and psychic energies are different manifestations of one sole universal energy." He insists on the importance of man's utilizing all forms of energy. He does not speak of "wasting energy," which, in view of its indestructibility, is a meaningless phrase, but of economizing it, and turning it to man's use, the extent to which this is done being the true measure of civilization. An idea of the rigidly scientific tone of the book may be gathered from the following passage:

What we have established in following out our mechanical studies is at bottom *analogous* to what is said when it is stated that in general the acts of an individual are *necessarily* produced by the action of the resultant of the *motives* (as a motor force) upon the *character* of the individual. It seems to me that the abstract and simple being, whom we have here called the *individual*, should not be conceived as the cause of his own change of state of motion without the intervention of some psychic force; that he cannot be conceived

as acting without motives. And it seems indubitable that the act which a *free* man performs *by his will* is necessarily in the direction and path of the strongest motive *for him*, that is, that his will is oriented in this direction and path, or rather in the direction and path of the resultant of all the motives, each one of which will have the intensity which the *character* of the man himself gives to it. For me the *liberty of indifference* of which some talk is inconceivable, because . . . an individual cannot help wishing what he wishes.

All this is in strong contrast with a large amount of the current loose, superficial treatment of sociological principles, and comes to us like a breath of ozone.

LESTER F. WARD

Economic Beginnings of the Far West. By KATHERINE COMAN.
New York: Macmillan, 1912. 2 vols. Pp. xxviii+868.
\$4.00 net.

In these volumes Professor Coman has put in convenient form for use by the public and in college classes a great mass of material hitherto inaccessible to the average reader. She has gathered her facts from the journals of explorers and fur-traders, the diaries of missionaries and pioneer settlers, the archives of the early Spanish and Mormon settlements, as well as from many recent monographic studies of special phases of western history. She has undertaken the difficult task of presenting a condensed summary of the first steps in the occupation by European people of over half of the territory of the United States. The difficulties of finding a satisfactory plan of organization for so vast, complex, and slightly related a mass of facts are almost insurmountable. The first volume tells of the exploration and transient occupation of the territory by the Spaniards and fur-traders, while the second is devoted to the discussion of the advance of the settlers who ultimately gained control by virtue of their sounder economic policy and superior domestic and political institutions.

Those disposed to emphasize the economic interpretation of history can find ample explanation for the failure of the Spanish to hold the territory to which they obtained the right by priority in discovery, exploration, and founding of settlements. The three centuries of occupation of New Mexico furnish striking evidence of the follies of Spanish policy and of their racial incapacity for colonization. The disastrous record of their failures is presented largely by means of well-selected extracts from the reports of early explorers and traders. The Pueblo Indians, who were evidently the most economically efficient of

the American aborigines, were subjected to the most heartless abuse and exploitation, resulting in years of bitter enmity and destructive warfare. The limitations placed upon commerce, the absence of a suitable medium of exchange, neglect of manufacturing or of improved means of agriculture, combined with a lack of thrift or industry in the settlers, and an exceedingly corrupt and inefficient system of government, all contributed their shares to the long record of wretchedness and failure preceding the occupation by settlers from the United States.

Professor Coman finds the colonial history of California much more creditable than that of the other Spanish colonies. She declares (Vol. I, p. 142): "The colonization of California was undertaken by men of marked ability and devotion. No English colony had more far-sighted and disinterested service than was rendered by Galvez, Bucareli, de Neve, Borica, Portóla, Costanzó, and Anza; but the prime essential in colonial development, settlers of resolution and resources, was lacking, and thus all the heavy expenditure in money and in human energy came to little."

In the volume dealing with the advance of the permanent settlers of the West, the chapter telling of "The Mormon Invasion" is one of the most striking and original. The Mormons are declared to have furnished "the most successful example of regulated immigration in United States history" (p. 184). Their remarkable economic prosperity achieved in an unfavorable environment was due largely to the superior type of settlers gathered from England, Wales, Scotland, and Scandinavia by Mormon missionaries. Care was taken to enlist skilled artisans who were instructed to bring their tools and plans for the machinery needed to start the industries that soon rendered their isolated mountain settlement independent. The shrewd management of Brigham Young and the intelligent co-operation and industry of his followers were also unfailing resources of what was undoubtedly the most economically efficient of the early western settlements.

A large amount of painstaking research has been condensed into an admirable brief history of the conquest and early economic development of California. No previous writer has produced so comprehensive and well-organized a summary of the striking economic situations that characterize the history of this most richly endowed of the American commonwealths. The author condenses into a little over a hundred pages the salient features of the gold period, the complex problems of land tenure, the stages in agricultural development, the establishment of manufactures, and the struggles with the vexatious labor problems of the Pacific coast.

These volumes will be particularly valuable for the smaller libraries of the West whose funds will not permit the purchase of the many expensive sets giving the sources necessary to an understanding of the economic development of the West. Historians will welcome the extensive and well-selected bibliography. Students of sociology will find them useful for obtaining a general background to more intensive investigations. The vast territory covered has made impossible the furnishing of those subtler details that must be discovered and presented before we can help the people of the West to become conscious of what is most characteristic and worthy of emphasis in the civilization they are founding in the territory conquered from the wilderness.

LUCILE EAVES

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Lead Poisoning and Lead Absorption. The Symptoms, Pathology and Prevention, with Special Reference to Their Industrial Origin and an Account of the Principal Processes Involving Risk. By THOMAS M. LEGGE, M. D. OXON., D.P.H. CANTAB., and KENNETH W. GOADBY, M.R.C.S., D.P.H. CANTAB. London: Edward Arnold; New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. xi+308. \$3.50 net.

This is one in a series of "International Medical Monographs" prepared under the general editorship of Leonard Hill and William Bulloch. The authors of the book speak from practical experience, the one as medical inspector of factories, the other as surgeon to certain smelting and white lead factories in East London. The work is highly technical and will prove of little value to the general reader. Technical, chemical, and medical terminology is employed throughout the book. The monograph should, however, be of great value to physicians and manufacturers who have to do with the many processes in which lead is used; it will, moreover, be of material assistance to legislature committees and investigators of industrial diseases.

Each chapter is accompanied by a bibliography, and a number of plates, figures, and tables are given. The chapters that are of special interest from the point of view of social technology are: iii, "Susceptibility and Immunity"; iv, "Statistics of Plumbism"; xii, xiii, xiv, "Preventive Measures against Lead Poisoning"; and xv, xvi, xvii, "Description of Processes." These last chapters include also the application, in the various processes, of the conclusions reached with regard to prevention and treatment. The authors are convinced, and

they describe the careful experiments which confirmed the conviction, that the most frequent and most dangerous cause of lead poisoning is the inhalation of dust, and therefore, though they readily recognize other precautions and constant watchfulness and care as necessary, they place the greatest emphasis, in their discussion of preventive measures, on the removal of dust and fumes by means of exhaust ventilation, fans and hoods, or vacuum cleaners.

ROBERT FRY CLARK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Wanderings of Peoples. By A. C. HADDON, Sc.D., F.R.S.,
University Reader in Ethnology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1911. 1 vol. Pp. vii+124, with five maps.

This is the first book of its kind, and I know of no one person equipped critically to review it as a whole. It is an excellent pioneer volume, and is especially valuable because of its maps.

Chap. i is an "Introduction." It occupies 11 pages, and is a simple statement of well-known conditions of migration. A bibliography of three authors (to which page references are given in the text) concludes the chapter.

Chap. ii is entitled "Asia and Oceania." It occupies 26 pages and is followed by a bibliography of twenty authors. This seems to be the least complete chapter of the book. Its incompleteness is especially noticeable in Oceania—inasmuch as part of this area, viz., Papua, is one concerning which Dr. Haddon is distinctively equipped to present new, authentic, and first-hand knowledge. So I infer that the incompleteness of data of Oceanic migrations is due to lack of space, and not to negligence or lack of knowledge. The map of Asia presents the migration routes of thirty-five peoples.

Chap. iii, dealing with "Europe," contains 13 pages, and has a bibliography of nine volumes. Europe is the area about which, of course, most is known, and about the movement of those peoples Dr. Haddon takes his readers' knowledge most for granted; however, he has packed these few pages full. I cannot help but see in this book, especially in this chapter on Europe, the direct effect of oriental travel in out-of-the-way places where one soon learns to pack the maximum number of utilities compactly and of such bulk, form, and weight that they are suitable for the burden of one man's back. Would that many more ethnologists had had similar "hiking" experiences, and had become equally apt in applying the law of the hiker to the writing of books. The migrations of nineteen peoples are presented on the map of Europe.

Chap. iv deals with "Africa"; it has 22 pages and a bibliography of twenty-two authors. This chapter well illustrates Dr. Haddon's method in preparing the book. Inasmuch as there is relatively little data published on the migrations of peoples, Dr. Haddon epitomizes the published opinions of whatever author is available to him, and presents said opinion with due credit to author, volume, and page; he is eminently fair to the author whom he uses. He seldom criticizes, seldom presents antagonistic opinions, and seldom presents his own opinions of migrations. The map of Africa shows the migration routes of thirty-one peoples.

Chap. v is entitled "America," and in spite of the fact that it has only 7 pages and is without separate bibliography, yet in method of treatment it is the most critical of the chapters in the book. Dr. Haddon presents as follows one of his own opinions: "There are indications of a palaeo-ethnic and a neo-ethnic period in the *New World* as well as in the *Old*; the interval dividing them may correspond to that dividing pre- or inter-glacial from post-glacial times. It seems likely that certain peoples of low stature, occurring here and there in America, represent the first palaeo-ethnic inhabitants of America" (p. 77). The chapter is really an introduction to the two following chapters.

Chap. vi, "North America," has 17 pages, and a bibliography of twenty-two authors. The reviewer is certain that known facts show more northward migration of the American Indians east of the Rocky Mountains than Dr. Haddon presents.

Chap. vii, entitled "Mexico and Central America," has 6 pages and a bibliography of five authors. This short chapter is a valuable discussion of the Aztec problem. The map of North America, which illuminates chap. vii as well as chap. vi, presents the migrations of twenty-three peoples—extending from the Arctic coasts (even from Asia) to Panama. It does not allow place for prehistoric European migration to America; this should have been, not only from probable facts, but from opinions the author published.

Chap. viii, entitled "South America," is the last. It has 13 pages and a bibliography of ten authors. The map of South America presents the migration of ten peoples.

An index to authors, peoples, and subjects follows the text of the book.

Since Dr. Haddon's book has only 108 pages of actual text and is an epitome of seventy-two authors, it is evident that so short a review can scarcely epitomize the chapters except by actually quoting them. So I present this review as an appreciation, and am happy to do so.

ALBERT ERNEST JENKS

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Croyances, rites, institutions. Par COMTE GOBLET D'ALVIELLA.

Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1911. 3 vols. Pp. xx+386; 412; 386. Fr. 22.50.

It is a pleasant custom of distinguished European scholars, when approaching the close of a long period of intellectual activity, to collect and publish their numerous fugitive papers—reviews, essays, and minor monographs. These *gesammelte Schriften* are not without utility at a time when the multiplication of special journals has made it almost impossible to keep up with the periodical literature of even a modestly limited specialty. Count d'Alviella's work has evidently been suggested by the appearance of the *Cultes, mythes, et religions* of Salomon Reinach (3 vols., Paris, 1905-8), which bring together many "chips" from the workshop of that encyclopedic scholar. The two collections cover substantially the same ground. A mere glance at their tables of contents discloses the remarkable progress made during recent years in a field of research for which "social anthropology" is tending to become the accepted name.

In *Croyances, rites, institutions*, Count d'Alviella gives us the "gleanings" of thirty-five years of unselfish, persistent devotion to anthropological and sociological studies. We welcome its appearance, though, to be quite frank, we believe that judicious compression might have reduced these three portly, well-printed volumes to two, or even to one, without sacrificing anything of permanent value. Many papers in the collection originally appeared as book reviews which were not so much critical comments on the authors' views as lucid summaries of the authors' arguments. All this was valuable enough in its time, but, in most cases, a student today gains little profit from reading estimates of works which themselves no longer represent the latest conclusions of his science. The count, moreover, has merely reprinted his earlier papers, without making any attempt to revise them and to bring them up to date. In general, we should say that the greater part of this collection will prove more valuable to the future historian of social anthropology than to contemporary scholars who are grappling with the concrete problems of the science.

Count Goblet d'Alviella, a senator of Belgium and a professor at the University of Brussels since 1884, is rightly reckoned among the pioneers in the historical and comparative study of religions. The Hibbert Lectures *On the Origin and Growth of the Conception of God* (1892) and the *Migration of Symbols* (English translation, 1894) are perhaps his best-known works. He belongs to the English school of anthropologists and

gratefully mentions among his masters Tylor, Spencer, and Max Müller. In 1911 he still remains faithful to the general principles of interpretation which, following his masters, he had begun to set forth as early as 1876. At the same time, he has a hearty welcome for the researches of the younger generation of students and recognizes the value of their work in elucidating such subjects as magic, totemism, and taboo. If he fails, anywhere, rightly to appraise the value of recent work, it is in his treatment of the French sociological school represented by Durkheim and his collaborators on the *Année sociologique*.

The eighty papers in these volumes are classified roughly under three headings: (1) hierography or the descriptive history of religions (including archaeology); (2) hierology, dealing with problems of comparative religion; and (3) hierosophy, chiefly devoted to general essays in the philosophy of religions. The following papers seem to the reviewer of special importance: Tome I—"Archéologie et histoire religieuse. Hiérogaphie": "Moulins à prières, rues magiques et circumnambulations," pp. 1-24; "Les roues liturgiques de l'ancienne Egypte," pp. 25-40; "Archéologie de la croix," pp. 63-81; "Quelques réflexions sur la persistance et la transmissibilité des types iconographiques," pp. 105-17. Tome II—"Questions de méthode et d'origines. Hiérologie": "L'Animisme et sa place dans l'évolution religieuse," pp. 109-24; "Des origines de l'idolatrie," pp. 125-47; "L'Intervention des astres dans la destinée des morts," pp. 328-39. Tome III—"Problèmes du temps présent. Hiérosophie": "Religion et superstition de la vie," pp. 327-46; "Sur l'histoire de la science des religions," pp. 347-66.

HUTTON WEBSTER

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Why Women Are So. By MARY ROBERTS COOLIDGE, PH.D., author of *Chinese Immigration*, *Alms-house Women*, etc. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1912. Pp. viii+371. \$1.50.

The author herself has characterized her book as "a first-hand study of the ordinary, orthodox, middle-class woman who has constituted the domestic type for more than a century," answering the question: "Is the characteristic behavior which is called feminine an inalienable quality or merely an attitude of mind produced by the coercive habits of past times?" As a working hypothesis she assumes that women have been "what men expected them to be," that "sex traditions rather than innate sex character have produced what is called 'feminine' as distinguished from womanly behavior." Here

is the old question and the modern hypothesis of much theorizing, but Dr. Coolidge has made a definite contribution to the subject by this intensive study, limited to the average American woman of the nineteenth century from about 1840 to the present.

The body of her argument is presented in a rather exhaustive examination of the domestic traditions which have surrounded women, beginning with the "conventions of girlhood." From babyhood the girl had an ideal of personal appearance, manners, even of virtues, held up to her which differed entirely from that of a boy. She early learned that it was most desirable to be pretty, well dressed, docile, and physically delicate, and that she was not expected to be courageous, reasonable, or thorough. With the coming of the factory era and of cheap household service, production in the home almost ceased, and the girl received little real domestic training. Her schooling covered only the common branches with a smattering of so-called "accomplishments," she was not expected to use libraries, and popular literature was of the sentimental-story or fashion-magazine type. Physical exercise or outdoor sports were quite unknown to her, and her leisure time was given to piano-playing and the "spurious industry" of fancywork. She grew up with the understanding that it was her destiny to marry, but she received no preparation for the duties of a wife and mother and when they came to her she was too commonly both mentally and physically unfitted for them. The domestic life which absorbed her was a monotonous repetition of petty details or of "made" work, invented to fill up idle hours. She lacked the education to enable her to lift her work out of the trivial, and tradition forbade her to interest herself in anything outside the home. The average woman was petty minded, incoherent in thought, absorbed in detail, limited to personal interests, all characteristics of the work she did and the life she lived. Trained to seek masculine approval in everything, since she must marry and be economically dependent upon her husband, she naturally cultivated the arts of pleasing even to the point of deception, and as naturally devoted herself to the cult of beauty and fashion that sprang up with the coming of an age of surplus wealth when a man's social status could be most easily shown by his wife's clothes and entertainments. Incidentally Dr. Coolidge contributes an interesting item to social history in her account of the growth of the influence of fashion and its commercial importance taken in connection with the increasing cheapness of fabrics.

In the section on "Some Exceptions" Dr. Coolidge treats of the elect ladies who were called out of the home into missionary, temperance,

and philanthropic movements, of the struggles of the pioneers for higher education against the "phantom of the learned lady," of the early insurgents against legal and political limitations, and of the eager, untrained "literary amateurs," each of whom she draws sympathetically but with full recognitions of their limitations, which she traces to their source in traditions.

The concluding chapters are somewhat in the nature of addenda, touching on certain features of present conditions, and the outlook, under the captions "The Significance of Femininity," "Family Perplexities," and "Larger Life and Citizenship." Most studies of sex characteristics by men have laid too much stress on physiological characteristics. The most recent and the broadest studies, however, do not disprove the hypothesis of the book; many uphold it. The transitional nature of the present time for women is seen most vividly in the unrest in family life, the increase of divorce, the lack of social standards. Complete readjustment can be looked for only when educational methods are fully adapted to present conditions and women have at least relative economical independence.

If Dr. Coolidge's study is not conclusive, as in the nature of the case it cannot be, it is at least very convincing. Women are "amateurs in the game"? Granted, but you must also grant the force of the traditions which still persist in social life. Is it not sufficient to account for the effects noted? Could any other effects be expected under the conditions? The only scientific method of reaching a conclusion has yet to be tried, the removal from women of all limitations, social, economical, and political.

HANNAH B. CLARK POWELL

CHICAGO, ILL.

The Country Church and Rural Welfare. Edited by the International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Associations. New York: Association Press, 1912.

This little volume of 150 pages is the result of an attempt on the part of the secretaries of the International Y.M.C.A. to show how the conservation and development of the spiritual side of country life may be secured. The volume contains eight chapters, each one dealing with a particular aspect of the central problem. They discuss the function of the rural church, standards of religious teaching, the church itself, the school, the grange, the institute, and leadership. Each chapter is in reality a symposium by several writers on the subject it

treats. Because of this the work is not systematic and is of a popular nature. It is necessarily unequal in value, being composed of the strong and the weak. For popular purposes it is enlightening and stimulating.

JOHN M. GILLETTE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA

Correlations of Mental Abilities. By BENJAMIN R. SIMPSON.

New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1912.

Pp. iv+122.

This monograph reports the results of an investigation into the interrelationships between certain mental traits, and the correlation between efficiency in certain functions and mental ability as measured by general social efficiency. The practical aim of the work was to find certain tests which might be used to determine the mental ability of applicants for various sorts of positions. The procedure followed was to administer several groups of tests, chosen so as to involve a variety of kinds of mental process, to two groups of adults. One of the groups consisted of seventeen graduate students and professors of Columbia University, and were regarded as possessing a degree of mental ability much above that of the average person. The second group was composed of twenty men who had not proven adequate to the task of providing for themselves, and were the occupants of an industrial home, or who occupied low-grade positions and were regarded by their associates as dull. The tests were designed to measure ability in selective thinking, memory, association, perception, motor control, and spatial discrimination.

The results show, first, that efficiency in these tests is closely related to the form of ability which determines one's station in the world—at least so far as academic attainment is a criterion. It would be well to compare a poor group, such as Simpson used, with a group of men who excelled in other than the academic field. In the second place, some of the tests differentiated much more clearly between the two groups and correlated more closely with the results as a whole than did others. The tests may be graded in value roughly in the order in which they are given above. Mental superiority appears most strikingly in those processes which involve abstract thought, while there is little significance in the simpler perceptual and motor activities.

The author compares his results with those of other investigators in the same field. In the main the results agree. This is the only

satisfactory study of its kind with adults, and is probably more satisfactory than other similar investigations with children. The results seem to substantiate the author's belief that tests such as these may well be used to distinguish at least the grosser differences in mental ability.

FRANK N. FREEMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Prehistoric Man. By W. L. H. DUCKWORTH, M.A., M.D., Sc.D. Cambridge, 1912. Pp. viii+156. With 28 illustrations, an index, and an excellent bibliography.

Dr. Duckworth divides his book into six chapters.

Chap. i is "The Precursors of Palaeolithic Man." In these 16 pages *Pithecanthropus erectus* and *Homo heidelbergensis* are discussed.

Chap. ii deals with "Palaeolithic Man" and is 42 pages in extent. This is an exceptionally able chapter. Successively the data concerning the following palaeolithic human remains are presented, and discussed: Taubach, Krapina, Jersey, La Chapelle-aux-Saints, *Homo mousterensis hauseri*, La Ferrassie, Forbes Quarry, Serrania de Ronda, Grimaldi, Baradero, Monte Hermoso, Combe Capelle, and Galley Hill. Nowhere else will one find such a study of the outstanding characteristics of all these palaeolithic remains. It is not possible to do Dr. Duckworth justice in the few words allowed for review of this chapter; but earlier, historically, is noted the type having tall, heavy physique, and small flattened brain-box; then followed one of lower stature, less bulk and weight, but with larger though still flattened brain-box; and last appeared the man with more slender and straighter legs, and with increased stature, but with the new characteristic of enlarged, elevated brain-box, developing chin and jaw—both the latter reduced in size.

Chap. iii, entitled "Alhrial Deposits and Caves," is 21 pages in length. The data presented are the geological setting of the important finds discussed in the first chapters.

Chap. iv, of 26 pages, is entitled "Associated Animals and Implements" and presents the artifacts and the animal remains found associated with the fossil remains discussed in the first two chapters. It is not possible to gain a clear idea of the great duration of man on earth from evidence the author presents in this chapter; so after presenting analytically the evidence pro and con he leaves the reader to come to his own conclusions in the matter. Diagrammatic schemes are presented which greatly assist by visualizing many relevant data.

In chap. v, 14 pages, entitled "Human Fossils and Geological Chronology," the author presents a comparison between the mammalian remains and stone artifacts. The chapter is misnamed.

Chap. vi, "Human Evolution in the Light of Recent Discoveries," is the last chapter, and occupies 21 pages. In this very interesting chapter the author presents his own view that the Neanderthal type of man became extinct. He presents Klaatsch's diphyletic theory that there was an ancestor common to the orang-utan and Aurignac man, and another ancestor common to the gorilla and Neanderthal man. He also suggests Schliz' polyphyletic scheme with its four human stocks—as Neanderthal, Cro-Magnon, Engis, and Truchère-Grenelle types.

It is certain that no one has written a better book covering this field; and it is believed a better one could not be written in so small a compass; there is not one word of padding in it. As highly as I know how, I recommend the little book.

ALBERT ERNEST JENKS

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

New Zealand. By HON. SIR ROBERT STOUT, K.C.M.G., LL.D., Chief Justice, and Formerly Premier, of New Zealand; and J. LOGAN STOUT, LL.B., Barrister of the Supreme Court of New Zealand. Cambridge, 1911. Pp. 185; 19 illustrations, and an index.

This little book brings nothing new to the careful student of New Zealand, but it is an excellent summary for the lay reader.

There are six chapters. The first one, unentitled, presents in 25 pages the essential geographic, physiographic, and climatic factors. A few paragraphs are given to the agricultural, zoöcultural, and forest resources; and a few pages to the white people of New Zealand.

Chap. ii is 46 pages long, and is given to "Early History." The very interesting statement is there made that recent researches in the *Bibliothèque nationale* in Paris have shown that at the time the Britisher, Captain James Cook, was at anchor on the east coast of New Zealand taking possession of the islands on behalf of His Majesty, a French vessel under command of De Surville was at anchor on the west coast. The long warfare between the natives and the British is presented in what seems to me an exceptionally fair manner; and the man who loves the savage because of his manhood feels just pride in the heroism of the Maori who, when asked to surrender in the face of sure defeat, replied: "We will fight on, forever, and ever, and ever."

The third chapter, "The Maori," has 24 pages. Much emphasis is laid on the Aryanization aspect of the natives—they are either Aryans ethnically or were early Aryanized by culture. Mr. Percy Smith's theory of oceanic migrations is accepted by the authors.

Chap. iv, of 34 pages, deals with the government. First the historical development of government is briefly sketched, then the general government, local government, and judiciary follow; while a succinct sketch of education completes the chapter.

Fifty pages are all too short for the summary of social, labor, and land legislation published as chap. v. The historic growth of much of New Zealand's famous "new" legislation is sketched.

Only three pages are given to the sixth and last chapter, called "The Outlook." In those few words there is written again the story of the making of the *American* pioneer out of the conservative Britisher. I quote a sentence which would be as true of us as of the New Zealander:

New Zealanders . . . are more readily influenced by new ideals of social duty than those who live under the domination of ancient institutions. . . . Free and untrammled, they hear the primitive call of brotherhood, learnt in the pioneer fight shoulder to shoulder in a new land. . . . They are alert and intelligent. Optimistic and cheerful, they are armed with the sword of hope and the shield of faith.

The authors believe the New Zealanders will found a noble race,

With the flame of freedom in their souls,
And the light of knowledge in their eyes.

ALBERT ERNEST JENKS

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Génie individuel et contrainte sociale. Par LUCIEN ARRÉAT. Paris: Giard et Brière, 1912. Pp. 133. Fr. 2.

The old question, Which is more responsible for social achievement, individual initiative or social control? is done over anew in this brochure, and the illustrative matter is rather interestingly handled. The outcome of the discussion is not radical. The individual initiates all social changes, but the individual is a social product and social change occurs only in an environment well prepared for it. Indeed, the author's emphasis is rather on the side of the molding and constructive environment. Science is valuable to the individual, not for any view of life it gives but for the control over life which it affords! The "view" comes from religion and philosophy, which build the individual but which

are themselves social inventions. Religion is historically based—a matter primarily of custom—and therefore necessarily dogmatic. Philosophy draws more immediately from science and is therefore more amenable to reason. Yet the author does not see the absurdity of his view that science is not a formative force.

There is some good characterization of current issues. Especially is the criticism of antisocial tendencies in fiction pertinent. The influence of the stage in molding public opinion is perhaps overestimated. The author sees clearly the hollowness of the cult of individualism. Incidentally he seeks to develop a category of contacts which fits his interpretation of environmental forces better than Tarde's category of imitation. The book makes a pleasant essay of the Cooley type.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Doit-elle Mourir? Étude sur la dégression de la natalité en France.

Par ÉDOUARD HEBERLIN. Avec préface de M. GEORGES BONJEAN. Paris: Giard et Brière, 1911. Pp. xx+218. Fr. 3.

In attractive literary form the author discusses with patriotic zeal the problem of the declining birth-rate in France. He finds the causes of her decrease in numbers in the high standard of living among the upper and middle classes, and in the low standard of sanitation among the working population of the cities; the evil is made worse by the spread of bad literature and immoral practices. As palliatives he approves a tax on bachelors and childless couples, with a bounty to parents. But for thoroughgoing remedies he proposes higher wages and salaries—without telling how they are to be raised—improved housing and sanitation, a relaxation of the laws of marriage and divorce, and, above, all, a policy of "back to the land."

To bring about the return to the soil the garden-city is advocated, with the allotment of a small plot of land to each family. The drift to the cities is deplored, and as a means of checking it the exclusion of agricultural machinery is urged—a somewhat reactionary proposal. That the work is dedicated to M. Anatole France is but one indication that the author writes as a man of letters rather than as a statistician. He concludes that France *will* die unless she rallies to meet the emergency.

R. C. CHAPIN

BELOIT COLLEGE

Heredity. By J. A. S. WATSON. London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1912. Pp. 94. \$0.20.

This is one of a series, "The People's Books," designed, like several other similar series, to convey to the general reader the essential findings in the various fields of modern science, philosophy, and history. It begins by explaining the mechanism of heredity and the difference between pangenesis and the germ-plasm theory and follows with chapters on variation and its causes, on the inheritance of acquired characters, pure-line inheritance, Mendelism, the statistical study of heredity, practical problems in plant and animal breeding, and eugenics.

The book is marvelously comprehensive, considering its brevity. It is very readable, though it will not in some places be fully comprehended by one not already fairly familiar with the field. Thus in chap. ii, in six small pages including four graphs, the author distinguishes continuous from discontinuous variation, explains the normal probability-curve, shows how to find the average deviation, the standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation. The volume throughout is similarly solid, showing rare judgment in the distribution of space and the selection of illustrations. On disputed points the author weighs evidence carefully and avoids dogmatism. He is inclined to think that De Vries's theory of variation by leaps, however small they may be, has wholly supplanted Darwin's theory of gradual evolution by many minute steps. He thinks it most reasonable to regard the affirmation that acquired characters are inherited as not proven; that is, on this point of great interest to social scientists and educators he holds that there is as yet no clear case of inheritance of any character "acquired during the lifetime of the individual," but some such case may possibly be brought to light. The book closes with a few suggested titles for a course of reading in heredity.

T. H. HANKINS

CLARK UNIVERSITY

Social Problems: Their Treatment, Past, Present, and Future.

Questions of the Day and of the Fray. By KARL PEARSON.

London: Dulan & Co., 1912. Pp. 40.

This lecture opens with an appeal for a recognition of the biological basis of our social problems, urges that on account of their complexity they can be studied properly only by mass statistics, illustrates the inadequacy of many conclusions from medico-social statistics by the use

of six cases, and concludes that the need in modern sociology is "the establishment of university laboratories adequately equipped biologically, medically, and statistically, whose sole business shall be sociological research."

It cannot be doubted that Pearson is correct in maintaining that "if we penetrate beneath the surface politics of the moment we find great social problems which are really biological in character." He illustrates dangers in the interference with conditions without considering the full biological consequences of the inference; points out that elimination of child labor reduces the economic cause of the fecundity and that the proposed enforced withdrawal of the mother from wage-earning during from six to nine months around the period of childbirth would again reduce birth-rate and not that of a feeble-minded class.

The specific errors he attacks are: (1) an error that a certain school clinic had produced any change in the rate of development of the children; (2) the assertion that in Switzerland imbeciles are more apt to be conceived during vintage than at other seasons; (3) the assertion that the toothbrush drill in school will diminish the proportion of carious teeth; (4) the conclusion that the greater size of children in two- or three-room apartments over one-room apartments is due to crowding; for the better class (and better nourished) occupy the larger apartments, also the larger (and hence more grown-up) families do so; and hence these are larger than the children of small apartments; (5) the conclusion of a causal connection between pauperism and phthisis, which show a high correlation, is weakened by showing that there is a high correlation between the increasing cancer death-rate and increasing expenditure for apples. This last is a dangerous line of argument, for it shows up the fundamental weakness of many biometric methods—they show a correlation but do not demonstrate a causal relation. Finally, Pearson attacks in similar fashion a certain inference as to cause and effect from the decline of disorder in a town dating from the establishment of a reformatory.

The general impression that is left by these critiques is the inadequacy of the statistical method pure and simple to give an interpretation of biological problems. Most of the conclusions Pearson attacks are statistical conclusions. The errors arose from reliance on the statistical method of reaching conclusions. Pearson himself has, at sundry times, drawn most unwarranted conclusions from too fond a reliance on the output of statistical methods. As Galton said twenty-four years ago, "It is always well to retain a clear geometric view of the facts when we are dealing with statistical problems, which abound with dangerous

pitfalls, easily overlooked by the unwary, while they are cantering gaily along upon their arithmetic." The great lesson that we can draw from this criticism of the conclusions based on one set of statistics by the use of another set of statistics is that to get at the truth in social matters we need about four-fifths analysis of the problem and one-fifth figuring.

CHARLES B. DAVENPORT

COLD SPRING HARBOR

Social Progress in Contemporary Europe. By FREDERIC AUSTIN OGG, PH.D., Assistant Professor of History in Simmons College. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. vii+384.

In speaking of socialism (p. 341), Professor Ogg says that "few words in any language have ever been more grossly abused." This is probably true, but I think we may except, as one of the few, the word "progress" at least, and perhaps also the word "social." Every age has its foibles, and one of ours, and a most significant one, is to be always talking of progress without knowing with any certainty what we mean by it. We do not know what is progress, but we are bound to have more of it—as Mr. Chesterton says. And therefore we are reduced to the necessity of supposing that whatever gets itself established is a step in the right direction. Conflicting tendencies are reconciled by falling into chronological sequences; and since national unity is the last great phase of European history, the unification of Germany, for example, at whatever cost to public morality, is judged to be a great gain—a tremendous victory for "progress."

Professor Ogg does nothing to get us out of this vicious circle. He frankly assumes that all the main tendencies of the nineteenth century—nationality, democracy, industrialism, and humanitarian social reform—are evidences of the onward and upward march of humanity. The book is indeed pervaded by a certain air of condescension toward ancestors, a certain complacent satisfaction in whatever is modern and strictly up to date. However, there is no great harm in this attitude, while there may be some advantages in it. At least, it has enabled Professor Ogg to write a useful book—a book which enlightens us little about social progress in contemporary Europe, but one which does give us, well and compactly presented, much desirable information about the changes that have occurred in the organization and activities of European society since the eighteenth century.

The two chapters on the "Old Régime" and the "Revolution," with which the book opens, seem somewhat perfunctory, and they are perhaps

open to the charge of being rather superficial. In general, the discussion of political changes is least valuable. For example, the main events connected with the passage of the Reform Bill are clearly presented, but Professor Ogg scarcely allows us to see how much more there was involved in Parliamentary reform than a mere extension of the suffrage. He indeed quotes Walpole's statement that it was "the largest revolution which had ever been peaceably effected in any country," without seeming to understand very clearly why it was a revolution at all. On the other hand, the chapters on the "Transformation of English Agriculture" and the "Industrial Revolution in England" are excellent. These, and other chapters on economic conditions—public protection of labor, the care of the poor, the spread of social insurance, the organization of labor, and the like—should make the book extremely useful as a supplementary text for elementary college classes in nineteenth-century history. It is, besides, a readable book, and will doubtless circulate widely among non-academic readers of contemporary history.

CARL BECKER

LAWRENCE, KAN.

The Minister and the Boy. By ALLAN HOBEN, PH.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. Pp. 171. \$1.00 net; \$1.10 postpaid.

Dr. Hoben's book on the "boy" should be carefully read by every person interested in social welfare. The treatment of the subject is broad, thorough, and practical. The author shows that he has been both a careful student of the large forces of which the boy's life is a part and also that he has had practical experience in dealing with boys. He is not only well informed on the subject but he is thoroughly human. So well does he describe the boy's life and needs that the reader is assured that Dr. Hoben must possess very much of the boyish quality to which he refers in these splendid words: "Genius and success in life depend largely upon retaining the boyish quality of enthusiastic abandon to one's cause. . . . The thing in men that defies failure is the original boy, and no man is really a man who has lost out of him all the boy" (p. 10).

The superiority of this book over so many which have been prepared for social workers is in the combination of practical suggestions with a broad knowledge of the subject. Most of these books have been so abstract and theoretical that the worker received but comparatively little aid from them. The practical book, on the other hand, is frequently but a collection of artificial rules which fail to impart the spirit of the

work. Such a book affords little help to the worker confronted with conditions which differ from those for which the rules were made. Dr. Hoben avoids both extremes. His broad appreciation of the boy problem enables him not only to give the reader the right attitude toward the work but also to describe definite incidents as illustrations of method of procedure.

The chapter contents are well indicated by the chapter titles. Chap. i is the "Call of Boyhood." So eloquently does the author plead the cause of the boy that one is led to believe that the life of the church and of society are at stake rather than the development of the boy. Chap. ii is an instructive discussion of "An Approach to Boyhood." Chaps. iii and iv contain the geography of the problem under the titles: "The Boy in Village and Country" and "The Modern City and the Normal Boy." Chaps. v to viii are devoted to the four great factors in the life of the boy, namely: play, vocation, citizenship, and religion. These chapters are filled with splendid suggestions on each of the topics mentioned. Chap. ix, entitled "The Church Boys' Club," contains a description of the machinery of a boys' club. Particularly valuable is the statement of the qualifications of the man who would be a leader in this work.

The narrowness of the title of the book is the only adverse comment worth mentioning. While the author may be amply justified in his selection of the title, both by the minister's need for instruction on the "boy problem" and by the adaptation of many suggestions to those needs, the book is too valuable to be limited to any one class. The combination of scientific principles and practical methods, presented in this brief and readable form, makes this book a real contribution not only to boys' club leaders but to every class of social workers.

THOMAS JESSE JONES

UNITED STATES BUREAU OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Problems in Eugenics. Papers communicated to the First International Eugenics Congress, held at the University of London, July 24 to 30, 1912. London: Eugenics Education Society, 1912. Pp. 486.

The eugenics movement which started in England a generation ago has not only become international in scope but has reached a stage of international co-operative work which finds its first expression in an international congress. The volume contains communications from America, England, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and Denmark.

The papers are presented under the sections of biology and eugenics, practical eugenics, education and eugenics, sociology and eugenics, and medicine and eugenics, those by Continental authorities being published both in the language in which they were read and in translation. It is not possible to remark upon the character of the thirty-two individual papers presented and published nor to criticize the volume as a whole.

Professor G. Sergi restates (p. 18) his criticism of Boas' study of immigrants, but adds nothing to his former argument, which has been well answered by Boas in a recent number of the *American Anthropologist* (1912). Sergi's statement that "as regards the external tegumentary characters with their adjuncts, the color of the skin, of the hair, and of the iris, and the character of the hair and of the eyes, we can affirm categorically that today these are as fixed as the skeletal characters," and that "only in crossings the external characters undergo alterations" (p. 22) is an extraordinary biological characterization. Hansen's assertion "that the later children of a mother are heavier than the first, the weight increasing by about 75 grams from birth to birth, and *we do not know how many of the infants are first-born*" [italics not in the original] which he gives as "a well-known fact," is only apparently contradicted by Boas' repeated finding that the first-born is, on the average, heavier than subsequent ones, since Hansen refers to weight at time of birth, and Boas to later development.

Dr. Agnes Bluhm (pp. 387 ff.) returns to an old superstition much repeated in the treatises on obstetrics but one which should be relegated once for all to the limbo of the past until special researches show the contrary; viz., the superstition that archaeological evidence shows an increase in the size of the skull, hence the greater difficulty of civilized peoples in childbirth. It is no longer permissible to write: "The development of the brain decides the size of the skull. The greater skull measurements of the civilized races are probably the outcome of 'selection' through long periods of time. It is possible that the female pelvis has not increased in proportion, and has not accommodated itself to the enlarged skulls" (p. 389).

There is another type of wrong inference from insufficiently sifted data which the eugenists may well afford to dispense with, that, viz., which tells us, as did Galton, of the inheritance of temper and the similar study of Pearson with regard to the inheritance of talent, in school children (see p. 401), where the influence of environmental factors has not received its due meed of attention.

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller's paper on "Practicable Eugenics in Education"

(pp. 162 ff.) is especially brilliant and illuminating, a vigorous protest against the study for study's sake, and subject for subject's sake, which penetrates the school and university atmosphere in which the English wealthier classes are nurtured. There is something significant in such a reaction on the part of a philosopher and one trained and now training in the classic atmosphere of an Oxford college. It is a timely warning:

The great institutions, which have the social function of transmitting the treasures of accumulated knowledge from generation to generation, are always liable to get out of order, and to engender so much obnoxious rubbish as to clog their working and to poison humanity. . . . There is a standing danger that educators should become the worst foes of education. There is probably no system of education, and no university in the world which does not tend to an overproduction of pedantry and dogmatism, and which, if it were conducted wholly according to the ideas of the experts whose duty it is to run it, would not become worse than useless socially. For experts, if left to themselves, tend to develop professional ideals and standards of value of their own, which grow independent of considerations of social welfare, and frequently run counter to them. But if there should occur at any time a general breakdown in the educational machinery which transmits the knowledge that is power and means social security, it is evident that a society may be propelled irreparably on the declivity that leads to destruction. No society, therefore, is safe unless it is constantly on its guard against its own weaknesses, against the clogging of its institutions by their own waste products, and by the excesses of their virtues, against the repression of ability and the preservation and promotion of unfitness, against the excessive delays in perceiving when old adjustments have broken down and new devices and new knowledge are needed to adapt human life to new conditions.

W. D. WALLIS

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Infancy of Animals. By W. P. PYCRAFT. New York: Henry Holt, 1913. Pp. xiv+272; 64 plates and many text illustrations. \$1.75.

The infancy of animals is a subject which is of interest, as the author says in his preface, not only to the naturalist but also to the sociologist, and especially to the observer of child life. Yet the present work is, we believe, the first book ever written expressly on this subject. It is a worthy treatment of the theme, being a fund of reliable data regarding the infancy of hundreds of species of animals, compiled by an expert naturalist. Space is apportioned to the different groups approximately as follows: mammals, 50 pages; birds, 105 pages; reptiles, amphibians,

fishes, invertebrates, 25 to 30 pages each. The treatment of each group is divided, in general, into three unequal parts: the greater part being given to habits and behavior, both the habits of the young and the nursing behavior of the parents; a large part dealing with structures, illustrating especially the law of recapitulation; and a lesser part dealing with coloration. The book is not a repetition of old reprinted facts, but gives the results of the great recent advances in the study of wild life, not a few of the observations being the author's own. Unfortunately, references to the original papers are given in only a few cases. The illustrations are of great value. The author's style is that of the great British naturalists, clear and fluent, yet conveying a vast amount of information upon every page. Nevertheless, a small book upon so wide a field can cover, of course, only selected instances. The two general facts which appear most constantly through all the wealth of particulars are, on the one hand, the severe struggle for existence to which the callow young are subjected, resulting in some species in a prodigious death-rate; and on the other hand, the infinite variety of the adaptations which tend toward the preservation of the young. There is little attempt at psychological interpretation; this is as it should be in a work by a zoölogist. A sociologist, reading the book, will find a rich store of data awaiting psychological and sociological interpretation and application.

The book has a good index, yet not so complete as it ought to be; for since the facts here presented are chiefly of an individual nature, each standing by itself, they cannot be systematized, and every fact should be represented in the index.

WALLACE CRAIG

UNIVERSITY OF MAINE

Christianity and the Labor Movement. By WILLIAM M. BALCH.
Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1912. Pp. i+108. \$1.00.

"No menace to the future can be so serious as a lasting estrangement between the labor movement and Christianity," says Mr. Balch, and this estrangement is now a practical reality. Mutual misunderstanding, he decides, is the cause, very few laborers being hostile or cordial but rather indifferent or dissatisfied. Mutual understanding is the solution.

It would be easy to criticize this little book. The social scientist could point out several flaws in its theory and might object to numerous *Outlook*, *McClure's*, *Saturday Evening Post* references to the neglect of more weighty authorities. And laborers would hardly find convincing the chapter on "What Wage-Earners Should Know about the Church."

But the book is for churchmen and to these Rev. Balch appeals with vigor: "Christian men of today must remember the Priest and the Levite of old who passed by on the other side—possibly not so much heartless as busy men, probably engaged just then in 'church-work'" (p. 51). "Not war alone, but work sometimes, is hell" (p. 44). "The difference is so inconsiderable that working-men seeking work do not usually inquire which employers are church-members and which are not" (p. 23). "Labor demands justice, not pity" (p. 44). "Church-men are to stand for social justice everywhere, all the time, and at any cost" (p. 108).

It is a timely book, interestingly written, will prove valuable for pastors' reading, advanced classes in Sabbath schools and Y.M.C.A. courses, and is cordially recommended for such use.

E. B. GOWIN

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
MIDDLETOWN, CONN.

The Courts, the Constitution, and Parties: Studies in Constitutional History and Politics. By ANDREW C. McLAUGHLIN. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. Pp. vi+299.

Professor McLaughlin has collected five studies in this volume, consisting of essays and addresses that he has published or delivered on different occasions in recent years. They are "The Power of a Court to Declare a Law Unconstitutional," "The Significance of Political Parties," "Political Parties and Popular Government," "Social Compact and Constitutional Construction," and "A Written Constitution in Some of Its Historical Aspects."

The studies deal with cardinal and fundamental principles that are of interest to all students of current and historical politics and to all interested in the science of government and the conduct of the state.

The chief study of the five is the one on the power of the courts to invalidate legislative acts. In this Professor McLaughlin is not controversial but expository. His purpose is not to prove or disprove the right of the Supreme Court to set aside legislative acts, but to give the background in history and political philosophy which will serve to explain if not to justify the nullifying powers that the courts have exercised. His inquiry is to find out how the power came to be. Professor McLaughlin first examines this power from the point of view of the principles laid down by Marshall in *Marbury v. Madison*; then, from the nature of a written constitution, and on the basis of the arguments set

forth by Hamilton and Wilson in the discussions over the Constitution at the time of its adoption; and working back farther to the origins through the prior decisions of state courts from 1774 to 1787, the principle of the supremacy of the courts is examined from the viewpoint of political philosophy. The author shows that this supreme judicial power has come, not because it was assented to when Marshall asserted it; not because it was specifically and intentionally conferred by the Convention of 1787, nor from the nature of a written constitution, nor yet because the principle had been established by prior decisions of state courts; but rather because the courts held themselves bound in litigation to apply the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, and because the courts, under the theory of the separation of powers, held themselves not as superior to, but as independent of, the other departments of government and were empowered to interpret the Constitution for themselves when acting within their own field in expounding the law. Professor McLaughlin recognizes that a decision of the Supreme Court is not a part of the Constitution and that the other departments of the government are also independent and may interpret the Constitution for themselves; and that where the political branches of the government have accepted as the Constitution what the court says is the Constitution, it has been done as a matter of accommodation and expediency to avoid conflict, and not because they were under obligations to accept the *dicta* of the court. Thus the defense of the doctrine of court supremacy is set forth. This purpose of the author is further seen in his connecting this nullifying judicial power with what is recognized as an all-pervading American doctrine that there were rights and privileges and powers beyond legislative control, and that men had natural rights which no government might violate or deny. This seems to connect the doctrine of judicial nullification with the right of resistance to usurpation, with the "right of revolution"—the right of the people to determine whether government—executive, legislative, or judicial—has transcended its powers, and to determine the mode and measure of redress.

This seems to the reviewer to press the point too far. This principle of the Revolution—"resistance to tyrants is obedience to God"—is more obviously related to the "higher law" doctrine of the Abolitionists, that there were clauses of the Constitution itself that were unconstitutional and therefore null and void, because they violated fundamental human rights and the immutable principles of justice. But from such revolutionary "ideas" the theory that the courts shall be supreme in defining and determining the competency of the legislature and the executive under the "supreme law of the land" seems hardly deducible.

The author's treatment of parties and of written constitutions is suggestive and illuminative. He shows deep reflection, rare insight and power of interpretation. He sees and reveals the problem with which parties have had to grapple, that of transmitting the will of the people to the government which the framers of the Constitution left to haphazard and voluntary associations. He shows that the problem of self-government in America is the problem of controlling our political parties, and he traces the forces by which the rising democratic spirit has from time to time modified party processes as a means of controlling the forces that control the government. The author brings refreshing vigor and enlightenment to his treatment of the necessity of parties; of the means by which the organs, or machinery, of the party have at times become more powerful than the party itself; the need of reward for honest party managers; of party influence on nationality; of the tendency of the popular election of senators to re-establish federalism; and of the need of bringing party organization under recognized law and more democratic control.

Professor McLaughlin is a careful student of political and constitutional history, to which he resorts as the most resourceful text for expounding political philosophy and constitutional law. His essay on the social compact shows what the framers of the Constitution thought on that subject, while his study of written constitutions shows the folly of supposing that great constitutions are ever "struck off by the brain and purpose of man" at a single time. These timely essays should not be neglected by students of politics and government. They hang well together and they may be studied profitably in a college course in political science.

JAMES A. WOODBURN

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Le système totémique en Australie. By ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1912. Pp. 649.

When, in 1896, M. Émile Durkheim and his associates began the publication of *L'Année sociologique*, they initiated a movement of far-reaching consequence in sociological circles. It was their primary purpose, in the words of M. Durkheim, "to react against the prevailing taste for generalities and facile system-making, to afford the public and particularly youthful workers attracted by sociology an idea of what the social reality in its richness and complexity truly is, in order to deflect them from the current ideology." The eleven volumes of the *Année*,

containing, besides original essays, extended analyses and reviews of all important books and articles in the fields of religion, law, ethics, economics, statistics, and demography, have well fulfilled this purpose. Too much credit can scarcely be given to the editors of the *Année* for the skill, patience, and critical spirit with which they have carried on what must have been a most laborious task. Recently, the scope of this publication has been somewhat changed: it is henceforth to consist entirely of reviews covering the sociological field and appearing in triennial volumes. Meanwhile, the work of the school is to be continued by means of a series of independent volumes issued irregularly as "Travaux de *L'Année sociologique*." Of these, the book under review forms the fourth and latest.¹

The monographs published in the *Année* and its supplements deal almost exclusively with subjects belonging to social anthropology. Durkheim writes on the prohibition of incest, totemism, the Australian matrimonial system, the definition of religious phenomena, and the elementary forms of religion. Hubert and Mauss collaborate in producing valuable studies of magic, sacrifice, and the collective representation of time. Bouglé treats of castes; Hertz, of the collective representation of death; and Lévy-Bruhl, of the mental life of primitive peoples. All this work is animated by certain general principles which are in sharp contrast with those either implicitly held or outwardly professed by the English social anthropologists (Tylor, Frazer, Jevons, Hartland, *et al.*), the only other group of systematic workers in this field. The French sociologists accuse their English neighbors of overemphasis on the resemblances between anthropological and sociological facts gathered from far and near; we must, it is urged, pay as much, or even more, attention to the real differences which may exist between facts superficially alike. This further implies that social facts shall be studied *in situ*, and not rudely wrenched from their original setting. Spencer's *Sociology* and Westermarck's *Moral Ideas* are held up as conspicuous examples of defective method in these respects. The French school, moreover, very properly emphasizes the need of studying social function as well as social structure; of showing how a particular custom or institution works under given circumstances. Perhaps their most original contribution to methodology is the theory of "collective representations," by them applied to a wide range of social phenomena. Such

¹ The others are: C. Bouglé, *Essais sur le régime des castes*, Paris, 1908; H. Hubert and M. Mauss, *Mélanges d'histoire des religions*, Paris, 1909; L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Paris, 1910.

a theory discards altogether the psychological or intellectualist account of origins: religion, for example, would by it be explained as the outcome of blind social forces which are utterly independent of individual ratiocination.

It is this principle of "collective representations" which underlies the elaborate, scholarly, and well-reasoned book before us. Australian totemism is here studied as the most elementary form of religion known to us; connected with it are ideas of *mana* (commonly defined as magico-religious energy, but, according to M. Durkheim, *mana totémique*), ideas of the soul, of spirits, and of gods (all totemic in origin, declares M. Durkheim), and the great mass of positive rites and negative rites or taboos. There is a wide variety of forms, but always one explanation: "The religious life is the most developed and abridged expression of the collective life in its entirety. If religion has engendered everything of importance in society, it remains none the less true that society is the soul of religion" (pp. 598-99).

It is obvious that our author is here giving us a sort of sociological *apologia* for the important place which religion has ever held in human affairs. He is not concerned with the truth or falsehood of our ideas—or the Australians'—about divinity; sociology has no verdict to pronounce on theological systems, high or low. Many, before M. Durkheim, have declared that religion is a social phenomenon and must be studied from the social standpoint. It has remained for him to raise such unsupported affirmations into a scientific generalization resting on much evidence carefully gathered, sifted, and analyzed. From this point of view his work may serve as a model study in social anthropology.

To the reviewer, this book, however, is more valuable for its sociological method of investigation than for its positive additions to our knowledge on specific points. The author surely exaggerates the significance of totemism as a primitive institution. At the very hour when Mr. J. G. Frazer in England is proclaiming throughout four bulky quartos that totemism, though important, is not the whole of savage society, and when Mr. Goldenweiser in America is making an "analytical study" of totemism to prove that it has no specific content at all, being merely a "process of socialization," comes M. Durkheim to assure us that everything significant in Australian religion is an outgrowth of totemic conceptions. In this way he would even explain the "high gods" (pp. 409-22) round whose misty personalities so much debate has raged. I am persuaded, too, that, in common with other members of his school, M. Durkheim makes far too much of the *mana* idea, not only in Australian, but in other

savage religions. More evidence than is yet available will have to be presented that the notion of *mana* is a truly primitive conception and not, as seems more likely, a relatively developed philosophical explanation, the investigation of which does not take us very far into the rudiments of the religious emotion. The time has gone by for "keys to all the mythologies." The elaborate systems which attempt to explain the totality of primitive religion by reference to a single factor—ancestor worship with Herbert Spencer, taboo with M. Reinach, totemism with M. Durkheim—"have their day and cease to be."

The volume is enriched with an ethnographic map of Australia. The proofreading, especially in the case of proper names, shows an accuracy unusual in a French book. It is a matter of real regret, however, that a work of such importance should be allowed to go forth without an index. For the latter, the detailed table of contents forms only a partial substitute.

HUTTON WEBSTER

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Race Improvement. By LAREINE HELEN BAKER. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1912. Pp. 137. \$1.00.

Among the shoal of books which the recent interest in eugenics has called into existence, none deserves less favorable comment than the one now under review. The author has set out with the intention of writing "a little book on a great subject," yet for the most part the statements which she makes would lead the reader to suppose that she was covering the entire subject with perfect adequacy. Nor are her general statements justifiable. "Nurture, or environment, has its place, and an important one, in race improvement, but the overwhelming fact remains that more than three-fourths of the elements which build up a human soul are in its nature, not its nurture. The formative factor of greatest importance in the making of human life and character is heredity" (p. 14). Similar looseness of statement is displayed when she writes, "Degeneracy is not a disease by specific intention, it is an attribute to our social neglect, it is the result of our inattention to vital issues, it is a sign that we are no longer keenly anxious to elevate the race" (p. 32). It is not necessary to go further into the analysis in order to demonstrate the gross inadequacy of the author's treatment. The book is not well written; it represents no new viewpoint; it is neither scientific nor popular.

SCOTT NEARING

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Genetics. An Introduction to the Study of Heredity. By HERBERT E. WALTER. New York: Macmillan, 1913. Pp. 274. \$1.50.

In *Genetics* Professor Walter has succeeded in placing before the general reader a simple, clear, comprehensive, and scientific statement of the fundamental principles of heredity based upon experiments recently made by himself and others in this field.

The social worker more than any other class of professional men and women comes in daily touch with the wasteful and cruel results of conventional methods of man-breeding. Professor Walter faces the problem fearlessly and scientifically. His suggestions for improvements are practical and based upon facts.

The first part of the book may be of little interest to the social worker beyond the value which it presents as a means of explaining the laws to which heredity is subjected. The last two chapters, namely, "The Application to Man" and "Human Conservation," should prove of great value to those interested in the development of the human race along normal lines and the reduction of the defective and delinquent classes to a minimum.

Although a believer in heredity as a determining factor in human progress, the writer recognized the science of eugenics or the science of living as essential in race development, and admits that "without euthenic opportunity the best of heritages would never fully come to its own."

In dealing with the practical problems of eugenics and the application of recent discoveries in this field Professor Walter suggests that in order to "dry up the streams that feed the torrent of defective and degenerate protoplasm" the following expedients should be used: control of immigration; more discriminating marriage laws; a quickened eugenic sentiment; sexual segregation of defectives and drastic measures of asexualization and segregation, when necessary.

In discussing the present immigration laws the following criticism is made: "Eugenically the weak point in the present immigration laws is that the criteria for exclusion are phenotypic in nature rather than genotypic, and consequently much bad germplasm comes through our gates hidden from the view of inspectors. . . ." The suggestion is made that inspectors be placed abroad so that applicants for admission to the United States would be subjected to investigation not only relative to their personal condition, but also as to their hereditary tendencies.

The other methods of control suggested are discussed with a well-selected fund of information and with a broad vision of race regeneration

and development. The social worker will be fully repaid for the time spent in reading this simple treatise on a most important and difficult subject.

CAROL ARONOVICI

NEW YORK CITY

The Fetish Folk of West Africa. By ROBERT H. MILLIGAN. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1912. Pp. 328. \$1.50.

This book deals with the customs, habits, and beliefs of the Mpongwe and Fang of West Africa, and contains chapters replying to the criticisms made by Professor Frederick Starr and Miss Mary Kingsley upon missionary methods. In its descriptive aspect the book is one of the best on Africa. It is interesting and gives a luminous insight into the native mind.

The part of the book, however, dealing with the views of Professor Starr and Miss Kingsley is not altogether commendable and not at all refutatory. It is captious, unfair, and superficial. The objections to missions by Professor Starr and Miss Kingsley are in line with those of the traders, administrators, and most eminent modern scholars. Briefly, they are that the native faith is undermined too rapidly, resulting in moral disorganization, before the new religion has had time to take root; too sudden undermining of native institutions; too much emphasis on creed and ceremony; that the education imparted to the African is not suited to his needs and not given in its proper sequence, promoting vanity, disinclination to work, and contempt for his untutored brother of the bush.

These criticisms seem to be fully borne out by Mr. Milligan's exhibition of his own methods and the results thereof. Mr. Milligan is a theologian of the old school, believing in God as a great miracle-maker (p. 231), in the "justness of vicarious atonement" (p. 255), the cleansing of conscience by sprinklings of the blood of Calvary (p. 253), making much of the atonement (p. 256), emphasizing miracles (p. 245), hymn-singing and reading of the Bible (p. 191), and preaching much from a "barrel of sermons" (p. 104). His ideal convert seems to be one who can attain to the position of "Catechist" (p. 258). He holds that the missionary is first of all "an evangelist, not a reformer."

The effect of this teaching is to substitute one great fetish for many of them, and cannot have wide-reaching influence on conduct. The good results of Mr. Milligan's mission are due evidently to his personal example and not to his doctrines. The same result might have been

brought about by declaring that the spectacles on his nose were a fetish that would cure people of their evil ways. He does not see that the sudden tearing-down of native faith and institutions uproots the moral system connected with them, and causes great masses to degenerate who have not the advantage of his personal example. He admits that the Mpongwe, among whom he has been working, are "hurrying to extinction," but he blames this on the coast trader and administrator, who in turn blame the missionary, the fact being that each of them is to be blamed for not co-operating.

It is disappointing, and much to be regretted, that missionaries have not profited more from the criticisms of their work by modern scholars, and that they should not have shown more of a disposition to follow the trend of modern religious thought in the direction of greater emphasis upon service.

JEROME DOWD

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

The New History. Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook. By JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. 266.

Of this collection of eight essays, all but one have previously been printed, although not precisely as they appear here. Six present Professor Robinson's conception of the modern point of view in history, and two are contributions to historical knowledge. Professor Robinson's first contention is that the selection of historical facts in books intended for the public has previously rested on a wrong basis. He would have history shake off everything not vitally connected with present-day life, and devote itself to furnishing a background for the problems of the common man. In the second place he would have history brought into closer touch with other sciences—anthropology, political economy, psychology, sociology, etc. He points out how much history has already gained from the natural sciences, and urges the advantage of closer alliance. Thirdly, he recurs constantly to the idea that the period of whose history we have a record is but a moment in the whole course of human development, that the pace of world-progress is growing constantly more rapid, that it is time to co-operate to direct and control this progress, and that it is the main function of history to furnish a sense of direction.

Professor Robinson's style is brilliant and interesting. He is not, however, a convincing controversialist, owing to his habit of setting up a

man of straw to overthrow instead of dealing with facts as they are. Actually the gulf between modern historical production and what Professor Robinson wishes is not so great as he represents it. If he had been content simply to express the modern point of view instead of presenting it as new and in violent contrast with the work of his contemporaries, his major views could scarcely have failed of very general acceptance. In other words, his views are on the whole more sound than new, though the majority of his own profession would probably claim that some of those that are new are not altogether sound. No one, however, would deny that his historical essays on the "Fall of Rome" and the "Principles of 1789" exhibit a thorough mastery of the most advanced historical method, and are contributions to an understanding of their respective fields.

CARL RUSSELL FISH

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Assistance publique et charité privée. Par MAURICE BEAUFRETON.

With a foreword by FERDINAND DREYFUS. In "Encyclopédie internationale d'assistance, prévoyance, hygiène sociale et démographie." Paris: Giard & Brière, 1911. Pp. xii+394.

Fr. 4.

The problem of the relations of public relief and private charity is the theme of M. Beaufreton's volume. The first chapter deals with the present crisis of private charity in France and the running fire of criticism to which it has been subjected. He concludes that the crisis is one of transformation, charity is becoming an art and a science. The next two chapters deal with the rôle of public relief and private beneficence. The problem of the relations between public relief and private beneficence is then discussed at length. Although in practice each form of aid has its own proper domain, the question of reciprocal co-operation is important because individuals seeking relief go from one to the other. The question of the pre-eminence of official relief over private charity is disputed. Without doubt society has the obligation of helping the indigent but it does not necessarily follow that the social power ought to execute this social obligation. If the need is relieved by private initiative, for example, the social obligation is discharged and the state has not interfered directly. So that far from substituting official aid entirely in the place of private aid, public relief should interfere when

private charity proves itself insufficient to cope with the situation. The intervention of public power has always been indispensable to success. It is a question of making history explain the change; it is not a question of principle. This discussion of principles is followed by a study of the conditions of the relations of the two forms of relief, and the control of official and private aid. The study of these conditions is elucidated by tabulations. M. Beaufreton has performed the service of giving us a clear exposition of the fundamental problems concerned in the relations of these two forms of relief.

F. STUART CHAPIN

SMITH COLLEGE
NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

Psicologia Sociale. Di GUALTIERO SARFATTI. Torino: S. Lattes & C., 1911. Pp. 87. L. 1.50.

This small volume is devoted primarily to defining the scope and limits of social psychology. The author makes careful distinctions between the social mind and the collective mind, and between social psychology and collective psychology. He regards collective psychology as the science which deals with the phenomena of crowds, individuals temporarily united in space. Social psychology, he maintains, should concern itself with the psychic phenomena of historical social groups. Differentiation of collective psychology from social psychology has been properly insisted upon by other Italian writers, as, for instance, Groppale and Vadala-Papale, but is not evident in the writings of Le Bon and Sighele.

After distinguishing social psychology from collective psychology and specifying its particular field, the book treats briefly of the formation, the evolution, and the manifestations of the social mind. It does well all that it attempts to do.

I. W. HOWERTH

VALPARAISO, IND.

Causes and Effects in American History. The Story of the Origin and Development of the Nation. By EDWIN W. MORSE. New York: Scribner, 1912. Pp. xxvi+302. \$1.25 net.

The professed purpose of this brief volume, as indicated in its title, is very commendable and it is to be hoped that someone will yet write of

the main currents of American history from the standpoint of the causes and effects of the movements. The present work is a pleasing though rather superficial narrative, such as students of American history in the public schools might use for supplementary reading with profit. For a more causal and analytical treatment of the subject we must still turn to the more extended works of McMaster and Rhodes and to the writings of the economic and industrial historians.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Ueber Gesetzmässigkeiten in der Geschichte ("historische Gesetze").—"Historical laws" are uniformities in special areas of social experience. The arguments against the possibilities of law in history are the universal evidence of freedom and originality in the individual; the large and necessary share of chance in human events; and the infinite number and variety of new combinations and situations in history. But though individuals have always been the bearers of events, they themselves can only be understood in relation to the whole. Historical generalization is possible only by means of comparison. The historian of necessity constantly compares types. The type expresses, not the concrete content, but the general form assumed by that; and this form is an integral and organic part of historical knowledge. The presuppositions of all historical construction are: the limited number and variety of elements with which generalization is concerned, and the finite range of combinations among them. Both these presuppositions are actually present. The historian is able to grasp the individual occurrence only by reducing it to a few known forms or types. Mere historical perception of reality without concepts is blind. The historical sciences, therefore, stand in constant need of the concepts developed by the systematic social sciences. Every branch of historical science demands for its correlate a general, theoretical, and systematic science of the same genus. The historical social sciences supply the content, the systematic ones the form of human experience.—Franz Eulenburg, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XXXV, 299-365. P. W.

Neuorientierung in der Sozialpolitik?—The working-class struggle for emancipation, by making use of the state for the attainment of its ends, has created not the means of liberation but the fetters that bind it to the existing order. The state had been appealed to as a counterweight against private enterprise. In consequence of the economic functions allotted to it, it is today perhaps the greatest of all capitalistic entrepreneurs. In the hope of saving large masses of workers from the blows and the insecurity of a free capitalistic labor market, the organization and activities of the state have been extended, with the result that these working masses, "emancipated from capitalism," are less free today and less able to determine their own lot than any proletarian masses in free private enterprise. We can no longer speculate on the dialectic self-elimination of capitalism or its displacement by other formations, but can only look forward to a strengthening and extension alongside of it of such other forms; none of these being democratic or socialistic, but all necessarily bureaucratic in structure: the state, the trade union, the co-operative society. It is the task of the future to select and develop that form of organization which liberates the largest measure of spiritual vitality, demands the maximum of individual self-determination, and involves the minimum of dead forms of authority.—Alfred Weber, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, January, 1913. P. W.

La dernière évolution de la théorie de l'évolution.—The position of De Vries in botany that species arise not by a slow process of natural selection of the fittest, but by the sudden appearance of entirely new forms due to mysterious and independently operative causes, receives confirmation in the fields of zoölogy, philosophy, and sociology. Bergson's conception of "creative evolution" represents a direct denial of the theory of Darwin and Spencer, and a return to the independent creation of Linne and Cuvier. Under the auspices of this movement of thought syndicalism has grown up. A merit of the new doctrine is its recognition of the normal and necessary function of revolution in the life process. Its fundamental fallacy is its view of periodic revolutions as the result of sudden causes intervening at the point of shock and unconnected with the antecedent evolutionary process. Just as the

mediaeval negation of movement had finally to bow before the "Eppur si move," so the present exaggeration of movement and its forcible withdrawal from the sway of all law will have to bow before the inviolable laws of the universal rhythm of things, which excludes all arbitrariness and all disordered creation.—Achille Loria, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, December, 1912. P. W.

Chinas Erwachen.—Closer observation of the Chinese reveals the error of the current belief that they have recognized the absolute superiority of the occidental or of "Christian" culture. They are even today in no way disposed to admit this, least of all those who are most concerned in the welfare of their people. On the contrary, they wish to remain, first and last, Chinese, and to protect as completely as possible the essential character of their own culture from European influence. They freely admit that occidental civilization is at present superior to theirs in material means—the means of war, of transportation, of production. But they deny any moral superiority. Their conviction as to the higher humaneness of their own mores has only been accentuated through contact with occidentals. The innermost nature of our modern civilization is aggressive, that of the Chinese passive, quietistic. As we foresee a "yellow peril," so they are confronted by a "white peril."—Dr. Georg Wegener, *Zeitschrift für Politik*, VI. Bd., 4. Heft. P. W.

Valuation as a Social Process.—We may distinguish two types of values: human-nature values, which spring quite directly from universal conditions, and institutional values in which the influence of relatively transient social conditions is greater, e.g., valuation of salt and valuation of poetry, of loyalty, and of church attendance. There is no sharply dividing line and the two may conflict. Each has its public and its private aspect. The public aspect includes all the persons and objects which enter into the calculation. The private aspect is simply the way in which the individual works up the material that he gets from the outside.—Charles H. Cooley, *Psychological Bulletin*, December, 1912. S. A. Q.

La conscience collective et le bien obligatoire.—The knowledge of good and evil is obtained from a study of the widest possible range of human experience. In other words, it is a collective rather than an individual conscience upon which we must depend, for it voices the wisdom of all ages and conditions of life. This collective conscience teaches us that the fundamental obligation is to submit the individual will to the general will, which has developed through the centuries, and which manifests itself today in the élite of humanity.—Arthur Bauer, *Revue philosophique*, June, 1912. S. A. Q.

Studien über den industriellen Arbeiterwechsel.—Studies of certain Prussian plants in five selected industries, involving on the average 175,000 men, reveal the following factors as operative in bringing about change of work: nature of the industry, chemical versus textile; local conditions, transportation facilities, housing; depression or increased activity; time of year, especially summer; seasonal nature of some trades; age and marital condition of workers; sex; skill; willingness to change; age and size of the business; care for personal health.—Friedrich Syrup-Gleiwitz, *Archiv für exakte Wirtschaftsforschung*, No. 2, 1912. S. A. Q.

La mission essentielle du droit international.—The International Postal Union and the other conventions of Berne are international organizations for special purposes. But in the Hague Peace Conferences and in the proposed Court of Arbitration lies the possibility of a single world union of states to handle all international matters. They have already taken up rules of warfare, and are now beginning to consider difficulties arising in time of peace not only between nations but also between citizens of one country and foreign powers. In addition to the organization of this jurisdiction a positive law is being formed and is already partially codified. From this the activity of the union is bound to extend to matters of international administration.—W. Schücking, *La vie internationale*, No. 8, 1912. S. A. Q.

Syndicalisme et internationalisme.—Labor organizations which have been for the defense of the rights of the workers have been of a political character—socialism

—or of an economic character—syndicalism. This paper deals primarily with the latter. In form of organization, syndicalism progresses from the local syndicate, composed of workers of allied professions within a restricted locality, up to the National Federation of those local societies. General authority over the Federation is vested in a National Center of Federations of Syndicates, and these in turn unite in the International Secretariat of National Centers. In 1911 twenty-three countries were organized with National Centers, eighteen of which were affiliated with the International Secretariat. These national organizations represent a total of 7,655,961 members, an increase of 5,322,700 in seven years. In number of members Germany ranks first, having almost a third of the total, and the United States is second. The international organization attempts to centralize and unify the whole movement by drawing up international codes of syndicalists, making recommendations, and acting as counsel or intermediary when necessary. French syndicalists are partisans of direct action, the general strike and sabotage.—Albert Marinus, *La vie internationale*, No. 4, 1912. E. E. E.

Race Development by Industrial Means, among the Moros and Pagans of the Southern Philippines.—A great part of the population of the Philippines is made up of wild and warlike tribes of pagans and Mohammedans, who inhabit principally the large island of Mindanao. They are entirely under a military government which is executed under American administration with fairness and wisdom. The government is attempting by means of improved methods of agriculture, new transportation facilities, and a multitude of other industrial devices to bring about among them a new economic condition. The chief instrument for their improvement is found in the system of exchanges, or trading stores, which are now established at prominent centers throughout their territory. These are under government supervision, and afford not only an opportunity for the wild people to buy things dear to them, but also market facilities for the exchange of articles of native production. The exchange is neutral ground where the bitterest enemies meet and traffic in perfect safety and harmony and gradually come to forget old scores. As a result of this system commercial enterprise is stimulated, good roads movements are having a practical realization, and piracy, clan feuds, and barbarism are giving way. The wild men are themselves sensible and appreciative of the improved conditions, and are coming to consider the American government in the light of a genuine benefactor.—J. P. Finley, *Journal of Race Development*, January, 1913. E. E. E.

La vie internationale et l'effort pour son organization.—With the development of relations between the nations of the world civilization is becoming more and more an international matter, and the international phases of our activities are demanding more and more of our attention. With the widening of methods of intercommunication nations are less isolated and less able to live unto themselves alone. The world at large would be greatly benefited by an organization and unification of its manifold interests. New and higher ideals would be created, the acquiring and dissemination of knowledge would be facilitated, mutual understandings between nations would be increased, and a day of international peace would be hastened if the interest of civilization were considered by all men in their world-aspect. The International Organization is a system intended to co-ordinate and harmonize all the circumstances which have to do with international life. It is not for the mere purpose of acquiring information relative to the many fields of human activity, but is primarily an organization for effective action toward the ends indicated.—H. La Fontaine and P. Otlet, *La vie internationale*, No. 1, 1912. E. E. E.

Social Denmark.—The Danish people are endowed with peculiar faculty for spontaneous co-operation and self-disciplined organization. The co-operative plan has been thoroughly tested in the rural communities, and proven successful in the dairy, slaughterhouse and egg industries. Trade unionism in the towns, as well as employers' associations, have been developed and are proving efficient. They have broadened their scope of activity so as to become recognized by the state as sick clubs, aid societies, etc. Insurance against unemployment has been encouraged and aided by the states, there being fifty-one organizations of this kind. Labor exchanges

have been created as corollary to these insurance societies. The state has amply provided for industrial accidents, poor and helpless, old age, invalidity, protection of children where parents have become unable to provide or protect.—P. Schou, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1912. R. E. S.

Divorce Law and Its Reform.—The differences between the majority and the minority reports of the Royal Commission of Divorce have been considered sufficient to render the whole work nugatory. But as a matter of fact there is a very great amount of agreement in the two reports, and the matter should not be dropped.—H. Gorell Barnes, *Contemporary Review*, January, 1913. R. E. S.

Comparative Measurements of the Changing Cost of Living.—Two series of index numbers—one for food, another for "other than food"—for American and international prices, show a decline in prices from 1860 to 1896, and a prolonged advance from 1896 to 1912. Cheaper transportation was responsible for part of the decline, and cessation of railroad building on a large scale, coupled with increasing consumption, resulted in the rise following 1896. The extensive use of farm machinery has lowered the cost of production but resulted in an exodus from the agricultural occupations which tended to produce a rise of prices. The increased production of gold has greatly increased the instability of the price level, and so made necessary an optional multiple standard.—J. P. Norton, *Science*, January 31, 1913. R. E. S.

Women's Wages in Chicago.—It is important to ascertain whether available data on women's wages in Chicago might be used to show the necessity of a minimum wage law. Eight retail stores, seventy men's clothing establishments, eleven paper box factories, eight candy factories, one corset factory, and seven packing-houses were chosen, employing over 30,000 women and girls. It was discovered that the majority of these persons are being paid less than \$7 a week, while thousands are being paid less than \$5 a week. The cost of living is greater than the average girl can afford. These girls do not "go wrong." Their energy and health are dissipated and they are sent to convalescent homes or to tuberculosis sanitarium.—Edith Abbott, *Journal of Political Economy*, February, 1913. R. E. S.

Agricultural Credit in the United States.—The United States is behind every other important country in the development of short-time non-mortgage credit for farmers. Existing banking facilities for agricultural credit are poor, and the demand for such loans is practically nil. The chief reasons for this backwardness in agricultural credit are: (1) the vast agricultural domain easily acquired by settlement, (2) the prevailing prosperity of American farmers, (3) nomadic character of a large part of the agricultural population, (4) rapid growth of commercial and manufacturing business, (5) obstacles which inhibit a farmer's credit demand. This credit demand is being increased by: (1) increased value of land, (2) increased use of agricultural machinery, (3) more extensive fertilization of soil, (4) greater amount of intensive agriculture. The following proposed solutions are worthy of consideration: (1) the establishment of government agricultural banks, (2) governmental guaranty of such a bank established with private capital, (3) encouragement of farmers in organizing co-operative credit societies, (4) more effective utilization of our present banking facilities in the interest of the farmer.—E. W. Kemmerer, *American Economic Review*, December, 1912. R. E. S.

The Importance of Venereal Disease.—It is estimated that fully one-eighth of all human diseases and suffering comes from gonorrhea and syphilis; that 810 of every 1,000 married men in New York have, or have had, gonorrhea, and a great majority of the wives of these men have been infected; that there are 200,000 syphilitics in New York City; that 80 per cent of ophthalmia in babies, and 20 to 25 per cent of all blindness is caused by gonococcus infection; that 60 to 80 per cent of all infected children die before being born or come into the world with the mark of death upon them; that 80 per cent of the women who die from diseases of the reproductive organs are killed by gonorrhea. In 1911, 12 per cent of the United States navy force were infected by venereal diseases. In the army, in 1910, the venereal ration was 13 per cent. Millions of dollars are spent yearly in this country for the care of venereal

patients and almost nothing spent in prevention.—John H. Cunningham, Jr., *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, January 16, 1913. R. H.

On the Education of the Public in Relation to the Prevention of Tuberculosis.—The attention of the public should be called to the causes of tuberculosis, to the methods by which the contagion gains access to the body, and the conditions which lead to its becoming inoperative and powerless for harm. The two most obvious sources are expectoration and infected milk. The disease gains access to the body through the air passages, the digestive tract, or, rarely, the skin, or, in exceptional cases, directly from parent to offspring before birth. The powers of the individual should be strengthened to resist contagion. The deadliest enemies of the disease are sunlight, fresh air, cleanliness, etc. An old patient is the best missionary. The plan of education should include traveling exhibitions and caravans, with popular lectures well illustrated, and the distribution of literature.—Theodore Dyke Acland, *The Practitioner*, January, 1913. R. F. C.

Unemployment and the Public Health.—Unemployment is a serious economic loss, and a menace to health; it also aggravates the problem of overcrowding, and often produces lack of stamina and moral indifference and undermines self-respect. Remedies should include preventive measures to reduce the risk due to physical defects, care committees in the schools, compulsory daily attendance at continuation classes of all unemployed lads under nineteen, the performance of the maximum amount of public work in slack seasons, the reduction of the number of casual laborers, employment in afforestation projects, and rural gardens for workingmen. Physical handicaps play an important part in the inability to secure work, but by no means always render the persons incapable of all work.—B. Seebohm Rowntree, *Journal of the Royal Sanitary Institute*, February, 1913. R. F. C.

Sex-Instruction in School.—In a Cincinnati school located in a slum district a course of sex-instruction was given to both boys and girls of the two upper classes by the writer and Dr. Nora Crotty. As a result the atmosphere of the schoolroom became altogether different. The children became more cleanly and developed self-respect and respect for others. New confidential relations with the teachers were developed. The children carried the influence with them, too, outside the schoolroom, into their homes and among their playmates. The wholesome influence of the instruction continued after their school days were over in a surprisingly large number of cases. Proper self-instruction in the home is desirable, but until this goal is reached careful instruction should be given in the schools. The prepared lectures might well be given first before the parents, giving them an opportunity to suggest changes.—Philip Zenner, *Journal American Medical Association*, February 1, 1913. R. F. C.

Health Departments and Housing.—Every city or town of sufficient size to have organized health control is already infected with the deadly virus of the slum. The prevention and cure of bad housing conditions must proceed along three lines: (1) New dwellings and tenements must be constructed so as to afford suitable living accommodation. (2) Every old house unfit for habitation must be demolished or made fit. (3) All habitations must be maintained in good repair and sanitary condition. The same standards should be set for living rooms in all classes of buildings. A trained inspection force is needed acting upon its own initiative as well as upon complaints. An individual record system for each home should be maintained through periodical house-to-house inspection. The privy vault and outside toilet should be abolished. Bulletins should be published regularly to develop an informed, alert, and exacting public opinion. Health officers should be given larger appropriations and larger authority to enforce laws.—Charles B. Ball, *American Journal of Public Health*, January, 1913. R. F. C.

The Abolition of the Russian "Mir."—In 1906 the attitude of the Russian government was suddenly changed in regard to its system of communal land tenure. Previously the "Mir" was considered as the historic cornerstone of the whole political and economic fabric. There had been a steadily growing exodus from the commune; there were great waves of peasant revolt in 1904-5; the peasants needed to have

more acres to enable them to live on the land with their families, therefore it was decided that the system of communal land tenure must go. The promulgation of the edict was carried on by Prime Minister M. Stolypin. It was accepted by the Duma in 1910 and became a proper law. This meant that richer peasants were to be protected and become individual landowners. It meant also that the poorer element of the commune must be cared for. By a careful administrative plan a vast emigration into Siberia was organized for this element. Thus it might seem that the whole system was broken. An analysis of the facts points to a different conclusion. (1) Statistics show a great decrease of emigrants to Siberia, and in 1911, 50 per cent of those who went returned to Russia. (2) To June 1, 1911, only 23 per cent of communal householders had expressed their desire of leaving the commune. Of these only 16 per cent have adopted as personal property the land they own in the commune. (3) In order to guarantee any economic independence to the peasant, a redistribution of the land is necessary, so that he may have his plots of land in one block in one place. To January 1, 1911, only 8 per cent of all communal householders had applied for such redistribution and only 2.6 per cent had actually received their land in one block. (4) In many cases the peasants who had left the "Mir" desired to return. This created a complication, as in some cases they were received, but in others they were not.—Boris Lebedeff, *Contemporary Review*, January, 1913. J. H. K.

Die neuere volkswirtschaftliche Gesetzgebung Schwedens.—(1) Financial legislation: An income tax law and a property tax law were both established in 1910. Both are progressive, the income beginning with 800 Kr. and the property with 6,000 Kr. Certain allowances for necessary expenditures, for children and for sickness are deducted from incomes which are to be taxed. In 1910 a progressive inheritance tax was also instituted with a four-class provision. The liquor industry is controlled by allowing only 5 per cent to go to the individual stockholders, the rest flowing into a general taxable fund. (2) Commercial legislation: In general the legislation is for the purpose of controlling stock companies. The policy is to require the directors to place their own shares in the general fund which is taxable. No banking association may have property other than that necessary for banking purposes. Monthly statements by government experts must be issued. (3) Agricultural legislation: A provision of 1907 states that a farm shall not be rented for less than five or more than fifty years. No land companies are allowed to own land fit for agricultural purposes. The government provides for experiment stations. (4) Social legislation: No corporation can be formed with less than five members; each member has one vote. A new law provides for government supervision of societies which care for the sick and for burials. The country is divided into seven districts for the purpose of controlling the labor situation. In each district a government official is stationed with power to regulate all differences between employers and employees. The hours of employment for women must be such as to assure eleven continuous hours of rest. This rest period must include the hours from 10 P.M. to 5 A.M.—Von Sven Helander, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, October, 1912. J. H. K.

The Movement of Rural Population in Illinois.—Within the last decade the population of the state of Illinois has increased 16.9 per cent. During the same period the urban population has increased 30.4 per cent, while the rural population has increased only 0.3 per cent. Separating the latter into its two component parts, it is found that the village population has increased 11.1 per cent and that the farm population has decreased over 7 per cent. There has been an improved and an increased farm acreage but the number of farms has decreased 5 per cent. The number of families rather than the size of the families has experienced the greater decrease. The chief explanation for this decrease is the introduction of more machinery and the substitution of horse-power, gasoline, or electricity for man-power. The improvement of machinery and transportation has made the small village less necessary to the farmer. Except in cases of crop movements he usually patronizes the larger centers. There is strong evidence that many of these smaller villages will soon be abandoned.—H. E. Hoagland, *Journal of Political Economy*, November, 1912. J. H. K.

The Modern Newspaper.—The influence of the newspaper is greater and more far-reaching than any other agency of our civilization. It has possibilities for good

and for harm. The newspaper of today encourages superficiality and non-consecutive-ness. It has not determined satisfactorily what real news is and what it may legitimately print. The comic supplements are degrading and pernicious in their influence upon the morality and manners of the rising generation. The ideal newspaper, on the other hand, should be such as would be read by all classes and such as would be believed in, though not always agreed with, because of its sincerity, honesty, and courage. The endowed newspaper would offer an experimental opportunity for putting such an ideal into practice. Such a paper need not be the organ for the exploitation of the personal views of the owner because an editor with high character and great knowledge should be in direct charge. It need not be either dull or void of news because there should be fine discrimination and selection. The duty of any newspaper is to be independent and to do what it knows to be right without regard to circumstances. Its silence can often be more efficacious than its clamor.—A. Maurice Low, *Yale Review*, January, 1913.

J. H. K.

The Sale of Liquor in the South.—The prohibitory movement in the South is a response to a fundamental social impulse. Contrary to general assertion the presence of the Negro has been an inconsiderable factor; as a voter the Negro has neither hindered nor helped prohibition more than the white. It is not a temperance movement, but one to abolish the public retail liquor store. Taxation, and especially local-prohibition-through-special-legislation, with or without the referendum, have been the instruments for the gradual repression of saloons. The dispensary system proposed as a substitute for the saloon has proved open to grave abuses. The method of local-prohibition-through-special-legislation is the important fact in the growth of no-license territory in the South. This system is superior to local option in that it secures a nicer adjustment of law to public sentiment, with correspondingly greater administrative efficiency, both in the local areas and later in the whole commonwealth.—Leonard Stott Blakey, *Columbia University Studies*, Vol. LI, 1913.

A. H. W.

The "Psychological Interpretation of Language."—The opinion of comparative psychologists seems to be that savage languages are encumbered with useless distinctions, and that they are poor in general concepts and rich in minute subdivisions of the species, with corresponding dearth of ideas and superfluity of words. Correct psychological interpretation of savage languages presupposes accurate knowledge of everything savages do, or think, or say. A lack of this intimate knowledge and a difference of point of interest furnish the basis of disparaging judgment. Interpreted in the light of the social context savage languages compare most favorably with civilized. The usual method if used in the study of English would show similar alleged disadvantages. Addiction to particular terms should not be considered a reproach when it is one of the chief excellencies of style. Historical conditions, which might go far to explain multiplicity of words, have been entirely ignored in the psychological study of savage languages. It is neither possible at the present time nor necessary to give a comparative psychological interpretation to savage languages.—A. M. Hocart, *British Journal of Psychology*, November, 1912.

A. H. W.

Changes of Climate and History.—The importance of physical factors, especially of climate, in influencing history has long been recognized. But the effect of climate is usually held to be slow and general because based on a non-pulsatory theory of climate change. The types of evidence for climatic changes are physiographical and archaeological phenomena, plant life, and historic evidence. Investigations seem to indicate that the climate of many portions of the past was different from that of the present; that climatic pulsations with a periodicity of centuries have been the rule; and that these pulsations were essentially synchronous in the eastern and western hemispheres. The importance for history of these climatic pulsations remains to be determined. But it would seem that with respect to the regions of the ancient empires of Eurasia and Northern Africa the advance and the regression of nations and the development and the decay of civilization have depended largely upon favorable or unfavorable changes of climate. The possible effects of climatic changes are economic advantage, political stability, and religious satisfaction, or the reverse;

plagues, malaria, etc.; international peace or discord; and the repression or stimulation of particular races. Accepting the theory of pulsatory change historians may profitably examine historic facts from this point of view.—Ellsworth Huntington, *American Historical Review*, January, 1913. A. H. W.

The Schoolhouse Recreation Center as an Attempt to Aid Immigrants in Adjusting Themselves to American Conditions.—Our schools are not taking into consideration the fact that the foreigner's children come from the homes of immigrants who bring to this country a view of life which is different but not always wrong. We must teach the child to assimilate all that is good in American institutions and yet not lose the good that was brought to this country by his parents. In order to close the breach that generally exists between the child and the foreign parent, we must remember (1) that the immigrant considers play a waste of time, (2) that he is an individualist, and (3) that he has customs and sentiments quite different from ours. And we should aim not only to teach the child to play and take part in dramatics and other such things, but also to interpret to the parent the meaning and value of the child's activities. Thus through the children's play and amusements the blending of the races may be partially effected.—David Blaustein, *The Playground*, December, 1912. V. W. B.

Was ist "Arbeiterschutz?"—The various newspapers in Germany and Austria have been arousing public interest in "Arbeiterschutz" ever since the time of Bismarck. So much interest has been taken in the movement by the politicians of the Social Democratic party and of the Liberals that it is politically inexpedient for an official to oppose it. The term "Arbeiterschutz" is now being applied, not only to the protection and insurance for the injured and sick and unemployed, but also for the well, and employed laborers.—J. Jastrow, *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie*, October, 1912. V. W. B.

Die Formen des ehelichen Geschlechtsverkehrs.—A study of one hundred Jewish and one hundred Russian women has been made in connection with polyclinic work, with the purpose of determining the spread of Malthusianism. It was found that the lower classes of South Russian women make fairly extensive use of preventive means in sexual intercourse, and that the Jewish women use such preventive means twice as much as the Russians. The movement has spread to all age-groups of the Jews, but only to the younger Russians. The result seems to be the two-child system, which means a significant decrease in the number of children.—S. Weissenberg, *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaft-Biologie*, March 13, 1913. E. H. S.

"New Religions" among the North American Indians.—The new religions which have sprung up among savage peoples after contact with a "higher" race are largely the result of suggestions introduced by missionaries and others. A study of these new religions among the North American Indians reveals important facts in regard to primitive life, as follows: the importance of the individual in the origin and development of primitive culture; the sequence of attempts to reform society upon the individual's reform of himself; the close relations existing so often between religious and social or political movements; the widespread belief in the Messiah-idea and the possibilities of improvement; the theory of a return of the "golden age"; the curious combination of a sort of generic humanity or poetic justice with race prejudices and individual ambitions; the utilization of ancient and native dogmas and ceremonies in combination with new and foreign ideas and practices; the existence in one individual of the medicine man and the prophet or reformer who really accomplishes much; the alliance sometimes of really petty frauds and deceits with a high sense of truth and noble conceptions of personal and racial duty; the irrepressible human instinct for knowledge concerning the dead and the use of alleged visits to the spirit world as the basis for projected reforms.—A. F. Chamberlain, *Journal of Religious Psychology*, January, 1913. E. H. S.

Notwendigkeit einer neuer wissenschaftlichen Begründung der Sozialpolitik.—The purpose of social politics is to increase the communal control of industry and thus to increase the share of the product received by the weak. Social politics throws

no light on whether this is to be done by the organization of laborers, by state compulsion, or by state ownership of a part or all of the means of production. Consequently social politics, as represented by Schmoller, Wagner, Brentano, and the Verein für Sozialpolitik, has no adequate scientific basis. Its purpose is the proposal of remedies, not the understanding of the existing situation; prejudices are not eliminated; standards are not made definite; policies are proposed without a knowledge of actual conditions and investigations are undertaken, not in order to determine policies, but in order to substantiate policies already determined. If social politics is to be reliable, it must have a scientific basis.—Richard Ehrenberg, *Archiv für exakte Wirtschaftsforschung*, Band, Heft, 1912.
E. H. S.

La famille et l'évolution.—Four methods have been used in the study of the family: the evolutionary, the socialistic, the theological, and the monograph methods. The evolutionary method has not been scientific, for it has not been based on patient and methodical study of the social reality, since its facts have been selected at random, and its interpretation is not impartial. The theological and socialistic methods and doctrines are no better. The only scientific method for the study of the family is that of Le Play.—Gabriel Melin, *Revue de philosophie*, December, 1912, and January, 1913.
E. H. S.

Grundlegung einer einheitlich-soziologischen Auffassung von Staat und Gesellschaft.—Wealth may be acquired by (1) "economic means," and (2) "political means." Most social science has assumed that law develops only after economic structures are evolved, and does not influence them. Thus there is the fallacious reasoning that through "economic means" differences in wealth arise and hence class differences, i.e., differences in political rights. On the contrary, out of "political means" arise differences in political rights, i.e., class differences, out of which arise differences in wealth. The materialistic conception of history is fallacious also because (1) it attributes social causation only to economic forces, (2) it attributes social causation only to the productive process and does not recognize the influence of distribution upon production. Besides the economic forces there are political and social factors in social evolution. The state is an instrument of the dominant class. It creates and maintains class monopolies in industrial society. These class monopolies, such as the ownership of land and of the means of production, create what Marx called surplus value.—Franz Oppenheimer, *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts*, Band 6, 1912.
V. W. B.

Ueber Wesen und Inhalt der (einzelwirtschaftlichen) Lehre von den Erwerbswirtschaften.—The particular science of business management and the more general social sciences are mutually dependent. J. F. Schär's conclusion, expressed in "Allgemeine Handelsbetriebslehre," that private business enterprises are most intimately dependent upon their social utility, that private business management can be profitable only when at the same time it has a social utility, and that there is the greatest profit when the enterprise is socially the most useful, has a kernel of truth. There may be some relation between social utility and individual gain but we cannot say that the special object of investigation in the science of business management is the social effect of business enterprise.—Richard Passow, *Archiv für exakte Wirtschaftsforschung*, Band 4, Heft 2.
V. W. B.

The Combination versus the Consumer.—The habits of the laborer, fixity of machinery for the capitalist, and the nature of the soil in relation to the seasons are permanent conditions of the three factors of industry. So long as such permanency exists, the natural or fair price in a competitive market will not be obtained. The assumption of fair competition is fallacious also whenever combinations and trusts arise, for the small and the large producer and the large producer and the consumer are not equally dependent upon each other. The state should protect the consumer by regulating the monopoly, and a public service commissioner should be appointed to investigate conditions and to suggest criteria for discovering a fair price, and efficient regulation.—H. B. Reed, *The International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1913.
V. W. B.

"Are the Brains behind the Labor Revolt All Wrong?"—Change in the industrial system can be effected without class warfare. The great evil is that the demand lags behind supply because so many have not the means to pay. The solution is the legal increase of wages and the organization of the unemployed and of the non-producing soldiers into "production-for-use associations."—Hugh Walker, *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1913.
V. W. B.

Social- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie—William Wundt als Socialphilosoph.—Wundt's conception of the will as the primary factor or force in society and history will tend to overthrow the fallacious materialistic and teleological conceptions of history. Thus Wundt's work is a great contribution to social philosophy.—P. Barth, *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie*, October, 1912.
V. W. B.

La question du minimum légal de salaire dans l'industrie privée.—The great obstacle to legal regulation of the wage is its lack of easy adaptation to the essentially mobile and fluctuating nature of the wage. Even in the same profession wages vary from place to place; the bids of laborers differ; the needs of the workers and those dependent on them are extremely different in amount. Rational legislation is therefore extremely difficult. If the legal minimum rate is lower than the current rate, legislation is superfluous; if it is higher than the normal, enforcement of the law will ruin the employers. The accompanying survey of the minimum-wage laws of Australia, New Zealand, England, Germany, and Austria is not reassuring as to the advisability of such laws.—P. Pic, *Revue politique et parlementaire*, September 12, 1912.
E. E. E.

Die wirtschaftlichen Güter als Rechte.—The economic theory of value must classify all commodities as passive material goods and active labor power or energies. The conception of property must accordingly be extended to refer not only to things but also to outward energies. The sole condition of the execution of economic plans, physically considered, is the possession of sufficient material goods and energies. But since the economic world is not an exclusively physical system, but is subject to a legal order, there are needed also legal rights to make possible the intended use of the things and forces possessed. If all rights were abolished, the economic value of physical goods would be diminished just so far as the security of control over them was infringed. The reduction in value would be very considerable. The effect of every legal order is to raise the value of all existing goods. The values of commodities are, therefore, not physical quantities depending on the nature of the things or the labor power expended in their production, but ideal magnitudes conditioned by the existing legal order.—Dr. Andreas Voigt, *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie*, January, 1913.
P. W.

Alte und neue Einwände gegen den historischen Materialismus.—Because the abuse of power (economic advantage) by one part of the population over another does not react harmfully on the former, institutions of social control have grown up in close adaptation to, and dependence upon, the economic system. The control of these necessarily passed into the hands of the possessing classes, to whose egoistic and exclusive interests they came to conform. The fundamental postulate of the theory of economic determinism is nothing more than that power is an outcome of income, and its exercise is always directed toward its own selfish ends. Social voluntarism stands opposed to this theory with the insistence that social and political events represent the expression of free human acts of will. In economics as elsewhere, scientific analysis proves that where apparently blind whim or chance rules, in reality an immanent regularity is revealed at work. The theory of the "élite" asserts that humanity is always governed by the best, i.e., those who possess the best qualities of leadership. This excludes the masses at the outset from the ability to lead and from intelligence. The presence of intelligence adapted to leadership has nothing to do with the possession of income and of authority. The ruling class does not represent an élite of intellect but a privileged class employing the authority of government for its own exclusive advantage. The objection that historic materialism ignores the modern criticism of causality and the postulate of pure functional dependence is not by the statement supported by science that the institutions correlated with

the economic system issue as a natural necessity out of the network of economic relationships.—Achille Loria, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, November, 1912. P. W.

Ueber die zukünftige Soziophysiology.—Sociology can become a natural science only by confining itself to the study of the physiological side of human relationships. Natural science deals with facts of experience, phenomena. The scientist disregards psychic processes in others than himself, as they are not phenomena. Modern sociology is full of erroneous conceptions of so-called social phenomena. Natural science is based on the principle that every external phenomenon has its cause in an external phenomenon. To explain means to establish a constant relation between phenomena of the same order. The naturalist may not have recourse to men's psychical processes in explaining their conduct. He proceeds from the data of immediate experience—a viewpoint that may be called scientific solipsism—and comprehends all our reactions within the framework of objective physiological fact. We must rid ourselves completely of the idea of man as a psycho-physical organism, and must present him merely as organism, ignoring his psychics entirely. Sociophysiology must base itself on the external physiology of the individual organism. Psychological sociology will attain a high degree of development only on the basis of a mature physiological sociology.—G. P. Zeligy, *Archiv für Rassen-und Gesellschafts-Biologie*, July-August, 1912. P. W.

Foreign Legislation and Labor Disputes.—England, in looking about for precedents of legislation affecting labor disputes, has considered the methods employed by certain Continental powers. These powers have established special and permanent tribunals which have jurisdiction over industrial disputes and questions, and, in varying degree, possess powers of mandatory and directory enforcement of their sanctions. The general tendency in the *Conseils de prud'hommes* in France, the industrial courts in Germany, the court of arbitration in Denmark, and the boards in Switzerland seems to be, in case of failure of these boards to arbitrate satisfactorily, or to effect conciliation, to have final decision to public opinion.—Norman Bentwick, *Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation*, October, 1912. R. E. S.

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
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